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How has oil revenue transparency been institutionalised in the developing world, why 
and to what effects? And what explains the outcomes of such processes? These are the 
main questions this dissertation will seek to answer using as a case study Angola, 
Africa‟s second largest oil producer and a key case at the centre of global demands for 
oil revenue transparency in the sub-region. Previously a poster child of the „resource 
curse‟ and reluctant to abide by Western pressures to reform, Angola has recently 
implemented a series of initiatives amongst which many that have been acclaimed by its 
international partners. In spite of this, sceptics regard the country‟s elites as having „anti-
reformist‟ attitudes and implementing reforms merely in a piecemeal manner just so as 
to disguise the true nature of the regime and get off the hook of Western campaigners. 
They frame their critique of transparency practices around information discrepancies and 
corruption scandals, arguing that many of these regulatory efforts have had anti-
developmental effects and in fact produced other types of opacity in the Angolan oil 
industry and beyond.   
 
Drawing from key case study analysis, conference notes and over 100 interviews with 
key stakeholders, this thesis will examine the key features, drivers and consequences of 
Angola‟s reform agenda. It finds that while there is indeed some evidence pointing 
towards the legitimisation of corruption in the oil industry, one needs to go beyond both 
information availability and corruption scandals to understand this Angolan paradox, and 
arguably, the diffusion process of the emerging global norm of oil revenue transparency 
in developing countries. Specifically, the thesis shows how competing normative and 
material rationales, external actors‟ legitimacy shortfalls and oil‟s materiality combined to 
shape not only the design but also the implementation and effects of oil revenue 
transparency policies. Its conclusions warn against an overreliance on imported models 
for solving complex governance challenges such as resource-related corruption in 
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―Transparency: a powerful idea whose time has come.‖ 
Balde (2011) 
―At long last there was something to replace the    
international press‘s image of Angola as a nation at war.‖  
Pepetela (2002: 66) 
 
 
In December 1999, a London-based organisation called Global Witness (GW) released 
its first report entitled A Crude Awakening: The Role of Oil and the Banking Industry in 
Angola’s Civil War and the Plunder of State Assets. The report highlighted the extent to 
which a significant proportion of oil revenues in Angola were allegedly subverted for 
personal gain and support of elite interests, and this in the midst of a brutal civil war (GW 
1999: 2). Having identified the international oil and financial industries as ―a key factor in 
this equation of corruption and opacity‖ (ibid: 4), the campaign group called on 
multinational oil firms to ―ensure that, in Angola and in other countries with similar 
problems of lack of transparency and government accountability, a policy of ‗full 
transparency‘ is adopted‖ (ibid: 3). By ‗full transparency‘, the group meant that 
―Companies must clarify their exact relationship with government. This means that all 
payments must be published and made available in a easily understandable format to 
the Angolan population, and internationally‖ (ibid: 13).  
 
A Crude Awakening kicked off what would become a global campaign for oil revenue 
transparency (ORT). Among the oil ‗supermajors‘, BP was the first to ―stick its neck out‖ 
in favour of the principle of ORT (Christiansen 2002: 13). In a letter to Global Witness 
dated 6 February 2001, BP bosses disclosed that the company had paid US$ 
111,089,000 as signature bonus for block 31 in which the company holds a 26.7 per 
cent stake (GW 2002: 41). They added that the oil firm would make public information 
related to its total net production, aggregate payments, total taxes and levies paid to the 
Government of Angola (GoA). These announcements were made in advance of its first 
oil production in the country. They were the results of the company‘s dialogue with 
international non-governmental organisations (INGOs), and its realisation that its 
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involvement in resource-rich countries like Angola could become problematic ―if the 
government fails to live up to the commitments to increase democracy, accountability 
and transparency, and if oil revenues continue to be the main source of income to the 
government‖ (Bennett 2002: 8). The announcements also received much support and 
acclaim from these non-state actors, including GW which qualified them as ‗an excellent 
move‘ (GW 2001). But they eventually backfired. In a letter also dated 6 February 2001 
and copied to other oil companies operating in Angola, Sonangol, the Angolan national 
oil company (NOC), accused BP of ―seriously violating the conditions of legal contracts‖, 
and threatened to revoke its contracts if it followed through with its pledge (GW 2002: 
41).  
 
This incident - now referred to as the ‗BP incident‘ – intensified debates within the 
petroleum industry, leading up to the creation in 2002, of two ORT initiatives which have 
since dominated the ORT landscape: the Publish What You Pay (PWYP) coalition, 
which is a global network of NGOs advocating for mandatory disclosure of oil payments; 
and the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), a multi-stakeholder initiative 
more favourable to voluntary disclosures by both governments and companies. The two 
initiatives have not only gained international visibility, but also immense influence in the 
setting, shaping and implementation of the ORT agenda globally, as demonstrated in the 
forthcoming discussion on their effect on legislative acts such as the Dodd-Frank Wall 
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (thereafter ‗Dodd-Frank Act‘) and its 
counterparts in Europe, Hong Kong, the United Kingdom, and Canada (see Chapter 2). 
Needless to say, with this development spawned a myriad of other government and 
NGOs initiatives (Lipschutz 2013) and a global industry attracting a multitude of 
transparency professionals and ‗experts‘, media, scholars and think-tanks (see, for 
example, CSIS 2004; WWIC 2007; Chatham House 2010).  
 
For a number of ORT‘s most high-profile advocates, the aforementioned changes attest 
to the fact that ―transparency is no longer an aspiration, but an expectation.‖
1
 Other 
critical scholars and analysts point out, however, that ORT only has a minimal impact on 
governance and development in Africa and elsewhere in the developing world. A 
                                                          
1
 This statement was made by six leaders - including Joe Clark (former Prime Minister of 
Canada), Lord John Browne (former Chief Executive Officer of BP), Senator Richard Lugar (co-
author of Dodd-Frank 1504) and Professor Jeffrey Sachs – in an open letter urging Canada to 
implement the EITI. See http://eiti.org/news/open-letter-pm-harper-urges-canada-implement-eiti 
[Last accessed, 20 March 2014].   
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consensus is emerging for example, around the failure of ORT standards to curb 
corruption in the extractives sector. To give the prominent example of EITI, Ölcer argued 
that ―although the EITI has been very useful in directing the international community‘s 
attention towards the extractive sector, it has not been able to significantly lower 
corruption levels‖ (Ölcer 2009: 5). Others note that the key issue with this standard is 
that assumptions underpinning its formation and processes are not based on the 
evidence available on the causes of the problem it is expected to solve. In fact, they 
contest that EITI might be distracting from other more pressing issues (Kolstad and Wiig 
2009: 526). Bracking (2009) added that besides its inability to reduce corruption in the 
extractive sector, EITI may actually facilitate ―excessive profit extraction‖ by multinational 
companies. These analysts are indeed part of a growing cohort of researchers bringing 
to light the gap existing between the theory and practice of ORT in developing countries.  
 
Together, the growing momentum for greater ORT and abovementioned critiques of 
ORT standards make it imperative to pause and critically reflect on its benefits, costs 
and achievements, particularly when considering that the current overemphasis on EITI, 
which in many cases limits the potential for lessons to be learned outside the EITI 
framework. The thesis seeks to deepen understanding of whether, how and under what 
conditions ORT reforms can be effective in a non-EITI setting. The remainder of the 
introduction sets out how this objective will be achieved in the upcoming chapters. It will 
expand on the main research questions, aims and objectives that guided this research 
project, as well as the theoretical approach adopted, and methodology employed. First, 
a point of order is made regarding the differing connotations of, and some illusions 
inherent, in the ―coercive ideological transparency‖ (Bianchi 2013: 17). 
 
THE IDEA(S) OF TRANSPARENCY 
 
Transparency has a long history, especially in the Anglo-Saxon world and in 
Scandinavia where it originated following demands for respect of the rule of law and 
government accountability. It is often counterpoised with participatory democracy, good 
governance, human rights, trust, legitimacy, accountability, information and knowledge. 
Despite this long history, and despite it being seen often as a panacea to all ills, there is 
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still no consensus on what transparency really means. That a universal definition is 
lacking, or a proliferation of meanings is evolving, is due to two main factors: 1) the 
concept‘s significant alterations over time, caused mainly by its application to numerous 
fields, including that of politics, security, public health, economics and the environment 
to cite but a few; and 2) the varied and competing expectations attached to the principle. 
As Bianchi (2013: 7) rightly points out, this is compounded by the fact that the one INGO 
that is expressly dedicated to the issue, Transparency International (TI), defines the term 
only in relation to corruption. 
 
The various expectations of transparency are no doubt context-specific and differ 
according to one‘s occupation, income, demographic group, and emotional involvement 
(Oliver 2006: 2). But they equally are influenced by constructions of values such as 
democracy, privacy, efficiency, accountability, which play a key role in the construction 
of transparency (Mason 2008: 12). One major consequence of this multiplicity and 
divergence of expectations and conceptions of transparency, this thesis will show, is the 
institutional uncertainty surrounding its value and role in the types of societies in which it 
is expected to be institutionalised. Another consequence is the difficulty in finding the 
―best yardsticks for measuring change and progress‖ (Koechlin and Calland 2009: 106). 
To the extent that it may not be possible to measure transparency so that there is an 
unambiguous comparison of two situations, whether separated by time or location 
(Heald 2006: 40).   
 
In effect, transparency is inherently elusive and ambivalent (Bianchi 2013). The ways in 
which the concept is interpreted and applied often obscure a number of illusions. This 
could be an ―illusion of virtual reality‖ or ―when we may be looking at a ‗mirror, reflecting 
what we – as users – are inclined to believe, rather than at a glass or a transparent 
window‘‖ (ibid: 15-16; Heald 2006: 41). There could also be a ―visual illusion‖, that 
reflects a misinterpretation of cues, or the co-existence of different connotations that the 
same phenomenon may take, depending, as Bianchi (2013: 16-17) and others observe, 
on professional bias, individual wishes, outlook, experiences, social norms, behaviour, 
attitudes, public opinion, values and often misleading or flawed self-perceptions about 
one‘s emotional and psychological transparency. And finally, a third illusion – or rather 
delusion – to be mindful of is that which leads information senders to overestimate the 
extent to which they are transparent or readable and engender a spiralling reaction that 
may generate at best an apprehension towards transparency, and at worst, more 
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secrecy (Bianchi 2013: 17). All three dimensions are relevant to the analysis that 
ensues. Nonetheless, for the purpose of simplicity, the idea of ―illusion‖ that is adopted in 
this context connotes the main misleading assumptions, limits, tensions, complexities, 
ambiguities, uncertainties, and contradictions that are identified as being associated with 
the concept of transparency, its practices and processes. These relate, for the most part, 
to the relation between transparency, information and power.   
 
ON THE ILLUSION(S) OF TRANSPARENCY 
 
Today‘s discussions of transparency are characterised by a ―war of ideas about what 
transparency is good for and when‖ (Florini 2007: 91). There are currently two views: 
one that holds that the best transparency can achieve is some partial and tangible 
degree of progress (see, for example, Soares de Oliveira 2006: 84; Benner et al 2010; 
Fox 2013; Gillies and Heuty 2011); and the second view is that which is defended by 
campaigners who expect greater transparency to empower citizens and deliver socio-
economic justice, and question the value of this sort of transparency that focuses solely 
on incremental change. What follows is a brief analysis of some of the shortcomings 
inherent in these two propositions that link transparency to information disclosure and 
power.  
 
In effect, one of the most visible characteristics of the ‗data revolution‘ of the past 
decade or so has been the over-privileging of information, with most debates on 
transparency focusing on the operationalisation of transparency as ―information 
availability‖ which inevitably leads to more optimistic predictions (Lord 2006: 16; 
Christensen and Cheney 2013). For proponents of this approach in the oil industry to 
which the principle has particular relevance (Barry 2013: 6), the emphasis should be on 
―open disclosure of what you pay and what you receive, for each of the two main actors 
– corporations and governments‖ (Koechlin and Calland 2009: 106). Among the very few 
definitions of transparency that convey this focus on information is that adopted by 
Gillies and Heuty (2011: 28), who define transparency as ―public disclosure of 
information in accessible formats‖. These analysts and others who espouse the same 
view are critical of expansive definitions, such as Ann Florini‘s conception of 
transparency as ―the degree to which information is available to outsiders that enables 
them to have informed voice in decisions and/or to assess the decisions made by 
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insiders‖ (Florini 2007: 5). They argue that despite providing some flexibility in 
determining the context to which transparency is applied to, this definition elevates 
transparency to intrinsic value in a way that blurs the distinction between the two very 
distinct concepts of transparency and accountability (Gillies and Heuty 2011: 28-29). Yet 
even this ‗way of seeing‘ transparency in relation to information poses great challenges 
to the operationalisation of the concept. For instance, who is expected to provide what 
information, by whom, when and how? What is or are the purpose(s) of that information? 
How relevant is it, and for whom?  
 
This complexity was highlighted during the course of this research project, and again 
recently, during an event on ―New Directions in Governance‖ co-hosted by the World 
Bank‘s Governance Partnership Facility and the Overseas Development Institute in 
London in September 2014. At the gathering, attended by senior staff of Western aid 
agencies, think-tanks and the World Bank, four main issues were raised that support the 
literature‘s misgivings about the potential of transparency. The first is the presumption 
that the information in question always exists, that it is accessible, comprehensible, 
credible, usable by consumers, hence, that it has a clear meaning, is free of 
manipulation, and even contains signposts on how to seek redress. In actual fact, 
transparency is not an ―antidote to the opacity of the state‖ (Barry 2013: 180) as many 
suggested. The fact is that the state, which is central to informational exchange 
processes, is not always the ―coherent, responsible and responsive‖ actor that is 
portrayed in traditional accounts of transparency theory (Fernster 2006). On the 
contrary, the dynamics of modern bureaucracy – that rests in part on ―the production and 
hoarding of information, and on a bureaucracy‘s ‗keeping secret its knowledge and 
intentions‘ from competing organizations and from the public‖ - are such that it is not only 
incoherent but also unresponsive to demands for openness (Fernster 2006: 915-21 
citing Weber 1968; emphasis in the original).   
 
The second issue with this idea of transparency as information relates to the 
appropriateness of technological options that underpin the construction of transparency, 
or the question as to whether communication through information and communication 
technologies (ICTs) can, in a participant‘s words, ―close loops or not‖, or indeed whether 
certain types of ICTs should be favoured against others. This aspect is all the more 
important considering that ―internet transparency‖ has serious implications not just for 
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the accessibility and manipulation of information as will be pointed out in Chapter Four, 
but for public accountability more broadly. What is more, many observers are concerned 
that there is not enough probing of the relevance - that is the salience, usability and 
comprehensibility (Peters 2013: 547; Gillies 2011:2) - of the information produced for the 
wide range of stakeholders involved in the process of information transmission and 
reception – communities, civil society, corporations, governments, multilateral agencies 
to name a few. That is despite the warning that transparency policies must be ―user-
centred‖, that is, focused on the needs, interests and capacities of both information 
users and disclosers, in order to be effective (Fung et al 2007:11).  
 
It follows that the type of information that is made publicly available, the type of ICTs it is 
disseminated through, and the way it is framed, all have major implications for power 
imbalances. As Mason (2008: 11) remarks, ―disclosure-based governance arrangements 
can be skewed by particular problem framings and unequal distribution in the capacity to 
access, interpret and use information‖. There is a third set of challenges that relates to 
unintended consequences. Indeed, experts warn that transparency itself can be used as 
a strategic tool for control and a source of the same inequities and unfairness that it is 
intended to eliminate (Stiglitz 1999; Kolstad and Wiig 2009: 523-4; Creed and Zutshi 
2012). They caution that an undue amount or the ―wrong‖ kind of transparency (Prat 
2003, 2004) can have damaging effects on trust (O‘Neill 2002; Fox 2005; Heald 2006), 
efficiency and effectiveness (Heald 2003, 2006), and competition (Stiglitz 1999; Florini 
1999). It can generate more corruption, notably, by increasing the probability that the 
relevant officials to corrupt are detected (Stiglitz 1999; Bac 2001; Kolstad and Wiig 
2008). It can equally encourage power holders to be either less honest and produce a 
flood of unsorted information (or misinformation) that adds to uncertainty rather than 
trust; or to adopt a conformist behaviour once they are aware of the consequences of 
their actions (O‘Neill 2002: 72-3; Prat 2003, 2004; Fox 2005). As noted earlier, another 
major issue relevant to the oil industry is that if the transnational political debate directed 
the world‘s attention to ORT, it effectively marginalised other aspects that pertain to local 
communities‘ needs and expectations, including those revolving around employment 
practices and the politics of labour (see Barry 2013, and herein, Chapter Seven).     
 
Regrettably, with a few exceptions (see Bracking 2009; Gould and Winters 2009, 2011), 
the focus of writings on transparency has tended to be either on a liberal and 
functionalist view that ―more and better information‖ can facilitate effective international 
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cooperation; or on more constructivist perspectives that analyse information itself as 
―arena of political conflict rather than as a means to rationalise such conflicts‖ (Gupta 
2010a: 33).  Essentially, these works examine transparency‘s role in ameliorating 
information asymmetries without paying due regard to the potential for transparency to 
reconfigure existing power asymmetries. This is particularly unfortunate given that 
according to many of its proponents, the main value of transparency stems from its role 
in overcoming information and power asymmetries that may exist between the principals 
(citizens, shareholders) and their agents (governments, companies‘ managers). 
Underpinning this relation between transparency and power is the notion of 
―empowerment through information‖, which heightens the governance significance of 
information use by civil society actors (Mason 2008: 10). In the oil industry, the idea is 
that if accompanied by greater civil society scrutiny, governments and companies‘ 
publication of more and better quality information related to oil revenues can enable 
citizens to pressure their governments to spend more on programmes that can boost 
economic growth and poverty alleviation (Transparency International 2008: 10).  
 
But there are several challenges with this proposition on transparency and power as 
well. As a starter, one can query whether the relationship between information, 
citizen/civil society action, and government responsiveness is always the classic linear 
model of communication that it is often portrayed (see also Fernster 2006: 914). In fact, 
it is possible that citizens are mobilised before any information is released; or that the 
state makes information available prior to citizens being mobilised. It is a fact too, that 
this model would be contingent on incentives to eliminate barriers to the production, 
demand and access of information, and trigger a change of behaviour and practices; as 
well as several other (visible and often invisible) dependent variables, including as will 
be illustrated herein resource materiality and the existence of a citizenry, civil society or 
public that is attentive, interested, knowledgeable, and understands and learns from 
government information in predictable ways (Fernster 2006: 930). Yet according to 
public choice theorists, to the extent that they have an interest in politics at all, citizens 
are more interested in policy outcomes than policy inputs, and they have very few 
incentives to spend the resources required to acquire information (ibid: 928). Besides, 
just like government, civil society is not homogenous. And whilst it is important to hold it 
as a potentially strong ―intermediary‖ (Fung et al 2002, 2007; Mol 2008) in the 
informational exchange process, this should be with sufficient regard to its history, 
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nature, character and capacity (Idemudia 2010: 4), for these factors can prove critical to 
the potential effectiveness of transparency policies.  
 
Michael Mason expanded on this point. In his view, ―claims of civil society organizations 
to speak for environmental victims or wider public interests are themselves claims to 
political legitimacy based on democratic norms.‖ ―This begs the question of political 
representation‖, he added, questioning: ―for whom is transparency intended? And by 
which standards of accountability are disclosure-based governance mechanisms to be 
judged?‖ (Mason 2008: 11). Likewise, if as scholars suggest, incentives to enhance 
transparency can be found especially at the international level where the sources and 
location of power in international politics can be easily located (Gupta and Mason 2014: 
10), are there sufficient incentives for international actors to help advance the ORT 
agenda? The thesis will raise similar questions and tease out possible answers drawing 
from specific case studies and interviews, but will leave it entirely to the reader to draw 
definite conclusions on what ‗ought‘ to be.  
 
LIFTING THE LID ON TRANSPARENCY 
 
The preceding analysis lends credence to Bianchi‘s (2013: 10) conclusion that 
information is not synonymous with transparency. In order for it to be aptly employed, it 
has to meet the requirements of ―complex chains of comprehension‖. It can be used 
instrumentally to advance differing and often conflicting purposes and goals, and 
besides the aesthetics of design, performs ―more sophisticated functions at the interface 
of society and (professional) culture‖ (ibid: 15). Put simply, ―transparency comes with the 
price of oversimplification‖ (ibid: 16). Using Angola as a case study, this study aims to lift 
the lid on the ORT ‗black box‘ by unpacking the various meanings of transparency, and 
examining how it has been institutionalised, in a developing country context. The 
research is underpinned by three main questions: How have ORT reforms been 
institutionalised in Angola, why and to what effects? What explains these outcomes? 
And how does the analysis of the institutionalisation of ORT in Angola develop a critical 
reading of the potential and limits of transparency in the extractive (oil) industry? 
Specifically, it seeks to achieve four main objectives: 
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(i) To give an overview of ORT policies that Angola implemented through this 
postwar period, and provide a critical analysis of their implementation in order 
to appreciate what type of transparency is at play in the country.  
(ii) To investigate the principal assumptions and rationales underpinning and 
driving the current transparency turn in the oil industry, globally and locally. In 
particular, following Gupta and Mason (2014), the study proposes to show 
how these (normative and material) rationales have intersected with one 
another and the conditions under which one or the other may have 
dominated, to the point of shaping not only the design, but also the practice 
and effects of ORT policies.   
(iii) To examine the outcomes these policies have led to so far, and lay out the 
possible reasons that might help explain them.  
(iv) To build on the empirical data generated through this analysis of ORT in 
postwar Angola to develop an understanding of the limits of ORT more 
broadly.  
 
This study makes a substantial and timely contribution to the social science study of oil 
and to transparency theory, notably by moving ―beyond accountancy‖ (Newell and 
Wheeler 2006: 22-23) to examine the broader context of transparency practices. It draws 
from the works of Aarti Gupta (2008, 2009, 2010a, 2010b) and colleagues (see, for 
example, Mason 2008; Gupta and Mason 2014), to assess the ability of transparency to 
achieve its normative, procedural and substantive ends. Broadly speaking, this entails 
critically examining whether transparency informs, empowers and improves oil 
governance. From a policy perspective, the research concludes at a time when ORT 
norm proponents – global civil society (GCS) and IFIs in particular - find themselves at a 
crossroads, and appear to be searching for new and more coherent ways to engage and 
reconnect with the original purpose of increasing citizen-state engagement, and align 
transparency policies with the expectations of citizens. It can therefore be seen as a 
welcome contribution to ongoing debates on the appropriateness, effectiveness and 
future of the ORT policy norm.  
 
The thesis adopted two main hypotheses. From the outset, the working assumption was 
that full transparency is an illusion generally, but also specifically in the industry and 
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context to which it is applied. In this context, it was conceived that though transparency 
may inform about basic facts, it does not necessarily empower neither does it lead to 
improvements of the oil governance context partly due to a general lack of incentives 
and commitment to bring about reforms (see Mouan 2010a). Mid-way into the research, 
however, a second hypothesis emerged, influenced by the author‘s preliminary findings 
on the application of transparency in Angola, her observations of the difficulties 
encountered by EITI in several implementing countries and finally, the revolutionary 
wave of protests and demonstrations that began in December 2010 and has come to be 
singularly known as ‗Arab Spring‘ or ‗Arab Uprisings‘. In particular, without undermining 
EITI‘s achievements or romanticising the Arab Spring, the limits of the former and the 
―narrative of potentials‖ (Larsen 2011: 50) constructed by the latter were believed to be 
exposing both the shortcomings of externally-imposed ―governance by disclosure‖ 
policies (Gupta 2009), and the potential that can be achieved if and when citizens are 
actively participating or indeed leading in the process of change in their countries. At this 
stage, the additional hypothesis to test was that for transparency to lead to some 
improvement, it needs not be ‗opaque‘, and must be coupled with accountability and 
active citizenship. As such, four key principles guided the research: 
(i) Right to know. Gupta aptly described the ‗right to know‘ as the ―first-order 
normative goal that governance by disclosure may seek to further‖ (2009: 9; 
emphasis in the original). A more detailed analysis of this idea follows in 
Chapter 2. Suffice it to point out that as conceived here, the ‗right to know‘ 
comprises two distinct but related aspects. The first relates to whether 
transparency policies put in place by the GoA further such a right – that is, 
―whether a right to know is contested or not and the extent to which it is being 
institutionalised in practice in a given disclosure initiative‖ (ibid). The second 
aspect, on the other hand, will involve questioning whose right to know these 
transparency policies actually promote. It will, in particular, test the assertion 
that transparency predominantly benefits private sector actors (see Bracking 
2009; Dingwerth and Eichinger 2010; Gupta and Mason 2014: 10), at the 
expense of citizens.  
(ii) Type of Transparency. A second concern here is the identification of the type 
of transparency that is at play in Angola. As Fox (2007: 665) remarks, ‗right to 
know‘ reforms can only promote a particular type of transparency. In the past 
decade or so, however, variations and directions of transparency were for the 
most part left implicit in academic and policy debates, making this aspect one 
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of the most understudied of the rise of transparency in global energy 
governance (Heald 2006: 27). In fact, a consensus is only just emerging 
about the fact that ―zombie transparency‖ (opaque and aggregated 
transparency) or ―partial transparency‖ (revenues rather than contracts, 
expenditures, sovereign funds and other valuable information) cannot lead to 
positive change (see Dawson 2013; Bielfeldt 2013). Heald (2006) and Fox 
(2007) provided a useful framework for measuring the effectiveness of 
transparency policies. Besides distinguishing ―opaque/nominal‖ from 
―clear/effective‖ transparency, these authors identified, in particular, two 
directions of transparency that are essential for any consideration of its 
effectiveness: ―upwards transparency‖ reflecting states imperative to monitor 
citizens; and ―transparency downwards‖ or that which goes from the state to 
society and is critical for right to know reforms and public accountability. The 
dissertation will seek to detect which of these four categories underpins 
Angola‘s ORT reforms, in addition to probing how and the extent to which 
they shape the institutionalisation of ORT in Angola.  
(iii) Empowerment for Accountability. In the previous section, the point was made 
that transparency seeks to promote such procedural aims as democratic 
governance, knowledge and accountability. Indeed, a particular concern of 
the study is whether and the extent to which the particular type of 
transparency that is at play – which, incidentally, Chapters 4 and 5 find to be 
partial or opaque – has led to the essential elements of empowerment and 
accountability. Empowerment is generally defined as a process through which 
individuals or organised groups increase their power and autonomy to 
achieve certain outcomes they need and desire (Eyben 2011), while 
accountability is perceived as the obligation of power holders to account for or 
take responsibility for their actions (Malena et al 2004: 2). In this sense, 
accountability is not just about answerability, which is what transparency 
promotes, but also about delivering enforceability or the ability to impose 
sanctions against illegal behaviour (Newell and Wheeler 2006: 7; Fox 2007: 
667-68; Schedler et al 1999; Goetz and Jenkins 2001, 2005). In addition, 
accountability can be ―vertical‖, referring to elections and other mechanisms 
by which citizens control governments; or ―horizontal‖, that is, involving 
internal checks and balances between various branches or organs of the 
state to ensure that due process is followed in governmental decision-making 
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(Jayal 2008: 108). In this thesis, rather than taking the empowerment of civil 
society and citizens and social accountability as a starting point, one asks 
whose empowerment the particular type of transparency on display leads to. 
An additional question is to whom information holders are or should be 
accountable. It is hoped that this approach would allow for the inclusion of 
ways in which different factors and actors, internal and external, shape the 
directionality of empowerment and accountability. 
(iv) Citizenship. A fourth principle that is critical to this enquiry into oil governance 
reforms in Angola is citizenship. As Grugel and Nem Singh (2013: 61-83) 
noted, scholars have largely failed to engage with the consequences of 
democratisation when it comes to understanding resource governance in 
developing countries. Emphases are on ―resource curse‖ theories (see 
Chapter 1); the econocentric, technocratic top-down prophylaxes and cures to 
be applied by the governors, policy-makers, and ordinary citizens of oil states 
(Weszkalnys 2009: 681); global and domestic structures; as well as on elites‘ 
negotiations, presuming perhaps that political choices are predetermined by 
elites‘ preferences, and inadvertedly downplaying the ways in which social 
mobilisation and community organisation can shape policy outcomes 
especially, though not exclusively, during economic booms (see also Obi 
2008: 9). This neglect of the possibilities offered by citizenship struggles in 
those settings is all the more surprising given that the development of civil 
society in states targeted by transparency campaigners is a crucial objective 
of the diffusion of ORT. The current enquiry considers the notion of citizenship 
in relation to rights and accountability. In this context, following Newell and 
Wheeler (2006: 6) and Kim and Lee (2012), ‗citizenship‘ relates concurrently 
to (a) rights claims that people believe they should be able to make of 
institutions, as well as their entitlements to access to material resources; (b) 
the multiple and overlapping connections and relationships that emerge from 
daily experiences; and (c) citizens‘ engagement in the discourse on 
transparency, anti-corruption, good governance, as well as the strategies they 
employ.  The argument here is that ―possibilities for accountability are […] 
strongly shaped by how citizenship is exercised, enforced, denied‖ (Newell 




As noted previously, this is a case study of the application of ORT in Angola. The case 
study approach has several uses. Scholars consider it appropriate for ―what‖, ―how‖ and 
―why‖ questions in unexplored research areas, for developing and evaluating theories, 
formulating hypotheses or explaining particular phenomena by using theories and causal 
mechanisms  (Vennesson 2008: 227; Creswell et al 2007). In addition to these uses, the 
case study approach proved particularly useful as a methodology that allows for an in-
depth and longitudinal examination of the phenomenon of study within contextual 
conditions (Yin 2003), not least because of the significance of the context. Angola 
provided the perfect opportunity to take an in-depth longitudinal view of the application of 
locally-developed ORT reforms in the developing world. First as a country whose 
relations with the external world have for decades been dominated and significantly 
impacted by perceptions of it as a classic case of an oil kleptocracy and a poster child of 
the resource curse. Although the country‘s international reputation has improved, its 
persistent low rankings in TI‘s Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) – 153 out of 177 
countries in 2013 – continues to arouse wide public concern. The second reason behind 
the choice of Angola, as the introductory remarks show, is because this is the key case 
around which global demands for greater transparency in the oil industry were framed 
right from the onset. Additionally and contrary to the narrative of Angola as ‗anti-
reformist‘, Angola has itself undertaken numerous ‗homegrown‘ ORT reforms since 
1999, many of which go beyond the provision of information.  
 
Angola‘s significance for this doctoral research extends well beyond the policy context, 
to its geostrategic positioning as one of sub-Saharan Africa‘s (SSA) major oil producers, 
third biggest economy and emerging regional hegemon. In a post-crisis era and an era 
of intense global competition for increasingly scarce oil resources, these elements 
helped position Angola as a land of foreign investment opportunities and a viable 
alternative to the Middle East where much of the remaining conventional oil is 
concentrated under the control of governments. The thesis will elaborate on the 
consequences of Angola‘s regional and global position as it relates to its bargaining 
power vis-à-vis external actors and the implications for the institutionalisation of ORT.  
 
Lastly, it is important to stress that although topical, Angola, ORT and post-conflict 
corruption are all still significantly under-researched (Koechlin and Calland 2010; The 
Carter Centre 2008; Le billion 2008). In the case of Angola, the limitations are context-
specific, having to do with language barriers, limited access to the field partly due to the 
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27-year civil war that ended in 2002 and partly to difficulties in accessing entry visas. 
Another explanation constraining the evaluation of the effects of ORT policies in Angola 
specifically, lies in the geographical context, more specifically, in the ways and extent to 
which ―oil‘s materiality‖ (Weszkalnys 2013: 275) – the unique material qualities of oil, in 
particular, its ―enclave‖ character and nature as a resource that is concentrated in the 
hands of governors – mediate the opportunities and impacts of transparency 
interventions ORT policies. This is an issue that has been largely overlooked in 
discussions of transparency in energy governance, despite resource materiality it being 
identified in the literature on the political economy of oil as one of the key features 
deterministic of the ‗curse‘ of oil (forthcoming in Chapter 1; see also Van Alstine 2014). 
Angola is arguably the country for which this feature is the most relevant, since two thirds 
of its oilfields are located offshore in deepwater plays in comparison to say, Nigeria, 
where only one third of oilfields are located offshore (Koning 2010). This factor alone, 
suggested one informant, explains why Angola is such a ―difficult context from which to 
judge the impact of transparency campaigns‖
2
. Also, the fact that it is an established oil 
producer – with oil exports starting in 1955 -, helps gain a much-needed insight into the 
effects of this phenomenon over a considerable amount of time, thereby avoiding time 
inconsistencies problems that are characteristic of studies on transparency‘s impacts 
(see Gillies and Heuty 2011: 29-30).   
 
Worth pointing out that the emphasis of the enquiry is as much on the context of 
adoption and implementation of ORT, as it is about the content of ORT policies. The 
researcher has therefore analysed multiple case studies that can help focus attention on 
the most salient aspects of the case (Scholz and Tietje 2002). Besides the ‗BP incident‘ 
which had repercussions far beyond Angolan borders, the author explores the Angolan 
government‘s interpretation of ORT through an analysis of the GoA‘s publication of oil 
revenues, its reporting of budget documents and the Law on Administrative Probity 
(LAP). Specifically, besides the new Constitution enacted in 2010, the analysis of LAP 
was critical to the question of whether and how a ‗right to know‘ is formulated, contested 
and institutionalised in the Angolan context and the issue of accountability (see Chapters 
4 and 8). Other valuable case studies include the Stand-By-Arrangement (SBA) signed 
between the GoA and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in November 2009, and 
Cobalt‘s operations in Angola. The former is widely held as an important reform driver 
during the post-crisis period in Angola, though in this context its implementation provides 
                                                          
2
 Interview with a senior INGO representative, via Skype, June 2009.  
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a useful insight into (a) the question of IFI leverage; and (b) how international 
organisations (IOs) such as the IMF actually do contribute to policy norm diffusion 
processes in developing countries (Chapter 6). Likewise, Cobalt‘s activities and 
practices in Angola provide substantial evidence of international oil companies‘ (IOCs) 
behaviour and practice in Angola, as well as of the potential effects (positive and 
negative) of transnational energy governance regulatory mechanisms (Chapter 5).  
 
As experts suggest, the demand and supply of transparency is now ―multidirectional‖ 
(Gupta and Mason 2014: 5). This observation, together with the plurality and divergence 
of practices between and among sectoral actors involved in the framing and diffusion of 
ORT in Angola underscores the importance of scrutinising agents. This is in the sense 
of: (a) interrogating ―how the authors and addressees of information disclosure are 
constituted‖ rather than ―treating individual and groups as pre-given actors—as 
policymakers, scientists, civil society actors, etc‖ (Mason 2008: 11); (b) identifying what 
strategies and approaches they employ; and more importantly in the case of external 
agents, (c) exploring how they themselves approach and interact with the global norms 
they advocate. As such, the thesis will pay close attention to the involvement of non-
state actors in the policy norm diffusion processes, as an alternative to the 
predominantly statist analyses that currently dominate in academic and policy 
scholarship.   
 
The researcher employed the qualitative methods of key informant interviews, case 
study analysis, conference notes and participant observation at relevant events, 
including dozens of meetings and seminars on China, Angola, civil society, donor 
strategies, anti-corruption, business and human rights, governance and extractives 
industries transparency hosted by the Royal Institute of International Affairs (henceforth 
Chatham House), the European Parliament, the Universities of Oxford and Sussex, 
Clifford Chance and the World Bank. In most of these events (listed in Appendix 1), the 
Chatham House rules - that prohibit the use of speakers‘ identity and affiliation(s) – did 
not apply. Between 2008 and 2014, the researcher conducted approximately 100 semi-
structured and unstructured interviews (see Appendix 2). Face-to-face interviews were 
conducted in Bergen, Brussels, Cambridge, Coventry, London, Luanda, Oxford, 
Stellenbosch and Yaoundé; others were conducted over the telephone and via Skype. In 
terms of the composition of research participants, they included Angolan and non-
Angolan company executives, human rights and extractive industry transparency 
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activists, journalists, academics, think tank analysts, trade unionists, lawyers, investors, 
opposition and religious leaders, diplomats, and ministers.  
 
Many of these respondents had been involved and/or remained engaged in the fight for 
greater transparency, human rights and governance at the national and global level. 
Among them some spoke on condition of anonymity, while others specifically gave their 
permission for their identity and affiliations to be disclosed. However, the researcher 
believed that the sensitivity of the topic and issues discussed could jeopardise 
interviewees‘ safety, and therefore decided to withhold all individuals‘ identity while 
revealing their affiliations whenever permitted and especially when relevant to the 
subject matter.    
 
The content of interviews was divided according to the sectoral differences. The author 
entered the field concerned that there had been insufficient attention to the outcomes of 
ORT policies in postwar Angola considering its pivotal role in the setting up of the 
agenda. At the time, all that was available on the topic was a 2004 report by Human 
Rights Watch (HRW) and a few media briefings and articles by various other sources, 
including GW. The questions then were: Did it mean that the GoA had become fully 
transparent? If not, what explained this waning interest in Angola? And what had the 
global ORT campaign achieved on the ground? Why was there no PWYP national 
coalition in Angola? And why was the government not an EITI member? These are some 
of the questions that guided interviews with civil society representatives, in addition to 
those that concentrated on the government‘s developmental agenda, the nature of 
politics, state-citizen relations and state-companies-IFIs relations. Interviews with 
company representatives for the most part dealt with their understandings of society‘s 
expectations of their responsibility, besides the challenges and dilemmas they face 
when operating in so-called ―zones of weak governance‖ like Angola.  And 
conversations with IFI officials were essentially revolving around their role and 
contribution to the ORT agenda and its implementation in Angola and beyond.  
 
It should be clear by now that process tracing formed a significant part of the strategy 
that was employed. In order words, the focus was not solely on what happened but on 
how and on the perceptions of respondents, their purposes, goals, values and 
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specification to the situation that faced them (Vennesson 2008: 233)
3
. The same 
approach was used in the analysis of the secondary data drawn from textbooks; journal 
articles; companies, IFIs, governments and civil society reports and documents; and 
media briefings.  
 
As far as access to these participants is concerned, it is worth noting that field visits to 
Luanda and Yaoundé in August 2010 were facilitated by two domestic NGOs: the Acção 
para o Desenvolvimento Rural e Ambiente (ADRA) in Luanda and the Réseau de Lutte 
contre la Faim au Cameroun (RELUFA) in Yaoundé. The PWYP website was also quite 
useful at the beginning of the project, since it contained a small list of organisations and 
individuals that were listed as ―members‖ of the coalition, even though by the time of the 
researcher‘s visit several of these organisations were closed, and many of the 
informants on the list were working either as public servants, or as employees of oil 
companies and oil service companies. Moreover, the researcher found ―snowball 
sampling‖
4
 to be a helpful and practical method of reaching participants within and 
beyond the oil industry. This type of respondent–driven sampling automatically brings to 
bear a bias in the selection of the population chosen, which could not be avoided 
considering the sensitivity of the topic and the fact that the ORT/anti-corruption industry 
is still a relatively small and closed industry, but still were tackled by using a combination 
of primary and secondary sources of data. 
  
One obstacle the author encountered was the language barrier. As a non-Portuguese, 
she had to rely on imperfect online translation tools and a professional translator for 
specific legal and more formal documents. The same goes for other materials in 
Norwegian. That notwithstanding, language barriers were less of an issue whilst in 
Angola, since interviews were conducted in French and English, two languages that the 
author speaks fluently. Understandably, the author‘s identity as a black African woman 
with very little knowledge of the economics of the oil industry sometimes proved to be an 
impediment to fruitful interactions with representatives from IFI, GCS and the oil industry. 
Her experience of the oil industry – which remains a complex, closed, male-dominated 
industry - certainly compares negatively to that of some white male scholars, including 
                                                          
3
 Vennesson (2008: 231 citing George and Bennett 2005: 176) defines ‗process tracing‘ as ―a 
procedure for identifying steps in a causal process leading to the outcome of a given dependent 
variable of a particular case in a particular historical context.‖   
4
 Put simply, ―snowball sampling‖ is defined as ―a technique for finding research subjects. One 
subject gives the researcher the name of another subject, who in turn provides the name of a 
third, and so on‖ (Atkinson and Flint 2001 citing Vogt, 1999). 
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one who suggested that ―anyone of the right race and gender who presents themselves 
in the field in the right manner can expect to be treated with all the privileges enjoyed by 
expatriates‖ (Ovadia 2013a: 71).  At times, however, this identity seemed to facilitate 
frank and honest conversations with many Angolan and African interlocutors, who were 
more open and even more welcoming than expected.  
 
When handling the research data, a high degree of confidentiality was ensured in a way 
that protects the confidentiality of the respondents and affiliated institutions in some 
occasions, though some details may be recognised by those acquainted to the 
topic/individual/organisation. This research was approved by Coventry University‘s 
Research Ethics Committee in 2009. 
 
STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS 
 
Having established the dissertation‘s emphasis on content, agents, context and process-
tracing, it suffices here to outline how it is organised. The thesis begins with an 
assessment of ORT‘s end goals in Chapters 1 and 2. Chapter 1 traces the origins of the 
global ORT norm to the need to bring about development to a region thought to be 
cursed by oil, and in doing so, deconstructs the concepts of ―state failure‖ and ―resource 
curse‖ that incited global demands for the regulation of the African oil industry. These two 
heuristic and deterministic terms that predict negative outcomes of oil extraction have 
since been challenged by recent economic growth in SSA, thereby reviving and 
revitalising the public discourse on the ―developmental state‖ and what it might mean for 
the sub-continent. Even then, the chapter will argue, the lack of clarity of this purpose 
means that there is no consensus on the direction of travel.  
 
Chapter 2 will highlight attempts by external actors to frame their responses around the 
oft-cited norms of ―human rights‖, ―corporate social responsibility‖ and ―good 
governance‖, and concerns over ―energy security‖. It also revisits the shape and record, 
wherever available, of the ORT initiatives cited above, namely, PWYP, EITI, Dodd-Frank 
1504 and the EU Rules. 
 
After the exploration of the normative and political drivers behind the adoption and 
implementation of ORT in developing countries, the thesis will then turn its attention to 
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applying these concepts, theories and critique to the Angolan context. Chapter 3 shows 
the civil war to be the main determining factor of Angola‘s contemporary political 
economy alongside elites‘ control of the country‘s resources through Sonangol and to a 
lesser extent, the ruling party, the Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (MPLA). 
Yet none of the preceding factors prevented the GoA to embrace the reform agenda 
albeit, some would say, belatedly. In effect, Chapter 4 makes clear that a number of 
reform components undertaken in the post-war era took roots during wartime, hence, 
whilst the government was under intense pressure. The objective of this chapter, 
therefore, would be to make sense of the content of this reform agenda as well as the 
context under which it emerged and was implemented, in order to qualify Angola‘s type 
of transparency. This will include an analysis of domestic and international perceptions of 
the information released, that is, its availability, accessibility, completeness and 
usefulness.   
 
Chapter 4 will impart on scholars of transparency in energy governance the necessity to 
move from the ―reformist versus non-reformist‖ conundrum, to consider why public 
institutions like NOCs actually do undertake reforms; a point that is taken on in Chapter 
8. Secondly, Chapter 4 will raise questions around the ability of Angola‘s ORT model to 
address the problem of oil-sector corruption. Not least because, as Chapter 5 
demonstrates, the emphasis on ORT has had the unintended outcome of opening up 
further more sophisticated and ―invisible‖ opportunities for corruption and private wealth 
accumulation in the oil sector. One of the big highlights of the chapter is the partnership 
between Cobalt International Energy (‗Cobalt‘) and Nazaki Oil and gas (‗Nazaki‘) that will 
be known as the ‗Cobalt-Nazaki case‘. This case, it is argued herein, has serious 
implications for the companies involved and for the regulation of the global and domestic 
oil industry.   
 
Crucially, the examples detailed in Chapter 5 will provide evidence of the contribution of 
IOCs to the prevalence of corruption. But should that be interpreted as complicity on their 
part, or as scholars and activists accused, as complicity on the part of IFIs, oil companies 
and perhaps INGOs who pushed through this agenda? This is a matter for Chapters 6 to 
8 to evaluate. In particular, the chapters examine the indirect and informal ways and 
methods through which these actors influence transparency policies. They will highlight 
the diversity of responses of different companies, IFIs, governments and global civil 
society (GCS) organisations and attempt to explain this variation. One of the main 
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findings is that these actors, IFIs and INGOs in particular, have been limited in their 
efforts to bring about reforms by factors internal to them, most notably by legitimacy 
shortfalls. 
  
Whereas the previous chapter will look into the role and contribution of external actors, 
Chapters 9 and 10 critically examine key features of the policy diffusion process at the 
national level, the actors involved in helping move this agenda forward, the strategies 
they employ and how they use them to bring about change. Chapter 9 returns to the 
―reformist versus non-reformist‖ rhetoric to detail issues that may work against 
international efforts to build institutions, including the primacy of informal and highly 
personalised relationships in the ORT reform process in Angola. Moreover, the chapter 
looks deeper into the apparent paradox between the emerging commitment to reform the 
oil sector on the one hand, and the prevalence of corruption on the other. It ascertains 
that while some reasons for this paradox may be political, there may be real capacity 
challenges too. In that sense, the chapter reinforces the need to focus on relationships, 
governance structures, incentives and interests, rather than on institutions. 
 
The main object of investigation in Chapter 10 will be Angolan CSOs‘ contribution to the 
diffusion of ORT, through critical reflections on the input of its chief norm promoter, the 
Catholic Church. As it uncovers, the Church too has suffered from legitimacy challenges. 
In fact, the gap left by this and other domestic and international CSOs has since been 
surprisingly but progressively filled by other new ―norm proponents‖ (Acharya 2010) who 
have for some time now been taking on the task of making claims for citizens‘ rights and 
greater public accountability, albeit outside the oil industry. As it will be suggested 
eventually, the purpose for showcasing these day-to-day struggles for greater 
transparency and public accountability will be to draw attention to the main differences 
between homegrown initiatives which emphasise bottom-up approaches and current 
externally-imposed governance reform initiatives which favour top-down strategies. 
Reflections emanating from this analysis are forthcoming in the concluding chapter. This 
closing chapter will propose some answers to the original questions, suggesting ways in 
which to understand the practice of ORT in Angola, and possibly the broader lessons 






OIL, GOVERNANCE AND DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA  
 
―Underlying the litany of Africa‘s development problems is a 
crisis of governance.‖ 
 
 World Bank (1989) 
 





Assuming that sustainable economic development is the ultimate goal of transparency, 
what, then, does one understand by ‗economic development‘ in a context of limited 
statehood such as the one that is prevalent in sub-Saharan Africa? This question is 
central to contentious debates on the role of the state in steering development, and that 
of natural resources, oil in particular, in assisting in that task. These debates tend to be 
influenced by unfair comparisons between Africa and other regions of the developing 
world. Over time, they generated official talk of ‗state failure‘ and ‗resource curse‘; two 
heuristic concepts that refer to the paradoxes that prevent African ―petro-states‖ (Karl 
1997) from reaching their developmental potential. These two concepts do not only 
reflect the particular worldview of those actors who frame it. More importantly, they 
inform policies that at times, seem to be more about furthering outsiders‘ agendas and 
meeting their expectations, and less about catering or accounting for the realities and 
capacities of African states themselves.  
 
Still, that this discourse gained traction in and steered development policy does not 
necessarily mean that there is an absolute consensus over what the problem is, or how 
to solve it. If anything, they have over the years instigated widespread criticisms. One 
such critique centres on their ―faulty diagnosis and prognosis‖ (Olowu 1999: 1). Another 
revolves around their ―impossibility thesis‖ with scholars arguing that African states are 
capable of and committed to aiding development (see for example, Meyns and 
Musamba 2010); that such ―developmental‖ states existed in the continent (Mkandawire 
2001); and more important to this research, that the world might just be witnessing the 
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emergence of African ―petro-developmental‖ states (Ovadia 2013a) - meaning those 
states that are increasingly using petroleum revenues to accelerate development. 
 
This first chapter delves further into this theoretical debate. This and the following two 
chapters are crucial for understanding and explaining the normative and political context 
of ORT adoption in postwar Angola. They provide the space for a re-assessment of the 
main governance challenges affecting African and other petro-states that led to calls for 
greater ORT, while simultaneously illuminating on some of the conditions that may 
facilitate or inhibit the effective institutionalisation of ORT in Angola and arguably other 
developing countries. As Mitchell (2011: 1883) suggests, examining these conditions is 
crucial, for, they ―not only influence whether transparency policies are adopted but, by 
influencing the goals and shape of policies that are adopted, also have an impact on 
whether those policies are effective.‖  
 
That said, the chapter focuses less on ―why oil-rich African countries [are] still so poor‖ 
(Yates 2012: 2; emphasis added) or whether development is at all possible in these 
states. Rather, taking Angola as a case in point, it simply rests content on introducing 
the reader to global and local discourses around Africa‘s governance and development 
challenges, first by critiquing state failure narratives before moving onto an analysis of 
the expectations of ‗petro-developmental‘ states in Africa, drawing from the literature on 
the developmental state. Discontent with existing institutional arrangements around oil 
transparency as the key to tackle oil governance challenges is one motivation for this 
―shift in the angle of vision‖ (Moorman 2008: 58).  
 
STATE FAILURE NARRATIVES 
 
 
Most attempts at conceptualising state failure take the role of the modern state as their 
point of departure. David Sogge frames the debate around two main questions: ―Should 
states exist chiefly to ensure better life chances for all citizens? Or are their tasks mainly 
to promote globalisation‘s winners and police its losers?‖ (Sogge 2011: 2-3). Two 
predominant narratives have emerged, each one yielding a different answer to the 
question. The first narrative considers the role of the state in relation to society. 
According to this vision, the ideal/typical modern state exists mainly to provide public 
goods to its citizenry, and protect its territory and population against external aggression. 
State failure therefore occurs when states are proved wanting in their authority, their 
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capacity to effectively deliver basic public goods and their domestic legitimacy
5
. In this 
instance, two features define a failed state: the prevalence of violence and neo-
patrimonialism. Typically, the basic argument is that nations fail because ―they are 
consumed by internal violence and cease delivering political goods to their inhabitants. 
Their governments lose credibility, and the very nature of the particular nation-state itself 
becomes questionable and illegitimate in the hearts and minds of its citizens‖ (Rotberg 
2004: 1). Violence, here, can take many forms - including civil unrest or warfare, regime 
or ruling class oppression, extortion and harassment of the majority of citizens (Rotberg 
2002) - but the blame lies squarely at the leadership. As Rotberg frames it, state failure 
is ―man-made, not merely accidental nor – fundamentally – caused by geographically, 
environmentally or externally‖. In other words, ―Leadership and leadership failures have 
destroyed states and continue to weaken the fragile polities that operate on the cusp of 
failure‖ (Rotberg 2002: 93). What also matters for this conception of violence is that it is 
not defined by its absolute intensity, but rather, by its ―enduring character‖ as in Angola, 
Burundi and Sudan; its ―direction‖ against an existing government or regime, and its 
―vigorous character of the political or geographical demands for shared power or 
autonomy that rationalise or justify that violence that identifies a failed state‖ (ibid: 85-
86). 
 
Neo-patrimonialism, the other ―convenient, all-purpose, and ubiquitous moniker for 
African governance‖, is a term encompassing a wide range of sub-concepts – 
clientelism, ethnicity, tradition, tribalism, nepotism, various forms of rent-seeking and 
prebendalism  (Mkandawire 2013: 5-6; Amundsen 2001: 44). Van de Walle (2007: 1-2) 
describes it as having three main components: (1) presidentialism, ―in which both formal 
and informal rules place one man – usually the president – largely above the law and not 
subject to the checks and balances that democratic executives face in mature 
democracies‖; (2) systematic clientelism used by the president and his followers to 
maintain the status quo and ensure political stability; and (3) a reliance on state 
resources to fund this clientelist logic. Besides violence, proponents advance that it is 
this form of organisation in which public officials hold positions and exercise them as a 
                                                          
5
 Carment and Samy (2011: 4) define ―authority‖ as ―the ability of the state to enact binding 
legislation over its population and to provide the latter with a stable and safe environment‖; 
―capacity‖ as ―the power of the state to mobilise public resources for productive uses‖; and 
―legitimacy‖ as ―the ability of the state to command public loyalty to the governing regime and 
generate domestic support for government legislation and policies‖.      
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form of ―private property‖ (Mkandawire 2013: 6) that prevented capitalist accumulation 
and threatened the ambitions of socialism in Africa.   
 
Whereas this first narrative on state failure paved the way for the African post-colonial 
state to be sidelined in the developmental project, the key premise of the second, 
neoliberal narrative has been that the state matters for development, except that its role 
is merely to facilitate the existence and well-being of ―a world economy and a world 
society‖ (Strange 1995: 70). Based on an understanding of state functions developed by 
scholars of the interdependence school, the argument is that the increased complex 
interdependence characterising contemporary international politics is such that state 
actions can no longer be understood as ―a set of discrete, isolated acts‖. Rather, they 
should be seen as enabling a much larger ―pattern of cooperation‖ and a ―harmony‖ of 
interests that should facilitate the attainment of others‘ goals (Krasner 1984: 51-52, 56). 
Seen through this prism, a state‘s ‗success‘ is evident in its ability to provide the ‗right‘ 
institutional environment for liberal, market-led development that would presumably 
include ―a set of institutions, policies and even social attitudes often called ‗good 
governance‘‖ (Hameiri 2011). Its ‗failure‘, meanwhile, would be signalled by its inability to 
take full advantage of the opportunities made available by globalisation, for example by 
failing to make its business environment more attractive to private sector investment 
(ibid). This perspective was laid out in a World Bank‘s 1992 study, which argued for ―a 
clearly articulated mining sector policy that emphasises the role of the private sector as 
owner and operator and of government as regulator and promoter‖ (World Bank 1992: 
53, cited in Campbell 2009: 245; italics in the original). Indeed, this stance differed from 
the ―one-dimensional, universal logic of neoclassical development theory, with its 
emphasis on a specific set of appropriate policies, designed to establish a free market, 
regardless of the historical, institutional and policy context‖ (Öniş 1991: 125).  
 
Around the same period that perceptions of the state were changing, towards the early 
1990s, theorists established that the ‗resource curse‘ or ‗paradox of plenty‘ (Karl 1997) 
was one of the most influential explanations as to why postcolonial African states 
endowed with natural resources failed to perform as well as their counterparts elsewhere 
(Di John 2011: 4). This complex and multidimensional phenomenon helps explain why 
countries endowed with natural resources are likely to grow more slowly than non-
resource-rich countries, and why they may have weaker democratic institutions, may 
experience higher levels of corruption and civil war (see, among others, Auty 1993; 
26 
 
Sachs and Warner 1995; Gary and Karl 2003; Ross 2001; Leite and Weidmann 1999; 
Collier and Hoeffler 1998).  
 
The ‗curse‘ occurs through three main mechanisms. The first relates to macro-economic 
instability associated with the fluctuation of international oil prices. This volatility is 
deemed detrimental to the quality and long-term planning of economic policy precisely 
because of the cyclical variability in revenues and spending - ―boom and bust‖ cycles - 
usually associated with it, as well as debt crises (Humphreys et al 2007: 8). Second is 
the ―Dutch Disease‖, which makes reference to the negative impact of revenues from 
natural gas in the Netherlands following its discovery in the country‘s jurisdiction in the 
North Sea in the late 1950s and early 1960s (Gyfalson 2001: 2). There are numerous 
explanations as to how the ―disease‖ is caught (see Stevens 2003: 11-13). But broadly 
speaking, this is linked to the negative impacts of a country‘s dependency on large 
exports of natural resources on the domestic economy, including the appreciation of the 
value of the national currency; increased inflation and the resulting loss of exports 
competitiveness; lack or decrease of foreign direct investment; import booms and 
depreciation or contraction of domestic industries, particularly from the non-extractive 
sectors such as the agricultural sector or the manufacturing sector as in the Dutch case 
(Fardmanesh 1991: 712-23; Humphreys et al supra: 5-6). In some cases, large natural 
resources exports create a ―resource pull‖ effect whereby domestic resources such as 
labour and materials are drawn out of other sectors to boost the extractive sector, 
pushing up demand for higher wages.  
 
Third is the ‗rentier state‘. This concept emanates from early studies by a group of 
scholars who sought to understand, among other things, the interaction between state 
and economy, and the extent to which this interaction influences developmental 
outcomes in oil-producing Arab countries (Mahdavy 1970; Beblawi and Luciani 1987). 
Mahdavy (1970: 428) defined ‗rentier states‘ as ―those countries that receive on a 
regular basis substantial amount of external rents‖. Later, Beblawi (1987: 49-62) 
broadened this definition within the framework of ―rentier economy‖, denoting states 
whose economy depends on external rents controlled by a small elite. Specifically in the 
case of oil, oil wealth creates a ―rentier effect‖ (Ross 2001: 332-35; Moore 2004: 307) 
and ―rentier mentality‖ that ―embodies a break in the work-reward causation‖ (Beblawi 
1987: 52). That is to say, that it frees the state from relying on taxation from citizens who 
would otherwise be increasing their demands for greater accountability and would have 
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influenced their engagement into politics; leads to spending on patronage rather than on 
encouraging private investment, production and economic growth (Karl 1997: 16); and 
creates opportunities for state elites to reconfigure the structure of society by preventing 
―the formation of social groups that are independent from the state and hence that may 
be inclined to demand political rights‖ (Ross 2001: 335). 
 
Overall, whilst oil generates the possibility of a developmental impetus, and set African 
petro-states free from many of the constraints that other developing countries face, it 
often offsets these benefits by encouraging the boom-and-bust pattern, debt, clientelism, 
and the impossible demands made upon oil states by claimants to the ‗national cake‘ 
(Soares de Oliveira 2007a: 39). With the elite so enmeshed in their rational pursuit of 
self-interests goals, state institutions weaken, thereby paralysing decision-making, and 
exposing the state further to international market shocks, budget constraints and a 
tendency to over borrow (Ross 1999: 320). As the nasty cycle of corruption, patronage, 
lack of accountability and weak institutions persist, a corollary is the emergence of 
political instability that serves as yet another vehicle for accumulation.  
 
Indeed, resource curse theorists have argued that natural resources increase the risk of 
civil war and play a key role in prolonging and financing such conflicts (Collier and 
Hoeffler 1998: 571; Ross 2004).  This debate on oil and conflict was elicited in response 
to the ―greed versus grievance‖ thesis that studied the motives for conflicts, and owes its 
popularity to Paul Collier, its lead thinker but also former director of the development 
research group at the World Bank which itself has great leverage in the developing world 
(Marchal and Messiant 2003: 58). The influential thesis stipulates that civil wars are 
more likely to be caused by insurgency groups driven by the desire to control high-value 
resources that are ‗lootable‘ – resources that can be easily extracted and transported - 
than by their grievances (Collier and Hoeffler 1998; Bannon and Collier 2003). In fact, 
understanding the grievances of rebels is less important than understanding their 
sources of finance when explaining the link between natural resources and civil war 
(Collier and Hoeffler 2002: 1). Collier (2007: 31-32) confirms this view when talking 
about oil insurgencies in Nigeria, wherein he says, ―grievance has evolved, over the 
course of a decade, into greed‖. 
 
Other studies however found that the geographical location of natural resources, their 
market characteristics and specific mode of exploitation/governance – including whether 
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they are operated in an ―enclaved‖ manner (Ferguson 2005: 378) - are all determinative 
of the extent to which these resources might be lootable so as to create particular types 
of conflict.  For instance, ―point-source‖ resources such as oil that are geographically 
concentrated in small areas and easily controlled by the government are likely to gener-
ate coups d‘états or secession movements, unlike  ―diffuse‖ resources that are more 
widely spread and likely to engender rebellions and ―warlordism‖ (Le Billon 2003, 2005).       
 
These theorisations of the state have led to misunderstandings about the nature of the 
African state as we will show below in the case of Angola below, and oftentimes 
disputed its very existence. Whilst efforts were made to broaden and refine this 
conceptualisation of the state, they still did not stop the African state from becoming ―the 
most demonised social institution in Africa‖ for ―its weaknesses, its over-extension, its 
interference with the smooth functioning of markets, its repressive character, its 
dependence on foreign powers, its ubiquity, its absence, etc.‖
 
(Mkandawire 2001: 293). 
One of its major flaws lies in its failure to account for the possibility of spatial and 
historical variations across state capacities. Consider the use of the term ―civil war‖ – 
defined as an internal violent conflict between a rebel organisation and a presumed, pre-
existing ‗state‘ – which seems to cause more semantic confusion and conflict (Kalyvas 
2007: 416), than it describes the situation under observation.  
 
As it will be shown in Chapter 3, the specific ―direction‖ of civil war that Rotberg 
describes does not always apply. Actually, when going beyond the legality of these 
concepts, a closer look back at the Angola civil war reveals that they two main opposing 
‗movements‘ were actually similar in more ways than one. As one interviewee pointed 
out, the origins of the two movements are against Portuguese colonialism, and in fact, 
the ruling party never had full control over the entire Angolan territory. What is more, it 
can be disputed whether greed was ever the primary motive of UNITA considered by 
most accounts as the main ‗rebel group‘. The fact is not only that UNITA started to 
finance itself with illicit diamond sales twenty years after the civil war began; but more 
so, that it agreed to a ceasefire roughly two months after the death of Jonas Savimbi, its 
leader, even though U.N. investigators estimated that UNITA was still able to earn as 




A second issue that arises from state failure discourses is one of measurements and 
variations. Here, the main concerns lie on the appropriateness of economic growth as 
the chief measure of economic performance (Rosser 2006; Lahiridutt 2006); as well as 
on the use of ―multiple regressions, statistical studies that draw broad-brush causal 
conclusions based on what could be mere spurious correlations‖, suggesting indeed, 
that ―any number of alternative explanations (missing variables for example), other than 
natural resource abundance, could explain the outcomes‖ (UNRISD 2007: 12). 
 
Third, it is debatable whether many of the outcomes predicted by the scholarly literature 
actually occur, in all or some countries. In the case of the Dutch Disease, differing 
patterns in Africa lead to the conclusion that African oil producers do not fit this model. 
As an example, manufacturing swelled in Nigeria during the 1970s oil boom owing to 
high investments by successive governments; whereas in Angola, the decline of the 
agricultural sector and the contraction of the economy had less to with the sort of 
―commodity-determinism‖ (Watts 2004; Obi 2012: 2) that characterises analyses of the 
political-economic impacts of oil than with the civil war (Soares de Oliveira 2007a: 75; 
Hodges 2004: 105-06). And in none of these two countries has non-oil growth been 
crowded out (Heller 2007).  In Angola, the non-oil sector contribution to GDP increased 
from 43 to 57 per cent between 2008 and 2010 (Vines and Weimer 2011: 8). One 
interviewee gave another concrete example that proves, as he asserted, that ―oil wealth 
is not the real problem‖. And that is the fact that one should see ―the benefit of oil wealth 
more moderated [in Angola] than in Nigeria because Nigeria has so many more people‖, 




A third note on this point is that it is unclear whether oil wealth hinders democratisation. 
In contrast, a growing body of evidence shows that transitions to democracy can occur 
both in spite and because of oil wealth, in Africa and beyond (Dunning 2008; Ross, 
2012; Grugel and Nem Singh 2013; Butcher 2014). Put simply, ―petroleum does not 
inevitably block democratic freedoms‖ (Ross 2012, p. 63; emphasis in the original). 
Rather, the relationship between oil wealth and democracy is increasingly mediated by 
―political and institutional variables, including class conflicts, social mobilisations and 
struggles on claims-making‖ (Grugel and Nem Singh 2013: 62). In particular, these 
authors note that ―commodity booms and democratisation are dynamic politico-economic 
                                                          
6
 Interview with a Western human rights advocate, 7 June 2011; emphasis added.      
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processes that serve as political opportunities for social groups to mobilise around 
rights-based frames‖ (ibid).  
 
By far the biggest contention in state failure narratives relates to the misunderstood role 
of endogenous and exogenous forces and factors. Like most narratives on Africa, they 
locate sources of failure within the state itself, that is, with greedy/corrupt elites and with 
the domestic political system. Soares de Oliveira (2007a: 156) notes that it is indeed 
predatory rule by African elites that is the key explanatory factor of decay. He is in fact 
very critical of the ―deterministic line of argument‖ of dependency theorists, for failing to 
appreciate that elites‘ agendas could ―possibly surpass the structural constraints it 
identified, and consequently denied the possibility of change‖ (ibid: 310). The author 
considers this is a major fault for, ―though the dependent relationship is ―unequal‖ in 
theory, any careful analyst of the last thirty years of oil politics in the Gulf of Guinea 
knows that the view of local politics as remote-controlled by foreign interests is 
nonsense.‖ 
   
Others believe that this depiction is not only ―oblivion to the colonial point of departure‖ 
(Pureza et al 2007: 3; Acemoglu et al 2001; Rodney 1997), but also underestimates the 
―enormous importance to African economies of external conjuncture and the role of 
foreign expertise‖ (Mkandawire 2001: 303-5) in the proliferation of tasks and the 
hijacking of key state functions that combined to create ―maladjusted‖ states 
(Mkandawire 2001: 306-09; Mkandawire 2010: 62-64). Indeed, the literature is replete 
with cases of African states being ―pushed‖ to the brink of failure or collapse (Sogge 
2011) by the Cold war and its demise, aid dependence, policies promoting the 
―responsible state‖ model, as well as those institutionalising the donor-sponsored 
neoliberal agenda that took the form of structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) in 
Africa (Brautigam 2000; Woodward 2004: 2).  
 
To take one example, the neoliberal project is said to have had a mixed record in Africa, 
including in countries like Angola that undertook only ―partial‖ adjustments (Roque 
1996). It dramatically undermined, and in some cases reversed, the developmental 
advances of several states (Adamolekun 2005; Mkandawire 2009; Nielsen et al 2010), 
thereby provoking or exacerbating debt and political crises with consequential effects on 
human life and dignity. Interestingly, in resources-rich countries, the civil wars and strife 
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that followed or tracked along the implementation of these neoliberal policies did not 
inhibit natural resources exploitation (Ferguson 2005: 379). On the contrary, in 
conjunction with the significant retreat of public actors from involvement in key areas of 
mineral resource extraction (Campbell 2009: 246-47), this ―noxious cocktail of commerce 
and violence‖ led to an increasing acceptance of the idea that effective and intensive 
mineral production in separately administered enclaves can exist alongside endemic 
violence (Ferguson supra). This context benefited both petro-elites who were adept at 
maximising opportunities on the state of confusion, uncertainty and chaos; and 
extractive sector companies and private security companies such as Executive 
Outcomes (EO) in Angola. Yet, there remained very little visibility of these actors in 
resource politics analyses (Watts 2004), at least until recently when they began to 
occupy a central place in relatively new investigations on historical scandals like the 
Angolan-Russian debt scandal whose details are provided in Chapter 3 (Corruption 
Watch and Associação Mãos Livres 2013; Klieman 2012).   
 
The implication of state-centred approaches to the resource curse for the reform agenda 
appears quite simple: it is what African elites – chiefly the presidents and the people 
around them - do that is the most important factor to concentrate on when tackling 
resource governance challenges. That is because, as one analyst claims, ―leaders are 
the only ones who can initiate the reforms, but also they are the leading cause of 
bubbles in the implementation because they themselves tend to undermine the 
implementation of the reforms mostly so that they can continue to have discretionary 
control over who gets what.‖
7
 Yet surely, this does not equate to saying that African 
agency has escaped old structural constraints; neither does it suggest that African 
leaders are only preoccupied by immediate material gains. Quite the opposite, African 
agency remains compromised by both external involvement and the limits to state 
capacity (Haman and Hurt 2009: 11). Moreover, Corkin (2013: 5) rejects the vision of 
state actors as ―passive and inconsequential‖ in their interaction with the international 
system
 
and sees African elites drawing positive possibilities for change from their 
international partners such as China in the Angolan case.   
 
Most significantly perhaps, the popular uprisings spreading across some of the world‘s 
major oil producers since January 2011 made clear what the consequences are when 
social actors are excluded from the debate on natural resources management.  So far in 
                                                          
7
 Interview with Western analyst, Cambridge, 1 March 2010. 
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the literature, discussions of their contribution to governance and development 
processes have been either completely inexistent (see Humphreys et al 2007), or 
whenever existent as in studies on the political ecology paradigm, they carry a negative 
connotation. To illustrate, Omeje (2007: 46-47) writes of the minority ethnic communities 
of the oil-bearing Niger Delta region that from being ―part low-stakes clients and 
partisans‖ prior to the mid-1990s, they have since then ―assertively established 
themselves as stakeholders in the accumulation process‖ by waging ―a formidable 
struggle of unrelenting violent protests, including oil theft, pipeline sabotage, and 
kidnappings‖ (Ibid: 47).   
 
Angola itself is portrayed as a ―state without citizens‖ (APPG 2006), or a state in which 
the idea of ‗civil society‘ is ―fictitious‖ (Schiefer 2006) presumably because like elsewhere 
in the continent, whatever ‗civil society‘ there exists is immersed in neo-patrimonial 
politics (see Messiant 2007: 113-15) and therefore, incapable of being an agent of 
positive change in the development process. Yet, as Okruhlik (1999) pointed out, just 
because citizens do not have to make financial sacrifices to fund their governments does 
not mean that they have no interest in how their governments use state resources, nor 
that they are unwilling to engage in collective action to influence spending or other 
decisions. In line with this argument, this thesis will also demonstrate that a context of 
prevalent corruption and lack of accountability does not preclude a positive contribution 
of these actors to the public discourse about oil governance and the expansion of the 
democratic space, even where this is least expected.  
 
In conclusion, one can argue that the ‗problem‘ in twentieth century African states was 
not so much that the development project failed, as that ―it never got started in the first 
place‖ (Ake 1996: 18). And even when it got started, the developmental process could 
not be sustained in these states in part because they were too weak to mobilise forces; 
unable to fend off foreign aggression and intervention, to attract enough foreign capital 
necessary to continue with the development project; and worse still, prone to state 
‗capture‘ by private vested interests (Fritz and Menocal 2006: 10-13; Amsden 1992: 12; 
Mkandawire 2001, 2010). 
 
It is incredible how perspectives on the developing world are fast changing. Critics are 
increasingly calling for the ‗failed state‘ concept to be abandoned. In their view, it is too 
vague, difficult to measure, meaningless, and so, should be dropped (Gruffydd Jones 
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2013; Hameiri 2011; Pureza et al 2007; Sogge 2011). Further, a consensus is emerging 
that ―it is not just the presence of natural resources that leads to the resource curse‖, 
but, ―the governance structures and institutions around the extraction, processing and 
management of the generated revenues that determine whether natural resources will 
be a blessing or a curse‖ (Obi 2012: 2, citing Alao 2007). In that sense, therefore, the 
pathologies associated with the so-called resource curse are due ―as much to the nature 
of the international oil regime - meaning the institutions shaped by multinational oil 
companies, their home governments, and foreign lenders - as it is to the structures of 
states and private actors in oil- exporting countries‖ (Karl 2007: 257). 
 
After decades of putting the spotlight on Africa‘s civil wars, poverty rates, leadership 
failures, and experiences of floods, droughts, diseases, Western media and institutions 
which have come to define narratives of Africa‘s development now widely speak of a 
positive outlook. Decades of Afro-pessimism and narratives of state failure are now 
being replaced by an Afro-optimist, ―Africa rising‖ narrative. In the policy environment, 
even IFIs traditionally hostile to the idea of a state expanding role in development, have 
shown more flexibility in their design and application of policy instruments in the 
developing world, especially after the 2008-9 global economic and financial crisis (Wade 
2010). This paradigm shift urges one to re-consider the following question: If African 
states can collapse because they can no longer perform the functions required of them 
to pass as states (Zartman 1995: 5), how and to what extent, can they be ―redesigned‖ 
so as to bring about development (Rose-Ackerman 1996)? What and whose 
developmental model is to be followed, and who decides? These questions are 
inextricably linked to the question of how to measure development, and above all, to the 
resurgence of the developmental state agenda in Africa. 
 
THINKING ABOUT „PETRO-DEVELOPMENTAL‟ STATES IN AFRICA 
 
 
As mentioned in the chapter‘s introductory remarks, one recurrent trend is to have 
Africa‘s developmental performance compared to that of other regions in the developing 
world, most notably, East Asia. In a debate recently organised by The Economist, one 
commentator appeared to suggest that rather than placing an inordinate focus on 
poverty reduction, industrialisation should be the common measure of successful 
development; one that would show that in reality, ―Africa is far from being another 
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economic powerhouse like East Asia‖ (Rowden 2013 in Economist 2013). Considering 
these common references, and mindful of the lack of understanding about why success 
happens (Leftwich 2009), the author will revisit the ―East Asian model‖ as a starting point 
for the analysis on the expectations placed on the 21
st
 century developmental states in 
Africa, even more so considering that ―learning about historical experiences of others 
and thinking creatively about how to take advantage of apparent lessons is a start‖ when 
attempting to reconstruct ‗developmental states‘ (Evans 2010: 38). 
 
Learning from the 20th Century East Asian „Developmental State‟  
 
Much is made of the experiences of East Asia; in effect, such has been the dominance 
of East Asia in the literature that Weiss (2000:23) commented that ―the term 
developmental state is [so] loosely applied that it has become virtually synonymous with 
the state in East Asia‖. Between the late 1960s and mid-1990s, whereas the vast 
majority of African ‗predatory‘ states struggled with political and economic instability, 
their East Asian counterparts were undergoing rapid and radical change, moving from 
being poor agrarian states to being highly industrialised states, with extraordinary rates 
of growth. Early interpretations of this economic ‗miracle‘ put an emphasis on the role of 
market forces and market-driven developmental policies, in contrast to the state/market 
dichotomy which many African states found themselves trapped in (Mkandawire 2001: 
292; Ake 1996: 18). Revisionist works have since underlined the existence of parallel 
patterns and elements, among which four were crucial: the ‗developmentalist‘ ideology; 
‗successful‘, sustained and selective state interventions; a meritocracy-based 
bureaucracy; and state capacity (Johnson 1975, 1982, 1999; Amsden 1992; Evans 
1995; Leftwich 2000; Chang 2002, 2003).  
 
A quick review of these scholarly works reveals that the main priority of the political and 
administrative elite of the newly industrialised economies of East Asia was to promote 
economic development. ‗Development‘ or ‗developmentalism‘ was conceived not only as 
high rates of accumulation and rapid industrialisation as Rowden underlined, but also 
―growth with equity‖ (Musamba 2010: 25; Evans 2008: 14).  It was accompanied by a 
favourable pattern of income equality, low levels of unemployment, improvements in 
infant mortality, life expectancy, educational achievements and other indicators of 
human development (Chang 2006; Deyo 1987). There were variations, to be sure. Jeon 
(1995) identified a ―growth-obsessed‖ pattern in South Korea; a ―growth-with-stability‖ 
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model in Singapore; and an ―equity-and-stability-based growth‖ model in Taiwan. 
Irrespective of these variations, however, legitimation of a political regime resulted from 
its performance, rather than from the way in which it came into power (Johnson 1999: 
53).   
 
To achieve high economic growth and productivity, East Asian governments pursued a 
two-pronged strategy: (a) a combination of market-friendly strategies and subsidies to 
stimulate economic growth in exchange for performance standards on private firms 
(Amsden 1992: 8); and (b) direct investment in the areas of skills acquisition, 
technological progress, and financial and labour markets (UNCTAD 2007: 58). Success, 
therefore, relied heavily on the close relationship and interaction between politicians, 
bureaucrats and ―agents of expansion‖ of the industrialisation process, that is, large 
diversified business groups in South Korea or large public enterprises in Taiwan 
(Amsden 2004: 8-9; Weiss 2000: 23; Wade 2004, 2010). The exposure of many of the 
region‘s industries to international competition of their foreign markets was another 
important driver of this success (Wade 2004).   
 
In these Asian ‗late industrialisers‘, state interventions and developmentalist ideological 
underpinnings were driven and supported by an ‗autonomous‘ state bureaucracy that 
was ―embedded in a concrete set of social ties that binds the state to society and 
provides institutionalised channels for the continual negotiation and renegotiation of 
goals and policies‖ (Evans 1995: 12; Mkandawire 2001: 290). This was a Weberian-type 
of meritocratic, relatively small and inexpensive bureaucracy within which an 
independent ―pilot agency‖
8
 had the monopoly over the planning of, and was capable of 
delivering industrial policy (Öniş 1991: 112).  
 
Öniş (1991: 114) made the point that the aforementioned ―unusual‖ degrees of 
bureaucratic autonomy and public-private cooperation did not lead to the sort of ―self-
maximising‖ forms of behaviour, or oligopolistic struggles for advantage so common in 
other contexts (see also Kohli 2004; Wade 2010). But this argument quickly became 
redundant with the advent of the 1998-99 Asian financial crises, which numerous 
advocates of neoliberalism, including the IMF, blamed on state-centred elements of the 
                                                          
8
 These included the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) in Japan, or Taiwan‘s 
Economic Planning Council & its Industrial Development Bureau, South Korea‘s Economic 
Planning Board and Singapore‘s Economic Development Board.   
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East Asian model, especially corruption and cronyism. This called into question the 
existence of a ‗developmental state‘ model that could act as a viable alternative to 
neoliberalism, although a small number of advocates, including Weiss (2000 cited in 
Musumba 2010: 28), insisted that developmental states are here to stay, except that in 
order to survive, they would have to continually adapt and innovate in order to fit in, and 
survive, the new global economic order. 
 
The other dynamic that added some degree of complexity to the debate is the 
juxtaposition of economic development, authoritarian politics and exclusionary model of 
social representation. Öniş (1992: 115) recalled the contribution of ―certain elements‖ 
within civil society, but it is largely understood that coalitions of entrepreneurs and state 
elites were contributing to the creation of developmental institutions, whilst social groups 
were ―peripheral, if not threatening to this exclusive state-society partnership‖ (Evans 
2008: 7).  One conclusion drawn from this characteristic was that the project of 
constructing developmental state is incompatible with that of building states that are 
democratically governed (Fritz and Menocal 2007).  
 
To solve the mystery about the replicability or irreplicability of East Asia‘s developmental 
state model in the rest of the developing world, Joshi (2012) argues that one should 
consider variations of a ‗non-Western‘ model of a developmental state. He specifically 
identifies three: the ―human developmental state‖, the ―social developmental state‖, and 
the most relevant to this research, the ―resource developmental state‖ – or ―petro-
developmental state‖ (Ovadia 2013a) to refer to petro-states. It is assumed here that the 
latter would fit the description of what Evans (2010) dubbed the ―21
st
 century 
developmental state‖. In addition to illuminating on the context within which the 
transformation from a ‗failed‘ or ‗cursed‘ to a ‗petro-developmental state‘ is possible, the 
ensuing discussion will establish key features that may facilitate or constrain the 
emergence and consolidation of this type of states in Africa. One should be mindful that 
the reading that follows is influenced by this dissertation‘s singular focus on 
transparency as a tool to foster good governance in petro-states like Angola. So whilst 
others have approached their analysis from a broader perspective (Bergessen et al 
2000), or looking specifically at the emergence in the Gulf of Guinea, of a ‗petro-
developmental state‘ that ―nurtures capitalism‖ by adopting policies designed ―to bolster 
domestic industry in the oil and oil services sectors‖ (Ovadia 2013: 49-64), this 
dissertation concentrates on ―how much and by what means prevailing governance 
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systems need to change in the direction of so-called modern state in order to be 
effective in delivering development and security‖ (Fritz and Menocal 2007: 532, 
emphasis added).  
  
Expectations of a „Petro-Developmental‟ State in Africa 
 
According to Bolesta (2007), a developmental state is an interventionist state committed 
to accelerating socio-economic development. It is strong enough and legally able to 
dictate not only the norms and rules of the social, political and economic existence, but 
also the directions of development - which is achieved through the process of 
industrialisation. In these states, although the strategy and goals might be drafted by the 
ruling elite, state transformation is facilitated by a competent bureaucracy, a state 
administration which is ―a structure largely independent from possible democratic 
choices of the society unlike in Mexico and Brazil‖ (ibid: 109). The economic 
environment is capitalist, meaning that ―the private sector plays a crucial role in the 
development of the country‖ (ibid; see also Bolesta 2012). The parameters by which this 
scholar and diplomat defines the developmental state are akin to those discussed 
previously, but they are mostly informed by his insight into the workings of the post-
socialist Chinese state.  
 
To be sure, there is a consensus that building or re-building 21
st
 century developmental 
states is both an economic and political project.  Still, the object of debate is on what the 
primary goal of such states should be, the process of development itself, and the 
―relational aspects‖ (Stubbs 2009) that should be defining them. Evans stresses the 
continuing role of the state in economic growth and social transformation, but confers 
that ―successful 21st century developmental states will have to depart fundamentally 
from existing models of the developmental state in order to achieve success‖ (2008: 1).  
He makes two interconnected propositions. The first is that the narrative that emerged 
out of the ―golden age of capitalism‖ cannot be sustained, and growth strategies that 
focus primarily on traditional capital accumulation will no longer suffice. Secondly, Evans 
stipulates that the state will have to rely on broader support from society, in a way that is 
different from the narrow relations it had with capitalist elites in the previous century 
(Evans 2008, 2010; Evans and Heller 2012). Essentially, Evans (2010) sees 
development primarily as ―capability expansion‖. In his view, ―a 21
st
 century 
developmental state must be a ‗capability enhancing state‘‖. It must ―support the 
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distribution of basic rights that gives individuals incentives to invest in their own 
capabilities‖, and be ―a vehicle for making social choices and defining developmental 
goals.‖ In essence, ―expanding the capabilities of the citizenry is not just a welfare goal. 
It is the inescapable foundation of sustained growth in overall GDP‖.  
 
This perspective differs from neoliberalism‘s focus on human capability in purely 
economic terms (Edighedi 2010: 13) and finds strong support within parts of the Angolan 
civil society. Not least because Angola‘s low human development and inequality levels 
exemplify worries about both the primacy of GDP growth as a measure of development, 
and the sort of ‗growth without equity‘ that is salient in both the developing and 
developed worlds. Angola achieved robust GDP growth rate in recent years, recording 
its highest scores during the ―mini golden age‖ (Da Rocha 2012: 1) that lasted between 
2005 and 2008. This was enough for the country to earn its place as the world‘s fastest 
growing economy throughout the previous decade, with an annual average GDP growth 
of 11.2 per cent (see The Economist 2011)
9
. Evidently, economic growth has immense 
benefits. Without it, ―nothing more can happen: no new jobs, no further income 
distribution, no improvement in living conditions‖ (Da Rocha 2012: 2). But economic 
growth itself says very little about, and does not always translate into, improvements in 
the overall living conditions of the population. A quick look at Angola‘s rankings in 
various indices validate this point, as they show that despite recent strides, Angola 
remains one of the world‘s most unequal countries with a Gini coefficient of 0.55 
(UNICEF 2012: 4)
10
,  and its population, one of the poorest
11
, to the point where,   
 
―Sometimes, you cannot understand why a country that is so prosperous [and is] 
the third economy in the region, has the most expensive city in the world, when 
about 60 per cent of its population live with less than 2 dollars per day. So, you 
ask yourself, why is there so much contradiction?  Why is it that there is so much 
wealth, and on the other hand, so much poverty?‖
12 
 
Saying that, the ―capability enhancing development‖ approach that Evans proposes is 
not just informed by growing evidence and increased recognition of the perverse effects 
                                                          
9
 The oil boom eventually subsided due to the 2008-09 global financial crisis, leading to a drastic 
fall of Angola‘s real GDP growth to 2.4 per cent in 2009 and 3.9 per cent in 2011, with an 
estimated rate of 5.1 per cent in 2013 (AEO 2012). 
10
 The Gini coefficient measures income disparities in a country. The higher the number, the 
more income is being taken in by a small group. 
11
 Angola ranked 148
th
 out of 187 worldwide in 2011. See UNDP (2011) available online at 
http://hdr.undp.org/en/media/HDR_2011_EN_Table1.pdf, accessed on February 18, 2012. 
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of inequality on institutions and ‗good governance‘ (Evans and Heller 2012: 6 citing 
World Bank Development Report 2006). It also is influenced by the changing character 
of economic activity, away from a focus on manufacturing onto an emphasis on the 
benefit of ―intangible assets (ideas, brand images, etc.)‖ or ―bit-driven growth‖, namely, 
―growth which is driven more by ideas and information (both as means of production and 
objects of consumption) than by the physical transformation of nature‖ (Evans 2008: 8-
10). This shift presumably has several implications for growth strategies and state-
society relations. It implies that the 21
st
 century developmental state would have to 
increase public investments in human capabilities. Further, success would depend on 
the existence and development of a capable and coherent state bureaucracy and a 
―broad-based embeddedness‖ – that which links the state to a plurality of groups, 
engenders ―multiple points of contacts with the state‖, and facilitates the ―co-production‖ 
(of services by communities, families and individuals) and coordination over domination, 
coercion or dependency (Evans 2008 13-17; Chang and Evans 2005: 26).  
 
As was the case for the 20
th
 century developmental state, studies of the 21
st
 century 
developmental state weigh in on the debate about its (in)compatibility with democracy, 
albeit only to a limited extent. Some maintain that a developmental state may not be 
able to sustain a fully democratic system in which ―people enjoy extensive rights‖ due to 
the possible unintended consequences of democracy on the developmental orientation 
of the state, in particular, its tendency to disperse power, slow down decision-making 
processes and reduce the autonomy of the state (Bolesta 2007: 106; Fritz and Menocal 
2007: 537). Bolesta (2012: 26) in fact suggests that the success of a developmental 
state depends on the interrelation of four actors - the state political elite, the 
bureaucracy, society and business – though he thinks less of civil society as a defining 
actor. Instead, apparent is his preference for thinking about the type of ―seamless web of 
political, bureaucratic, and moneyed influences‖ that structured economic life in capitalist 
Northeast Asia as the most determining factors.  
 
Others uphold on the contrary that these states should be predicated on building 
democratic (participatory) governance, for ―states whose power is democratically 
authorised have been much more successful in the long-run in developing synergistic 
relations with society than authoritarian states‖ (Chang and Evans 2005: 26-27; 
Mkandawire 2001; Meyns and Musamba 2010: 26-28). Evans particularly cautions 
against close relations with global capital for, its growing influence increases the 
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opportunities for capture and the difficulties of sustaining the right balance between 
autonomy and ‗embeddedness‘ (2010: 50). He observes that: 
  
―Developmental success has strengthened private capital and increased the 
domestic political role of transnational capital. Deeply entrenched reliance on 
local private elite, the growing centrality of transnational capital to local 
accumulation and the proliferation of alliances between local transnational capital 
have transformed the political landscape into something quite different than that it 
was 40 years ago. [This] shifting balance of public and private runs counter to the 
requirements of 21
st
 century strategies, which demand a stronger more capable 
public sector than the 20
th
 century version [...] Capability expansion fits less 
easily into a shared project with private capital‖ (ibid: 15; emphasis added).    
 
In sum, one should do away with the ―all good things go together‖ view that previously 
associated the East Asian model with ―whatever one thought was good – transparency, 
accountability, autonomy, non-corruption and so on‖ (Mkandawire 2010: 78), and think 
of the 21
st
 century developmental state ―one whose ideological underpinnings are 
developmental and one that seriously attempts to deploy its administrative and political 
resources to the task of economic development‖ (Mkandawire 2001: 291, emphasis in 
the original). Its policies should give special consideration to ―the minimal conditions of 
governance necessary to allow political and economic development to occur‖ (Grindle 
2005: 2).  They must make room for ―trial and error‖, in other words, for flexibility and 
experimentation that accommodate poor performance possibly stemming from 
―exogenous factors, miscalculation or plain bad luck‖ (Mkandawire 2001: 295).  
 
ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
This chapter sought to review the main theoretical debates and conditions that led to the 
need to regulate the African oil industry using transparency as a policy tool. In a nutshell, 
it found that demands for ORT are driven by faulty assumptions about what the problem 
of governance and development is in African petro-states. State failure theories 
undoubtedly informed the debate about the linkages between oil extraction and 
development in postcolonial Africa. They shaped and even justified international 
interventions in the sub-continent. But it is true that these theories are not always 
qualified. They offer a simplistic and static view of what development ―ought‖ to be as 
opposed to what it ―is‖ in Africa (Mkandawire 2001: 290), and even less imagination or 
thought given to what it can be in the distant future.  More problematic is the lack of 
consensus on ideal outcomes. In fact, much of this deterministic research cast doubt on 
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the possibility that Africa ever had, and can ever have, developmental states. Yet as 
Bergessen and colleagues (2000) rightly pointed out,  
―No analytical framework should be deterministic, though. It is possible to foresee 
a transformation towards a benevolent oil state. Growing oil revenues 
can facilitate positive change by 'greasing' political and economic reform 
processes. New sources of political mobilisation may appear, reinforced by for 
instance international NGO alliances and the Internet. International oil companies 
and multilateral financial institutions - both alone but more promisingly by working 
in tandem, could be able to exert effective pressure on political regimes seemingly 
immune towards conditionality.‖ 
 
For one thing, if unlike in East Asia development in Africa was constrained by limited 
resources, debts and conflicts during the 20
th
 century, it is now facilitated by vast oil 
resources, and a more favourable security, socio-political and economic environment. 
The global demand for oil resources brought about by the rise of emerging markets is 
contributing to the transformation underway, as well as the increased number of 
discoveries and improvements in the terms of trade. One also notes the influence of 
regional competition, state ambitions and agency, the strengthening of domestic 
technical capacities, increased resource nationalism and investment in social sectors. 
Parallel to state actors‘ interests, strategies and agency is the positive effect of the 
middle class, demography and the spread of mobile technologies on cultural progress 
and the ―awakening of the counter-public‖ (Faria 2013a, 2013b) - a civil society 
increasingly willing and able to find ways to ―speak up‖ about injustices and demand 
accountability through street protests, music, or social networks as in Angola and other 
African resource-rich countries.  
 
In this respect at least, the concept of a ‗petro-developmental state‘ represents a useful 
framework for understanding and explaining how a state can avoid the resource curse 
and utilise oil revenues for developmental purposes (Edighedi 2010: 11). Regrettably, 
this subject of how a developing, mineral-rich country becomes developmental has been 
overlooked in the scholarship (ibid; Ovadia 2013: 20) for a number of reasons, including 
a lack of understanding of the reform context and disagreements over visions of 
development. As the chapter showed, issues of what development should constitute, 




Two common themes run through the two sets of literature reviewed above. One is the 
concern or uncertainty surrounding the concept of democracy, and possibly that of 
accountability; and the other is the lack of understanding of the contribution of domestic 
and international actors to development or lack thereof. In particular, the question of the 
role of a ‗civil society‘ as a sine qua non condition for the effective functioning of 
developmental states is less settled than is often presumed. As subsequent chapters will 
show, this confusion has translated into the neglect of local voices in the design and 
implementation of ORT policies in Angola and beyond. More generally, one should point 
out that struggles over the meaning of development, ‗good‘ governance and 
transparency are not divorced from politics, but rather increasingly enmeshed in them in 
a context in which relations between ―public/state‖ and ―private/market‖ actors are 
undergoing change (Khagram et al 2002: 12; Newell and Wheeler 2006: 14).  Above all, 
they are linked to, and driven by, the presence of a multiplicity of actors in governance 
and development processes, their competing roles, visions and interests, and 
contradictory practices (see Peters et al 2009; Newell and Wheeler 2006).  This 
necessitates that one examine who these actors are, and what their rationales and 
objectives are for promoting and supporting ORT in ‗weak governance‘ contexts like 
Angola is also central to the understanding of how and why ORT evolved; what or 
whose goals they aim to and actually advance; and whether the policy tool can 
effectively deliver on its promises. These are the issues the second chapter will now 























―One of the reasons why Angola is not developed is be-
cause of the amount of money that has been stolen. This is 
not something that anyone looking at Angola would dispute. 
What they would argue about, is how big the problem is and 
how to solve it.‖ 
Excerpt of an interview with a Western INGO 
official, 7 March 2011. 
 
―We will not have succeeded until the citizens of resource-
rich countries see real improvements in their lives.‖ 
      Short (2011) 
 
With ORT dominating the regulatory landscape of the oil industry, it is easy to form the 
opinion that it is the sole solution proposed to transform the natural resource ‗curse‘ into 
a blessing in weak governance contexts. But it is not, except that like ORT, other 
proposals focus on domestic institutions. These proposals emphasise the adoption of 
macro-policies that can help countries diversify their economies away from the oil sector; 
the creation of sovereign wealth funds to support the development of future generations 
following the example of Norway; the distribution of oil revenues directly and equally to 
citizens as it is the case currently in Alaska and Alberta, in the United States and 
Canada respectively; the adoption of revenue management laws; and finally, the 
increase of transparency in oil sector deals. The combination of economic and political 
policies stems from the belief that economic policies are ultimately dependent on 
institutional reinforcement that encourages the reduction of corruption and 
democratisation and the growth of a developmental state more generally (Karl 1997: 
241; Auty 2001: 315-28).  
 
Needless to say that many African oil states have undertaken or are in the process of 
undertaking reforms but their experiences show that no matter the attractiveness of poli-
cies and indeed raison d’être, fundamental questions remain about their feasibility and 
impact. Is there genuine political will to see through these policies? Can and should they 
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be replicated across space and time? Is international policy intervention the right ap-
proach (Pegg 2006) or should home-grown policies be advocated at the local or national 
level? And is ‗soft‘ or ―hard‖, extraterritorial law the answer?  
 
These questions notwithstanding, the embrace of the governance reform agenda by the 
world petroleum industry is best captured by the rise of oil sector transparency as a now 
established norm (Gillies 2010). Transparency has received the support of most donors, 
investors, oil companies, and even oil-dependent developing countries that view it as the 
new, desirable and viable standard of state behaviour. Its coverage by Western and Af-
rican media outlets has significantly improved since its inception in the beginning of the 
millennium, so has the attention it is attracting from scholars and think-tanks. This in-
creased interest and the multitude of actors involved in pushing the ORT agenda has 
contributed to its rise in the international scene, but it is important to note also that para-
doxically, conflicts over the diffuse benefits, objectives and expectations of the policy 
have also created obstacles to both the evolution of the global ORT regime and its insti-
tutionalisation in developing countries.  
 
With this in mind, the main preoccupation of this chapter will be to explore further the 
normative and political context of the emergence of transparency in the African oil indus-
try, by looking specifically at actors‘ rationales and how it has been applied in other con-
texts. Specifically, the chapter asks: What explains the transparency ‗turn‘ in the global 
and African oil industry, considering that key stakeholders involved in the oil business 
were previously either reluctant or unable to address the governance deficits that char-
acterise most oil-dependent developing countries? The objective here is twofold: (1) to 
examine how the tensions between actors‘ normative and material objectives combined 
to shape not only the character of the current international disclosure-based regulatory 
regime, but also the design, application and effects of the initiatives that constitute it, 
chiefly EITI; and (2) to strengthen the reader‘s ability to appreciate the degree to which 
the Angolan experience that will be detailed in subsequent chapters compares with that 




TRANSPARENCY‟S ENTRANCE IN THE OIL INDUSTRY: ACTORS AND RA-
TIONALES 
 
The global push for increased transparency in the oil sector can be associated with 
global demands for openness spreading as part and parcel of democratisation and glob-
alisation trends after the end of the Cold War (Florini 1999). It was driven, in part, by the 
rise of neoliberalism and the West‘s desire to spread ―the positive experience of political 
systems‖ based on such liberal democratic values as the rule of law, human rights, plu-
ralist government and the market economy (Duffield 2001: 41). But it was also influ-
enced by other trends that began to shape global agendas, including the rise and grow-
ing influence of non-state actors – especially GCS and transnational corporations -; the 
increasing complexity and growing interdependence of global policy arenas; and finally, 
the rise of global media and spread of information and communication technologies. 
 
These dynamics had profound effects on international policy-making. They created the 
necessity for shared standards of correct behaviour (Florini 2002: 23-24; Van Orange 
and Parham 2009) - or as Krasner (2009: 232) argued, ―the transcendence of accepted 
rules, including the creation of shared sovereignty‖ -, thereby generating a proliferation 
of multi-stakeholder initiatives (MSIs). Also, by blurring the limits of national borders and 
creating more opportunities for interactions between state and non-state actors across 
the world, they re-ignited the debate around the intricate links between politics and eco-
nomics, which in turn, provoked a change in the policy formulation of international organ-
isations (IOs), including IFIs. Major oil companies too sought to take a proactive role in 
debates about their role in societies in which they operate, amidst concerted internation-
al NGO-led campaigns aimed at their activities. The questions are: under what circum-
stances and how did these international actors actually respond, and what motives un-
derlying these responses?  
 
In the following paragraphs, the chapter will locate the rise of ORT in (a) the belief in a 
multidisciplinary way of solving global challenges; (b) GCS‘s struggle to frame acts of 
corruption as ―symptoms of a deeper problem in the relationship between state and so-
ciety in general and in the functioning of democracy in particular‖ (Ackerman 2014: 294); 
(c) IFIs‘ objective to push through ORT as a good governance principle; (d) consumer 
governments‘ goal of ensuring their energy security; and (e) IOCs‘ intent of promoting 




Multi-Stakeholder Partnerships for Development and Governance 
 
So far in the thesis, it has been established that a key feature of the global campaign to 
increase revenue transparency in the African petroleum industry is the engagement of 
diverse actors – host and home governments, investors, IFIs, IOCs and civil society – in 
the movement. While underpinned by their own sector-specific rationales (Peters et al 
2009: 510), these actors‘ involvement primarily stems from the belief in the petroleum 
industry‘s inextricable links with local and global contexts (Karl 2007: 258), and in the 
fact that the tackling resource curse requires a holistic, multidisciplinary approach to 
problem-solving. 
 
The partnership model was publicly endorsed during the Rio Earth Summit in 1992 and 
the Johannesburg World Summit on Sustainable Development in 2002, as a key ap-
proach to achieving global sustainable development objectives. Ever since this en-
dorsement the number and size of MSPs has grown exponentially.  In the extractives 
sector, the first notable experience of collaboration gave rise to the Voluntary Principles 
on Security and Human Rights (thereafter ‗Voluntary Principles‘) in 2000. According to a 
former senior oil company executive, these were ―an important example of what it would 
be like to bring together governments, businesses and NGOs‖. Besides, the leadership 
of the US State Department and the UK Foreign Office in this case demonstrated that 
―you ought to have a strong government role and then business and NGOs can play 
their full part.‖
13
 This formulation is what partly influenced the design of EITI.  
 
Partnerships are portrayed as ―the development approach of our time‖ (Kjaer 2003: 13), 
and a source of hope because they are transforming how both commercial enterprise 
and the business of government is conducted, as well as re-shaping the nature of citi-
zen‘s engagement in the governance of their affairs (Zadek and Radovich 2006:6). As 
with most concepts used in the dissertation, however, the term ‗partnership‘ means dif-
ferent things to different people. This is illustrated by the multitude of terminologies often 
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associated with the term
14
, as well as by the lack of a common definition. Among the 
plethora of definitions produced to date is that offered by the UN, as ―voluntary and col-
laborative relationships between various parties, both State and non-State, in which all 
participants agree to work together to achieve a common purpose or undertake a specif-
ic task and to share risks, responsibilities, resources, competencies and benefits‖ (cited 
in Tennyson and Bowman 2003: 36). Others define partnerships as an ―alliance between 
organisations from two or more sectors that commit themselves to working together to 
undertake a sustainable development project‖, in order to ―share risks and benefits, re-
view the relationship regularly and revise the partnership as necessary‖ (Tennyson and 
Wilde 2000: 12).   
 
From these definitions it resorts that partnerships are by and large and voluntary, which 
means that no single partner is forced to opt in, and accordingly, that there is no major 
consequence for opting out as these are not legally binding. The definitions raise the ex-
pectation of a common purpose and mutual benefits for all stakeholders involved. In the 
ORT arena, this ‗win-win‘ situation was best captured by the former British Prime Minis-
ter, Tony Blair, who stated:  
 
―We need to use transparency in revenue and financial management to allow 
people to hold government to account and build public trust. Increased transpar-
ency will also help to create the right climate for attracting foreign investment, and 
encourage an enterprise culture. Governments need to create this favourable en-
vironment, but companies have an interest in promoting transparency too. Trans-
parency should help companies to reduce reputational risks, to address the con-
cerns of shareholders and to help manage risks of long-term investments. And 
transparency is a positive contribution to development as it increases the likeli-
hood that revenues will be used for poverty reduction‖ (Blair 2003:2). 
 
In addition to the principles of mutual benefit and collaboration, Tennyson suggests two 
other principles which are key to the success of any partnership (Tennyson 2004: 6-7): 
(a) equity, or the idea that each partner‘s contributions should be equally valued and not 
simply in terms of their cash value or public profile; and (b) transparency or the principle 
that each partner should be open about their own vested interests.  
 
                                                          
14
 The term ‗partnership‘ is often used is often used interchangeably with such terms as ‗multi-
stakeholder partnership‘, ‗cross-sector partnership‘, ‗tri-sector partnership‘, ‗public-private 
partnership‘, ‗new social partnership‘ or ‗strategic alliance‘.  
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For proponents in Europe and North America where they originated, the main value of 
MSPs lies in their ability to enable norms and standards (Guoqiang et al., 2009: 38)
15
, 
knowledge dissemination, social learning, and in closing the ―participation gap‖ in global 
politics (cited in Compagnon 2008: 6). For critics, the challenge remains that there is not 
sufficient empirical evidence on the benefits of partnerships; as Martens (2007: 34) con-
tended, ―the widely-held notion that there is no alternative is often no more than a pro-
fession of faith‖. It would seem, in effect, that the operational or practical challenges as-
sociated with this multi-disciplinary approach to problem-solving are often greater than 
the benefits it brings to some stakeholders.  
 
Indeed, several studies show that MSPs can lead to power imbalances (Hale and Mau-
zerall 2004; Rein et al 2005; Martens 2007; Findlay-Brooks et al. 2007). While seeking 
to be inclusive and participatory, they tend to exclude certain groups, often accentuating 
existing conflicts over power relations between and within communities. They can allow 
certain participants to acquire the influence necessary to shape agenda-setting and de-
cision-making by other less powerful actors (Martens 2007: 5). Critics fear, for example, 
that partnerships can be used by corporations for ‗blue-washing‘ or ‗green-washing‘, to 
divert the attention from their irresponsible behaviour (Hale and Mauzerall 2004; Stott 
and Rein 2003; Martens 2007). They suggest that endorsement from international insti-
tutions such as the UN, or in the case of extractive industries, the World Bank, can grant 
companies a ―false sense of legitimacy‖ (Hale and Mauzerall 2004: 223) which may en-
hance companies‘ image and help them gain access to markets, but damage the reputa-
tion of the IO in question. A case in point is the Chad-Cameroon Pipeline Project, a pub-
lic-private partnership that tarnished the World Bank‘s reputation and its ability to miti-
gate social impacts from the project.  For governments, partnership initiatives can be 
seen as an opportunity to shy away from their responsibility for social services provision. 
This is sometimes the case in developing countries, where the general assumption of 
the existence of a well-functioning state capable of addressing a set of responsibilities 
simply does not reflect the reality on the ground, as the capacity of these states is usual-
ly lacking.  
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 These are known as rule-setting and advocacy partnerships, as opposed to implementation 
partnerships that are predominantly about ―facilitating, financing and managing action to achieve 
particular, tangible objectives‖ (Hamann and Boulogne 2008: 60). 
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Another major challenge with partnerships is the lack of legitimacy of the initiatives 
themselves. They are perceived as a tool for ―continued intervention by the West in de-
veloping countries‖ (Stott and Rein 2005: 6), and as underpinned by ―a clash of 
worldviews and expectations‖ (Idemudia 2007: 20) – or differences in perspectives and 
worldviews defined by the socio-historic context of the actors within them. Additionally, 
these types of arrangements do not only lack ‗teeth‘. They are also, in most cases, likely 
to be alliances between non-elected actors with immense power but dubious mandates 
– a fact that ultimately leads many to question their credibility (Findlay-Brooks et al. 
2007; Rochlin et al 2008) and appropriateness for developing countries (Idemudia 
2007). As will be shown shortly, many of the foregoing shortcomings apply to EITI. First, 
one explores the foundation and value of ORT as a right. 
 
The Human and Democratic Right to Information and Transparency 
 
As noted in the introduction of the dissertation, transparency or the ‗right to know‘ is 
seen as the first normative goal that transparency may seek to further (Gupta 2009: 9). 
Yet just as transparency has several meanings, so too has the ‗right to know‘ or ‗right to 
information‘. In Transparency in International Law, scholars explain that while the right to 
information has been enshrined in several national and international laws, for decades 
these covenants interpreted it in a ―liberal‖ and limited sense. In other words, the reading 
therein was that of a ‗negative‘ right that did not confer on citizens the ‗positive‘ right to 
obtain information held by governmental agencies, and could not function as a legal 
basis for claims to access administrative files, court proceedings or records, and could 
not act as a catalyst for the creation of governmental transparency (Peters 2013: 587). 
The Constitutional Court of South Africa was chosen to illustrate this point, as it 
interpreted the ―freedom of information‖ not as a ―universally accepted fundamental 
human right‖, but as a right ―directed at promoting good government‖ (Klaaren 2013: 
223). A second feature inherent in regional and international covenants was that 
whereas individuals had the right to receive information, and sometimes seek and 
receive information, there was no guidance on who the holder of the information should 
be, whether private or public actors, state or international agencies (Peters 2013: 587).   
 
More recently though, there has been a shift towards the recognition of a new and 
broader construction of right to information in provisions of legal documents. This shift is 
spearheaded by case law, regional bodies such as the European Court of Human Rights 
50 
 
and most significantly, the UN Human Rights Commission (ibid: 588; Klaaren 2013: 228-
38). In its General Comment on Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, the Human Rights Commission stated on the right to access information 
in paragraph 18: 
 
―Every individual should have the right to ascertain in an intelligible form, 
whether, and if so, what personal data is stored in automatic data files, and for 
what purposes. Every individual should also be able to ascertain which public 
authorities or private individuals or bodies control or may control his or her files. If 
such files contain incorrect personal data or have been collected or processed 
contrary to the provisions of the law, every individual should have the right to 
have his or her records rectified.‖ 
 
In terms of who should have the onus of disclosure, paragraph 7 stipulates that primary 
obligation should fall on ―all branches of the State (executive, legislative and judicial) and 
other public bodies or governmental authorities at whatever level‖ (paragraph 7), 
besides ―other entities when such entities are carrying out public functions‖ (paragraph 
19). As for the content of such a right to information, the Commission noted:  
 
―Such information includes records held by a public body, regardless of the form 
in which the information is stored, its source and the date of production […]. The 
right of access to information includes a right whereby the media has access to 
information on public affairs and the right of the general public to receive media 
output.‖  
 
Other bodies and scholars adopt either a limited or expansionary perspective on the 
content of this right. As an example, Klaaren (2013: 232) points to the omission, in the 
African Charter on Human and Peoples‘ Rights, of the term ―seek‖ which has been a 
―key textual term in the elaboration of a free-standing right to information
16
. The author 
himself distinguished between four components of the right to know: ―as a democracy-
supplementing right, an individual- autonomy right, a market-supplementing right and a 
socio-economic right‖ (ibid: 227). All four components find broad support in the literature.  
 
On the value of the right to information as a ―supplement‖ to democracy, some experts 
submit that transparency - or a broad right to information - is part of the value systems of 
                                                          
16
 The author referred here to Article 9(1) of the African Charter of Human and People‘s Rights 
adopted in 1981, which provides that ―[e]very individual shall have the right to receive 
information‖ and Article 9(2) which states that ―[e]very individual shall have the right to express 
and disseminate his opinions within the law.‖ 
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liberal democracy and human rights (Dror 1999: 63); that it can promote democracy by 
allowing different social groups to participate in the decision-making process and monitor 
state institutions (Bellver and Kaufman 2005: 11). Moreover, it is held that while at the 
national level ―democratic control by citizens, through public opinion, fosters 
transparency in State activities and promotes the accountability of State officials in 
relation to their public activities‖, at the level of global governance, transparency can 
equally be ―democratically relevant to international actors‖ (Peters 2013: 562-64). 
Specifically, transparency can ―alleviate the democratic deficit to be found in 
international organisations and international law-making processes‖, by ―providing a 
reasonable semblance of democracy at the global level of decision-making‖, in the 
sense of acting as an alternative accountability mechanism when direct accountability is 
lacking (ibid: 564). In the opposite direction, experts affirm that the level of democracy is 
determinative of whether and how international transparency initiatives are applied, and 
whether they are effective. Fox (2013:1) argues in fact, that: 
 
―We should not expect international initiatives to make a big difference in nation 
states that are already solidly democratic, or where authoritarian rule is 
entrenched. In countries in transition, in contrast, international initiatives can 
bolster national actors who have the motive and means to mobilize – and they 
can get the attention of those governments that might actually care about naming 
and shaming.‖  
 
Others believe the relationship between transparency, democracy and corruption to be 
more complex.  Analysts argue that transparency cannot directly impact country scores 
on the Corruption Perception Index, Governance Matters, Freedom House, Human 
Development Indicators (Gillies and Heuty 2011: 29-31). One interlocutor was in fact 
adamant that ―there is no way can EITI be expected to affect democracy scores, 
especially in a couple years‖
17
. The reason for this scepticism varies, but one that was 
noticeably stressed was the flawed methodologies employed for the indicators in 
question. As one senior Western development analyst wrote,   
―Scoring according to these indicators is done through a not-very-transparent 
process whereby the views of ―experts‖ are mixed (or not mixed) with findings of 
social surveys.  These data aren‘t ―facts‖ but ―factoids‖ constructed in ways that 
are open to question. And the results can be laughable‖
18
.   
 
                                                          
17
 Personal communication with Western INGO official, 5 June 2010. 
18
 Personal communication, 12 February 2013. 
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There is also the question of whose opinion gets surveyed. As far as corruption is 
concerned, ―in many African cases, those advising Transparency International and other 
anti-corruption bodies have quite different perceptions than do ordinary citizens.‖
19
 
Razafindrakoto and Roubaud (2006) share this view. Writing about corruption perception 
indexes, they affirm that:  
―The experts do not provide a good gauge of the real level of corruption. They 
systematically overestimate the frequency of corruption. Moreover, the ranking of 
countries derived from their perceptions does not tie in with reality. The experts‘ 
measurement error is all the greater in that the countries are not well graded in 
the international bases, which penalises the poorest of them.‖ 
 
 The interpretation of the right to information as an individual-autonomy right and a 
socio-economic right or as ―a right to access a mechanism to access information‖ 
(Klaaren 2013: 228)
20
 also has the backing of other analysts. Henriques (2007: 53) 
posited that transparency is valuable because it could be shown to be an apparently 
‗new‘ human right that is necessary for the achievement of other rights. Armatya Sen too 
argued, in his oft-cited Development as Freedom, that transparency is connected to 
human rights and human development, especially as transparency guarantees, including 
the right to disclosure, have ―a clear instrumental role in preventing corruption, financial 
irresponsibility and underhand dealings‖, and they are critical in providing incentives for 
efficient service delivery and allocation of resources, as well as a way forward for a more 
humane society (Sen 1999: 40). Further, analysts contest that transparency acts as an 
―instrumental right for empowerment‖ (Article 19 and ADC 2007), that which leads to the 
realisation of other rights and freedoms enabling the achievement of social and 
economic justice (Sen 1999; Florini 2007). Here, the ―empowerment case‖ - or ―the 
empowerment of disadvantaged groups to exercise their voice effectively, so that power 
relations are re-constituted to their advantage‖ - is seen as a defining characteristic of 
―deep‖ as opposed to ―formal electoral‖ democracies (McGee et al 2010:7). 
 
Finally, the fourth concept underlying the right to information moves beyond the public 
sphere into the private sphere, where it is seen as a significant facilitator of economic 
efficiency, of the self-regulation of the market in goods and services (Klaaren 2013: 
227), and of the efficiency of investment decisions, which can in turn improve a country‘s 
competitiveness and foster its economic growth (Florini 1999; Bellver and Kaufman 




 These are taken to entail the sum total of human rights that a right to information fosters.  
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2005). This theoretical argument is nonetheless conditional on the extent to which there 
is corporate transparency (Williams 2003:42-46), which refers to the availability of 
financial and other business information about firms in a given country (Bellver and 
Kaufman 2005:7).  
 
There is a predisposition to treat ORT as stand-alone principle, with some proponents 
even suggesting, in the context of EITI, that it is not a ―human rights standard‖ (Short 
2014). Yet, as Anne Peters affirms, there are ―practical consequences to acknowledging 
a human right of access to public documents, as opposed to endorsing transparency 
(only) as an ‗objective‘ (not rights-based) principle of governance‖ (Peters 2013: 290). 
One is that ―access to non-public information could not be summarily rejected as falling 
outside the scope of the human right to information‖; another is that the ―burden of 
justification in maintaining secrecy‖ would shift to the information-holder. A third point of 
relevance to the extractive industries is that such a human right underpinning would 
make it possible to ―counter World Bank decisions to finance ecologically sensitive 
developmental projects‖ (ibid: 291). This will be crucial to avoid past mistakes that led 
the Bank to promote ORT as a good governance principle. 
 
IFIs and Transparency as a „Good Governance‟ Principle 
 
The World Bank is another international actor whose support for revenue transparency 
in the early stages facilitated its entrance and rise in the African oil sector. Transparency 
was a key variable of the ‗good governance‘ concept, itself a contested term as will be 
shown subsequently. By the late 1990s, it had become necessary to ―bring the state 
back in‖ the debate about development in Africa. At the same time, the processes identi-
fied in the resource curse theory provided IFIs with the perfect opportunity to re-assert 
their authority and re-define a role for themselves in the wake of widespread criticisms 
(Kapur and Webb 2000: 17-18; Gillies 2010). After initially focusing solely on market-led 
growth, the Bank expanded the term ‗governance‘ to denote the need for institutional 
reform and a more efficient public sector in sub-Saharan Africa (World Bank 1992). In 
1999, together with the IMF, it launched the Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initi-
ative that would enable low income countries to access financial assistance or debt relief 
on condition that they draw up poverty reduction programmes also known as poverty re-
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duction strategy papers (Harrera et al 2005; Razafindrakoto et al 2006)
21
. ―It is here‖, 
Doornbos (2001: 98) writes, ―where the notion of ‗good governance‘ came in, somehow 
broad enough to comprise public management as well as political dimensions while at 
the same time vague enough to allow some discretion and flexibility in interpretation as 
to what ‗good‘ governance would or would not condone.‖  
 
Indeed while there is a broad consensus on what bad governance represents, and on 
the fact that good governance is necessary to development, there is no agreement on 
what exactly constitutes good governance. Since the emergence of the concept, its defi-
nition has emphasised the political components of local ownership, accountability, trans-
parency, participation in decision-making and empowerment, yet the measurements and 
comparisons of some of these components across and within countries at different mo-
ments in time have proved unreliable (Grindle 2007; Kaufman 2005). According to 
Campbell (2009: 249), this underlines the ―ambiguity and confusion that arises as a re-
sult of the polysemic nature of the notion of governance, and notably the consequences 
of the manner in which it is conceptualised and used by multilateral financial institutions.‖  
Grindle suggested a way to solve these ambiguities, by thinking of institution and capaci-
ty-building as ―products of time‖.  She argued that ―not all governance deficits need to (or 
can) be tackled at once‖; in fact, ―governance achievements can also be reversed‖.  
Consequently, ―interventions thought to contribute to the ends of economic and political 
development need to be questioned, prioritised, and made relevant to the conditions of 
individual countries‖ (2007: 554).  Others affirm that it is this conception of ‗good enough 
governance‘ that ―bridges key concerns of both the developmental state agenda (achiev-
ing results on social progress) and the good governance agenda (the development of 
fair and humane rules of the game)‖ (Fritz and Rocha Menocal 2007: 538).  
 
Onto the question of the rationale and application of the ‗good‘ governance concept in 
the oil sector, Szablowski (2007: 100 cited in Campbell 2009: 5) posits that this model 
represented an ―influential attempt to arrive at a new, post-liberal social contract with re-
gard to the development of large-scale projects in the Global South‖. Others charge that 
this normative shift enabled Western donors and IFIs to link good governance to eco-
nomic development, leading them to conclude that several global governance arrange-
ments and outside actors ought to concern themselves with the changing governance 
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 I am grateful to David Sogge for bringing these publications to my attention.  
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practices and arrangements in developing countries (Benner et al 2010: 291). This con-
tributed to shift attention back to host countries and indicators of bad governance among 
which is the incidence of corruption.  
 
Crucially, attempts by the Bank and other IFIs to address social issues within the mar-
ket-led paradigm did not lead to the annihilation of the neoliberal fundamentals. What it 
did, according to Carroll, was changing the way in which these fundamentals were em-
bedded and delivered. In his words,  
 
―This new social neoliberalism deployed particular political technologies – that is 
methods to assist with the embedding of particular projects and programmes 
[that] included participatory approaches and consultation exercises designed to 
circumvent or dissolve implementation impediments. [They] were executed in a 
manner that sought to build constituencies for particular agendas and marginalise 
opposition, in tandem with technocratic efforts to avoid some of the problems at-
tending past efforts – especially environmental and social problems associated 
with large scale infrastructure projects. [This involved] the increasing internment 
of NGOs and social and environmental ‗experts‘ into ‗development‘ practice […] 
and in particular those elements of it congenial to the operationalization of ne-
oliberal development‖ (Carroll 2010: 8). 
 
In effect, these new legitimation processes, and the good governance agenda more 
generally, enabled the Bank to proceed apace with its investments in the developing 
world. As Sogge (2011: 3) points out, at stake were ―claims to economic and strategic 
advantages gained in controlling hydrocarbons, rare minerals and other natural re-
sources - things that awaken the animal spirits of powerful outsiders.‖ They played a 
crucial role in the management of the crisis of credibility that the institution suffered from 
before the launch, in 2001, of the Extractive Industries Review (EIR) in response to GCS 
activism against the Bank‘s financing of and involvement in large oil and gas projects 
which, as Peters alluded to earlier, were perceived as ecologically and socially damag-
ing. Many of the Bank‘s critics felt that through its involvement in these projects, the mul-
tilateral institution had effectively become a major contributor to ―the perpetration, per-
petuation, and amelioration of the resource curse‖ (Duruigbo 2005: 25); and that it had 
generated conflicts between its traditional purpose of poverty reduction and its pursuit of 
profit-maximisation (Turcotte, 2002: 130-1; Cray and Kretzmann, 2001; Hilson and Ma-




Both the results of the EIR and the Bank‘s response to these were equally surprising to 
say the least. As one expert commented,  
 
―When the EIR was launched, no one at the Bank anticipated that it would yield 
the result it did: feedback from its handpicked director, Dr Emil Salim, that the 
Bank must get out of the extractive industries and move into renewable ener-
gy.  But just when things were about to kick off when the Bank refused to take 




The Bank then ―latched‖ onto EITI and ORT as a valuable tool to ―manoeuvre and 
manage political space, post-review, in its favour‖ (Bracking 2009: 4). This would, in turn, 
have the triple effect of securing the future interests of capital, safeguarding the 
legitimacy of the Bank (Carroll 2010: 3; Bracking 2009), and enhancing its influence over 
oil governance reform processes in implementing countries. Yet many doubt that the 
Bank is the right agency to lead on the drive for good oil governance in developing 
countries. Fjeldstad and Isaksen (2008) argue that as an institution under strong 
pressure to lend, and one  whose mandate prohibits intervening in recipient countries‘ 
politics, the Bank is not only poorly structured to lead a fight against corruption, but more 
so, that it lacks adequate knowledge of corruption realities in these countries. In 
contrast, there are a lot of expectations on the Fund‘s leverage to move forward 
necessary reforms, as it is thought to have done most recently through the SBA in 
Angola.  Chapter 6 shall assess not just whether this hypothesis is founded, but also 
whether the Fund has made full use of its presumed influence to drive positive change in 
postwar Angola.   
 
Home States and Energy Security through Transparency 
 
For ‗home‘ states, the drive to promote greater ORT lies at the heart of energy security 
concerns. These concerns are particularly accentuated in the US, where it is assumed 
that ―poor governance and a lack of transparency in global energy transactions have se-
vere implications both for economic development and political stability of oil producing 
countries and for long-term U.S. energy security‖ (cited in Thomisee 2007). Discussions 
of energy security usually begin with home states‘ national energy challenges, from de-
clining oil production, growing dependence on foreign oil to the need to diversify energy 
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supplies. Clearly, a heightened awareness of the geopolitical implications of these ener-
gy supply and demand issues has given energy issues an increasing prominence in the-
se states‘ domestic and foreign policies (Tønnesson and Kolas 2006: 5). But underlying 
‗energy security‘
23
 needs alone is insufficient to explain the so-called ―scramble for Afri-
can oil‖
24
. The other explanation accounting for this interest lies in Africa‘s strategic im-
portance for the global energy market and its positioning as a viable alternative source 
of oil supply. Africa‘s oil is indeed highly regarded in the industry on account of its high 
quality ‗sweet crude‘, its proximity to European and American markets and relatively low 
costs of extraction. Further, some energy experts perceive the expanding membership of 
Africa‘s oil and gas club and the recent shift away from nuclear energy following the Fu-
kushima nuclear disaster (of March 2011) as revitalising and increasing further Africa‘s 




Yates suggests, in addition, that one should not detach oil from its location and the histo-
ry of that ‗place‘. In the African context, that would be disregarding the crucial fact that 
besides being located within superpowers‘ old ―colonial spheres of influence‖, Africa‘s oil 
is serving their imperialist interests (Yates 2012: 3). According to this scholar, the con-
tinued control of African oil industries by former and ‗new‘ colonial powers - France‘s To-
tal in Gabon and American Gulf Oil in the Northern Angolan region of Cabinda - exempli-
fy this pattern (ibid: 29-34, 44-56). Others like Yates supporting the ‗energy imperialism‘ 
theory attribute the recent rise of military interventions - notably through the U.S. African 
Command (AFRICOM) structure - in the Gulf of Guinea to the US Administration‘s desire 
to gain control over world oil supplies (Klare 2001; Ovadia 2008), presumably with the 
objective of circumventing China‘s attempts to ‗lock up‘ oil supplies in Africa and else-
where (Bellamy Foster 2005).   
 
But these geopolitical rivalries between China and the US have been largely overplayed.   
As Raphael and Stokes (supra: 914) opine, ―the assumption of innate geopolitical rivalry 
is not sufficiently attentive to the largely positive-sum nature of US global hegemony, 
and the dense economic and political linkages which now exist between alleged rival 
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 ‗Energy Security‘ is defined here as access to cheap, secure and reliable sources of energy.  
24
 Yates defines the ―scramble of African oil‖ as ―a pattern of globalisation that has generalised 
foreign oil investments, which had previously been exclusive domains of former colonial powers‖. 
See Yates (2012: 16). 
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 Discussions held during a meeting on ‗African Energy and UK Energy Policy‘, at Chatham 
House, 14 November 2012.  
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core powers and regions.‖ Moreover, Croshaw and Ye (2012) see positives in both Chi-
na‘s and the US‘s interpretations of energy security. In China, they contend, energy se-
curity is defined as ―an ability to rapidly adjust to its new dependency on global markets 
and engage in energy diplomacy, shifting from its former commitments to self-reliance 
and sufficiency […] to a new desire to build a well-off society […] and become open to 
the outside word […]‖ (ibid: 16-17).  According to this reading, securing energy calls for 
―mutually beneficial cooperation, diversified forms of development and common energy 
security through coordination‖ (ibid: 17 citing Chairman Hu Jintao). In 2007, the US gov-
ernment also declared that its policy would be to increase energy security by ―promoting 
anti-corruption initiatives in oil and natural gas rich countries‖, and ―programs such as 
the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative that seek to instill transparency and ac-
countability into extractive industries resource payments‖ (ibid: 29).  
 
Bellamy Foster (2005) blamed the emphasis, in the US, on the link between national se-
curity and energy issues on the influence that national security analysts have on strate-
gic energy policy. Taking the James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy Report on The 
Changing Role of National Oil Companies in International Energy Markets and David 
Litvin‘s writing on ―Oil, Gas and Imperialism‖ as cases in point, he argued that this influ-
ence has led to more support of oil imperialism that involves consumer states launching 
political or military interventions to secure supplies, break up the monopoly power of oil 
producers; and to ―guard against a ‗hostile‘ alliance between major oil produc-
ing/consuming states, such as Russia, China, Iran, and the Central Asian states‖ (ibid). 
But it is also the case that efforts by some of these strategists and think tanks to realign 
the discourse on energy security with transparency, CSR and human rights principles, 
elicited the US government‘ support for the ORT policy norm.  Insiders believe this to be 
the case with the UK government as well, especially at the initial stages of norm setting 
and promotion (Van Oranje and Parham 2009: 42, 57; Gillies 2010: 112). An supple-
mentary trigger in this latter case was the wish to counter the rising popular criticism of 
the UK government‘s investment in projects like the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan pipeline (ibid).   
 
IOCs and Transparency as Corporate Responsibility 
 
As illustrated in the introduction, IOCs are one of the lead ―norm entrepreneurs‖ of ORT. 
Their support for the principle of transparency is part of their strategy to demonstrate 
good CSR – a term often used interchangeably with corporate citizenship or corporate 
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responsibility to denote the idea or expectation that business, in view of its growing 
power, influence and resources, should be able and willing to take up a more active role 
in the positive development of society
26
. The rise of this agenda can be traced back to 
civil society activism against globalisation, and in particular, against the negative 
developmental impacts of large corporations (Utting 2005). Such activism took early aim 
at large oil companies that were implicated in several high-profile scandals and 
disasters, including the Exxon Valdez oil spill off the Alaskan coast in 1989, Shell‘s 
disposal of the Brent Spar oil rig in 1995 and accusations of complicity in human rights 
abuses in Nigeria, and IOCs‘ involvement in corruption scandals in conflict zones in 
Angola, Sudan and Colombia (Utting and Ives 2006: 12).  
 
Driven by economic and commercial interests, reputational concerns, other internal 
motives and home state regulation, several large IOCs have engaged in CSR efforts. 
Over the years, many have adopted codes of conduct and various CSR initiatives such 
as the UN Global Compact, published sustainability reports, and invested in social 
projects sometimes in partnership with government institutions, NGO, and/or IFIs. Like 
the resource curse however, CSR theory and its practice have become contentious. In 
fact, the advent of CSR in the development discourse does raise a number of questions. 
What are its purposes? Is it an appropriate tool for dealing with the complex governance 
and development challenges facing resource-rich countries? And how can one measure 
its impacts? Another challenge is that it is difficult to measure. The issue here is not just 
about measuring its impacts, but about what to measure and how. Put simply, should 
the emphasis be on the outcomes of CSR initiatives or on the processes through which 
these initiatives were moulded, negotiated and implemented? Besides, what structural 
and context-specific factors shape corporate behaviour, or affect what CSR instruments 
can or cannot achieve in the developing world, and how? What about the element of 
comparability; in other words, how do we compare the community development activities 
of oil companies against one another in the various countries in which these companies 
operate (Prieto-Carron et al 2006)?   
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 Blowfield and Frynas (2005: 503) define CSR as ―an umbrella term for a variety of theories and 
practices all of which recognize the following: (a) that companies have a responsibility for their 
impact on society and the natural environment, sometimes beyond legal compliance and the 
liability of individuals; (b) that companies have a responsibility for the behaviour of others with 
whom they do business (e.g. within supply chain); and that (c) business needs to manage its 







Advocates of CSR believe in the great potential for business to address social, 
economic and environmental issues in the communities and societies in which they 
operate, while sceptics point to the potential adverse effects of the mainstreaming of the 
CSR agenda on its expected beneficiaries. To illustrate, Henderson (2005: 32) warned 
that the case against CSR is not that it would necessarily be bad for profits, but that, 
whatever its effects on enterprise profitability in particular cases, it would make people in 
general poorer, by weakening the performance of business enterprises in their primary 
role. He adds that businesses‘ lack of knowledge and expertise would hamper social 
provision which is, and should remain, the responsibility of the state.  
 
Others claim that CSR is used by large corporations solely for public relations purposes, 
or to legitimise their hegemonic position and shape the institutional context (Utting 2005; 
Utting and Ives 2006). Further, they believe that the Western origins of the CSR concept 
render it largely inappropriate for addressing the governance challenges facing 
developing countries, and call for a separate CSR agenda focused on examining, 
among other things, the enabling or constraining role of developing country governments 
on the discourse and practice of CSR (Blowfield and Frynas 2005; Frynas 2005; 
Hamann 2006; Visser 2008; Idemudia 2011). A new study proposed going beyond the 
consideration of CSR as a business and ethics issue, which not only obscures CSR‘s 
contribution to other fields - such as public health, education, poverty reduction -, but 
also neglects CSR‘s impacts on government institutions, local administrations, civil 
society organisations and local populations (Tallio 2013: 91). Pointing towards the 
increasingly positive input of CSR in Angola, this study found that ―CSR departments 
have become essential development actors and their legitimacy no longer needs to be 
proven‖ (ibid: 92), suggesting that this is due to an undergoing shift affecting external 
development actors in the country. According to its author,  
 
―Relations between ―classical‖ actors of development have changed. The status 
of NGOs is different as they are no longer the contracting authority but 
technicians that implement projects on behalf of the CSR departments […] 
Indeed, how businesses handle development issues rubs off on how 
development issues are defined‖ (ibid: 93). 
 
How this and other changes - including the geopolitical shift mentioned in the 
introduction - affected GCS‘s work in the field of ORT is a critical issue that will be 
considered in Chapters 7 and 8.  On IOCs, it is worth pointing out that this study offers 
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an alternative interpretation of the practice of CSR in Angola. Rather than approaching 
this in terms of negative or positive impacts, this reading is about shedding light on the 
dilemmas and paradoxes facing IOCs in developing countries. In particular, the objective 
will be to look into how external and internal factors mediated key companies‘ responses 
to the call for greater ORT in postwar Angola.   
 
The foregoing discussion served to show how diverse, and often conflicting, were the 
rationales and objectives underpinning the emergence and support of ORT by interna-
tional norm entrepreneurs and adopters. Such a discussion is central to the understand-
ing of how and why ORT evolved and, specifically for the purposes of the next section, 
why ORT initiatives took the form they did.  The following is an assessment of the shape 
and record of EITI, which is understood to be ―one of the centrepieces of global efforts to 
tackle the ‗resource curse‘ and translate natural resource wealth into genuine develop-
ment for producing countries‖ (Critical Resource 2008). 
 
FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE: SPOTLIGHT ON EITI 
 
There are several reasons that justify a focus on EITI in this chapter. First, as noted pre-
viously, Angola was a key trigger for the creation of this MSI. Second, there is a sense 
among many interviewees that the debate on the potential benefits of joining the EITI for 
Angola, and the international transparency campaign in general, is in part behind the in-
crease of transparency in public financial management in the country. Moreover, Ango-
la‘s membership of EITI continues to be advocated by several foreign governments and 
civil society organisations. It was certainly a talking point during the visit of Hillary Clin-
ton, former U.S. Secretary of State, to Angola in August 2009. Fourth is the evolving 
landscape. One oft-cited factor Angola‘s reluctance to join EITI has been the hypocrisy 
of Western governments that preach what they would not practise themselves. This justi-
fication now appears redundant since key governments like the US and UK have now 









Table 1: The EU and US Reporting Standards in a Nutshell  










 Companies: EU and non-EU 
large oil, gas, mining and forest-
ry companies, privately or state-
owned companies, parent or 
subsidiaries companies, listed 
on EU regulated stock markets; 
and companies with depository 
receipts. 
 Activities: exploration, prospec-
tion, discovery, development, 
extraction and payments from 
the logging of primary forests. 
 Payments: taxes, royalties, fees 
(including licence fees), produc-
tion entitlements, bonuses, 
payments for infrastructure im-
provements.  
 Companies: US and foreign oil, 
gas and mining companies, pri-
vately or publicly owned, listed 
on the US stock exchange, as 
well as subsidiaries where con-
solidated in the parent compa-
ny‘s financial statement.   
 Activities: exploration, extrac-
tion, processing, export, or the 
acquisition of a licence for any 
such activity involved in the 
commercial development of oil, 
gas or minerals. 
 Payments: taxes, royalties, fees 
(including licence fees), produc-
tion entitlements, bonuses, divi-








 Level of Disclosure: reporting 
required for each project
27
 in 
each country where firms oper-
ate 
 Level of government: payments 
to be disclosed include those 
made to any national, subna-
tional or local authority, depart-
ment, agency, or undertaking 
controlled by a government au-
thority such as SOEs. 
 Level of disclosure: reporting 
required for each project, to 
each foreign government. 
 Level of government: payments 
made to be disclosed include 
those made to any national, 
subnational such as the gov-
ernment of a state, province, 
county, district, municipality, or 





 Disclosure of any payment 
worth at least 100,000 Euros, 
whether made as a single pay-
ment or a series of related pay-
ments, in money or in kind.  
 Disclosure of any payment 
worth at least US$100,000, 
whether made as a single pay-
ment or a series of related pay-
ments. 
Exemptions  Parent companies of small and 
medium firms unless  
 No Exemptions 
Source: RWI (2011); US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) (2012); EU 





                                                          
27
 Article 41 (4) of the EU Rules define ―project‖ as ―the operational activities that are governed 
by a single contract, license, lease, concession or similar legal agreements and form the basis 
for payment liabilities with a government.‖ 
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Globally, EITI has informed a number of other ORT initiatives. Both Dodd-Frank 1504 
and the EU Rules draw from the new EITI rules adopted in May 2013, except that unlike 
EITI the first these ORT initiatives are mandatory, and in the case of the EU Rules, ex-
tend to the forestry industry (see Table 1 above). There is also an argument that con-
structive engagement with EITI by new emerging oil consumers like China can foster 
greater transparency in the sector. As Lord Malloch-Brown, a former British Minister of 
International Development, put it: 
 
―China's full support for and engagement with the Extractive Industries Transpar-
ency Initiative would not only be hugely symbolic but would make a real practical 
difference. It would be a big push towards much greater transparency in […] oil 
markets. The point is that a common approach will only be effective if it is just 
that – common. It is bound to be weakened if we apply different standards as do-
nors and partners on working conditions, labour conditions or debt sustainability 
or standards of governance in different individual countries. But for none of us, 
least of all China, working together in this way, shouldn't be seen as a sacrifice of 
agenda‖ (quoted in Guoqiang et al 2009: 49).      
 
As argued elsewhere, this proposition - that China‘s involvement with EITI can be a 
game changer - remains unproven, partly because of EITI‘s own track record (Mouan 
2010b). Before making sense of this argument, one revisits  the BP incident that shook 
the global oil industry in early 2001 together with the achievements of EITI‘s other pre-
cursor, PWYP.  
 
The BP Incident 
 
Interviews with key informants suggest that on the whole, the BP incident had three 
main consequences: on individual companies, the global ORT agenda, and in Angola – 
the latter examined in Chapter 7. Reflecting on the incident, one source suggested that 
this event ―encouraged‖ his oil firm to take on a leading role in the promotion of the as-
cendant norm. The company had been enmeshed in scandals, and at the time had be-
gun ―a soul-searching exercise‖ to re-think its responsibility towards human rights, sus-
tainable development and its relationship with governments. For his company, the les-
son emerging from these controversies was that ―one needed to try and learn to antici-
pate more the sort of issues which were arising in society - or which would catch you 
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out.‖ In this regard, ORT ―fitted in a more strategic thinking about how a company can 
assist countries to get in to a more secure governance footing.‖
28
   
 
Beyond individual IOCs, the BP incident highlighted collective action problems in relation 
to governance issues – the idea that ―most companies would benefit from improved 
governance in host countries, but companies may be reluctant to pursue governance 
initiatives because they may potentially suffer individually as a result‖ (Frynas 2010: 
167). In the words of an INGO official, ―the BP incident was an illustration that you would 
not just expect one company to voluntarily or unilaterally publish‖, but what one can do, 
is ―to try and influence the international rules and norms that apply to all countries.‖
 29
 
This is an argument shared by INGOs and companies alike. GW did make this position 
clear on several occasions, including in its 2002 report All the Presidents Men from 
which the catchy phrase ―publish what you pay‖ was derived (see GW 2002: 39). Lord 
Browne who was BP‘s Chief Executive Officer at the time also wrote that ―clearly a uni-
lateral approach, where one company or one country was under pressure to ‗publish 




Despite this consensus on the need for a common approach, there were opposing views 
on the best way forward.  Campaigners pushed for a mandatory option that would place 
the onus of disclosure on oil companies, as it was felt that ―change in this respect was 
possible and realistic‖ (van Oranje and Parham 2009: 30). Oil companies, on the other 
hand, advocated for a voluntary and government-led approach to disclosure. These de-
bates on the type of regulation and who should bear the onus of disclosure led to the 
current hybrid regime: with EITI emphasising a voluntary approach to disclosure-based 




Above all, transparency‘s emergence in the global oil industry was made possible by in-
fluential INGOs who took advantage of the trends highlighted in the research on the re-
source curse, their past experiences and expertise to shape the debate on good re-
source governance and frame it around the norm of transparency (Benner et al 2010; 
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 Interviews, 23 September 2009 and 1 February 2010.  
29
 Telephone interview with Western INGO representative, 7 March 2011.   
30
 See http://eiti.org/eiti/history.  
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Gillies 2010). These initial London-based leaders - GW, TI, Save the Children UK, 
Oxfam UK, CAFOD and Open Society Institute (since 2011 renamed Open Society 
Foundation (OSF)) - had acquired (1) language that already resonated with broader pub-
lics; (2) normative and moral legitimacy – presumably dependent upon their reputation 
as ―providers of objective expertise‖ or ‗‗disinterested‘ third party‘ actors (Price 2003: 
589) - ; but also (3) a critical mass of support at the international level. They had nothing 
in common, except perhaps their geographical location and ―ideational commitment‖ 
(Finnemore and Sikkink 1998: 898) towards increased ORT, which emanated from their 
shared objectives - of promoting CSR, conflict prevention, poverty reduction and good 
governance – as well as from the fact that this was ―a niche issue that was not being 
tackled by other NGO campaigns and was not on the agenda of governments and the 
business community‖ (Van Oranje and Parham 2009: 34).   
 
PWYP was created specifically ―to assist citizens of developing countries in holding their 
governments accountable for the management of natural resource revenues […] by 
campaigning for greater transparency and accountability in the management of reve-
nues from the oil, gas and mining industries‖ (ibid: 27). Although the ultimate objective of 
PWYP had been to get governments rich in natural resources to publish payments re-
ceived from extractives sector companies, the coalition primarily targeted oil companies 
from Europe and North America because these were more vulnerable to pressure 
change, and because ―it was felt that change in this respect was possible and realistic‖ 
(ibid: 30). The coalition thus called for the full disclosure of payments – taxes, fees, roy-
alties, bonuses and other financial transaction -, made to every developing country of 
operation, by corporations that are listed on ‗home‘ country stock exchanges and subject 
to these countries‘ and international accounting regulations (ibid: 28-30). To push this 
agenda forward, members of the coalition, either individually or as a group, have contin-
ually garnered or made use of information, persuasion and moral pressure
31
 with some 
success and trickle-down effect. In fact, as one commentator remarked,  
 
                                                          
31
 This is consistent with Keck and Sikkink‘s (1998: 16) conceptual mapping of GCS work. These 
authors have divided GCS activities into four categories: ‗information politics‘ – gathering and 
providing information, and dramatizing facts by using testimonies -; ‗symbolic politics‘ – using 
symbolic events and conferences to publicize issues -; ‗leverage politics‘ - linking issues of 
concern to money, trade or prestige and persuading more powerful governments or institutions to 
exert pressure - and ‗accountability politics‘ - reminding  governments or institutions of living up 
to previously endorsed principles.  
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―There is little doubt that organisations such as Revenue Watch, Global Witness 
etc contributed decisively in adding important provisions of the Dodd-Frank legis-
lation in the USA, and those contributions were built in part on their specific atten-
tion to the corporate sector‘s dealings with Angolan elites.  We now see the mo-
mentum continuing, thanks in no small part to policy activists such as the Tax 
Justice Network, toward ―obligatory‖ corporate responsibilities in respect to re-
porting country-by-country, in respect to ―Base Erosion and Profit Shifting‖ (i.e., 




In Angola too, PWYP members played a key role in awareness raising among civil so-
ciety groups, in garnering the support from the Angolan government on ORT, and influ-
encing IFIs‘ attitudes towards the latter. But there is an overwhelming consensus that 
they did not live up to expectations. As a matter of fact, the international campaign for 
increased revenue transparency in the petroleum sector never gained the same traction 
and urgency as that on ‗conflict diamonds‘
 
conducted only a few years earlier.  
 
Analysts attribute these limitations to the utility of these two resources, specifically, to the 
fact that ordinary Western citizens use petroleum in their day-to-day activities unlike di-
amonds which tend to be the preserve of a wealthier constituency (Benner et al supra: 
293; Gillies supra; Shaxson 2008). A second oft-cited constraining factor is the character 
of the oil industry as an opaque, high-capital and highly competitive business difficult to 
regulate, with many industry players and analysts proffering that the mandatory ap-
proach advocated by the PWYP coalition was costly and undeniably against the special 
interests of industry players. Third was the nature and technical complexity of the issues 
at stake. As Gillies (2010) rightly noted, ORT did not involve ―bodily harm to vulnerable 
individuals or ‗legal equality of opportunity‖ that ―speak to aspects of belief systems or 
life experiences that transcend a specific cultural or political context‖, and are more likely 
to facilitate the emergence of new norms (Seck and Sikkink 1998: 204). Its technical and 
complex nature rendered the subject remote and far-fetched especially considering that 
in most target states, citizens are engaged in a daily battle to access more pressing, 
basic needs - a critique accepted by insiders and outsiders.  
 
The last point was reinforced in a 2013 independent review, which suggested that the 
location of coalition members‘ organisations in the capital was creating ―considerable 
challenges to enabling local organisations from fully participating in the national cam-
paign (Batchelor and Hearn 2013: 11). The same document revealed that ―coalitions 
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 Communication with senior Western international development analyst, 12 February 2013. 
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were stronger at convening than they are at community building‖ (ibid: 13). Most signifi-
cantly, it conveyed the criticism that ―there was there was no systematic monitoring of 
the context – beyond the monitoring of the EITI implementation‖ (ibid: 8). As Chapter 8 
will show, similar shortcomings caused PWYP‘s downfall in Angola.  
 
The ORT agenda has now evolved to include mandatory initiatives; a new development 
which must be credited in part to the coalition. PWYP‘s own agenda has also evolved, 
perhaps in recognition of the limitations of its approach. It now centres its advocacy work 
of five pillars: (1) publish why you pay and how you extract; (2) publish why you pay; (3) 
publish what you pay; (4) publish what you earn and how you spend; (5) publish what 
you learn (PWYP 2012). The task in the few years to come would be to assess whether 
and to what extent this approach brought about systematic changes. 
 
Myths and Realities of EITI 
 
EITI has developed from an idea promoted in Tony Blair‘s speech at the WSSD Summit 
in 2002, into ―the most broadly recommended policy response to the poor governance 
records in resource-rich states and their damaging developmental effects‖ (Gillies and 
Heuty 2011: 26). It is a global standard-setting MSI comprising governments, compa-
nies, investors, civil society, IOs, and premised on the idea that by strengthening trans-
parency of natural resources, this ―can reduce corruption, and [...] revenues from extrac-
tive industries can transform economies, reduce poverty and raise the living standards of 
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 EITI Article of Association, Article 2.2. 
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Box 1: Expected Benefits of EITI 
 
 Political, social and economic stability 
 Trust  
 Empower reformers 
 Improved levels of access to foreign aid, private capital and debt 
relief 
 Improved investment and business climate 
 Improved decision-making and efficiency 
 Enhanced country‘s international legitimacy and reputation 
 Greater understanding of problems related to public administration  
 Increased transparency  
 Improved public accountability and responsiveness in the public 
service 
 Less corruption and rent-seeking opportunities 
 Poverty reduction 
 Improved availability and public access to information about the ex-
tractives sector 
 Increased Public participation 
 Empowered civil society and citizens voices 
 Lower transaction costs and increased profitability for firms 
 Long-term security of investments for extractive industries sector 
 Enhanced company‘s credibility and reputation 
 Improved relations with civil society and governments for investors 
and companies 
 Reduced risk of litigation under the FCPA and OECD Corruption 
Convention  
 Effectiveness of aid 
 Increased credibility of donors  
Sources: EITI (2008, 2011); Bracking (2009); Acosta (2010); Mainhardt-Gibbs (2010); 
Aaronson (2011); Dykstra (2011); David-Barrett and Okamura (2012); 
 
More detail on its process can be found on its website
34
, but in a nutshell, it is contingent 
on interested countries committing to a set of criteria, including committing to work with 
civil society, before gaining ‗candidate‘ status.  Following this, extractive industries com-
panies, private or state-owned, are required to make public all ‗material‘ revenues paid 
to governments, governments to make public those payments, and an independent and 
credible administrator to reconcile the figures disclosed applying international auditing 
standards. A reconciliation report containing opinions on any discrepancies that may 
have occurred is expected to be published within eighteen months of the publication of 
the data, and then validated within two and a half years (EITI 2011). The governance of 
this process is overseen by an international board. Its implementation is funded through 
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 Please refer to http://eiti.org/eiti/implementation/signup. 
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a country‘s government; a World Bank-managed Multi-Donor Trust Fund, or by multilat-
eral and bilateral donor agencies. 
 
Box 1 contains a summary of EITI‘s expected benefits, many of which highly hypothet-
ical but also benchmarks through which the initiative‘s track record has been assessed. 
The main highlight is that although the MSI holds out the promise of benefits for each 
stakeholder group engaged in it, its ‗win-win‘ model presents governments and citizens 
of resource-rich countries as its primary beneficiaries. The Box shows that besides the 
potential for learning, benefits for implementing countries are mainly from an economic 
nature; that is, centred on the potential increased level of access to rents from foreign 
aid, private capital, FDI or tax income and lower borrowing costs. This is confirmed by 
reports of an increase of government take from 63 to 75 per cent annually or a US$18-
million debt write-off since the creation of EITI reporting in Nigeria (Ahmed 2010; 
Shaxson 2009), and the widely held view that certain African EITI member countries 
joined in order to be eligible for Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) debt reduction 
(see Chapter 6).  
 
For citizens and civil society groups, benefits from EITI come from ―increasing the 
amount of information in the public domain about the revenues that governments man-
age on behalf of citizens, thereby making governments accountable‖
35
, presumably be-
cause information disclosure can act as ―a stimulus for action‖ (Heald 2006: 61) by ena-
bling disadvantaged groups to make their voice heard freely and effectively, thereby 
provoking a positive response on the part of governments and companies and increas-
ing the level of trust between the different groups. In places like Cameroon and the Re-
public of Congo, many attribute the growing civil society participation and engagement in 
the public discourse on natural resources management with EITI. According to one 
Cameroonian CSO representative, ―simply the fact that people are able to talk about 
these [oil] issues is a big achievement. Some years back, you could not even talk about 
the money, but now it is possible.‖
36 
 
Thus far, assessments of EITI‘s track record show questionable and oftentimes oppos-
ing and inconclusive results. Underpinning these differing outcomes are methodological 
and measurement challenges (Gillies and Heuty 2011). Beyond these matters, standard 




 Interview, Yaoundé, 18 August 2010. 
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critiques of EITI usually revolve around a) its membership and narrow focus on revenue 
payments; b) the usefulness of the data; c) the voluntary nature of the initiative; d) its 
reliance on weak civil society; and finally, e) the fact that it has ―let some nasty govern-
ments off the hook.‖
37
 Many, including former insiders, believe the validation process to 
facilitate this last dynamic. Speaking in April 2010, one investor who formerly served on 
the International Board found ―depressing‖ the fact that only 2 candidate countries 
(Azerbaijan and Liberia) out of 22 had completed the 2010 validation process, while 17 
out of 19 had an extension
38
. Explanations on these extensions were not quite clear and 
the decision itself was denounced by groups like HRW which argued that ―lack of politi-
cal commitment and wilful neglect shouldn‘t be used as excuses to get more time‖ (HRW 
2010).  
 
The International Secretariat‘s stewardship and attitudes are further sources of conflicts.  
Reflecting on its admission and validation process ahead of the release of the report of 
2010 validation of EITI in Cameroon, one NGO official cited ―pressure‖ from the Secre-
tariat to conform with its decision to validate the process in Cameroon, even though the 
main EITI report produced by the government had not yet been properly analysed by 
domestic civil society groups. According to this informant, this incident illustrated the ex-
tent to which the Secretariat would go to admit to the MSI even those countries that pay 
―lip service‖ to its process in order to ensure that the standard ―remains visible‖
39
. Lately, 
it is the International Board‘s decision to acceptance Ethiopia‘s application for candida-
ture that was contested by some civil society groups who accused the Ethiopian gov-
ernment of political repression and the EITI International board, of ―removing the bar for 
Ethiopia‖ (Lefkow 2014) and possibly ―dignifying mining corruption in Ethiopia‖ (Mariam 
2014).  
 
There is also the question of unrealistic expectations and the idea that EITI‘s challenges 
may be of its own making. Comparing transparency to a screwdriver, ―a tool designed in 
practice to perform one specific function‖, another former insider argued that one of the 
main challenges of EITI is that it ―has implied in the past that it is more than just a 
screwdriver (which it had to do, in order to get global support).‖ In actual fact, ―I don't see 
a strong will in the West or China to take on the governments of resource-abundant 
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 Personal communication with Western transparency advocate, 7 March 2013.  
38
 Interview, 26 Avril 2010. 
39
 Interview, Yaoundé, 18 August 2010.   
71 
 
countries, however corrupt they may be, and irrespective of whether they are in the EITI 




Experts imply that it was predictable that EITI‘s stakeholders would have different expec-
tations of the MSI and divergent interests that would be influenced by their own ―sector-
specific rationales‖ (Peters et al 2009). Unfortunately, these self-interest motives turned 
out to be much stronger than the common goal pursued leading to detrimental unintend-
ed consequences. To the extent that it seems to be reinforcing power asymmetries that 
analysts say lead to rent-seeking and other patterns identified in the resource curse lit-
erature. Notably, whereas governments, extractives sector firms and donors are shoring 
up their international reputation through their association with the standard, many civil 
society groups are increasingly persecuted. To the point where one vocal Nigerian activ-
ist questioned, in relation to the lack of positive impact of the EITI reform process on 
human development in his country: ―if Nigeria is a global case study for EITI, then isn‘t it 
that EITI has failed? Is it not unfortunate that Nigeria is being used as something that is 




SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
This second chapter aimed at exploring further the global political and normative context 
of ORT emergence and application, as a general grounding for the analysis on ORT 
norm socialisation and meaning in Angola, from the perspective of the transparency 
norm promoters. It has highlighted the contradictions and contentions that characterised 
the normative and political context of ORT emergence in the African oil industry, but as it 
shows, this must be qualified.  For, in spite of the ambiguities and contradictions embed-
ded in the notions of good governance, CSR, energy security and human rights
42
, it is 
clear that ORT benefited from the ―logic of appropriateness‖ of these preceding norms  
(Olsen 1997; March and Olsen 1998; Olsen 2007; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998)
43
, and 
                                                          
40
 Personal communication, 21 May 2013.   
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 Peter Stork (2007) argues that whilst at one juncture human rights seek to transcend violence 
as it violates human rights and dignity, on the other, nationally and internationally, human rights 
depend on violence as the legitimating authority for the enforcement of human rights law.  
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  Olsen (2007: 3) writes that ―the logic of appropriateness is a perspective on human action‖. To 
act ‗appropriately‘ he adds, is ― to proceed according to the institutionalized practices of a 
collectivity and mutual understandings of what is true, reasonable, natural, right, and good. 
Actors seek to fulfil the obligations and duties encapsulated in a role, an identity, and a 
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that it is now ―playing a big role and changing the way things work‖ (Gillies 2010: 118 
citing a World Bank official).  
 
Periods of crisis were essential to create momentum around the norm, and Gillies (2010) 
foresaw that promoters‘ self-interests would determine the norm‘s evolution. The Dodd-
Frank and EU Rules launched during this post-2007-08 global economic and financial 
crisis context validates this point. Undeniably, the effect of the crisis on the global com-
modity markets and the international balance of power was an added impetus for 
stronger regulation of financial and oil markets, leading to stronger regulatory rules (Col-
lier 2008: 2). This is consistent with the argument that responses to deficits in societal 
governance faced by developed countries often occur either at a time when their econ-
omies suffer an economic crisis ―with companies closing and serious social exclusion 
problems‖ as in the case of the UK; or ―out of a combination of longstanding advanced 
welfare state traditions and innovative practices in response to new challenges faced by 
industry, government and society due to increasing globalization‖ as in Norway (Al-
bareda et al 2008: 354).  
 
On the other hand still, the foregoing analysis of EITI demonstrates that despite the 
adoption of new rules, its legitimacy remains constrained by promoters‘ desire to protect 
the EITI ‗brand‘. But at whose expense? Answering this question of course requires an 
assessment of the interests and objectives affecting the norm‘s or ORT initiative‘s appli-
cation given that these are not always shared by all actors involved, not even among 
sectoral actors – a qualification that will become clearer in the examination of IFIs, IOCs 
and GCS in Chapters 6 to 8.  
 
Ultimately, the efficacy of transparency in targeted countries depends on, and is shaped 
by global politics as well as the norms, capacities prevailing within these countries 
(Florini 2010; Brown and Michael 2002). It is at this level that the ‗win-win‘ model pro-
moted by the ORT norm can be evaluated. In Nigeria, the challenges that NEITI sought 
to address are said to be a product of colonialism
44
, suggesting that understanding histo-
                                                                                                                                                                                    
membership in a political community. Rules are followed because they are perceived to be 
adequate for the task at hand and to have normative validity.‖   
44
 Communication via Skype, March 2013.  
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VIOLENCE, OIL AND CORRUPTION: ON THE ORIGINS OF BAD 




―Much of this poverty is unnecessary poverty. It is poverty 
borne out of corruption!‖ 
 
BBC journalist Stephen Sackur, in his 
interview with George Chikoti, Angolan 
foreign minister, broadcast on 28 February 
2012. 
 
―We have a serious problem, a heavy legacy from the 
colonial times that is underdevelopment.‖ 
Angolan President Jose Eduardo dos Santos 
in an interview with SIC Noticias journalist 
Henrique Cymerman, broadcast on 6 June 
2013.  
 
―Here, even the past is unpredictable.‖  




Having set out the theoretical debates around oil governance in Africa, and after locating 
the emergence and development of the oil revenue transparency policy norm within its 
global context, a crucial task remains, i.e., to elaborate on the origins of the policy norm, 
on its diffusion and effects at the national level.  That is the objective of this chapter 
henceforth. In particular, the current chapter concerns itself with the circumstances that 
propelled Angola at the centre of the global extractive industries transparency 
movement.  
 
Earlier international perceptions of Angola as one of the world‘s most corrupt states and 
one cursed by its natural resource wealth were instrumental in rendering this African 
petro-state a fashionable topic in the twentieth century. Yet it was argued in Chapter 1 
that how ever useful concepts such as ‗failed state‘ and ‗resource curse‘ may be as 
shorthand for the pathologies associated with African post-colonialism and petro-
statehood, they do not offer a comprehensive explanation to the development path 
followed by these post-colonial oil-rich states. This chapter highlights two main defining 
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aspects conditioning the genesis of present-day Angola: the civil war and elites‘ 
governance of the oil sector. First, the general overview provided here of the origins of 
underdevelopment and ‗bad‘ governance in Angola underscores the cultures of violence 
and corruption resulting  from nearly three decades of a vicious and internationalised 
civil war. The chapter traces the origins of the conflict back to Portuguese colonial rule 
and internal divisions that conditioned the struggle for national liberation; while 
presenting it (a) as an instrument for the cover up and rationalisation of the diversion of 
resources, and (b) a shield against international and national demands for transparency 
and accountability. Second are the foundations and early self-regeneration of the ruling 
elite. With deep roots in the historic Luanda Creole community, this elite has traditionally 
been centred around the President and to a lesser extent the ruling party, the MPLA. 
The party emerged as a Marxist-Leninist party that was inherently non-democratic, elitist 
and centralist and owes its advantage to the fact that it has had a great deal of discretion 
over the utilisation and distribution of oil and other state resources, and very limited 
competition at least in the first 17 years after independence.  
 
The argument here, therefore, is that oil reinforced rather than generated the patterns 
linked to the resource curse phenomenon in Angola. This explains why oil‘s centrality to 
Angola‘s (bad) governance is only treated in the second section. On a cautionary note, 
the reader should be mindful of the fact that any study of Angola must be viewed as an 
―exercise in scepticism‖, for, ―there is little that is entirely indisputable‖ (Aguilar 2001: 1 
citing Wheeler and Pélissier 1971). 
   
THE ANGOLAN CIVIL WAR: CAUSES, ACTORS AND DYNAMICS 
 
While it is debatable how the aforementioned legacies of Angola‘s contemporary political 
economy have interacted over time and what degree of causal significance might be 
ascribed to any one of them (Chabal 2007: 2), the overwhelming consensus is that the 
civil war has been the most important factor of change in twentieth century Angola. As 
shown below, it owed much ―to the prevalence of pervasive violence in economic and 
political relations throughout colonial rule and its aggravation from the beginning of a war 
of independence in 1961‖ (Le Billon 2001: 57). 
 




Despite early attempts at resisting colonial occupation during the so-called ―wars of 
pacification‖ since the sixteenth century, Angola came under full Portuguese military and 
administrative rule in the twentieth century. Until then, rulers from the Mbundu-
dominated kingdoms around Luanda and the neighbouring coastal areas traded slaves – 
and subsequently as palm oil, ivory and rubber - in return for imported European, 
American or Asian goods. The trade contributed to the integration of Angola in the 
Atlantic economy and the development of strong commercial, social and political links 
with Europe and America (Newitt 2007: 19; S. Roque 2009: 30-31). Simultaneously, it 
strengthened the position of the Luanda Creole community which has dominated 
Angola‘s postcolonial political economy, despite the various transformations to the 
configuration of clientelist power which have occurred since then.  The extractive system 
and socio-economic relations erected during this pre-colonial period were eventually 
extended and institutionalised in the early twentieth century, notably under Jose Ribeiro 
Norto de Matos, the first Governor-General (1910-1926), who was famously described 
as the ―chief architect of the extractive system‘s extension through Angola, and of its 
regulating principles and practices‖ (Davidson 1975: 120).   
 
Three features distinguished Portuguese colonial policies from their French and British 
counterparts. The first were the unusually cumbersome and autocratic political and 
administrative systems that existed, neither of which conducive to the preparation of self-
governance. Quite the contrary, this rigid form of rule had the debilitating effect of 
depriving Angolans of the opportunities to express their political ideologies and learn the 
skills that would have enabled them to take over the responsibility of running future post-
independent states. Second was the colonial regime‘s economic outlook. This regime 
was centred around foreign capital, the exploitation of Angola‘s mineral and agricultural 
resources, forced labour, peasants‘ and workers‘ taxes which constituted about 68 per 
cent of government revenue in 1948 (Heywood 1987: 184). In spite of this, it is only in 
the early 1950s that Angola‘s industrial development really began following a massive 
injection of capital investment (of around US$48 million per year) between 1953 and 
1955 (Heywood 1987: 67). In fact, such was the degree of economic prosperity and  
―repertoires of functional statehood‖
45
 that these last ten years of colonialism are 
commonly referred to in Angola nowadays. There were significant increases in state 
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 Ricardo Soares de Oliveira, speaking at an event on ―The Return of the State in Post-War 
Angola‖, University of Cambridge, 1 March 2010.      
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investments on health, education, and infrastructure and a number of laws and 
regulations came into effect that brought in certain reforms in politics, education, labour 
and religion.  
 
Still, while ―Angola was given greater political and economic autonomy [...] the 
undercurrent was in fact the opposite direction‖ since Governor-Generals instead 
acquired ―quasi omnipotent powers‖ that they used to control the population (Croese 
2013: 67 citing Wheeler and Pélissier 1971: 111-13). In that sense, the accelerated 
modernisation process that brought about remarkable economic growth paradoxically 
did also have major political and social ramifications. For, besides intensifying latent 
conflicts between whites and blacks, peasants‘ resentment of colonial-style agriculture 
and its undercurrents – including the use of white settlement, forced migration, land 
expropriation – this modernisation engendered virulent rivalries between different 
colonial peoples with different experiences of exploitation (Birmingham 2002: 140).  
 
Third, to make matters worse, Portugal pursued a French-style assimilation strategy that 
classified the population into two groupings: ―assimilated‖ (assimilados) - whites, 
mestiços and Africans who were considered civilized -; and ―non-assimilated‖ (nao 
assimilados) - Africans and mestiços not adjudged to be civilized (Bender 1978: 149-
50)
46
. The policy played a crucial role in the distribution of social and economic 
opportunities, mainly at the expense of non-assimilated who were excluded from private 
and public sectors of colonial society. Together with the other exclusionary patterns of 
governance, this strategy of social exclusion did, in turn, create a climate of distrust and 
conflict that came to shape the nationalist movements that fought the anti-colonial 
struggle and later defined the civil war. 
 
Besides colonial policy, the modalities of Angola‘s decolonisation process contributed to 
create the conditions under which Angola would be governed during its post-
independence years.  This was a particularly tumultuous decolonisation process on 
                                                          
46
 The policy stipulated that to become an assimilado, one had to be eighteen, be able to speak 
and write in Portuguese, be able to display stipulated levels of Portuguese culture and economic 
independence; all criteria that could be raised or lowered to regulate admission into the colonial 
elite. Whilst almost all Africans of Portuguese descent were accorded this status, Bender notes 
that the legal and social distinctions were such that only few Africans had access to the 
institutions that could impart Portuguese civilisation and thus could not have the status of 
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account of (a) the duration of the anti-colonial war (from 1961 to 1975); (b) the 
progressive development of political mobilisation and radicalisation of dissent which by 
1962 took the shape of guerrilla warfare; and (c) the nationalist competition that 
characterised pre-independence Angolan polity. In effect, unlike in Mozambique and 
Guinea Bissau where nationalist movements were able to put a united front against 
Portuguese rule, Angola found itself more divided than ever, with three rival nationalist 
movements split along ethnolinguistic, geographical, racial, class and religious lines, and 
each one with a distinct ideology and pool of external backers.  
 
The ruling party, the MPLA, emerged in the 1950s as a socialist movement influenced by 
Marxist-Leninist principles developed through links with Portuguese socialist groups and 
the support of the Soviet Union and Cuba (Le Billon 2007: 101-02). The MPLA was 
originally composed of Mbundu, mestiços and white intellectuals, some educated in 
Europe and others in Angola‘s Protestant mission-run schools. In Angola, the movement 
drew support from groups attending the Methodist Church and living in and around the 
coastal city of Luanda.     
 
The second faction was the National Liberation Front of Angola (Frente Nacional de 
Libertação de Angola – FNLA)
47
. Founded in July 1956 by groups originating from the 
Kongo Kingdom and based in Leopoldville (now Kinshasa), the FNLA primarily enjoyed 
the support of members of the Bakongos – Angola‘s third biggest ethno-linguistic group -
who have links with the Baptist Church and whose traditional homeland was in the north 
west of Angola. While the MPLA adopted progressive, multiracial and national values, 
the FNLA espoused a micro-nationalist, almost tribal stance based essentially on 
traditional Bakongo values. It established a revolutionary government in exile in 
Leopoldville which received recognition and support from the Organisation of African 
Unity (OAU) in 1963, from China, the United States, Apartheid-South Africa and Zaire 
(Birmingham 2002: 142).  
 
The third guerrilla group, the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola 
(União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola - UNITA), was formed in 1966 by 
a group of disgruntled FNLA members in the Moxico Province of Angola. Led by its 
charismatic leader Jonas Savimbi, UNITA claimed to be the true representative of the 
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Angolan people because of the considerable support it received predominantly from the 
Ovimbundu - Angola‘s largest ethno-linguistic group - who were based in the central 
highlands and connected to the Congregationalist church.  
 
Together, the three rival movements never really posed a serious military threat to the 
NATO-backed colonial regime, a fact that partly explains why the low-intensity liberation 
war ended with no decisive military outcome. The support and power that each 
movement acquired from different strata of society laid the basis for their exclusive 
claims for power (Guimaraes 2001), while at the same time limiting their ability to gain 
national popular legitimacy so as to be recognised as the legitimate successor to the 
Portuguese colonial power. These ethnoregional divisions were compounded by 
Portugal‘s counterinsurgency strategies, along with political and operational difficulties 
emanating from within the factions, to the extent that ―the competition was within 
movements as well as between them, and it was as much one of ideas, personal 
commitments, and organisational capabilities as one of ethnic loyalties‖ (Minter 1988: 9). 
 
Eventually, the end of Portuguese colonial rule was triggered by two inter-related 
external developments, namely, the success of the anti-colonial movements in 
Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau, and the overthrow of the Salazarist regime of Marcello 
Caetano on 25 April 1974. The transition to independence began soon after the 
signature, by Portugal and the three guerrilla factions, of the Alvor Agreement in January 
1975. This truce proved to be short-lived though, as disunity and distrust among the 
warring parties persisted and fierce fighting the exclusive control of the capital Luanda 
(and thus, of central government), broke out in July 1975. Many lamented the intensity of 
this ―second war of independence‖ (Birmingham 2002: 145), with some Angolan 
Christian churches qualifying it as a ―tragedy never before experienced‖, because ―our 
Nation lost more people during the 1975 confrontations than were lost in the first war of 
national liberation‖ (CICA 1984 cited in Comerford 2009: 165). Ultimately, Soviet military 
hardware and Cuban manpower tipped the balance of power in favour of the MPLA, 
allowing the latter to capture Luanda, where it declared the independence of a People‘s 
Republic of Angola on 11 November 1975. This marked the end of the first of three 





Cold War Politics, Economic Instability and Political Fragmentation in the Socialist 
State  
 
Far from bringing in peace, therefore, the MPLA‘s victory and declaration of 
independence only contributed to sharpen the divisions that were erected during the 
colonial period. After losing the battle of Luanda to the MPLA, the FNLA and UNITA 
retreated to rural areas in the North and South respectively, where they continued to 
challenge the MPLA‘s authority with the support of their respective external backers. By 
1976, the FNLA ceased to operate as a credible movement. UNITA, in the meantime, 
emerged as the guerrilla movement that won the war in rural areas, helped by the 
extensive backing of South African troops and American aid; whereas the MPLA 
remained confined to the coastal strip and urban centres (Munslow 1999: 551).  
Observers stress that whilst the involvement of Cold War opponents was dictated by 
geopolitical interests, these interests were above all instrumentalised by domestic 
political actors willing to exploit the bipolar competition to fulfil their objectives. In the 
words of one senior UNITA representative, the Cold War was only ―a cover up‖ for what 
each belligerent to the civil war was looking for, which in the case of UNITA, he claimed 
to be ―the transformation of society into a more pluralistic society‖
48
. This was not unique 
to Angola. In fact, Clapham (1996: 48) is explicit that it was a common phenomenon in 
sub-Saharan to have African governments seek ―international alliances through which to 
obtain the arms and diplomatic support needed to maintain their conceptions of 
statehood.‖ The fact is, nonetheless, that the presence of these external actors 
accentuated the political and economic crises that the country was experiencing during 
the course of this internationalised conflict.  
 
It is in a context of an urban/rural divide and wider political fragmentation of the country 
into two enemy camps that the MPLA received international recognition (except by the 
United States and Zaire), that it officially adopted Marxism-Leninism and a centralised 
management rooted in its former stature as a national liberation movement. Under the 
leadership of Agostinho Neto, the country‘s first president, the party sought to establish 
a strong state that would ―eliminate the various deficiencies and injustices inherited from 
colonialism, integrate cultural and regional diversities, rehabilitate the socio-economic 
‗relapse‘ and accelerate development‖ (Pacheco 2006: 2). State-led development was 
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however constrained by a number of difficulties right from the outset, one being lack of 
human capital. Indeed unlike in Mozambique where more well-educated settlers stayed 
after the departure of Portuguese colonial authorities, the lack of sufficient investment on 
education and the abrupt mass departure of Portuguese settlers culminated to create a 
shortage of a skilled labour force, thereby hastening the breakdown of the Angolan 
economy and administrative capacity. Most non-oil sectors were distorted following 
years of conflict, financial pressures and lack or decay of infrastructure. Above all it is 
these deficiencies that led to the crisis of governance Angola experienced during this 
period, rather than its dependence on oil as some resource curse theorists suggested.  
 
As such, nationalisation remained the only means through which the new government 
could maintain economic activity (Aguilar 2001: 4), and hereafter, it became the main 
supplier and distributor of consumption goods. Unfortunately, all attempts to revive the 
economy largely failed despite the assistance of technicians from Soviet Bloc states. 
The ―gulf of incomprehension‖ prevailing between the predominantly urban/multiracial 
MPLA leadership and the ill-educated/rural black militants complicated matters further 
(Marcum 1987: 74). Many peasant and factory workers from Lobito in the East to 
Huambo in the West felt alienated and targeted by the party and as a result, were 
generally supportive of UNITA (Heywood 1989: 58-59). In the territory it controlled, a 
brief interlude of pluralism and popular mobilisation under the ethos of poder popular 
(―people‘s power‖) was soon followed by the suppression of dissent and political 
opposition, especially after an alleged coup orchestrated by Nito Alves (an Interior 




 would have far-reaching consequences for the future developmental 
path of postcolonial Angola. Following these events, the MPLA underwent dramatic 
transformations. It became a workers‘ vanguard party, with party leaders resorting to the 
purge of its membership in an effort to instil discipline. One scholar recalls that the 
reprisals against the ‗coup‘ leaders were, in his words, ―so savage that Angola was set 
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82 
 
on a downward path of spiralling violence far outstripping either the cruelties of the 
colonial war or the brutalities of the war of intervention‖ (Birmingham 2002: 153). Aside 
the human costs though, Moorman adds, the social and political effects of the display of 
authoritarianism that resulted from the coup were, and still are, ―tangible and 
widespread‖. As she argues,   
―Self-censorship […] has been one of the most deleterious effects. Not only do 
survivors and relatives of those killed remain reluctant to speak out or act 
politically, but an on-going and generalised fear of openly criticising the 
government and the party permeates Angolan society. When the party leadership 
sanctioned the killing and torture of a good number of its own militants, it created 
a disincentive to political engagement among youth that continues today‖ (2008: 
172). 
 
From these events sprung not just citizens‘ disengagement with politics, but importantly, 
Angola‘s centralised authoritarianism. Henceforth, power became concentrated around 
President Neto, who became head of state, executive head of the government and 
commander-in-chief of the armed forces, the FAPLA (Sommerville 1986: 56; Hodges 
2004: 52). Throughout the 1980s, Neto‘s successor José Eduardo Dos Santos created 
several military organs in charge of coordinating the single-party state‘s political and 
economic activities. This effectively marked the beginning of the integration of close 
allies of the armed forces into party-state structures and therefore, into its clientelist 
network. Angola‘s Reconstruction Office (Gabinete de Reconstrução Nacional - GRN) - 
famous for its prominent role in the administration of Chinese oil-backed loans - is an 
offspring of this system
50
. Until it was reportedly dismantled in mid-2010, it was headed 
by General Helder Vieira Dias ‗Kopelipa‘, a close military adviser of the president. 
 
Meanwhile, massive investments in the education and health sectors were progressively 
curtailed from 1979 onwards (Vidal 2007: 205-17). Unlike in previous years when it was 
weak at asserting its authority and relied on the population for its legitimacy and support, 
the MPLA now had enough oil rents and tight political control to become autonomous. 
As Messiant confined, the party simply ―discarded‖ the general population, ―first in the 
rural areas, which were afflicted by war and had become irrelevant ever since the oil rent 
made it possible to buy food abroad; then in the cities, where poverty grew over time 
and political support dwindled‖ (2007: 96). The provision of basic social services was 
increasingly discharged to mass organisations, international NGOs and humanitarian 
organisations, particularly after the withdrawal of Cuban assistance in the late 1980s. 
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Mass organisations in particular served both as forums for the promotion of the party as 
the initiator of development and defender of the people (Pearce 2012: 456); and 
―transmission belts‖ through which supporters could benefit from patrimonial distribution 
of state resources (Messiant 2007: 95; Vidal 2007: 130).   
 
In sum, if the Angolan decolonisation conflict was primarily driven by a quest for the 
liberation from Portuguese rule and the inability of the three main protagonists to share 
power, this first phase of the Angolan civil war was much more significantly affected by 
Cold War politics, the country‘s political disintegration into two enemy camps, internecine 
conflicts within MPLA camps, as well as the ―cluster of popular grievances‖ (Marcum 
1986: 75) that arose from its neglect of rural peasants and urban poor, and the party‘s 
inability to revive the economy. A major turning point at this first stage of the civil war 
was the battle for the southern town of Cuito Cuanavale in 1987. This battle was 
decisive insofar as it set the stage for peace negotiations which culminated first, in the 
signing of the Bicesse Accord in May 1991 between the two warring parties, then in 
parliamentary and presidential elections in October and November 1992. President Dos 
Santos was declared the winner but while accepting the results
51
, UNITA rejected the 
argument that the elections had been free and fair. The sum total of alleged electoral 
fraud and the international community‘s response made the results of the 1992 
legislative elections ―rather difficult to stomach on the part of UNITA‘s leadership‖
52
, and 
a full blown conflict resumed in early 1993.  
 
“The Politics of Disorder”
53
 in Angola Post-1992 
 
The point was made about the territorialisation of Angola, or its division into two ―states‖ 
during the civil war. As a matter of fact, the two rival movements (MPLA and UNITA) 
were similar in more ways than one. Both movements sought legitimacy by asserting a 
                                                          
51
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developmental role that involved the provision of basic services and in that process, 
created a consensual relationship with the population living in the zones under their 
control (Pearce 2009, 2012). In the South of the country under the control of UNITA, the 
party had its own teachers, health professionals, ‗civil society‘; and it emulated the MPLA 
by operating like a government-in-waiting, seeking some kind of social contract by 
offering free education, healthcare, security, in return for farmers‘ provision of food or 
their membership to the army
54
. Similarities between the two movements extended to 
the concentration of power around the leaders, the modus operandi of the conflict - 
which in this instance, consisted of depriving the opponent of human and logistical 
resources (see Pearce 2012: 453; Heywood 1989: 59) -, and the fact that no movement 
had the monopoly over violence.  
 
The Bicesse peace process and post-1992 civil war altered these processes in dramatic 
ways. For one thing, Bicesse epitomises the start of the reversal of fortunes for the 
belligerents.  The agreement, and the process that accompanied it, set the stage for the 
instrumentalisation of the war in a way that ultimately benefited the Luanda-based elite. 
They effectively legitimised a one-party form of regime as well as the government‘s 
decision to use force against its opponent in Luanda and other cities (Messiant 2007: 
100-1). The intention was ―to keep on fighting‖ (Maier 1996: 177) in order to defeat the 
enemy and consolidate power.  
 
Thus armed with the legitimisation of its government by the international community, and 
the advantages that such an outcome brought, including unilateral lifting in 1993 of the 
arms embargo imposed by the U.S. Administration and UN sanctions against UNITA in 
1997, the MPLA government henceforth justified its war and military intervention in 
neighbouring countries, Zaire and the Republic of Congo in particular, on the need to 
protect and defend its sovereignty. As the party waged its ―Battle of the Cities‖ (Messiant 
2001: 291) where confrontations had moved to from rural areas, it became more violent 
and oppressive. Reports cite its use of landmines, looting, massacres of UNITA soldiers 
and voters, recruitment of child soldiers, indiscriminate killings, forced displacements, 
attacks on the press, to cite just a few methods (HRW 1994; Vines 1995; Messiant 2001, 
2007).  
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Yet, ―the disregard for human life and bodies and the widespread slaughter during the 
war were associated more closely with UNITA than with the MPLA‖ (Brinkman 2000: 9). 
As one knowledgeable source asserted, the MPLA government ―never did what Savimbi 
did to his own people.‖
55
 In effect, at the same time that the MPLA was consolidating 
power, UNITA became increasingly isolated, and its tactics more vicious. Such was the 
level of brutality and criminality on its part that the party lost credibility, and 





From the perspective of civilians, both non-combatants and active participants to the 
conflict, the post-Bicesse era and last phase of the war (1998-2000) in particular was 
one of the most violent in the history of Angola. No aspect of life was sparred. An 
estimated 1.5 million people lost their lives often as a result of extreme violence, hunger 
or disease, and about a third of the population, that is over 4 million people, were 
displaced. One in three children died under the age of five, prompting UNICEF to 
declare Angola ―the worst place to be a child‖ (UNICEF 1999). Clinics and hospitals 
were destroyed, leaving only a small percentage of people with access to the most basic 
health services, whilst the majority relied heavily on the international community to 
provide for their basic social services. Landmine infestation – especially in the central 
highlands - , was among the worst encountered in any post-conflict situation globally, 
and arguably represented the biggest challenge to resettlement (International Crisis 
Group 2003). By the president‘s own reckoning, the provinces had effectively become 
―islands‖, because most roads and railways were nearly all destroyed or damaged as a 
result of the war (SIC interview, 6 June 2013). In short, the humanitarian conditions were 
such that Angola became ―the most expensive humanitarian operation in the world, with 
10 United Nations‘ Agencies, 100 international NGOs and more than 420 national NGOs 
providing assistance to two million people‖ (Gomes Porto and Clover 2002: 10). 
 
There is another distinct feature of the ―politics of disorder‖ that reigned during this 
period of the war, however, which aroused public concern of the MPLA government‘s 
war. It is that which stemmed from the availability and management of revenues 
generated from natural resources, chiefly oil.  
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THE OIL FACTOR 
 
One irony of the Angolan civil war is that ―the war that destroyed everything, at the same 
time created wealth [for a few]‖
57
. For sure, the war facilitated the formation and 
flourishing of an ―oil nomenklatura‖ to the extent that neither the acceptance of 
democracy nor the transition to a market economy that preceded and/or accompanied 
the Bicesse Accords was incompatible with its economic reconversion (Ennes Ferreira 
1995). Revolving around President dos Santos and his close allies, this nomenklatura 
established absolute economic and political hegemony thanks to several mechanisms: 
from the manipulation of the exchange rate, to the toleration and instrumentalisation of 
the black market, inflation, imports, bureaucracy, land reform, the development of joint 
ventures, access to cheap bank loans, the provision of international medical evacuation 
and overseas scholarships, weak military procurement procedures and the privatisation 
of state assets both of which are examined below (ibid; Munslow 1999; Le Billon 2001: 
65-66; Hodges 2007: 186-91; Vines et al 2005: 12). In a nutshell, this oil-based 
presidential patronage system involved domestic players who ―appropriated rents 
though entirely legal means yet without investing their money, or hard work‖ (Vines et al 
2005: 24), as well as external actors. Politically, Le Billon (2001: 64) writes, 
 
―The oil and other state rents have allowed the Presidency to sustain a clientele 
beyond the military apparatus, building a degree of legitimacy among those 
rewarded and allowing support or resistance to reforms, according to short-term 
expediency. This clientelism requires a contractual stability with foreign oil 
companies ensuring their long-term obedient participation in the system.‖ 
 
Unsurprisingly, these circumstances inspired research on the character of Angola‘s war 
economy (see, among others, Collier and Hoeffler 1998, 2004; Cilliers and Dietrich 
2000; Le Billon 1999, 2001). After all, Angola had become a ―successful failed state‖ as 
reflected by the extent to which it went on surviving and indeed thriving amidst 
widespread human destitution (Soares de Oliveira 2007: 596).  
 
This chapter makes no exception to this trend given that this recent history is crucial in 
explaining Angola‘s contemporary political economy. Specifically, this second part 
examines the reasons why post-independent Angola did not collapse in spite of the dire 
circumstances it was faced with during its first decades of existence. As should be 
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apparent from the discussion so far, ―petro-violence‖ (Watts 1999) and neo-
patrimonialism form an integral part of the answer to these questions, though one should 
not omit that these issues are inextricably linked to how the oil sector and Sonangol 
evolved to become central to Angola‘s political economy. In effect, one aspect unique to 
Angola, indeed, is that ever since crude oil was first exported in mid-1955, the oil sector 
was for the most part shielded from the chaos of the war. If anything, its output actually 
increased (see Table 2). This paradox can be explained primarily by the fact that oil 
activities progressively shifted from onshore areas in Cabinda province to offshore areas 
between Luanda and the northern town of Soyo where prospectivity proved to be even 
more attractive. But there were other factors at work too. These included (a) 
technological changes occurring in the nineties; (b) the increasing privatisation of the 
civil war; and finally, (c) the pragmatism of the sector‘s managers. The chapter now turns 
to these three factors.    
 
Sector Evolution and Organisation 
 
If the 1990s were for Angola and several other developing countries a ―lost decade‖ 
characterised by stagnant economic growth, internecine conflicts and financial crises, for 
the Angolan oil sector certainly, this was a decade of opportunity, success and intense 
competitiveness. Research and advances in seismic data gathering and deepwater 
drilling technology pioneered in other oil provinces (in the Gulf of Mexico, Brazil and the 
North Sea) made it possible to identify the industry‘s high potential and reach previously 
inaccessible oil deposits (Soares de Oliveira 2007a: 206; Hodges 2004: 143). Giant 
investments, discoveries and signature bonuses followed that not only reinforced the 
idea of Angola as a new oil frontier, but also instigated talks of it forming the new 
―Golden Triangle‖ together with the Gulf of Mexico and a small pool of countries in West 
Africa (Clarke 2008: 123).  
 
Three sets of factors were of utmost relevance. The first were substantial investments 
made in the sector by IOCs in the 1980s – from 550 million in 1982 to US$650 million in 
1985 (Bhagavan 1986: 56). These investments led to huge discoveries starting with 
blocks 0, 2 and 3 operated by Chevron, Texaco and Elf respectively, and to a surge in 
petroleum production, from the 1978-82 average of 130,000 bpd to 231,000 bpd in 1985. 
In spite of the 1986 fall in petroleum exports, these initial discoveries and output growth 
remained a great impetus for subsequent deepwater and ultra-deepwater exploration, 
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although tax incentives, such as the abolition of the price cap that varied from US$13 
per barrel in 1980 to US$32 per barrel in 1988 also played a major role (Bindermann 
1999: 89). 
 
A second major breakthrough occurred in 1996, when Elf discovered the Girassol field in 
block 17 located midway between Cabinda and Luanda, in the lower Congo basin. This 
was followed by a staggering 35 oil discoveries in four of the 17 deepwater blocks (14, 
15, 17 and 18) within five years, with the last three blocks being the most productive 
deepwater blocks to date (Developing Markets Associates 2012: 14). In total, over 70 oil 
fields with reserves of some 14 billion barrels have been discovered in the Tertiary 




Table 2: Crude Oil Production in Angola (1980 – 2002) 





A third milestone was achieved after the lease of the country‘s first ultra-deepwater 
concessions (blocks 31-34) offshore the lower Congo basin. Incidentally, interest in 
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these concessions in the midst of the 1998-99 oil price crisis and at the heights of the 
raging civil war provoked such a competition that the winning consortia, including those 
led by BP and Total in blocks 31 and 32 respectively, had to offer US$935 million in 
signature bonuses (Hodges 2004: 144)
59
. By the turn of the millennium, the number of 
blocks allocated had significantly increased, so too did investments in the sector, the 
number of oil companies participating in exploration and production (E&P)
60
, and the 
sector‘s total output, which by the end of the civil war in mid-2002, had risen above 896 
million bpd.  
 
The largely offshore location of oil fields and operations reduced visible health and 
environmental impacts that could have heightened tensions between local communities, 
the government and the oil business (Clarke 2000: 216; Soares de Oliveira 2007b: 214-
16; Heller 2012; Hodges 2004: 151). This insulated the industry from the sort of regular 
armed disruptions that besets certain oil-producing regions like Nigeria‘s oil-bearing 
Niger Delta region. That is, at least until early 1993 when UNITA captured oil-rich Soyo, 
attacking facilities based in the region and its surroundings. During these attacks, an oil 
terminal was destroyed, as well as wells, pipelines, storage and tanks. Nine foreign 
workers were kidnapped, Total‘s offshore oil platforms shelled and Petrofina‘s offices 
looted (EIA 1995: 6; Reed 2009: 73-74). Almost 155,000 bpd of processing capacity was 
eliminated in January that year, and both Total and Petrofina were forced to halt all 
production (EIA 1995).  In all, almost half billion of assets was destroyed and in Hooper‘s 
(2002: 46) words, ―not since the withdrawal of their Soviet bloc allies had the MPLA 
faced a crisis of such magnitude‖.  
 
In response, Sonangol hired EO upon the advice of Heritage Oil, a Jersey-based oil and 
gas E&P company. Its mission: to recapture Soyo, train troops from the FAA and direct 
front-line operations against UNITA (de Beer and Gamba 2000: 14). The PSC was no 
newcomer in Angola. It had been instrumental to UNITA‘s capture of much of the 
Angolan territory when fighting alongside the movement between 1976 and 1988 
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(Hooper 2002: 230-31), and its contribution to the MPLA‘s military advances and 
supremacy subsequently could not be underestimated either. Undoubtedly, this 
―security-led‖ approach to mineral exploitation (Ferguson 2006: 199-200) and other 
forms of privatisation of the state were significant in securing the MPLA‘s victory and 
fending off threats from the opposition. This included ―bottom-up‖ violence
61
 perpetuated 
in the northern exclave of Cabinda where a small separatist movement, the Front for the 
Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda (Frente para a Libertação do Enclave de Cabinda – 
FLEC) has fought a low intensity guerrilla war to win independence for the province 
since the 1960s.  
 
Another feature which facilitated the sector‘s growth, and one that arguably distinguishes 
Angola from other African petro-states, is the pragmatism and dexterity of the sector‘s 
managers. Once moment that captures the extent of this pragmatism during the civil war 
was when payments made by American oil companies were used to ensure the 
protection of their operations by Cuban troops against attacks by UNITA, the US-backed 
client. This example, combined with Angola‘s resource nationalism - the way it manifests 
itself and the mechanisms deployed it -, are reflective of the overall management of the 
sector which revolves around Sonangol, under the control of the presidency.  
 
In practice, as indicated above, ―the oil game revolves around Sonangol and state 
approvals‖ (Clarke 2008: 122). The Sociedade Nacional de Combustíveis de Angola or 
Sonangol was created in June 1976 of the negotiated nationalisation of Angol, itself 
created in 1953 as the Angolan subsidiary of Portugal‘s first oil company, Sacor (Soares 
de Oliveira 2007b). Sonangol controls about two-thirds of government oil revenue 
(Richmond et al 2013: 4). It is the exclusive concessionaire of E&P rights
62
 and until 
2008 at least, was a wholly-owned state oil company
63
. That the company dominates not 
just the oil sector but Angola‘s entire political economy speaks of its professionalism and 
elites‘ ambitions to sustain and control the inflow of oil rents. This, it should be stressed, 
is also a consequence of the circumstances - of political and economic distortions 
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caused by a prolonged conflict, skills shortage and ill-judged centrally planned socialist 
management - under which the company emerged and developed. It is, in fact, these 
conditions that combined with the consensus around the vitality of the oil sector to 
influence the decision to concentrate the country‘s limited resources into this single 
agency, and give it overall responsibility for the oil sector. As one research participant 
commented,  
 
―President Neto, although against capitalism, knew that he needed the oil and so, 
he said that they were going to run the sector according to a different logic 
because without the oil, everything would be lost. And Dos Santos kept the same 




Sonangol was thus ―spared from Marxist and postcolonial African economics alike and 
allowed to flourish according to ‗modern‘, ‗rational‘ and ‗pragmatic‘ criteria‖ (Soares de 
Oliveira 2007b: 598). Whereas most nationalised enterprises were run by state workers 
with little to no managing experience, the firm was immediately put into the hands of 
individuals ―capable of speaking the language of high finance, business contracts and oil 
technology‖ (Soares de Oliveira 2007a: 88). Most significant perhaps was that these key 
figures had important political credentials: they were well-networked MPLA loyalists, who 
shared the common social background, and in some cases, blood ties and friendship, of 
those at the top of the ruling party and government (Soares de Oliveira 2007b: 602). In a 
context of general distrust and tight state control of the economy, these connections and 
access to the President proved critical in providing the company with enough leeway 
and political support. Above all else, they allowed the state-owned corporation to 
successfully rebuild and modernise the oil industry. 
 
As the most technically and financially capable state organ, Sonangol has been called 
upon to carry out a number of functions to drive the sector‘s growth and use it to steer 
other industries. The NOC has championed local capacity development by investing in 
technical and professional training development and by recruiting the most highly skilled 
personnel especially at top levels. It has driven the generation and maximisation of oil 
rents through its involvement in the drafting and enforcement of the petroleum legal 
regime which in turn has provided an attractive, competitive and stable environment for 
foreign investors while simultaneously delivering the necessary revenues for the 
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government to pursue its agenda at times of war and of peace. Furthermore, Sonangol 
has managed the progressive modernisation of the sector which it undertook by (a) 
diversifying the industry‘s participants; (b) increasing its participation in the upstream 
sector through Sonangol Pesquisa e Produção (Sonangol P&P); and (c) taking overall 
control of the marketing and trading of Angola‘s share of oil internationally
65
. As one of 
the company‘s directors stated back in 2006, these strategic decisions were seen as a 
way for the firm ―to create the very means to perform its functions‖ (cited in Universo 
2006: 22). Above all else, it is from Sonangol‘s performance in carrying out non-
commercial functions, especially its standing as ―an all-purpose promoter and surrogate 
treasury‖ (White 2012), which stems the lack of transparency and accountability in 
Angola‘s public finances that is at the centre of allegations of corruption in the oil sector. 
It is that which forms the subject of the next sub-section.    
 
Before moving on to discuss the various mechanisms through which corruption became 
entrenched in the Angolan oil industry, it is worth pointing out that corruption is in no way 
the single governance challenge facing Angola, despite being the most mediatised. 
Angola has indeed been struggling with a whole host of socio-economic impacts of oil 
dependency, one of which relates to the vagaries of the international oil market and its 
effects on oil revenue volatility. As Hodges (2004: 141) confined,  
 
―Oil has been a mixed blessing, even in purely economic terms. Angola‘s extreme 
dependence on this single commodity has left the country dangerously exposed 
to the ups and downs of the international oil market, sometimes with serious 
consequences for the rest of the economy.‖   
 
This showed itself again lately with the 2008-9 global financial and economic crisis which 
slowed economic growth
66
, and led, among other things, to the building up of 
government arrears (of US$9 billion in 2009 alone) as the MPLA government struggled 
to meet its commitments for debt servicing. Still, if the volatility of the international oil 
market mediates the variability of oil revenues in Angola, so too does the complex 
structure of its petroleum contracts, the preference for upfront fees (such as signature 
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bonuses) (Vines et al 2005b: 15-16), and ―uncertainties in the institutional setting for 
managing oil revenues‖ (Staines 2011: 5) - which refers to Angola‘s dualistic financial 
system at the origins of the opacity in the oil sector. 
 
Sonangol, Oil Revenues Management and the Origins of Corruption in Angola 
 
The process of oil revenues management is fairly well defined in Angola‘s legal 
framework. Along with its primary responsibility for the implementation of national policy 
and coordination and supervision of all oil activities, Ministry of Petroleum (MINPET) is 
mandated to determine oil prices to be used for fiscal purposes alongside the Ministry of 
Finance (MINFIN). Beyond the setting and implementation of oil policy, the Angolan 
legislation assigns specific responsibilities for the collection, disbursement and/or 
management of oil revenues to other government agencies. These include MINFIN 
which is mandated to act as the ―chief fiscal institution‖ or organ of the state responsible 
for assessing and collecting revenues that flow from the oil sector and for recording all 
tax transactions (World Bank 2006: 38-40); and the Central Bank (BNA) which is 
responsible for managing the foreign currency reserves of Angola, and negotiating, 
raising, servicing and repaying loans taken out on the government‘s behalf (MINFIN 
2004: 11). 
 
Moreover, Decree 15/89 approves the process through which Sonangol submits 
revenues earned from the sale of its profit oil and that remitted by oil companies under 
PSAs, minus the 10 per cent commission to MINFIN
67
; and Decree 30/95 of 3 November 
stipulates that all taxes and royalties of oil companies, including Sonangol, should be 
paid into a special petroleum account housed within BNA (see MINFIN 2004; HRW 
2004).  This system not only provided an effective way of recording and accounting for 
incoming petroleum revenues; it also provided a clear line of communication between 
the various agencies involved in the management of these revenues.  
 
These rules were not really followed through in practice, giving way to ―at least two 
parallel, but articulated, public spending systems‖ (World Bank 2005: 16-19): one 
―conventional‖ system under the supervision of the National Tax Directorate within 
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MINFIN and coordinated by the Ministry of Planning (MINPLAN) and the BNA; the other 
―non-conventional‖ system which Sonangol uses to deduct part or all its export sales 
proceeds for costs it incurs while undertaking quasi-fiscal activities on behalf of the state.  
 
A major issue concerning this non-conventional system has been that Sonangol‘s 
payments are effected outside budgetary processes, thereby strengthening the power of 
Sonangol and illegally bypassing and undermining the authority of the other formal 
institutions
68
. What is more, these activities are offset against Sonangol‘s oil revenue 
due to the government on a monthly basis according to a noncash and cumbersome 
procedure (IMF 2007: 9), which gives rise to frequent inter-agency disputes and 
substantial discrepancies between Sonangol‘s estimates of oil revenues paid and 
MINFIN‘s reporting of oil transfers. The result has been a black hole in Angola‘s public 
finances symbolising ―the Bermuda Triangle‖ that sees money disappearing between 
MINFIN, BNA and Sonangol without trace (Hodges 2004). According to the IMF, these 
discrepancies amounted to US$4.2 billion between 1997 and 2002 (IMF 2002: 47 cited 
in HRW 2004); and nearly US$32 billion between 2007 and 2010 (IMF 2011).  
  
Angola‘s dualistic public financial management systems must be viewed in the context of 
a worsening macro-economic situation arising from the 1980s when a sudden drop in 
the price of crude oil plunged the country in a cycle of debt. Sonangol was finding it 
difficult to finance its share of investments for oil fields that were crucial for the oil 
industry‘s expansion, and Angola‘s economy was characterised by fiscal deficits, 
balance of payment crises, repressed inflation, proliferation of parallel markets and an 
extremely distorted structure of relative prices and wages (Le Billon 2007: 112 citing 
Pereira da Silva and Solimano 1999). In the context of a poor external credit rating and 
lack of access to traditional sources of commercial borrowing, oil quickly became a 
crucial instrument for the negotiating of trade finance (Hodges 2004: 162; see also Vines 
et al 2005: 40-43). 
 
From the government‘s perspective, this type of oil-backed borrowing was a fairly well-
run and profitable operation during the war. Loans were serviced through the direct 
delivery of oil from the share of production accruing to Sonangol, they involved direct 
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transfers of oil money from creditors to a number of Sonangol‘s offshore bank accounts, 
and were oftentimes repaid at a fixed barrels-per-day rate. This implied that Angola‘s 
public coffers were not actually benefitting from a hike in oil prices since loan 
repayments were fast-forwarded during such periods, and the opposite happened at 
times of low oil prices (Vines et al 2005: 41). Accelerating loan repayments was hugely 
beneficial to the government, for, it meant that the sooner loans were repaid, the sooner 
and easier it was to obtain new and even bigger loans on the back of new oil streams.  
With time, this practice went from being used to service Sonangol‘s cash calls, to being 
deployed for ―general government use‖ (ibid: 16-17), including for imports, debt 
renegotiations, construction projects and from 1992, for arms purchases. In effect, by the 
late 1990s, it was the only form of external financing available to the government and by 
implication, central to the exercise and consolidation of presidential power. 
 
Commercial oil-backed loans thus marked a steep departure from the traditional 
channels of international financing for Angola but for critics, they raised two main 
concerns. The first concern relates to their steep interest rates and short maturity 
(usually of about four years) which often meant that substantial (sometimes up to 95 per 
cent of) revenues from the government‘s oil share to be diverted for debt servicing rather 
than, say, for social spending. The size of the loans was telling. By the end of 1999, it 
reportedly amounted to 33 per cent of Angola‘s US$8.78 billion total debt, serviced with 
almost all the oil that was physically available to the government (Hodges 2004: 164). 
The second concern regards the lack of transparency and accountability surrounding the 
inflow and spending of these types of loans. The IMF described these loans as 
―detrimental to growth and inherently lacking in transparency since the use of the funds 
is undisclosed‖; and the World Bank, as ―the core obstacle to [Angola‘s] development‖ 
(cited in GW 2005; emphasis added). The MPLA government argued that the strategic 
funds were placed abroad in a time of war as ―basic risk management‖ in part to avoid 
the inefficiencies of the formal financial regime (see Shaxson 2007: 179; Van Nierkerk 
and Peterson 2002: 5). These arguments nevertheless failed to convince campaigners 
who insisted that the opacity and secrecy that characterised these deals provided a 
cover for grand corruption.  
 
Three sets of events converged to raise further doubts as to the real motives and 
beneficiaries of these loans. The first was research conducted by the International 
Consortium of Investigative Journalists, of Sonangol‘s banking records. These 
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investigations revealed that funds generated by signature bonuses paid into one of 
Sonangol‘s offshore accounts were transferred, among others, to a private security 
company owned by former Angolan state officials, the Eduardo dos Santos Foundation 
(FESA), and a private bank that counts an alleged arms dealer among its shareholders 
(Van Nierkerk and Peterson 2002).  
 
The other two sets of events are known as the ―Angolagate‖ scandal and the second, as 
the ―Angola-Russia Debt Deal‖. The ―arms-for-oil deal‖ or Angolagate dates back to the 
period soon after the return to the civil war in 1992, at a time when the MPLA struggled 
to re-arm itself and President Dos Santos felt it necessary to circumvent the UN arms 
embargo to fend off the threats that UNITA‘s military advances and control of more than 
80 per cent of Angolan territory posed to his regime. The president then called for help 
from Jean-Bernard Curial, a French government insider, who, through his connections, 
introduced him to the businessmen Pierre Falcone and Arkadi Gaydamak. This triggered 
―the deal of the century‖ (Simons 2008) that saw companies and individuals involved in 
the wartime acquisitions of weapons receive ‗commissions‘ from the overvalued deals.  
 
An estimated US$510 million worth of weaponry was acquired between November 1993 
and April 1994, with US$300 million understood to have gone to President dos Santos – 
through a Panama account in the name of his daughter Isabel - and a dozen Angolan 
officials (Simons 2008). More importantly, the lucrative arms deals were paid for by an 
oil-backed loan arranged through the Swiss oil trading company Glencore, and signed in 
exchange to equity participation in oil blocks 32 and 33 operated by Elf and Exxon. Two 
companies that benefited from the deals are Prodev and Falcone Oil Holding: the first 
and Swiss-based firm received 20 per cent stake in block 32; and the second, a ―wholly-
owned Angolan corporation‖ which reportedly counts among its shareholders the 
Angolan president and the Volkswagen dealer Antonio Moquito Mbakassi, received 10 
per cent in block 33 (GW 1999: 13). As Chapter 5 will make evident, this trend of 
rewarding political associates with equity partnership in the oil industry continued into 
the postwar era. 
  
The Angola-Russia Debt Deal dates back to April 1996. It followed the commissioning by 
the Angolan government of Falcone and Gaydamak, to re-negotiate the terms of the 
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US$6 billion Russian debt that it incurred during the civil war
69
. Their renegotiation of the 
Deal led to Russia agreeing to a substantial reduction of the debt (from US$6 billion to 




It appears that the transaction was intended to be facilitated by the issuance of 
Promissory Notes (‗the Notes‘) by BNA, with Sonangol making payments for the Notes 
using another financing arrangement guaranteed by oil sales and negotiated with 
Glencore. What happened subsequently however, is that rather than Sonangol making 
the payments directly to Russia, in March 1997, Gaydamak and Falcone set up Abalone 
Investments - a company registered in the Isle of Man - which offered to buy the Notes 
from Russia at half the price (or US$750 million), only to resell them to Sonangol at their 
full face value, thereby making a US$750 million profit. Sonangol made these payments 
until February 2001, when the Swiss judicial authorities froze Abalone‘s UBS accounts in 
Geneva after uncovering that: (a) the company had been set up as a front company to 
―extort financial resources, to the prejudice of the Republic of Angola and the Russian 
Federation‖ (Hodges 2004: 166); and (b) the money Sonangol disbursed to these 
accounts (some US$775 million between October 1997 and July 2000) had in fact been 
passed on to a range of companies and individuals, among whom the Angolan 
president.  
 
The Swiss response provoked a furious reaction in Angola both from within the 
government and from a section of the Angolan civil society. The deal continued 
regardless, and in spite of the Russian government‘s decision to terminate its Escrow 
agreement with UBS. Except that, unbeknown to the other parties, the deal was no 
longer with Abalone but with Gaydamak alone, through a bank account in Cyprus 
apparently duping Sonangol into paying more than US$618 million in the belief that this 
money was being transferred to the Russian government when in actual fact it was not.  
 
The case was settled in 2005, after the GoA agreed to pay Russia for the value of eight 
of the remaining promissory notes worth US$387 million and Gaydamak, the remaining 
US$206 million. The Swiss authorities also decided in favour of the restitution of the 
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funds plus interests to the Angolan government (evaluated at US$43 million), on 
condition that the money released is used for developmental purposes, under the joint 
supervision of the Angolan authorities and the Swiss Agency for Development and 
Cooperation (GW 2008; Afriquinfos 2012).  
 
The significance of these corruption cases for Angola‘s reputation and future 
developmental path cannot be overstated. The Angolan anti-corruption crusader Rafael 
Marques affirms that the corrupt channels established by the arms and oil trading 
networks in question set the stage for ―a culture of impunity, plunder of the state assets 
by the ruling elite, and the legalisation of such criminal acts in peace time‖ (Marques 
2009). The damage to Angola‘s international reputation was all too visible as well. 
Justino Pinto de Andrade, an Angolan university professor and activist recalls that the 
Angolagate scandal, particularly, was the event that did the most damage to Angola‘s 
international image (Pinto de Andrade 2009: 101), putting it right at the forefront of the 
international campaign for increased transparency in the management of oil revenues in 
Angola.    
 
 
CULTURES OF OIL? 
 
It is said that Angola brings together ―the pathologies of the colonial and postcolonial 
African state with the ailments of petro-statehood and socialist management‖ (Soares de 
Oliveira 2007b: 610). One of the most popular arguments put forward to explain this 
state of affairs lies squarely on the country‘s natural resources, oil in particular. This 
chapter on the other hand has demonstrated that the dual culture of violence and 
accumulation that has been so determinative of Angola‘s postcolonial era owes to three 
main sources, the first of which revolves around the colonial and pre-oil context of 
economic and political subjugation and appropriation, division and distrust. These 
ailments combined contributed to shape the character of the 27-year long civil war.  
 
To conclude however that colonial legacy alone is responsible for Angola‘s current 
predicament would be misconstrued. As Chabal (2002: 34) rightly pointed out, colonial 
legacy becomes less important in the post-independence years, if not for the way in 
which it was subverted by Angola‘s postcolonial elites; a process he termed ―political 
Africanisation‖. This re-appropriation was visible first in the political manipulation of the 
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identity question, and later in the way and extent to which the oil sector and Sonangol 
came to replace citizens‘ taxes and labour as the basis of governance in postcolonial 
Angola. To understand how this came about, one needs looking at the second set of 
drivers, which lie in the origins, agency and experiences of postcolonial elites. Marxism-
Leninism, for instance, was described as 
  
―The spring of understanding for a lot of policies in the past: the bureaucracy, the 
nomenklatura, the centrality of the state, the self-understanding of the state [...] 
and the special relationship between the leadership and citizens in that [...] there 




It is equally interesting to note how the circumstances under which these elites evolved 
enabled them to reinvent themselves, from wanting to build a state embedded in 
developmentalism to being closed, distant from society and increasingly corrupt. Also 
intriguing is how this self-regeneration (and empowerment that arose from it) affected 
the character of the state thereon. Remarkably, the civil war proved to be an important 
tool in this respect. Though at first driven by ideological differences, distrust, repression 
and exclusion of a section of society, economic incompetence and poverty, the conflict, 
as well as the dynamics that characterised it, were all rapidly instrumentalised by these 
elites so as to gain access to power (within and beyond the movements) and wealth. 
Hence the affirmation that the civil war was, to quote Imogen Parsons, ―a war propelled 
from the inside, driven by its own logic and dynamics‖ (2004: 45). 
 
Oil wealth - which is the third source of Angola‘s governance challenges - added more 
sense to this ―organised disorder‖ (Nzinga 1999: 8). It made possible the survival and 
consolidation of powers around the Angolan leadership during the twentieth century by 
facilitating the concentration of powers around it, enhancing its exercise of high levels of 
social control, and justifying the ―extraversion‖ of the Angolan state which ultimately 
ensured the MPLA‘s military victory over its political opponents. Among other things, it is 
from this extreme form of centralised control, from Angola‘s parallel or ―unrecorded 
economy‖ (Cockcroft 2012) caused by military and extra-budgetary spending, and from 
the internationalised privatisation of the Angolan civil war, that corruption and lack of 
transparency in Angola‘s management of oil revenues originate.  
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Chabal (2007: 8) was right in pointing out that these specificities are not in themselves 
dissimilar to those present in other African oil states, if not for the fact that their 
combination ―bestowed upon [the Angolan state] an extraordinary degree of power, 
which has been further boosted by the fact that the Western countries whose companies 
are extracting oil have been exceedingly accommodating of such practices.‖ Still, it must 
be stressed that companies and foreign governments were not the only external forces 
that played a key role in the civil war. As the overly simplified summary of the facts of the 
Angolagate and Angola-Russia debt deal showed, unlike in Nigeria where American oil 
companies were the catalyst to the entrenchment of opacity in the oil industry (Klieman 
2012), in Angola the main actors came from a wide range of public and private sectors, 
and at various levels. They ranged from syndicates of Western private banks to 
multinational oil companies, private military and security companies, and businessmen, 
all of whom benefited immensely from the state of confusion that prevailed in twentieth 
century Angola. EO alone is understood to have had a turnover of approximately US$40 
million per year during its two-and-a-half year contract in Angola (Pech 2007: 86).  
 
By the end of the civil war in April 2002, Angola faced three highly complex transitions 
simultaneously, which would test to the utmost even the capacity of the most effective 
developed state: a transition from war to peace which also involved ―a complex 
emergency to national reconstruction and sustainable development‖; a second transition 
from single-party Marxist-Leninist rule to multi-party democracy; and a third, from a 
centralised command-based economy to a free market (Munslow 1999: 552-53). It was 
quite unclear how the country would undergo these transitions, given their institutional 
complexities, and considering the primacy of vested interests which have traditionally 
hampered political and economic reforms.  
 
Amid these uncertainties, one thing was sure. It is that the end of the civil war opened 
new windows of opportunities for the elaboration of a proper and coherent long-term 
national development agenda, which once having overcome its rivals, the MPLA regime 
was now permitted to pursue. In effect, having recognized that the cessation of military 
conflict brings radically different conditions for the exercise of economic planning (Da 
Rocha 2010: 81), the GoA assigned a high priority to the elaboration and implementation 
of policies they believe are capable of bringing about development. A ―new‖ and 
dominant developmental model emerged that is very similar to that which was adopted 
by the socialist state, bar the fact that it is planned and implemented during peace times, 
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and, in spite of the MPLA‘s nationalist credentials, is much more receptive to some 
neoliberal reform prescriptions, chiefly fiscal transparency. How it localised this policy 
norm in the postwar era, having for so long being reluctant to adhere by it, is the object 



























THE LOCALISATION OF ORT IN POSTWAR ANGOLA 
 
―People have almost generally looked at our 
problems rather than to the good things that we have 
done.‖ 
George Chikoti speaking in an 
interview with Stephen Sackur. 
Broadcast on BBC Radio 4, 28 
February 2012, 0030. 
―Not everything that counts can be measured. Not 
everything that can be measured counts.‖  
Albert Einstein. 
―Any way you make so-called ‗progress‘ on the 
freedom of information and transparency is, of 
course, progress from a previous situation towards 
something else […].‖ 
Excerpt of an interview with an INGO 
official, London, 18 February 2013. 
 
 
To reiterate, one of the objectives of this research project has been to assess the track 
record of the oil governance reform agenda implemented in Angola since 2002. This 
was quite a difficult task, given as explained in the introduction, the constraints 
associated with the concept and operationalization of transparency. The consequences 
of the fixation on data, in particular, could not be more visible when it comes to Angola. 
In discussions and analyses of oil sector transparency in Angola, one notices the over-
privileging of the regular publication of oil sector data on the MINFIN website at the 
expense of a fuller and more comprehensive analysis of the reform programme as a 
whole, or the conditions of economic policy for that matter. The fact that the content of 
this programme is mainstreamed in several reports which are not always easily 
accessible and extremely difficult to piece together certainly conditions this situation.  
Nevertheless, the fact remains that this failing accentuates the lack of information on 
and understanding of Angola‘s political economy that makes studying this African petro-




This chapter attempts to remediate to this problem, by offering a broader and perhaps 
more balanced view of transparency reforms implemented between 2002 and 2013. The 
first two sections of the chapter advance in a chronological manner in order to allow the 
reader to better evaluate how the economic reform agenda has evolved into what it is 
today. They begin with a background on past reform experiences in Angola, before 
proceeding to the review of the content and shape of the postwar ORT reform 
programme. Fundamentally, one observes that transparency reforms implemented or 
launched during the post-2003 oil boom period running up to the 2007-08 global 
financial crisis were aimed at strengthening oil payments collection and improving the 
reporting of oil sector data. Those that followed the crisis are part of a much wider 
political and economic reform programme, though on the economic front they targeted 
more structural and politically contentious issues such as those relating to Sonangol.  
The third section will concentrate on informational practices, as they pertain to the 
availability, accessibility, timeliness, comprehensiveness and coverage of the 
information disclosed by the Angolan regime, in order to give an overview of what 
change on the ORT front actually means in the Angolan context.  
 
A BRIEF HISTORY OF ECONOMIC REFORMS IN ANGOLA 
 
Economic reforms in Angola began in earnest before the formal abandon of Marxism-
Leninism in 1990, in 1987 to be more precise. The launch of this reform agenda 
coincided with the battle for Cuito Cuanavale which was nearly lost by the MPLA forces 
in 1987 and the Bicesse peace process which took place amid external disengagement 
at the end of the Cold War, a sharp drop of oil prices in 1985-86, and general discontent 
with the resulting politically damaging economic crisis. The reforms were intended to 
restore macro-economic stability and kick-start the transition from a centrally planned 
dominated by state-owned companies as in the oil sector, to a market based economy 
(Hodges 2004: 113), in part, in order to meet IMF and World Bank requirements for 
loans.  
 
This reform agenda was distinctive for the sheer number of programmes launched, their 
policy incoherence and ineffectiveness. In total, ten reform programmes were launched 
between 1987 and 2000, which were either partially implemented or simply abandoned 
(ibid: 114-15). As with similar transitions in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, 
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the blurring lines between state and party did account for the fragmented approach to 
economic policy, together with the lack of appropriate institutional framework capable of 
supporting the efficient operation of markets (Aguilar 2001: 5; Vines et al 2005: 2). 
Noteworthy too were incessant shifts in leadership and institutional responsibilities 
between the MINFIN, the Ministry of Planning (MINPLAN) and BNA; and the frequent 
interventions of the council of advisors at the presidency. Known informally as the 
Homens de Futungo (―group at Futungo‖) and named after the site of the presidential 
palace, Futungo de Belas, this group has traditionally been ideologically hostile to 
reforms and cooperation with international financial institutions (Hodges 2004: 122-24; 
Aguilar 2001: 7). In short, as one Angolan civil society activist recalled,  
 
―There was a process of shifting who is actually in the ministries: sometimes it 
would be ‗let‘s put this person at the head of the ministry because he would be a 
better representative on the relations with the IMF, and so on. Then when the 
issue with the IMF is close, done, then we can put another one […].‖
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Besides institutional constraints, skills shortage and periods of war also impeded 
economic reforms. By way of example, the previous chapter documented how the return 
to the armed conflict and oil-backed loans used as a response to military pressures by 
the MPLA government from 1992 onwards favoured opponents to reforms and allowed 
corruption and opacity in the management of government finances to thrive. This same 
fact explains why campaign groups were sceptical of the official argument that the civil 
war was the major impediment to economic reform. For example, HRW (2004) contested 
that the war could not have prevented increased transparency by the government, nor 
could it account for the massive discrepancies in expenditures. In their view, there was 
no structural or specific impediment for reforms, except political will, or as an insider put 
it bluntly, ―the fact that they didn‘t want to do it.‖
73 
 
Generally, however, reforms were implemented that were aligned with elites‘ business 
interests (privatisation reforms for example), or during peace times (as was the case 
after the end of the so-called ―third war‖ that gave way to the signing of the post-Lusaka 
Protocol in 1994). Periods of crisis – rising urban social tensions, acute financial 
stresses and even the president‘s growing unpopularity – equally proved to be important 
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reform drivers. Widely documented, for instance, is the ―fluctuating resolve‖ to reform 
(Reed 2009: 39) in accordance with international oil prices – though it is argued below 
and further in Chapter 6 that this external variable does not provide a full explanation for 
the uptake and implementation of reforms during the postwar period. Figure 1 is 
illustrative of this. It demonstrates how the 1985-86 fall in oil prices that triggered 
Angola‘s debt crisis prompted the government to initiate talks with the World Bank and 
IMF about the possibility of joining the two institutions. Similarly, hyperinflation in 1994-
96 triggered further negotiations with the IMF; and once again how the 1998-99 crash in 
oil prices during a ceasefire with UNITA forced the government to turn to the IMF 
(Hodges 2004: 141; HRW 2004: 6-7). In all, the Angolan government negotiated at least 
four staff monitored programmes (SMPs) with the IMF between 1995 and 2001: three of 
those were abandoned, and only one served as a springboard for a series of reforms 
that will extend to the postwar era. One refers here to the nine-month SMP signed 
between the government and the IMF in April 2000, and extended until June 2001.  
 
Negotiations for this agreement coincided with the government‘s implementation of a 
medium-term adjustment and reform programme, whose goal was to ―restore domestic 
and external equilibrium, create the conditions for sustained economic growth, lowering 
inflation, improving the efficiency and transparency of public sector operations, and 
enhancing the role of the private sector‖ (IMF 2000: i; see also Neto and Jamba 2006: 
4). It must be added too, that the implementation of this programme occurred in the 
midst of protest actions by international donors, including the World Bank, which 
downgraded its Luanda‘s office into a Liaison office after the departure of its country 
representative in 1999.  Nonetheless, this was the first indication of the government‘s 
subscription to ―the principle of universal coverage of its receipts and expenditures in the 
national budget‖ (IMF 2000: 19) and to the idea that ―transparency and good governance 
are instrumental to macroeconomic stability and growth‖ (Graça 2003). 
 
It is difficult to ascertain with certainty what the motivations behind the apparent 
commitment to this programme were at the time, but experts speculate that:   
  
―[…] the absolute key was a desire by the president to regain control over the 
economy following the economic disasters of the 1990s, and the new economic 
crisis brought by the onset of war. It was also important to remain on good terms 
with the West at a time of great military uncertainty and economic and political 
weakness, which coincided with low oil prices […] Macroeconomic reform, then, 
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is the result of a slow learning process after a decade of disastrous trial and error 
by the Angolan leadership […]‖ (Vines et al 2005: 25; see also HRW 2004).  
 
Figure 1: Relationship between Economic Reforms and Oil Prices 
 





Key features of this reform programme included the ―Diagnostic study‖ of the oil sector 
which began in November 2000, and the contracting in 2001 of the London-based 
Crown Agents to undertake an overhaul of customs. The former in particular represented 
a major milestone in the history of Angola, serving as an important first step towards 
ensuring greater transparency in Angola‘s oil revenues inflow. The US$1.6 million study 
was implemented by the international accounting and consulting firm KPMG, following a 
competitive bidding process. It was financed by the Angolan authorities and World Bank, 
at the rate of 68 to 32 per cent of the cost respectively (HRW 2001: 2). KPMG completed 
its first report in July 2002, and produced eight other reports to the Angolan authorities 
(HRW 2004: 13). After initial concerns that these reports would not be made available to 
the public (McIntosh 2002), the government eventually released the initial report 
together with an executive summary of the final report in 2004 (see MINFIN 2004).  
 
Soon after the study, the GoA commissioned the first ever audits of BNA accounts 
(conducted by the international accounting firm Ernst and Young), to which the IMF 
(2003: 21) attributed adjustments to BNA‘s balance sheet in 2002, and the signing of a 
Protocol that set out rules designed to improve fiscal and monetary coordination and 
synchronisation between BNA and MINFIN. The same year, the government launched 
its own Public Finance Modernization Programme (PMGFP) that comprised a number of 
measures aimed at increasing transparency and efficiency in the budget process (IMF 
2004: 38; World Bank 2005; Isaksen et al 2007: 7).  
 
Hodges (2004: 40) remarks that early attempts to improve fiscal transparency and 
macro-economic stability were remarkable for the way in which they clashed head-on 
with powerful vested interests, in actual fact, the more structural and political reforms 
were not followed through. Public access to government documents ―such as budgets, 
plans and programmes‖ and data ―even from surveys financed by international 
institutions‖ remained constrained. In turn, delays in the implementation of reform 
measures and persistent deviations from the quantitative targets led to the reform 
programme having ―little success in improving transparency and the quality of fiscal and 
external debt data‖ (ibid: 121 citing IMF 2002). In spite of these deficiencies, the 
aforementioned initiatives forced the government to consider regularising the economic 
situation. The KPMG diagnostic study is a case in point. The summary of the final report 
specified that the study ―does not amount to an audit conducted in accordance with 
international auditing standards and does not give the same level of assurance as an 
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audit would‖, neither did it attempt to ―verify the accuracy or completeness of any such 
data, information or documentation‖ (MINFIN 2004b: 1). Nonetheless, the study 
uncovered oil companies‘ mis-pricing of costs, irregularities in the reporting of incoming 
revenues, and large discrepancies in the revenues received in 2000 when oil revenues 
amounted to 89 per cent of government revenues, just above US$ 4 billion (MINFIN 
2004a: 21-25; HRW 2004: 16). According to HRW (2004: 24), 
   
―KPMG found five different sums for incoming oil revenues: figures of the 
Accounting Department of the Ministry of Finance; figures of the Tax Department 
for the Ministry of Finance; a revised Ministry of Finance total that subtracted 
1999 taxes received in 2000, taxes and Profit Oil paid during 2000, and 2000 
taxes and Profit Oil that was going to be paid in 2001; figures from Ernst & 
Young‘s (E&Y) fiscal reports on oil revenues conducted on behalf of the Ministry 
of Finance; and the amount of money that the BNA reported it had received.‖ 
 
These and other findings were critical in presenting at length the level of dysfunctionality 
that plagued Angola‘s public financial system, and prompting government action. Most 
significantly, the actions taken delivered important results that helped the government 
enhance its international reputation. A great deal of commentary on specific reform 
components shall follow in the forthcoming analysis of the reform context and process 
provided in Chapters 6 to 9. What follows is merely a synopsis of a broad range of 
reforms which are helpful in unpacking the Angolan regime‘s ORT model.  
 
ANGOLA‟S POSTWAR ORT REFORM AGENDA (2003-2013) 
A senior oil consultant submits that the economic reform agenda received substantial 
impetus after the Angolan leadership moved to request an assessment of the human, 
institutional and legal capacity necessary to comply with the Diagnostic study‘s 
recommendations (Macnab 2006). From these efforts sprung major breakthroughs from 
2003 onwards. The 2003 revised budget became the first national budget ever to 
comprise extra-budgetary spending and Sonangol‘s quasi-fiscal operations (World Bank 
2005: 29). The debt management process previously under the purview of Sonangol 
was smoothened with the elaboration of a regulatory framework on public debt (Law 
10/2002)
74
 and the creation of a coordination committee to facilitate interactions between 
BNA‘s debt unit, the Treasury‘s External Debt department, and Sonangol (Aguilar 2004; 
                                                          
74
 More information on the decree can be found online at 
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accessed 26 February 2013].    
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World Bank 2005: 45). Moreover, the government allowed the IMF to publish findings of 
its 2003 Article IV staff report (unlike the neighbouring Congo Brazzaville), having 
previously blocked the publication of the 2001 and 2002 Article IV staff reports. On 5 
June 2002, it disclosed a US$30 million signature bonus paid by Ranger Oil, Odebrecht 
and Sonangol to parliament (HRW 2004: 31). 
 
Resistance to reforms from some parts of the Angolan public administration persisted 
throughout this period. That was evident with regard to the release and sharing of critical 
information. To the extent that when the Angolan government hired Deloitte & Touche to 
audit all the oil companies‘ tax returns and accounts, data regarding Sonangol were 
obtained not from the NOC but from block operators (World Bank 2006: xii). Only the 
financial statements of companies within the Sonangol group were ―comprehensively‖ 
audited, the first time in 2003. The audits were shared with the World Bank but never 
published. They apparently contained ―minor audit qualifications‖ with regard to 
exploration and production operations ―where most of the money is‖; and ―numerous 
audit qualifications‖ in the less important downstream operations, leading Sonangol to 
invite Accenture to help deal with the irregularities uncovered (ibid). 
 
At this stage, Angolan officials acknowledged that ―there is, still, much work to do in 
order to build the institutional capacity to ensure integrity, high quality and coverage as 
well as regular publication of the data‖ and blamed the slow pace of reforms on the lack 
of human and financial resources (see Graça 2003). Interestingly, and contrary to 
hearsay, reforms continued apace during the 2004-2008 oil boom. In 2004, Angola 
agreed to participate in the IMF General Data Dissemination System which addresses 
the quality and dissemination of data, and it requested the organisation‘s Fiscal Affairs 
Department to undertake a report on the Observance of Standards and Codes (ROSC) 
regarding fiscal transparency, including on revenues from oil and other natural 
resources. The move was seen as ―undoubtedly a significant step in the process of 
gradually and progressively improving the production and dissemination of Angola's 
official economic, financial, and socio-demographic statistics‖ (IMF 2004 citing a 
government official).  
 
Most significantly, in breaking with the culture of secrecy that surrounded oil deals during 
war time, MINFIN began publicising oil sector data and information regarding Chinese 
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and Portuguese credit lines on its website in 2004
75
. In May 2004, Chevron too 
announced that it paid US$210 million in signature bonus and an additional US$80 
million in social bonus to Sonangol for the extension of block 0; one of the most prolific 
oil blocks in Angola. Information on several other payments has since been released 
either by the Angolan authorities - most notably during the 2005/6 oil licensing round 
(see Chapter V) -, by IOCs or by industry experts. Most recently, on 3 April 2014 to be 
more precise, White Rose Energy Ventures (―White Rose‖), a UK-registered oil 
company, and Genel Energy plc (―Genel‖), a UK-Turkish oil company registered in the 
London Stock Exchange, announced that they paid a total of US$59 million for 15 per 
cent interests acquired from China-Sonangol in Block 38/11, and US$222million for 15 
per cent interests acquired from Statoil Angola Block 39 AS, a wholly-owned subsidiary 
of Statoil, the Norwegian NOC (Ballard 2014; StockMarketWire 2014). 
  
Beyond the publication of oil revenues, the Angolan authorities focused a great deal on 
strengthening the accounting and reporting process between and within government 
agencies, the primary targets being MINFIN and MINPLAN. In 2005, they tasked the UK-
based firm Aberdeen University Petroleum Economic Consultancy (AUPEC) Ltd with 
overseeing the Tax Administration project to be completed in March 2007. The project 
was designed ―to improve systems and reporting, to reconcile taxes declared as per the 
Inland Revenue records with taxes received as per Tax collection office and taxes 
received as per Bank record‖ (Macnab 2006; Calder 2006). The same consultancy firm 
was asked to work on updating the revenue forecasting model first proposed in the 
KPMG study with the National Tax Directorate‘s Special Tax Regimes Department 
(Calder 2006; IMF 2005). The ‗AUPEC model‘ was formally adopted in April 2006 in the 
context of the Oil Diagnostic study, and described as ―a more effective tool to forecast oil 
revenues‖ and ―a step in the right direction‖ (World Bank 2007: 9).  
 
In addition, the National Inspectorate of Finance (INF), began auditing government 
departments. By 2008, it had conducted 43 inspections, 6 deeper audits, 2 management 
audits and 17 examinations in 2 provinces (World Bank 2010: 8). Another major 
development was the functioning and rollout of the integrated financial management 
system (Sistema Integrado de Gestão Financeira do Estado or SIGFE), a system set up 
with international assistance in 1992 to increase transparency of government revenues 
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and expenditures across all the national territory and overseas budget units located 
within MINFIN‘s information technology department. After a slow start-up in 1997, SIGFE 
made noteworthy advances: there were ―some improvement in the quality of returns 
from the provinces connected to the SIGFE‖ (World Bank 2007: 12), and a lot more 
―discipline into the expenditure procedures of state institutions‖ (UNDP et al 2002: 8). 
Presumably, these advances occurred as a direct result of the availability of detailed 
accounts of expenditures in the system, which made it possible ―to see if [revenues] 
were used properly‖ (HRW 2010: 11 citing a World Bank official). At the end of its 2008 
Article IV consultation with Angola, the Fund (2009) declared that ―Angola‘s most 
successful initiative on public financial management and fiscal transparency‖ continues 
to be the information system, SIGFE, which has helped strengthen budget execution 
and fiscal reporting‖.   
 
Improvements in SIGFE were complimented by (a) advances in the management of 
public sector operations through the functioning of a parallel programme, the Patrimonial 
Management System (Sistema Integrado de Gestão Patrimonial do Estado or SIGPE); 
(b) efforts to improve the tendering and auditing of public sector procurement contracts, 
among other things, by employing new staff at the Tribunal of Accounts responsible for 
the oversight of public finances (AEO 2006); and (c) the approval in 2007, of the Law on 
Local Organs of State (Law 2/07) in line with the general governmental goal of re-
establishing state administration in 2008 as stipulated in the pre-2008-elections budget. 
The latter provides for the transfers of financial resources to local government, citizen 
participation at the local level, and the creation of a bridge between the populations and 
public services ―as means to ensure celerity, de-bureaucratisation, and adequate 
solutions to the local reality‖ (Orre 2007: 7).   
 
Whereas most projects were implemented to boost the collection and (internal/external) 
reporting of oil data, others were quite simply directed at procedural aspects. These 
ranged from the issuance of a ―comprehensive‖ oil tax manual accompanied with 
―detailed desk procedures outlining the day-to-day steps required to perform the 
functions described in the manual‖ (Calder 2010: 376; Calder 2006); to a major overhaul 
of the petroleum legislation. For example, the 2004 Petroleum Activities Law
76
 reaffirmed 
the government‘s position on contract confidentiality enshrined in the 1978 version 
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(Article 77), though it provided for open tender procedures for allocating oil licenses 
(Article 46) and direct negotiation regime in exceptional circumstances (Article 47).  
 
A second statute regulating petroleum activities, and also approved in 2004, was the 
Petroleum Taxation Law
77
. This Act upgraded and simplified rules governing oil tax 
administration: it brought all oil all foreign operators as well as Sonangol under a 
common regime for tax assessment and payment; clarified the responsibilities and lines 
of communication that exists between these tax payers and government ministries 
responsible for tax collection; and provided rules that are ―comparatively well-designed 
and straightforward‖, thereby making the Angolan oil tax regime simpler than that 
existing in the UK (Calder 2006; Heller 2007). According to one analyst, this Act reflects 
lessons learned from IOCs‘ experiences with the government under previous 
individualized taxation arrangements, and its drafting process was quite collaborative 
(Heller 2007: 52). 
 
The reform phase between 2008 and 2013 was the most eventful and therefore, the 
most interesting not only the breadth and depth of the changes announced, but also 
because of the socio-political and social context within which they were implemented. 
These reforms covered the expenditure side to a greater extent than the revenue inflow 
side, and its process involved arguably the greatest amount of foreign input that at any 
time in the history of economic reform in Angola. If the previous transparency reforms 
were planned mainly to ensure that ―the revenues that should be received by the 
government are indeed received‖ (Corbett 2008 citing José Pedro de Morais), those that 
are launched during this period appear to have been set up either as part of the 
reorganisation of public financial management after the 2008-9 financial crisis, or as 
result of changes occurring on the political scene. Importantly, they were implemented in 
conjunction or as part and parcel of a Stand-By-Arrangement (SBA) signed between the 
Fund and the Angolan government (2009-12) and its Post-Programme Monitoring (2012-
14); and implemented between or after Angola‘s two postwar legislative elections in 
2008 and 2012.    
 
Among changes that arose during this period were the following: improvements in inter-
agency reconciliation of incoming revenues; the establishment of a new framework on 
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statistical reporting and analysis that would enhance information of oil revenue transfers 
to the state budget
78
; attempts to gradually phase out fuel subsidies and Sonangol‘s 
quasi-fiscal activities; the adoption of a new debt management framework; the 
publication, in August 2010, of the results of the first national household survey critical to 
the transparency and effectiveness of decision-making related to revenue spending (INE 
2010); the publication of the first draft of a five-year debt strategy; the conduct and 
publication of the audits of Sonangol‘s accounts in 2009; Ernst and Young was 
contracted to help MINFIN improve budget execution; the strengthening of the Tribunal 
of Accounts and controls over public investment, procurement, budget execution, and 
the general budget process, mostly through the legislation and associated decrees (see 
Staines 2013; Jensen and Paulo 2011).   
 
Speaking of legislation, the period from 2009-2013 was particularly active in terms of the 
number of statutes adopted which are relevant to the fight against oil sector corruption 
and lack of transparency in public finance management. To give but one example, the 
2010 Constitution comprises several pro-transparency provisions. It describes the state 
budget as ―the most important tool for the implementation of government policies‖; and 
gives assurances that the government would adopt a multi-year approach to budgeting 
(Article 104) and that budget execution ―shall observe the principles of transparency and 
good governance and is controlled by the National Assembly and the Court of Accounts 
…‖ (Article 104(4)). Moreover, the Constitution established the Court of Accounts as ―the 
supreme supervisory body responsible for overseeing the legality of public finances and 
judging such accounts‖ (Article 183 (1)), while reinforcing the idea of parliament‘s take-
over of the President‘s role of approving the budget - while another legal statute, Law 
15/10 of July 14, gives it the power to amend the budget (see IBP 2012: 156). Regarding 
the right to know, it is important to note that the Constitution upholds citizens‘ rights and 
freedoms - of expression, association, and of the press, to cite just a few.   
 
The same year that the Constitution was adopted, the National Assembly adopted LAP 
(Law 3/10 of 29 March) which obliges Angolan government officials to disclose 
information on their wealth and prevent them from gaining private benefits from public 
office or from the sale of public goods. Parliament also passed a law on Anti-Money 
Laundering and Countering Financing of Terrorism in December 2011 (Law 34/11 of 12 
December). Further, Presidential Decree No. 48/11 of 9 March created the Oil Fund 
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which was later renamed Sovereign Fund of Angola (Fundo Sobereno de Angola or 
FSDEA) by Decree 89/13 in June 2013. The FSDEA was allocated an initial sum of 
US$5 billion to be gradually transferred from the petroleum account at BNA.  
 
Table 3: Angola‟s FOREX Rules 
1 October 2012 Oil companies need to make all payments for goods and services 
supplied by Angolan residents out of bank accounts domiciled in 
Angola, whether in national or foreign currency. 
13 May 2012 Payments of services and products by Sonangol or its 
Associates are made through local bank accounts in local or 
foreign currency. 
1 July 2013 Payments of services and products to local contractors are made 
in local currency.  
1 October 2013 Operator companies need to make all payments for goods and 
services to foreign contractors from local bank accounts.  
 
 
As of September 
2013 
BNA‘s Aviso No. 
13/2013 of July 2013 
a) All payments for current invisible79 operations involving 
foreign companies should be made from the foreign 
exchange account of the applicants; or with an 
international electronic payment card; or a debit entry in 
the kwanza account of the applicant at the time that the 
settlement of the transaction or the payment in foreign 
exchange abroad is made.  
b) Furthermore, foreign exchange transactions for current 
invisible operations must be made within 360 days after 
the relevant services were provided;  
c) Such contracts for which FOREX payments are to be 
made must clearly describe the object, term, rights and 
obligations of the parties and the price; register import of 
goods and current invisible operations. 
d) Imports of goods and invisible operations should be 
registered with the BNA. 
Sources: De Pina and Brigolas (2012); Van Welzen and Fonseca (2013). 
 
 
On 29 November 2011, the Angolan parliament approved a new foreign exchange 
(FOREX) regime applicable to the oil and gas sector. This legislation (Law 2/2012) was 
promulgated on 6 January 2012. It obliges Sonangol and its associates to process all 
payments pertaining to their operations through Angolan bank accounts, irrespective of 
the residency of the concerned entities. It compels operators to open and maintain 
Angolan bank accounts a) in foreign currency for payments of goods and services 
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provided by international suppliers, and b) in Kwanza, to pay for goods and services 
provided by local suppliers. Law 2/12 applies to all current and future petroleum 
concessions and subjects all foreign exchange operations to registration with BNA. The 
Bank has since issued rules related to the phased implementation of the Law, as well as 
a number of exceptions summed up in Table 3 above. 
 
UNPACKING ANGOLA‟S POSTWAR ORT 
 
The consensus view of the government postwar reform efforts is that they have led to 
some noteworthy improvements which constitute the essential first steps towards the 
transparent management of Angola‘s petroleum revenues.  Besides questions regarding 
the real intentions behind this agenda though, the object of debate has been what this 
progress actually means in practice. This section aims to appraise the quantitative and 
qualitative nature of this transparency, by examining local and international perceptions 
on the government‘s publication of oil revenue payments, as well as two issues that 
many Angolan interviewees perceived to be central to the discourse on ORT in Angola: 
budget transparency and the Law on Administrative Probity that aims to further the right 
to information in Angola.  
 
“Publish What You Pay”: Revenue Payment Disclosures in Angola 
 
As stated above, MINFIN regularly – with a two to three months lag
80
 - publishes 
information oil revenue payments on its website. The data reveals how much crude oil 
the government estimates to have exported since 2007, and how much revenues it 
deems to have received from these exports, per production block, taxation type, on a 
monthly and yearly basis. Since 2008, It also contains information on the price of oil per 
barrel, which as the website makes clear, is related to ―the market price and not the tax 
reference price determined by MINFIN and MINPET‖, whilst the ―revenues of the 
Concessionaire‖ are based on Sonangol‘s declarations after the deduction of 10 per 
cent
81
. The revenues are estimated both in Kwanzas and in U.S. dollars and are 
calculated based on tax returns made to the national tax department by oil companies. 
What is more, the valuation of tax payments is made one month after the completion of 
the oil shipments.  
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Needless to say, this level of disclosure has been widely acclaimed by critics and 
supporters alike. Former U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton cited it as a positive step 
toward transparency during her visit to Angola in 2009
82
, and the World Bank (2006: 44) 
stated that ―this level of published detail is virtually unique among oil producing 
countries‖. Civil society activists equally praised the government, with HRW (2010:6)  
describing it as an ―unprecedented in Angola‖, and others in Angola referring to it as ―a 
good step‖ or a ―step forward‖
83
, especially considering that ―before they used to publish 
a spread sheet and then stopped.‖
84 
 
In principle, it is true that the information disclosed makes Angola one of the most 
transparent among sub-Saharan African oil-producing states. An analysis of EITI reports 
produced until 2011 indicated indeed that several EITI implementing countries lagged 
behind in terms of the regularity and quality of the data published in EITI reports, as well 
as their coverage and comprehensiveness. Many such reports did not cover all 
companies operating in the sector; nor did they include the monetised value of the 
commodity exported (Gillies 2011). Nigeria, the region‘s biggest oil producer, had 
produced ten EITI reports, on average every three years after the fiscal year of the data. 
But these reports did not contain information on the price of crude oil sold by the 
government, the total production figures, and total government receipts
85
, rendering it 
extremely difficult to make an informed judgement about whether the government 
received the revenues that it is owed.  
 
These differences notwithstanding, an in-depth analysis of the information released by 
MINFIN and other government agencies raise serious questions about its ―dubious 
quality‖
86
, lack of credibility and integrity.  The issue is that there are ―a lot of grey areas, 
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and a lot of discrepancies in the numbers that Sonangol gives, the ministry of finance 
gives, the ministry of petroleum gives‖, and there is ―no way that we can consolidate or 
harmonise the information for it to be credible.‖
87
 These difficulties prompted one critic to 
treat the data as ―drafts because they have not been audited or verified by civil society, 
or even put under the scrutiny of EITI.‖
88
   
 
Table 4: Oil Revenues Data (2008-2012); amounts in billions of Kwanzas. 
  Source: MINFIN‘s website . 
 
Table 5: 2009 Oil Revenues in billions of Kwanzas from Various Official Sources 
Source: Jensen and Paulo (2011: 33). 
 
A recent analysis of the reporting of oil revenues in 2009 reinforces these calls to treat 
the data released with a dose of scepticism. It shows massive discrepancies in the 
reporting of oil revenues by four different sources in 2009, namely, the budget execution 
report for 2009; the background analysis budget documents; MINFIN‘s tax department 
and Sonangol‘s audited financial statements for 2009 (Jensen and Paulo 2011: 62). 
According to the authors of the report, the discrepancies stemmed, inter alia, from (a) 
Sonangol‘s continuing failure to remit all its payables to the treasury; (b) inconsistency in 
the reporting format used in main budget or supporting documents; and (c) errors in the 
calculation of oil revenues reported in Kwanzas. The authors speculate that these 
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shortcomings might explain discrepancies between the Kz1,367.9 billion disclosed by 
MINFIN‘s tax department and the Kz671.3 billion released on its website for the year 
2009 (as highlighted above in Tables 4 and 5). 
   
A second study of oil revenue flows for 2008 contains similar findings. It notes that: 
 
―The official data on oil production, exports, domestic sales, prices and above all, 
revenues, are not reliable. None of the figures appear to be independently 
verified (with the partial exception of Sonangol‘s accounts, which are audited by 
an international accounting firm). Thus even in cases where different agencies‘ 
figures are consistent with each other, there is no external assurance that the 
figures are accurate. In fact the figures from different agencies show numerous 
gaps, discrepancies and anomalies which are hard to explain, based on the 
available information‖ (GW and OSISA 2011: 4). 
 
Moreover, the report demonstrates how difficult it is to reconcile Sonangol‘s reporting of 
US$91 million paid to the national treasury for ―social projects‖, ―a commercial discovery‖ 
and ―for starting production‖, with MINPET‘s reporting of US$38.99 million as ―the cost of 
social projects‖ in a way that could give a clear, accurate picture, of how much social 
bonuses for 2008 were paid to the GoA. This type of classification, the lobby groups 
conclude, ―illustrates, once again, the need for much greater transparency in the ways 
that figures are categorised and reported across government agencies‖ (ibid: 39).   
 
It should be stressed that the government acknowledges the difficulties it faces when 
reporting fiscal data. The fact that both BNA‘s 2008 and 2009 audits contain some 
qualifications
90
 on the report‘s format is a case in point. Other aspects of ORT such as 
the materiality of this information for, and lack of accessibility by, ordinary citizens are 
even less discussed if at all, despite the latter being a key component of the right to 
know. These include. A senior member of staff at one of Angola‘s oldest NGO told the 
author:   
 
―I think the most progress has been that there is now more information but the 
problem is access to information.  If you want to know more, you have to say: ‗ok. 
I will spend three hours just to look for the information‘. The information is not 
available in the easy way people could know […]. Some people say that the 
information is not received on time. It does not make sense if you tell people now 
what the revenues from the oil sector were in 2002. What can they do with this 
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information now? In terms of influence, how will you use this information anyway? 
But yes, we have to recognise that there are some improvements on this.‖
91 
 
In Angola, one speaks of lack of access in two main contexts: (1) lack of access to the 
internet; and (2) lack of access to the websites that contain the information in question. 
A number of reasons explain these constraints, one being the lack and/or bad quality of 
internet access, and another, frequent electricity shortages. Indeed, the 2008-9 
household survey referred to above indicates that only an estimated 0.3 per cent of 
Angolans had access to the internet in 2008, all of whom resided in urban cities (INE 
2010). That means in actual fact that more than 95 per cent of Angolans ―do not have 
access to the data that should be for everyone to see.‖
92
  The report equally revealed 
that only 8.6 per cent of Angolans living in rural areas had access to electricity compared 
to 66.3 per cent in urban centres in 2008
93
. Others are more sceptical. One critic asked: 
―I know that there are difficulties to access internet sites. Here we often say that the 
system is not good but is it the system or is there a deliberate attempt to create 
difficulties for people to access MINFIN‘s and Sonangol‘s websites?‖
94 
 
“Publish What You Spend and How”: Budget Reporting in Angola 
 
One Western researcher present in Luanda at the time of the author‘s field visit sug-
gested that the Angolan civil society was not inquisitive enough about the link between 
the budget and Angola‘s oil-based economy.  ―Civil society is very conscious about the 
link between the budget and development‖ he commented, ―but to go the extra step to 
say: ‗where does the budget come from?‘ is not something that people often ask.‖ The 
informant made this observation after a visit to a Luanda-based INGO whose library has 
―a section on everything but they do not have a section on petroleum.‖
 95 
Chapter 8 will 
illustrate why and how this point matters. Worth pointing out, however, that it cannot be 
generalised. In fact, whereas the previous subject matter was more often than not 
brought about in conversations by the author, that on budget transparency was inter-
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viewee-generated together with LAP and oil companies‘ labour practices. And this is not 
only because they understand and appreciate the fact that ―most of our budget depends 
essentially on oil‖
96
, but more so, because they consider budget transparency to be es-
sential for citizens‘ exercise of their right to know, a key ingredient to build accountability 
and trust between the government and the Angolan people, and by implication, a crucial 
measure of progress on revenue transparency.  
 
An interviewee spoke of budget transparency being ―very crucial because it touches 
people‘s lives; everything that the government is supposed to do is for the people and 
these people should know how much, and how the money is spent.‖
97
 However, as 
another added, Angola is obviously different from developed countries where people are 
not looking at the budget every day because ―they have the trust that they can leave it 
up to people that can make the right decisions; and if they want to know, they can go to 
the designated authorities and they can get the information sought after‖
98
. In Angola, 
information is usually not available. Whenever that information is eventually made public, 
one recurring challenge is that it does not circulate freely throughout the country, so 
much so that there is always much more information available in the capital and in other 
big coastal cities than there is in the interior
99
.    
 
One way of measuring the progress that Angola has achieved on the transparency of 
budget reporting is by analysing the results of the surveys commissioned by the 
Washington-based International Budget Partnership (IBP). IBP launched its grounds-
breaking Open Budget Index (OBI) in 2006, and has to date conducted four biennial 
surveys, in 2006, 2008, 2010 and 2012. The surveys are conducted by local researchers 
and research teams, then peer reviewed by one or more researchers, before being 
approved by staff at IBP headquarters. They use ―internationally accepted criteria‖ to 
assess four key areas: (a) the availability of the eight key documents referred to in Table 
6; (b) the comprehensiveness of the information contained in those documents; (c) the 
degree of oversight by the legislative and supreme audit institutions; and (d) the level of 
public participation in the budget process. As an overview of all these areas is beyond 
the scope of this chapter, it will concentrate essentially on offering a synopsis of the 
results pertaining to areas (a) and (b). These findings are complemented with those of 
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the World Bank, IMF and Norway‘s Chr. Michelsen Institute (CMI) (see CMI 2007 and 
2011).  
 
As per IBP, transparency of budget reporting increased from a mere 5 per cent in 2006 – 
perhaps the country with the least transparent budget process at the time -, to 4 per cent 
in 2008, 26 per cent in 2010 and 28 per cent in 2012. But these scores do not reveal 
much about the specific areas where progress has been achieved. In order to give these 
numbers a meaning, one needs to take a closer look at IBP analysis of budget data and 
at Table 6 that comprises the type and publication date of budget documents publicised 
during the period under study.   
 
Table 6: Availability of Key Budget Documents (2006-2012)  
Documents                   Publication Status 
 2006 2008 2010 2012 
Pre-Budget Statement  - - - - 
Executive‘s Budget 
Proposal  
- - 2009 2012 
Citizens Budget  2005 2007 - - 
Enacted Budget  2005 2007 2009 2011 
In-Year Reports  - - - 2011 
Mid-Year Review - - - - 
Year-End Report 2004 2006 2007 2010 
Audit Report  - - - - 
Source: IBP (author‘s compilation). 
 
Table 6 signals that the advancement made in 2010 and 2012 rested almost exclusively 
on the fact that the government made the executive‘s budget proposal available on the 
website of the Ministry of Finance before it is approved by the National Assembly, and 
the production and release of the in-year report in 2011. This is in stark contrast with 
past practices where the budget proposal was considered public only after parliament‘s 
approval (Jensen and Paulo 2011: 73). The release of the 2011 year-end report equally 
points toward a significant shift from the previous official position that releasing in-year 
reports would be a ―waste of time‖ since the same information would be obtainable from 
year-end reports (IBP 2010: 6). The dissemination of the 2012 executive budget 
proposal was also published within a shorter time lag than that published when the 
preceding survey was conducted in 2010, but this element was not taken into 
consideration by IBP researchers since timeliness was not one of the criteria used by the 




As far as the comprehensiveness and coverage of budget documents are concerned, 
one witnesses an interesting change in the classification of public expenditures which 
the Bank (2007: 3) had previously identified as a problem in Angola. In 2010, for 
instance, information recorded on budget expenditures was classified per fiscal unit, 
ministry, individual programme and per province. The following year, the executive 
released an Integrated Municipal Programme for Rural Development and Poverty 
Reduction covering details of projects to be carried out at the municipal level in every 
province. This step was described by an OBI reviewer as ―increasing transparency about 
expenditure immensely‖, a step which the government ―should be commended for‖ (IBP 
2012: 88).   
 
Significantly, one remarks improvements in the reporting of annual domestic and 
external debt repayments, interest rates payments, different sources of tax and non-tax 
revenues, and macro-economic forecast with estimates on oil and diamond prices and 
production; all of which were noticeably absent before 2010 since the executive‘s budget 
proposals were not published (IBP 2010: 18). Moreover, a number of high level 
workshops and conferences were organised on petroleum revenue management and on 
the first US$2 billion credit line from China, that is, in addition to the disclosure of 
information on Chinese and Portuguese credit lines referred to in the second section. 
This is quite remarkable considering, as discussed in the previous chapter, that oil-
backed loans was one of those topics Angola‘s petro-elites were the most tight-lipped 
about during the nineties. 
 
The aforementioned initiatives regardless, Angola‘s relatively low scores do reflect the 
fact that a lot more still remains to be done. To cite IBP analysts, ―the government 
provides the public with minimal information on the central government‘s budget and 
financial activities assessed by the Survey. This makes it extremely difficult for citizens 
to hold the government accountable for its management of the public‘s money‖ (IBP 
2010). One major challenge in relation to budget reporting is the inconsistency and 
timeliness in the reporting of relevant information. Table 5 illustrates, for instance, that 
documents of critical importance such as audit reports, which constitute ―one of the most 
basic building blocks of budget accountability‖ (TAI 2011: 1), or citizens‘ budgets which 
are supposed to unpack the budget in simple terms in order to give citizens a clearer 
idea of how public resources are to be managed, are only rarely produced or published, 
if at all. The latter, or rather ―a small summary‖ of the budget was publicised in 2005 and 
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2007, but ―when they changed the minister [of finance], they just stopped‖
100
. In addition, 
budget execution reports (represented in Table 6 by year-end reports or general state 
accounts (Conta Geral de Estado)) continue to be released with a significant time lag - 
usually two to three years after the end of the financial year covered in the report (IBP 
2012: 123)
101
 -, leading some to call into question the credibility and integrity not only of 
the information released but of the entire budget process. One Catholic Priest conveyed 
this sentiment when he declared:  
 
―It is true that there is a higher degree of transparency in the sense that you have 
the budget in the website of the ministry of finance; but just the budget. Then if 
you want to have access to the information about the real implementation, it is 




Another shortcoming is that core budget information such as key assumptions on social 
issues, the composition of government debt and outstanding debt stock, or multi-year 
estimates of aggregate expenditures are missing from the documents released. That is, 
in spite of the social sector representing 30 per cent of total expenditures as of late; and 
despite the provision of the latter being specified in the 2010 constitution.    
Regrettably, one observes that the duality of Angola‘s public financial management 
which was such a concern during wartime has somewhat been maintained, as reflected 
by the fact that there continues to be little or no information on ―secret items‖ or 
―administrative costs‖. These are reportedly included in a separate budget approved by 
the President of the Republic (IBP 2012: 77), and constituted a ―substantial portion of 
expenditures‖ especially in the 2006, 2007 and 2008 budgets according to a 2008 U.S. 
embassy cable
103
. Considering that spending on defence, security and public order has 
often been qualified as ―secret‖, this finding is broadly in line with Angola‘s F scoring on 
Transparency International‘s relatively new Government Defence Anti-corruption Index 
which analyses corruption risks in defence establishments from 82 governments
104
. This 
scoring – the worst in the Band shared with countries like the Democratic Republic of 
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Congo and Cameroon –, reflects weak procurement procedures, lack of effective 
oversight, as well as the industry‘s domination by private military and security companies 
with links to Angola‘s generals (TI UK 2012).       
 
Likewise, a major drawback remains lack of access to information on Sonangol‘s quasi-
fiscal activities, extra-budgetary funds and transfers to the budget, some of the important 
aspects pertaining to the principles of unity and universality of the budget which were 
critically and consistently violated during wartime and soon after the end of the civil war 
(World Bank 2005: 45).  In section 2, it was noted that Sonangol has audited its financial 
accounts since 2003, although it is only from May 2010 that it made these audited 
statements public. In 2005, the Bretton Woods institutions recorded some incremental 
changes. In 2005, the World Bank mentioned evidence of ―remarkable progress in the 
elimination of the so-called ‗unexplained discrepancies‘ from the budget‖ (World Bank 
2005: 11). A few years later, it was the turn of the IMF (2012: 5) to disclose that 
Sonangol remitted US$2.7 billion as of the end of February 2012. This was lower than 
the IFI expected, but still represented a major shift towards positive change. Additionally, 
the Fund (IMF 2014: 11) referred to the reduction of Sonangol‘s extra-budgetary funds 
from US$9.3 billion in 2011 to US$3.5 billion in 2013, acknowledging the Angolan 
authorities‘ decision to revoke Sonangol‗s authorization for extra-budgetary spending on 
housing programmes. 
 
Surprisingly perhaps, Sonangol‘s own statements are as silent on its transfers to the 
treasury and budget as the main budget reports cited in Table 6. Jensen and Paulo 
(2011: 34) reported that the main criticisms of the international auditors centred on this 
shortfall.  In December 2011, Sonangol‘s non-payment into the budget made the 
headlines once again, when the IMF was forced to explain that it was partly to blame for 
the US$32 billion accounting gap – the equivalent of 25 per cent of Angola‘s GDP - 
which it identified in the period from 2007-10 (See IMF 2011: 9; Angop 2012; Vieira 
2012). 
 
However, incompleteness of budget data is not confined to Angola; indeed, it is a 
common problem in many government financial systems (Development Alternatives 
2008: 2), which therefore requires that Angola‘s OBI scores be put within their regional 
context. Tables 7 and 8 illustrate just how far apart Angola‘s levels of transparency are 
from the region‘s major oil exporters, and its neighbours. One crucial finding is that lack 
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of budget transparency is more acute in Angola‘s oil-rich peers than it is with its 
neighbours, all of whom are rich in minerals. The notable exception is the Democratic 
Republic of Congo, which scored 0 per cent, 6 per cent and 18 per cent in 2008, 2010 
and 2012 respectively.  In effect, with the exception of Ghana which consistently scores 
between 40 per cent and 50 per cent throughout the period of coverage, Angola‘s scores 
are higher in 2010 and 2012 than those of Cameroon, Chad and Nigeria whose scores 
were downgraded from 18 per cent 16 per cent.  
 
Table 7: Angola‟s OBI Scores vs. OBI Scores of Key African Oil-Rich States 
 2006 2008 2010 2012 
Angola 5 4 26 28 
Cameroon 29 5 2 10 
Chad 5 8 0 3 
Ghana 42 49 54 50 
Nigeria 20 19 18 16 
Source: IBP (author‘s compilation). 
 
Table 8: Angola‟s OBI Scores vs. OBI Scores of its Neighbours 
 2006 2008 2010 2012 
Angola 5 4 26 28 
Botswana 65 62 51 50 
Dem. Rep. of Congo - 0 6 18 
Malawi 41 28 47 52 
Namibia 51 47 53 55 
South Africa 85 87 92 90 
Zambia 37 47 36 4 
Source: IBP (author‘s compilation). 
 
Furthermore, Angola is the only country which improved the most, with Zambia being the 
one whose scores significantly dropped from 34 per cent in 2006 to 4 per cent in 2012.  
De Renzio and Simson (2013: 3) add that Angola is one of 11 countries in Africa out of 
26 in sub-Saharan Africa which published both the budget as approved by the 
legislature and annual reports that detail actual revenues and expenditures. The other 
country in the list is South Africa, the country whose budget data is, according to IBP, 
the most transparent in the region and one of the most transparent in the world. In fact, 
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in 2010, South Africa was the most transparent in the world – with a score of 92 per cent 
-, only to be dethroned in 2012 by New Zealand when its scoring went down by two 
percentage points. Needless to say, unlike Angola, this neighbour produces and 
publishes all eight key budget documents covered in the survey, providing some of the 
most comprehensive budget data
105
.  
“Publish What You Own” and  LAP 
Until recently, corruption was a term ―rarely used in government circles despite Angola's 
poor record on graft‖ (Almeida 2009). Even when presented with allegations of 
corruption, the government was ―always on the defensive saying that these are only 
accusations.‖
106
 Lonely voices included Cabinda‘s Vice Governor, João Santos de 
Carvalho Mesquita, who was among the first officials to make public provincial 
government reports after being criticising ―the mismanagement of public funds by 
successive provincial governments here in Cabinda‖ in a 2003 interview (IRIN 2003).  
 
The President had occasionally denounced corruption. He promised, during the 1996 
economic crisis, to ―put a definitive end to high-level crime, to organised theft and to the 
pillaging of state assets‖; and declared, in 1998, that ―corruption is a worrying problem 
that must be tackled by political and judicial means and by the police if we are not to 
lose control of it‖ (Marques 2010). However, these denunciations almost always seemed 
destined to national audiences. Outside these forums, most politicians would simply not 
accept that corruption is prevalent. As one of the government‘s harsh critics opined, ―it is 
one of those things you‘ll find that a thief will not say that he is a thief unless he is 
caught.‖
107
   
 
Nowadays, the major difference is that state officials are using every possible avenue to 
―market‖ the GoA‘s anti-corruption and good governance policies, particularly to 
international audiences. The former British Ambassador to Angola confided, for 
example, that corruption was ―the longest topic talked about‖ during his meeting with 
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 Interview with an Angolan transparency campaigner, 6 December 2010.  
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President Dos Santos in May 2010. According to the diplomat, the Angolan President 
emphasised several initiatives such as the anti-corruption legislation and increases in 
the number of prosecutions.
108
  LAP, the anti-corruption legislation in question, is an 
offspring of the president‘s ‗zero tolerance‘ policy on corruption launched in a party 
conference speech in November 2009.  
 
In general terms, LAP is designed to tackle corruption at all levels of public sector
109
. It 
defines ―civil servant‖ as ―members of the executive‖, of the parliament, judiciary, armed 
forces and police, public foundations and state-owned companies, local and central 
administration as well as ―private companies that have been given public function 
through concessions, licences, contracts or other contractual ties (Article 15). Among 
other things, the Law prohibits the civil servant from: (i) benefiting directly or indirectly 
from gifts (in cash or in kind) made by individual or collective entities, be they Angolan or 
foreign (Article 18a); (ii) directly or indirectly obtaining economic gain by facilitating the 
acquisition or transfer of assets or public goods by or to the public entity at a price below 
its market value (Articles 25 (1)(b) and (c)); (iii) acquiring goods whose value is 
disproportionate to his/her salary in the process of exercising the mandate, task or public 
assignment (Article 25 (1)(g)); and (iv) directly or indirectly obtaining an economic gain 
by intervening in the availability or application of public funding of any kind (Article 25 
(1)(l)).  
 
Furthermore, LAP subjects civil servants to the declaration of ―titles, income, 
entitlements, stock shares or any other form of good, located in Angola or abroad‖ 
(Article 27 (1)). These declarations have to be made every couple of years (Article 
27(2)), submitted in a sealed envelope, and be forwarded to the State Prosecutor within 
eight working days from the time of submission (Article 27(5)). Crucially, this provision 
only applies to ―magistrates or public prosecutors‖; ―managers or persons in charge of 
local or central administrations‖; ―managers of national heritage affecting the armed 
forces and state police‖ and ―managers and persons in charge of public institutions, 
funds or public foundations and public companies‖ (Article 27(1)(b) to (e). Article 32 
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gives any individual the right to lodge a complaint about impropriety, to which the 




Legally, LAP is not an innovation per se, as it simply brings together in a single legal 
document, provisions that are dispersed among various laws, leading one activist to 
question why these older laws were not enough to curb corruption in the first place 
(Marques 2011: 22)
111
.  Still by far the biggest concern with LAP is that it is non-
transparent and discretionary. In other words,  
  
―It is not forcing civil servant to disclose their wealth. It is not compulsory and it is 
just a request that is made and this is made in such a way that it is not made 
public. So, the civil servant will write something, put it in an enclosed envelope 
and gives it to the national assembly or the Court of Accounts, but that will never 
be open and it will never be made public. Access to it has to be done upon 
request, and at the reservation of the highest authority [the President of the 
Republic]. So, it is an initiative but it is a closed initiative; it really does not 




Another respondent expanded on the question of access to the declarations. In his view, 
LAP is ―just like a mockery‖, since ―even the Prosecutor general is not allowed to have 
access to it unless there is a case in one of our courts, then the case imposes access to 
the declaration of assets.‖
113
 The other biggest grey area regards its exemption of key 
―civil servants‖. As one civil servant previously engaged in ORT declared,  
 
―There the President of the Republic, the Vice President of the Republic and the 
President of the National Assembly are exempt from submitting, before the 
Attorney General of the republic, information about their private property. Not just 
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a matter of example; how can you talk about probity when some are exempt to 
fulfil their responsibilities? It is as if they are people who cannot be punished. One 
has to wait for them to leave office before prosecuting them, when we are talking 
of capital flight worth billions each year. Imagine that it is billions that are lost! I'm 




If, as this interviewee suggest LAP is not applicable to ―people at the top‖; if as the Law 
stipulates, the information disclosed is classified as ―state secrets‖ and therefore cannot 
be publicly disclosed ―even for the purpose of blowing the whistle on impropriety‖ (Article 
27(7)); and if access to the information by the Attorney is denied except under certain 
circumstances (Article 27(6)), what effect can it thus have on actual practice? Some take 
a fatalistic view. ―It is just a fake law. It cannot have a big impact.‖
115
  
As the foregoing expose shows, there is still a long way to curb corruption in Angola. 
What complicates matters is the commingling of public and private interests in the 
Angolan economy, to the extent that it is not always clear in the legislation promulgated 
what information the government considered public versus private. Beyond conceptual 
issues, the biggest challenge to the fight against corruption in Angola lies in the 
implementation of the legislation, which gives the impression that it cannot necessarily 
be fought and won at the level of institutions. One interlocutor affirmed that ―the main 
problem is not the formality of the law but rather respect of the law. Unfortunately, the 
bad example comes from the top: the president does not respect the law, judges, 
generals, no one respects the law.‖
116
  Another asserted that ―we are seeing the political 
will through the enactment of laws, some of which are good laws but the implementation 
of these laws is the problem.‖
117
 A third interviewee asked: ―I don‘t know anybody who 
does not think that there is a high degree of corruption in Angola; so who is being held 
accountable for it?‖
118
 According to this informant, the best way to gauge the 
effectiveness of ORT and anti-corruption measures is ―by seeing if there is any high level 
official being investigated under this law‖.  
 
Indeed, whereas in Nigeria where ―governors are being arrested [and] nobody is 
invisible‖
119
, in Angola on the contrary, key players largely remain unaccountable. 
Actually, it seems that ―what they are doing is pull out some individual cases to show 
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that the government acts on this corruption but there is no such a fight because if you 
get a minister into a jail, all of them would be going to jail.‖
120
 This contributor‘s colleague 
agreed, adding: 
 
―But you see [...] they would never do public trials of government officials unless it 
would serve a certain cause. I think if they want to get rid of that person anyway, 
then they can use trial as a show trial to say that they are doing something. But if 
they were really dedicated and if the combat against corruption was really 
effective, then many more things should be happening, and at the moment they 
are not happening. And everybody knows that a lot of people are corrupt. But yes 





Marques de Morais (2012) speaks of a trend towards the ―legitimisation‖ of corruption, 
which sees the president reappointing public figures at the centre of allegations of 
corruption and wrongdoing. If the nomination of Falcone to the ambassadorial role in the 
‗Angolagate‘ scandal (Chapter 3) provided some indication of this tendency, the latest 
case involving Manuel Vicente does provide further illustration of it as it will be shown in 
Chapter 5.   
 
WHAT ORT IN POSTWAR ANGOLA?  
 
 
This chapter was designed to give an overview of the shape and content of the ORT 
reform programme implemented in Angola since 2002 in order to foster a better 
understanding of the nature of the novel practices of transparency that are prominent in 
postwar Angola. To recapitulate, the chapter confirmed that change is afoot, as visible 
for instance in the fact that a right to know is established in statutory documents such as 
the Constitution and LAP. The other significant points to highlight regard the context 
within which ORT reforms were implemented, the involvement of external actors and the 
diversity of domestic actors. Notably, whereas the government previously argued that it 
could not fulfil transparency requirements because of the civil war, the post-war changes 
evolved under both favourable and difficult circumstances, notably through an oil boom, 
a financial crisis, in between two electoral victories, and ―amid fast-growing 
sophistication of economic management and spectacular headline GDP growth‖ 
(Shaxson 2009: 55). Surprising too is Angola‘s extensive reliance external experts, from 
international consultancy firms, to lawyers and IFIs; and the extent to which it opened its 
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books to international scrutiny. The SBA agreed with the IMF in late 2009 represents 
perhaps the biggest signal of this shift as it was the first IMF-monitored programme that 
has ever been completed in post-independent Angola.  
 
In sum, the question that derives from the foregoing analysis is not whether there is 
increased ORT but what constitutes ORT in postwar Angola. The brief review of reform 
components in the second section above suggested that the government frames ORT 
as an economic and technocratic issue; an approach which is clearly aligned with that 
adopted and endorsed by most multilateral organisations. This approach basically 
emphasises institutional strengthening through the clarification of the roles and 
responsibilities of, and increasing the coordination between, the different government 
agencies responsible for the collection and administration of oil revenues; information 
disclosure as with the release of data related to the budget, national debt and oil 
revenues; process transparency as with the 2005-6 oil licensing round; and assurances 
of integrity, which government agencies sought to give by conducting and disseminating 
findings on audits conducted of oil companies, including Sonangol, and BNA.  
 
The chapter‘s investigation of actual practices of information disclosure raised some 
doubts over the efficiency gains of this Angolan ―data revolution‖. As it showed, this 
revolution falls far short from fulfilling some of the basic requirements for full ORT, such 
as clarity, reliability, frequency, timeliness and relevance of the public information. For 
instance, the chapter highlighted how blinkered the increased levels of ORT are by: (a) 
discrepancies in the data provided on revenue inflows and budget process by the 
different sources of information cited above; (b) the incomprehensiveness of the data 
covered in key public documents, which in turn, translates into lack of public oversight on 
historical aspects such as Sonangol‘s quasi-fiscal activities and off-budget spending on 
defence and security; and (c) the mostly external direction of Angola‘s ORT, to the 
extent that while in the past the sharing of information occurred merely between the 
government (mostly MINFIN) and IFIs, there is currently much more information 
produced and disseminated within and between government departments (chiefly 
between and within MINFIN, BNA and Sonangol), or between the government and IFIs; 
but significantly less so between the government and the intended primary information 




The comparison with some of the region‘s other key petroleum exporters and Angola‘s 
neighbours suggests that the challenges underscored above may not be unique to 
Angola, and that in fact, Angola may have made great strides when compared to other 
key players. That this partial transparency on display since 2002 is endorsed and widely 
praised in some international circles and yet does not allow information to be easily 
located or accessed by citizens within the country calls into question the credibility of 
both the information and information senders, and indeed, the usefulness and credibility 
of the information itself. This also begs the questions: For whom is this transparency 
really intended, and what for? Besides, what are the consequences of this ‗supply-side‘ 
approach to governance for the effectiveness of the anti-corruption agenda, and what 
does it say about the role of civil society and citizens in these processes? Responding to 
these sets of questions is all the more pressing considering the concern raised above 
about the trend towards the legitimation of corruption in the country the concern raised 
above about the trend towards the legitimation of corruption in the country, and recent 
























ORT: CURE OR TOOL FOR THE LEGITIMATION OF CORRUPTION 
IN POSTWAR ANGOLA? 
 
―The more the public domain is privatised, the more that the 
private is politicised and becomes a matter of public 
concern.‖  
      Shamir (2005: 93). 
 
―Most rumours you‘ve heard are not true.‖ 
 
Isabel Dos Santos, in an interview with Tom 
Burgis of the Financial Times, 29 March 2013. 
 
―Unless transparency is seen to make a difference, 
introducing or increasing transparency may have damaging 
rather than beneficial effects.‖   
Heald (2006: 36). 
 
The previous chapter gave a clear indication of the dual character of Angola‘s ORT 
model, showing increased transparency in areas revolving around incoming revenues 
and less transparency on government expenditures. The current chapter takes this issue 
further by focusing specifically on the oil industry‘s operations which have become 
increasingly important as avenues for hidden transfers of payments to the ruling elite. As 
a 2005 report by the London-based think tank Chatham House noted,  
 
 ―While the IMF and actors in international capital markets all require far better 
transparency and economic management, Angolan leaders prefer dealing with 
international markets because they do not represent direct interference but offer 
a more impersonal set of opportunities from which Angola‘s leaders can pick and 
choose. The preferred way forward is thus to push rent-seeking activities 
―downstream‖ and to more invisible forms [...]. This might mean that it is still 
possible to operate the networks while making it harder for the IMF to be able to 
publicly identify the specific rent-seeking mechanisms and thus withhold their 
support‖ (Vines et al 2005: 15). 
 
This chapter will expand on this point by investigating just how big a problem 
―downstream‖ corruption is with relevant empirical evidence emanating from specific 
case studies. It identifies three specific areas that are at risk of ‗downstream‘ corruption: 
(i) during the award of E&P contracts; (ii) in the nascent oil service industry; and (iii) 
134 
 
through the ‗resource-for-infrastructure‘ deals. After an analysis of each of these 
aspects, the chapter re-examines the facts and issues raised by the latest case of 
Cobalt‘s operations in Angola which has wider implications for the regulation of the oil 
industry in Angola and beyond.   
 
MAPPING „DOWNSTREAM‟ CORRUPTION RISKS IN THE OIL INDUSTRY 
 
Al-Kasim et al (2008) point out that the relation between a producer government and oil 
companies spans across the entire value creation process in the upstream sector, from 
pre-licensing all the way to cessation and decommissioning. Each of these stages has a 
bearing on the efficiency, productivity and profitability of the oil sector with implications 
for both sets of actors, but they can be exposed to corruption too. Among those aspects 
of oil sector regulation that are at higher risks of corruption, the authors cite the pre-
qualification phase; the tender, selection and award of oil licenses; and the decision 
about production profile and cost recovery schemes (Al-Kasim 2008: 20).  
 
This section deals with the first two stages – under the heading of ‗award for E&P 
contracts‘ – because they have since emerged as the most prone to corruption in the 
Angolan oil sector.  One interviewee went as far as declaring that no other aspect of the 
Angolan oil industry had as ―clear‖ a corruption risk as ―the allocation of oil E&P rights 
where it is common practice - not in all cases, but in many cases - for Sonangol to 
require foreign companies to accept a local company as a minority partner.‖ In most 
cases, he proceeded,  
 
―[...] you can establish the ownership [of oil companies] because it is someone 
with the same name as a government official. So, there are certainly grounds to 
suspect that these companies are proxies of corrupt officials within the 
government who are inserted in this field, and this is a legitimate suspicion 




Marques (2011: 29) corroborated this point when stating: ―As international calls for 
transparency in oil revenues have grown over the past decade, Angolan leaders now 
circumvent outside pressure by openly capturing shares in the oil blocks, through joint 
ventures with powerful multinationals.‖ 
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Award of E&P Contracts 
 
One of the key questions regarding the award of E&P rights is whether ―bidding 
procedures for awarding licensing rights and contracts are transparent and competitive‖ 
(Alba 2009: 23).  According to the Promoting Revenue Transparency project initiated in 
2007 by RWI and TI
123
, there are divergent practices in Angola. Specifically, Sonangol 
appears to be one of the lowest performers on the reporting of payments and supplies to 
governments, procurement services and anti-corruption programmes, but one of the 
most transparent oil company on the reporting of licensing criteria and licenses (RWI 
and TI 2008: 18). This last finding reflects improvements visible during the 2005/6 oil 
bidding round predicated on provisions encrypted in the Petroleum Activities Law of 
2004
124
, and the cancelled licensing round of 2007/8. As one European lawyer familiar 
with these processes noted, the process of allocating E&P rights during these two 
licensing rounds was similar to the way the Angolan authorities have consistently looked 




Typically, for oil companies to be granted the right to operate an oil block, the Angolan 
Government has to issue a Concession Decree, published in the Angolan Official 
Gazette (Diário da República de Angola) (INTSOK 2011: 13). In the Decree, the 
government advertises blocks to be awarded, information regarding the blocks, as well 
as the terms of reference. Oil companies that are interested to bid have to decide 
whether they want to bid as operators or non-operators, and they are required to pre-
qualify according to the criteria set. Deadlines for the submission of bids are set by the 
Angolan authorities, and geological and other data pertaining to previous operations are 
usually available for licence applicants to buy directly from Sonangol. The Angolan 
authorities usually take ―a very professional approach‖ by attending and providing useful 
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information on the bids to potential bidders during international roadshows
126
. At home, 
E&P rights are allocated through a ―discretionary system‖ whereby a tender committee – 
made up of representatives of MINPET, MINFIN and Sonangol - evaluates the bids 
submitted, MINPET endorses the decision made, and the Council of Ministers gives final 
approval before a constitutional decree is issued with the names of successful 
bidders
127
.   
 
The terms of reference are typically ―very very strict‖
128
. 50 per cent weight is usually 
placed on the signature bonuses, 30 per cent on the work programme, and 20 per cent 
on the contribution to social projects. Companies are allowed to bid on signature 
bonuses, their contribution to social projects and the minimum exploration work 
programmes. Everything else, including the production scale, outputs, extent of the 




These similarities notwithstanding, there were slightly different approaches to the 
selection of industry participants. During the 1005-06 licensing round, Sonangol sought 
to limit the number of local participants and the number of blocks on offer in an attempt 
to avoid the repeat of Nigeria‘s ―shambolic‖ auction organised some time earlier (Vines 
et al 2009: 34)
130
. Overall, it took six months to implement the bidding process, from the 
date of the publication of the call for tender on 16 September 2005 to the deadline of 
applications on 31 March 2006. Sonangol pre-qualified 51 companies: 29 companies to 
bid as operators and 22 firms, including domestic oil companies, as non-operators. The 
company put seven concessions up for auction:  in blocks 1, 5 and 6, in shallow waters 
off the lower Congo and Kwanza basins; blocks 15, 17 and 18 in deep water of the lower 
Congo basin; and block 26, a deep water block in the Benguela sub-basin (Oil Voice 
2005). 
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In terms of the transparency of the process, Angola‘s 2005-06 auctions were close to 
good practice
131
. They were described by industry insiders as ―state of the art‖, and 
―among the best in the world‖ (Heller 2007: 22 citing personal communications with IOCs 
officials). The view was that ―Sonangol entered a new era of transparency‖: ―In a level of 
transparency not before seen in Angola (or in many oil-producing countries)‖, read a 
leaked US cable, ―sealed envelopes containing the bids were opened in front of the 
group and bids were read aloud, including the signature bonus offers.‖
132
 The bids 
contained the world records US$902 million offer by ENI for the relinquished part of 
block 15, and US$1.1 billion by Sinopec Sonangol International, Sonangol‘s joint venture 
with Sinopec, for the relinquished parts of blocks 17 and 18 (see Table 9). These figures 
brought in a high level of astonishment among Western oil companies officials, one of 
whom felt ―like history was being made in the room‖ (cited in Heller 2007: 21). 
 
Table 9: Oil Bonuses Reportedly Paid in 2006 
Source: OSISA and GW (2011). 
 
Although this oil bidding process was laudable in that it represented a significant break 
from previously opaque practices, it was nevertheless only partially transparent. An 
unpublished report by RWI signals that the bids were neither open to the public nor the 
press (ibid: 21-22). Another shortcoming relates to the independence of the process, or 
the fact that the auctions were managed by Sonangol - an equity partner in all the blocks 
up for auction - rather than by an independent auction house or international 
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independent observers as in Nigeria. What is more, the weight given to signature 
bonuses appeared bigger than that stipulated in the terms of reference, which might 
explain why the largest signature bonus accompanied the award of oil concessions in 
every case. A third limitation is that the allocation of rights was somewhat influenced by 
politics as illustrated by the fact that Total was awarded a 15 per cent stake for block 
15/06 despite submitting a lower bid than that submitted by Petrobras, Statoil, and 




The postponed 2007/8 licensing round followed similar patterns in the sense that ―there 
were not major differences in terms of transparency‖
134
. Still, it was nonetheless subject 
to some criticisms due to the fact that IOCs‘ payments revenues were only thinly 
disclosed (see, for instance, Esau 2011; Ramos 2012: 7; Burgis 2012a: 4).  As a matter 
of fact, only Statoil voluntarily revealed that it paid US$1.4 billion for ―signature bonuses 
and a minimum work commitment‖ for its stakes in five blocks. Information on other 
IOCs, including the US$550 million that BP, Cobalt and China Sonangol paid for ―social 
projects‖ as part of their deal on block 20 came essentially from secondary sources 
(Esau 2011; Burgis 2012a: 4).  
 
Another criticism revolved around the fact that this bidding round did not follow the rules 
established by the Petroleum Activities Law of 2004. On the contrary, this round was 
organised in accordance with Presidential Decree 297/10 of 2 December 2010, which 
expressly makes provisions for limited tenders for the award of E&P rights with respect 
to a) concession areas of lesser risk of investment, b) tenders aimed at promoting 
opportunities for Angolan private entrepreneurs, and c) strategic areas as defined by the 
Executive (Silva and Frazão 2013: 28).  In this instance, several sources suggested that 
the purpose was more strategic, meaning that the most crucial aspect taken into 
consideration for this round was IOCs‘ operational experience in the complex pre-salt 
play.  As one of these sources explained, 
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―[The 2005/06 round] was probably the first time that you had a completely open 
bidding round with people from all sides of the world, you had the Indian, the 
American. It was necessarily more open because it had different objectives. 
Open license rounds are for anyone to come in.  I think that the reason why some 
people have said that the pre-salt round was less open is because [certain] 
companies that wanted to bid could not bid and not everyone was allowed to bid, 
but I believe that this was more linked to the experience, financial standing and 
know-how that Sonangol was requiring for companies to participate, than an 
issue of transparency. In practical terms, the way everything played out 
afterwards was pretty similar to what you saw in 05/06 and 07/08. It is just that 
Sonangol really wanted to make sure that the companies that came in were 
companies that it could trust. And when you see the number and type of 
companies to which blocks were awarded, they, in fact, went out of their way to 
try and attract the world‘s most qualified players. So it was on a strictly 




Another minor difference is that whereas only ―a couple of local oil companies‖ qualified 
as non-operators in the first open 2005-06 bidding round, Sonangol sought to replicate 
that experience and bring into the industry more local oil companies that had shown 
interest in qualifying as non-operators in 2007
136
. As the following paragraphs will show, 
the issue is that the award of E&P rights to these domestic companies was for the most 
part inextricably linked to their political connections.  
 
The forthcoming Cobalt-Nazaki case follows the trend set by Prodev and Falcone Oil 
Holding cited in Chapter 3, as well as others. In this postwar era, three such cases 
precede the company‘s. The first concerns Grupo Gema, an Angolan conglomerate with 
investments in the construction, beverage, automobile industries (Marques 2009), and a 
five per cent stake in the oil block 18/06 operated by Petrobras. Created in 1994, the 
group‘s oil subsidiary is one of those domestic companies that count among its 
shareholders several state and party dignitaries. These included (a) Joaquim Antonio 
Carlos dos Reis Júnior who served in 2009 as a senior police officer, secretary of the 
Council of Ministers – the state institution in charge of approving the award of E&P rights 
as well as investments of over five million US dollars - and Chief Commissioner of the 
National Police; (b) António Gomes Furtado, the chairman of the Council of auditors of 
the BNA and advisor to the President; and (c) Jose Leitão da Costa who took on the role 
of chairman and director of Grupo Gema in 2003 after standing down as the president‘s 
                                                          
135
 Interview with Western lawyer, 3 September 2012; emphasis added.   
136
 Ibid.   
140 
 
chief of Staff, and is alleged to have received $3 million from Abalone via a Swiss bank 
account (Marques 2009: 2-3; Global Witness 2011: 13).  
 
The second case relates to a company that was not granted E&P rights but nevertheless 
was pre-qualified to bid as non-operator in the postponed 2007-2008 licensing round. 
Equally peculiar in this instance is that the company in question, Sociedade 
Hidrocarbonetos de Angola (SHA), had seven shareholders, among whom (a) Manuel 
Vicente who is the president‘s step-nephew and at the time was Sonangol‘s CEO; (b) 
General ‗Kopelipa‘, head of the Military Bureau of the President and of Angola‘s 
Reconstruction Office; and Leopoldino Fragoso do Nascimento alias General ‗Dino‘, an 
advisor to the President and head of the telecommunications department for Angola‘s 
Presidency. These three individuals are linked to over 40 ventures and reportedly 
dominate Angola‘s contemporary political economy (GW 2012a: 11; Burgis and 
O‘Murchu 2012).  
 
Third is Sociedade Petrolífera Angolana SA (Somoil). Somoil is an anonymous company 
that has stakes in seven concession blocks including a 15 per cent stakes in block 4/05. 
In line with legal requirements, the company was awarded the contract for this block by 
the Council of Ministers in July 2005, and as part of a production-sharing agreement 
between Somoil, ACR - another domestic company -, Norsk Hydro which has a 50 per 
cent in the block and Sonangol, the operator. An internal document suggests that the 
inclusion of Somoil and ACR in the contract was much to the discontent of Norsk Hydro, 
which asked the two domestic companies to release details of their ownership 
(Simonsen Advokatfirma DA and Sidley Austin LLP 2008). After Somoil declined to 
identify its owners, Norsk Hydro formed an internal task force to consider the matter. It 
also hired U.S. and Norwegian legal firms to ―conduct a due diligence investigation on 
the Angolan company‖ (Africa Energy Intelligence 2008; GW 2012a: 15).  
 
The two firms published a report confirming that Norsk Hydro had established the 
ownership of ACR, but that the company was unable to determine the identities of the 
owners of Somoil ―in spite of the due diligence process‖. This conclusion was disputed 
by the industry newsletter Africa Energy Intelligence found ironical since it had reported 
on numerous occasions  that ―Somoil is simply controlled by interests very close to the 
Angolan government and particularly [...] to oil minister Desideiro da Costa and the CEO 
of Sonangol, Manuel Vicente‖  (Africa Energy Intelligence 2008). One of Angola‘s top 
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transparency activists too believed that the information provided by Norsk Hydro was 
misleading. In his view,  
 
―They [Norsk Hydro] knew about it. [They] tried to demand the Angolan 
government and the Angolan government told Statoil to take or leave it and they 
decided to leave it. They know. All these multinational companies know that 
these are fake companies belonging to the political people in the political 





Africa Energy Intelligence contest that the lawyers‘ report was simply ―destined to certify 
the group didn‘t have questionable ties with a foreign government‖. Whatever the case 
was, the Norwegian state-owned multinational authorised the execution of the PSA 
signed in October 2005 regardless ―in light of the mitigating steps that had been taken‖ 
(Simonsen Advokatfirma DA and Sidley Austin LLP 2008: 14). Norsk Hydro eventually 
merged with Statoil in 2007 but ―despite ample opportunity to do so, Norsk Hydro 
personnel did not disclose the existence of the issues to Statoil during the due diligence 
process‖ prior to the two companies‘ merger (Simonsen Advokatfirma DA and Sidley 
Austin LLP 2008: 2). Statoil got to know only when investigating unrelated corruption 
cases involving Norsk Hydro in Libya.    
       
Statoil subsequently incorporated ―protective provisions‖, including ―a warranty that the 
parties would not make corrupt payments and a requirement that any public officials with 
an ownership interest in one of the partners would not participate in governmental 
decisions affecting the venture (as already required by Angolan law)‖ (Statoil 2008: 14; 
GW 2012a: 15). A company insider claimed that it now uses these measures in 
conjunction with other anti-corruption safeguards, including the ―regular monitoring of all 
our contracts, ranging from normal supply contracts to partners‖ and ―control 
mechanisms for corruption‖.  The informant noted that Statoil is contributing to create 
awareness of transparency in the oil sector and boasted about the fact that the company 




More recently, in February 2014 to be more precise, the magazine Foreign Policy 
released a report alleging that Trafigura - the world‘s third largest private oil and metals 
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trader - sold 18.75 per cent stake of one of its major energy subsidiaries to a Singapore-
registered company wholly owned by General Leopoldino Fragoso do Nascimento, 
another high profile public figure (Weiss 2014). According to this report, details of the 
sale (amounting to US$213 million) and the purchaser were uploaded to the 
Luxembourg Stock Exchange, and they show that although the General‘s shares were 
subsequently reduced to 15 per cent, the General‘s stakes were valued at around 
US$750 million. 
 
The fifth case the study will return to shortly is that of Cobalt‘s relationship with Nazaki. 
In studying this example, one will revisit not just the issues it raises, but also domestic 
and international responses. For now, it suffices to provide a brief review of corruption 
risks in Angola‘s emerging oil service industry.  
 
Corruption Risks in the Emerging Oil Service Industry 
 
So far, the thesis has highlighted at great length the role of Sonangol. Chapter 3 
described it as an NOC that fulfils multiple functions: equity partner in oil and gas 
projects; concessionaire tasked with making and overseeing the implementation of laws, 
and allocating rights for E&P activities; and negotiator, guarantor and manager of 
Angola‘s external debt. It was established that besides raising suspicions that 
Sonangol‘s conflating roles have been primarily been at the service of the presidency 
and its rentier ambitions, its extra-budgetary activities, lack of transparency around oil-
backed loans contracted during the civil war and the resulting ‗missing billions‘ that 
symbolise what the ‗Bermuda Triangle‘ that contributed to the lack of transparency and 
accountability in Angola‘s public finances (Hodges 2004). More recently, Sonangol has 
been granted greater power and control over the procurement process and joint 
ventures in the oil service industry as part of the recent push to capture the industry‘s 
added value, to the point where its approval is often required to import even some of the 




Critics argue that it is this pivotal role as agent of economic development that makes 
Sonangol ―the undisputed enabler of conflation among public and private interests‖ 
alongside the President, and foreign investors who are ―an undistinguishable part of the 
state apparatus‖ by virtue of their participation in these business arrangements (Marques 
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2010: 18). Informally, Western officials are generally the first to admit that these local 
partnerships facilitate entry into the Angolan market, thereby making it easier for foreign 
investors to operate in the country
140
. When responding to the author‘s question about 
the potential risks of Angola‘s local content policies to American companies‘ long-term 
investments, US Ambassador Christopher McMullen went all the way to assert that there 




That does not mean that they are unaware of the growing risks that this area and others 
pose to foreign businesses. Elsewhere, the British Ambassador stressed that Angola‘s 
reputation with regard to corruption and the ease of doing business remains one major 
impediment to British companies‘ investment in the country, along with a perceived 
dominance of Portuguese and Brazilian firms (cited in British Expertise 2013: 10).  
Carsten Sønderskov gave a specific illustration of this challenge in the oil industry. 
Speaking to Danwatch, the former General Manager at Maersk Oil Angola AS confirmed 
that IOCs can be forced to use assigned local subcontractors, who may often be 
replaced by other local subcontractors without explanation, even though the latter might 
be more expensive and sometimes less efficient than the alternatives (Danwatch 2011). 
He added that corruption risks are likely to increase when companies ―start earning 
money in the country‖. Ovadia (2012) also explained that Sonangol‘s interference may 
take the form of demands for kickbacks or delaying tactics when approving contracts. 
Citing one Angolan former Chevron employee who abandoned the industry, he 
explicates: 
 
―If you want to get contracts, you need to give protection to Sonangol. Twenty to 
thirty per cent (...) I‘ve seen people lose contracts because they didn‘t pay people 
in Sonangol to protect them. I know I can get a contract. I‘m worried about 
keeping it‖ (ibid: 412).  
 
In sum, corruption is far from being a ‗local‘ issue in Angola. In fact, the postcolonial 
post-war patronage system is now described as ―a many-tentacled network linking 
political power to the economic world‖ (Pinto de Andrade 2009: 101). It comprises ―first 
generation‖ MPLA members who benefited from the positive discrimination that was 
instituted during the colonial period; top military officials (Messiant 1999); state 
administrators (such as governors and ministers); and ex-FNLA, UNITA and FLEC 
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members, many of whom gained privileged access to capital through the mechanisms 
described in Chapter 3 - including privatisation, external debt, foreign exchange and land 
grab in the 1990s. Added to these actors is a new class of Europe-educated technocrats 
with no previous links with the party-state machine but enough economic power to be 
integrated into the oil-based personalised network of patronage; and a group of 
investors whose visibility and success are increasingly dependent on entering into 
partnership with local, mostly influential, figures of the regime, just like IOCs. This last 
grouping includes both Western and non-Western actors, among whom many are 
believed to make the most of Angola‘s ‗resource-for-infrastructure‘ deals. 
 
Oil-for-Infrastructure Deals: New Wine in an Old Bottle? 
 
Oil-backed loans continue to play a prominent role in the financing of government affairs 
in Angola. Except that unlike in previous years when it was almost impossible to track 
how the loans were used, in peace times at least, it has actually been possible to 
visualise how some of the loans contracted are used, partly because the majority of 
these deals are financing the construction boom that the country is experiencing since 
the end of the civil conflict in 2002. This policy of rapid reconstruction is one of the most 
recognised aspects of Angola‘s developmental agenda, and it has drawn for its 
financing, implementation and relative success, on public-private partnerships. To date, 
its biggest funding source is Chinese investors, most significantly, China‘s Export-Import 
Bank (EximBank) and China International Fund Ltd. (CIF). China‘s Exim Bank provided 
the first US$2 billion oil-backed loan in 2004 and CIF entered the scene one year later.  
 
The participation of China‘s EximBank in the post-civil war reconstruction of Angola is 
beyond the scope of this study. The purpose here, to continue with the theme of 
corruption and private wealth accumulation, is to expose CIF and its affiliates as one of 
main vehicles facilitating the regeneration of elite accumulation and elite‘s transformation  
into a fully ―transnationally-oriented‖ cabal (Robinson 2010). Whilst policies around 
China‘s EximBank seek to ―protect local agents from global competition‖ – as well as 
providing ‗in-house‘ opportunities for self-enrichment -, CIF‘s activities alongside that of 
its partners almost entirely aim to ―integrate local agents into emergent transnational 
circuits‖ (ibid: 1). This outlook perhaps explains the fact that China‘s EximBank-funded 
projects have been managed through official channels, albeit nominally, whereas, 
judging by the degree of secrecy that surrounds them, projects funded and undertaken 
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by CIF and others were deliberately conceived to be the purview of Angola‘s ‗parallel‘ 
government headed by the presidency and Sonangol.   
 
CIF is part of a global tangled corporate web with resource-for-infrastructure and other 
commercial ventures in Guinea, Zimbabwe, Tanzania, Mozambique, Madagascar, 
Nigeria, Singapore, China, Indonesia, Russia and the U.S. The group - dubbed the ―88 
Queensway group‖ – also has links with BP, Total and Glencore (Burgis et al 2014). CIF 
was created in 2003 to finance and manage the construction projects of Dayuan 
International Development Ltd
142
, which in turn has links with China Sonangol 
International Holding Ltd (CSIH or China Sonangol), a joint venture between Sonangol 
exploration subsidiary (with 30 per cent stakes) and the Hong-Kong-based New Bright 
International Development (70 per cent). According to its website, CSIH was created in 
2004 ―with a single aim to promote investments in a south-south cooperation 
framework.‖ Headquartered in Hong-Kong, the firm engages in the oil, gas, mining, 
infrastructure, real estate and transportation sectors among others.  
 
In 2005, CIF extended a credit line of at least US$2.9 billion to Angola for major 
infrastructure projects to be carried out by Chinese companies in Angola; loans that it 
may have contracted over three years from Chinese and French banks (Levokowitz et al 
2009: 13-14). The conditions of CIF‘s loan were similar to those provided in agreements 
related to China‘s EximBank loans (see Appendix 3), with the exception that the 
construction of the main flagships projects financed by the loan
143
 were to be overseen 
by GRN.  
 
GRN was created in 2005 partly as a solution to the ministries‘ presumed lack of 
organisational and technical expertise to manage large inflows of revenues, and partly 
as a  response to allegations of corruption and misappropriation of the first EximBank‘s 
credit line that emerged in 2004 (Vines et al 2009: 53). Rumours surged about the illegal 
use of the credit lines, with the Chinese government going as far as ―providing President 
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dos Santos with a list of twenty businesses connected with the elite Angolans said to be 
illicitly benefiting from the newly available resources‖ (Ennes Ferreira 2008: 313). These 
rumours resurfaced again in 2007 during the trial of General Miala, a former director of 
the Angolan Intelligent Services who was sentenced to four years in jail for 
insubordination. 
 
GRN itself was headed by General Kopelipa and directly accountable to the Angolan 
President. There were growing criticisms of the GRN‘s lack of capacity and its 
objectives, with one journalist commenting in 2006 that ―provincial governors and other 
senior regional politicians are in a constant state of waiting for a governmental Messiah 
to turn up that will enlighten them on the real intentions of the GRN, currently managing 
the billions of U.S. dollars from Chinese loans‖ (Levokowitz et al. 2009: 16; see also 
Campos and Vines 2008; Vines et al 2009: 53).  
 
CIF and CSIH also are known for their controversial deals – in Zimbabwe and Guinea 
most prominently -, poor track records and involvement in bribery and high-level 
corruption cases. A high profile incident occurred in 2007 that brought to light some of 
CIF‘s opaque practices: an investigation into Zhejiang Hangxiao Steel Structure Ltd‘s 
business dealings with CIF in Angola. The Shanghai-based construction firm was 
accused by China Securities Regulatory Commission of suspected stock rigging in 
relation to a US$4.4 billion-contract signed with CIF for a housing development project in 
Angola. Chinese investors and regulators doubted the authenticity of the contract and 
the capacity of Hangxiao to execute the project within two years (Jiangong 2007). The 
company argued that CIF had failed to disclose details of its contract with the Angolan 
government but in the end, it was fined US$95.000 together with its shareholders and 
managers, for failing to follow legal procedures in the release of financial information 
(Vines et al 2009: 54). Two employees and one associate were jailed in May of the 
same year, for their part in what became ―one of the most notorious price-rigging 
activities in the China‘s stock market‖ (Zhenghua 2007). 
 
Chinese government officials tried on several occasions to distance themselves from 
CIF and the 88 Queensway group on several occasions, arguing that it is a private 
entity. However, evidence suggests links between some of CIF‘s directors and the 
Chinese military intelligence, state-owned enterprises such as China CITIC bank and 
various Chinese ministries. There are also high profile Angolan personalities connected 
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to the conglomerate. Manuel Vicente who is credited for facilitating the entrance of CSIH 
in the Angolan market is in fact a director of the company as well as being a director of 
Sonangol Asia Ltd.  José Filomeno dos Santos, the president‘s son, is also the official 
representative of Sonangol on the board of CSIH (Vines and Weimer 2012: 99; see also 
Burgis et al 2014).  
 
China Sonangol also declined to confirm or distance itself from the conglomerate. In its 
response to the Financial Times (Burgis et al 2014), company directors stipulated:  
  
―Due to confidentiality agreements and our legitimate desire for privacy, which 
private companies are entitled to, we will not be providing you with any additional 
information than is necessary [sic]. We do however reserve our rights to pursue 
legal remedies if you repeat or publish defamatory statements.‖ The letter adds: 
―We are not a listed company and the Law does not require us to disclose all our 
business dealings in the same manner as listed companies.‖ 
 
It may well be that the advent of the new unofficial resource-for-infrastructure 
arrangements just discussed opened a new era that is similar to previous years in terms 
of the self-enrichment goal of key figures of the Angolan elite, yet at the same time 
different with respect to the source of the new rents, the sophistication and transnational 
nature of elite capital accumulation and the addition of new partners in this process. Still, 
that should not detract from the fact that preventing corruption and delivering 
accountability for its victims remains a challenge in the country and globally. One case 
from which to draw useful lessons is the Nazaki-Cobalt case that ensues. The analysis 
of this case must contain explanations of its relevance for the Angolan oil industry. This 
ultimately lies in the importance of the ―pre-salt‖
144
 play for the future and international 
reputation of the Angolan oil industry reputation as well as its utility as a major source of 
rents, not just for the patronage system engulfing a few elites, but more so for the 
development of the country. The story quickly became seen as one of the most prolific 
corruption scandals of the decade, not least because of the industry, type of play and 
the country and the actors involved.  
 
COBALT AND NAZAKI: TROUBLES IN THE PRE-SALT 
 
On 11 June 2009, the Council of Ministers published Decree Law No. 15/09 and Decree 
Law No. 14/09 which granted ―the mining rights for the prospecting, exploration, 
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development and production‖ of hydrocarbons on blocks 9 and 21 offshore Angola to 
Sonangol and nominated Cobalt as the operator in both blocks (Cobalt 2009a: 4; see 
Figure 2 on Cobalt‘s blocks)
145
. Negotiations for the RSA were completed in October 
2009, its terms and conditions approved on 16 December 2009; and the contract 
executed on 24 February 2010. The decrees granted 40 per cent to Cobalt as the 
operator in the two blocks, 30 per cent to Nazaki, 20 per cent to Sonangol 20 per cent 
and 10 per cent to Alper Oil, the third domestic oil company in the blocks. These events 
took place after Cobalt paid US$ 24 million for three blocks in 2007: US$4 million for 
block 9, US$10 million for block 21 and US$10 million for another unnamed block – 
presumably block 20 (Rudd 2009: 7). The company had also facilitated the entrance of 
Sonangol into the Gulf of Mexico after the two parties signed an agreement which 
entitled Sonangol to 25 per cent non-operated interest in eleven U.S. Gulf of Mexico 
leases (ibid). 
 
It is interesting that irregularities surrounding Cobalt‘s activities deals were first reported 
in October 2010 by the Angolan anti-corruption watchdog Maka Angola, but only caught 
the international community‘s attention in April 2012, after the Financial Times released 
its own report confirming that among the co-owners of Nazaki oil and gas were Manuel 
Vicente, General Dino and General Kopelipa (Burgis and O‘Murchu 2012). This 
triumvirate had been involved in previous cases detailed in the first section, but never 
did their involvement receive so much media attention or cause such a huge 
embarrassment for the Angolan regime.   
 
What is more, Cobalt seemed to be a reputable company. A 2009 company document 
destined to potential investors specifies that Cobalt is an ―independent, oil-focused 
exploration and production company with a world class below salt prospect inventory in 
the deepwater of the U.S. Gulf of Mexico and offshore Angola and Gabon in West 
Africa.‖. The company was founded in 2005 by ―a team of veteran explorationists, 
equipped with industry-leading data, newly available seismic technologies, industry 
contacts and adequate funding‖ who believed that they ―could acquire a deepwater 
prospect inventory that could rival supermajor oil companies‖ (SEC 2009: 2). That the 
New York-listed company attracted the backing of its high profile shareholders
146
 is due 
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in part to their contribution to the development of the bulk of oilfields in the US Gulf of 
Mexico, and in part to the experience of members of the team of ex-BP and Unocal 
deepwater explorers, among whom Joseph Bryant its chairman and board member of 
the American Petroleum Institute, who served as BP Angola President from 2000 to late 
2004 (Rudd 2009: 3).  
 
Figure 2: Angola‟s Pre-salt Blocks and Operators 
 
 
Source: Energy-Pedia News (2011). 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
firms invested an initial US$500m into the company and by the end of 2012, retained holdings of 
18 per cent and 15 per cent respectively as well as two seats each on the board (Burgis and 
O‘Murchu 2012). In January 2013, however, it was reported that the Carlyle-Riverstone group 
sold one sixth of its stakes in Cobalt, cashing in about US$1 billion. See 
http://peureport.blogspot.co.uk/2013/01/carlyle-groups-cobalt-cash-in.html [Last accessed 30 




If the deepwater exploration experience and financial standing of Cobalt was never in 
doubt, what then seem to be causing the controversy? Campaigners accused Manuel 
Vicente, General Kopelipa and General Nascimento – the three individuals who had held 
previously concealed stakes in Grupo Aquattro which owned Nazaki – of using and 
abusing their positions of power and their ability to influence President Dos Santos who 
promulgated the deals in order to ―gain illegal control over state assets in the 
privatisation of public companies‖ and for the ―creation of consortium with public and 
international companies‖. In addition to illicit enrichment, they highlighted Manuel 
Vicente‘s role. At the time of the deals, Mr Vicente was chairman and representative of 
Sonangol and a part-owner of Nazaki – a clear conflict of interest that is not only 
punishable under Article 25 of LAP (see Chapter 4), but also raise serious questions 
about ―compliance with US anti-corruption laws, which make it a crime to pay or offer 
anything of value to foreign officials to win business‖ (Burgis and O‘Murchu 2012). It is 
thought that the laws breached include the FCPA (Coppola 2014).  
 
Despite confirming that they were co-owners of Grupo Aquattro, and by inference of 
Nazaki, Manuel Vicente and General Kopelipa denied that their interests constituted an 
―abuse of power‖ (Burgis and O‘Murchu 2012). Moreover, Mr Vicente specified that he 
was unaware that his private investment company owned a stake in Nazaki and that he 
and his partners relinquished their shares in 2011 (Burgis 2013). Meanwhile, a 
statement from Sonangol stipulated that the blocks were awarded ―through processes 
which included an open and transparent lease sale for the deep-water pre-salt blocks‖, 
concluding that the reporting of the awards was only intent on ―causing controversy 
where none exists‖ (Mendes and McClelland 2012).  
 
Cobalt also claimed that it was assigned to a contractor group by the Angolan 
government via Sonangol, and did not become aware of details of Nazaki‘s ownership 
until 2010 (Coppola 2014)
147
. In its defence, a company‘s spokeswoman insisted that 
―Sonangol‘s announcement regarding the bid process is fully consistent with Cobalt‘s 
understanding and experience in Angola‖ (Mendes and McClelland supra). Officials also 
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argued that Nazaki was ―a fully paying member of the contractor group‖ (Burgis and 
O‘Murchu 2012) unlike Alper and Sonangol P&P which do not contribute to development 
costs. These responsibilities are the subject of Articles 20 and 21 of the RSA, though it is 




Figure 3: Pre-Salt Potential in West Africa 
 
Source: Morgan Stanley (2012). 
 
 
Figure 4: West African and Brazilian Pre-Salt Plays 
 





Interest in this story is connected to interest in the pre-salt plays, the latter fuelled by 
exploration successes experienced in the pre-salt reservoirs in the Campos and Santos 
Basins off Brazil, which many industry experts believe to be analogous to those found off 
the Angolan coast - Figures 3 and 4 are illustrative of the similarities between the two 
plays. Many experts opine that the success of the pre-salt oilfields could determine 
Angola‘s positioning as SSA‘s top oil exporter ―on a sustained basis‖ (cited in Power 
Hedge 2012)
148
. According to one industry expert, the output from this play could 
determine whether or not oil peaks in 2017 as the IMF suggested lately (McClelland 
2014)
149
. Sonangol itself reported that the discoveries made in these oilfields represent 
―a new era in the [oil] sector‖ (quoted in Morgan Stanley 2012: 3). If proven, this will no 
doubt translate into an upsurge in oil rents for host governments, and high profitability for 
oil companies with an interest in these concessions. Cobalt is one of the IOCs that have 
seen tremendous success with pre-salt exploration.  Since 2012, it has made five well 
discoveries - the last reportedly with a resource potential of between 400–700 million 
barrels of oil (Petroleum Africa 2014) - in block 20. To some investors, this confirms the 
potential of this play as ―the most promising new offshore oil play globally‖ (Morgan 
Stanley 2012: 1).  
 
In sum, it is this enthusiasm, along with the confirmation of the existence of 
hydrocarbons in the play that seem to be behind the decision to postpone the 2007/08 
licensing round until late 2010 when the last licensing round was held. As Figure 2 
above illustrates, the biggest benefactors of this last bidding round were BP, Total, 
Statoil, Maersk, ConocoPhillips (COP) and Cobalt. 
 
When asked about the impact of the revelations on Cobalt‘s operations in Angola, one 
source linked to the story replied that it had been ―more than negligible‖, adding: 
 
―I think it caused some trouble within the Futungo because it came just when they 
were trying to position Vicente especially, as this kind of face of the next 
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generation. I think it caused them some problems; that is why they claimed to 
have dissolved Aquattro and Dos Santos, I was told, was pretty angry. Well I 
don‘t know whether it was about the deal itself, or because it came out, but I 




At the time, the political costs associated with the revelations surrounding Nazaki did not 
prevent President Dos Santos to sign a decree allowing Sonangol P&P‘s purchase of 15 
per cent stake in Nazaki‘s share in block 21, thereby giving the company a 35 per cent 
interest in the block (McClelland 2013). The sale was estimated to be worth about 
US$1.3 billion, implying that Nazaki would have made 14 times what it invested and still 
retained half its interests (Burgis 2013). In another show of defiance, ―Vicente suggested 
that if Cobalt‘s dealings with him and his associates were to create further problems, the 
company should abandon its interests in Angola‖ (Silva 2012). That said, what clearly 
emanated from the story was the ineffectiveness of Angola‘s anti-corruption framework 
to curb oil-related corruption in the country. As a top transparency and pro-democracy 
activist reiterated the common concern with lack of accountability in the country when 
stating: 
 
―This information [about Cobalt] was well covered in Angola but nothing 
happened, no prosecution, nothing! That‘s because corruption is the way of doing 
business in Angola. You never see the judiciary go after these people because 
everybody in the political system is involved so they are the ones controlling the 
wealth of the country. So everyone is looking for his piece, you know.‖
151
   
 
If anything, this case raised further concerns about a possible legitimation of oil-related 
corruption with the nomination of Manuel Vicente as Minister of State for Economic Co-
ordination in early 2012, then Vice-President in October of the same year. These 
nominations occurred despite criminal proceedings lodged against Mr Vicente over illicit 
enrichment through Nazaki in 2010 in Angola, his involvement in the embezzlement of 
US$775 million related to the Angola-Russia debt deal in 2011, and for fraud and money 
laundering in Portugal. This provided fresh evidence of a pattern that sees the president 
appointing or reappointing public figures at the centre of allegations of corruption and 
wrongdoing, as he did with the nomination of Falcone to the ambassadorial role in the 
midst of the Angolagate scandal.  
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The second set of concerns with this case relates to the theory and practice of due 
diligence by IOCs: what does due diligence actually mean? How is it practised and to 
what effects? Burgis (2013) notes that ―to have broken the law, a US company must act 
―knowingly‖ or with ―a firm belief‖ that corruption will occur.‖ In its submission to US 
regulatory agencies, Cobalt claimed to have retained two US law firms - Vinson & Elkins 
and O‘Melveny & Myers - since 2007 to advise on complying with anti-corruption laws 
with respect to its Angolan ventures. The question is whether it is reasonable to expect 
an IOC to partner with another company without knowing who the shareholders of that 
partner are. One Angolan transparency campaigner strongly rejected this possibility, 
arguing: 
 
―Do you think that they didn‘t that Manuel Vicente was part of the whole scheme? 
They knew about it! So, what they are saying is not true. They knew from the 
beginning, that Manuel Vicente is going to be there because this was going to be 
a joint venture. And why didn‘t Cobalt insist on asking those people to disclose 
who are the owners of Nazaki and so on? If you don‘t know the owners of one 
company that you are entering into a joint venture with, why would you want to 
join with them in the first place?‖
152 
 
Coppola (2014) opines that Cobalt must have known that involvement of state officials 
was likely given that it is extremely difficult to do business in Angola without the 
involvement of members of the ruling elite, and concluded that ―Cobalt decided the 
potential returns from the oil exploration venture outweighed the risk of potential fines, 
litigation costs and reputational damage arising from breaches of the FCPA‖. The 
problem, though, was not only the context within which Cobalt applied to conduct its 
activities, but its links to Sonangol. As another source commented, 
―Joe Bryant [Cobalt‘s Chairman] knew Vicente. He knows him very well. He used 
to run the Angolan operations of BP. He knew Manuel Vicente personally and 
they conducted due diligence? Now, how they failed to find erm […] well there 
are two possibilities on this. One is, they [Cobalt] did know and they are lying. 
The other is, that they - and this is the broad thrust of their argument - that they 
never found out about who owned Aquattro. I think they knew who some of the 
shareholders of Nazaki were, but I think that they did not know who owns 




Cobalt nonetheless pressed ahead, confirming its intention to remain in the country. In 
2011, SEC and the US Department of Justice (DoJ) – that handle civil and criminal 
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cases respectively - announced that they will investigate the company over potential 
breaches to fiduciary duties. Cobalt‘s shares fell immediately after the announcement of 
the investigations but soon rebounded, possibly reflecting market confidence. On 5 
August 2014, Cobalt announced that it received a ―Wells Notice‖ from SEC in connection 
to the investigations. Likewise, Andrews and Springer LLC, a boutique class action law 
firms representing shareholders has announced that it will be investigating Cobalt for a 
possible breach of securities exchange laws
154
. In a dramatic turn of events, SEC 
announced that it will drop charges against foreign bribery probe in January 2015.  
 
It follows that SEC‘s latest decision and investigations have produced two sets of 
outcomes. On the domestic front, almost four weeks after the Wells Notice was issued, 
the Angolan national newspaper, Jornal de Angola revealed that Nazaki would no longer 
be allowed to keep its equity. According to an executive decree issued by the Ministry of 
Petroleum and cited by the paper, Nazaki ―does not possess the legal requirements‖ to 
be associated with the concessionaire and had fallen behind on payments of the share 
of costs incurred by the consortium. The decision also involved the transfer of Nazaki‘s 
shares to Sonangol. A second Angolan-owned oil company, Falcon Oil Holding Angola, 
which has equity in several exploration blocks, was also subject to the same decree 
(Jornal de Angola 2014). 
 
The problem with Cobalt resides with its profitability. The company had in effect been 
capitalising on Angola‘s potential. Despite its significantly unproven properties, there 
were speculations that it could be acquired by Chevron, Shell or ExxonMobil. An article 
from Bloomberg described the company as having a ―good combination of high-quality 
assets and an extremely large resource-based potential‖ that could attract takeover 
interest (Sutherland 2013). The article reflected the fact that Cobalt‘s value had doubled 
since going public in 2009 and investor gains more than tripled. From this potential, 
analysts concluded that ―now may be the time for a buyer to make a move on Cobalt‖; ―a 
savvy acquirer has probably already seen enough.‖ Yet, to date, there is no confirmed 
purchasing interest in the company from any of the five supermajors, presumably due to 
companies‘ fears of litigation risks via the FCPA. The company has in fact been 
downgraded from ―buy‖ to ―speculative buy‖ and is said to have negative cash flows, 
which could affect its future investments at least until production in 2017 (Digger 2013).  
                                                          





The implications of SEC‘s and DoJ‘s investigations of Cobalt – or more broadly what 
Simmons and Macklin (2014) dub the ―home state advantage‖ – are forthcoming in the 
conclusion in particular as it relates to the implications for the ‗host‘ country. The 
question now though, is what allowed this type of behaviour in the first place? Is it a lack 
of regulation on the part of the host state or the complicity of IOCs and other external 
actors? Did external actors take seriously their role and responsibility in helping drive the 
institutionalisation of transparency in Angola? Chapters 6 to 8 will evaluate what they did 



































―In the world of realpolitik, economic self-interest must 
always prevail, regardless of the music to which it sways‖ 
 
    Jim Hooper (2002: 45). 
 
 
―A lack of progress in eradicating corruption could be due to 
misguided strategies.‖  
 




In the past two chapters, the author provided evidence of the two parallel trends that 
characterise Angola‘s ORT model: the increase in the levels of ORT on the one hand, 
and the sophistication of the means of private wealth accumulation on the other. The 
main objective of the next five chapters is to attempt to make sense of this dichotomy. 
This conversation begins with the role and contribution of external actors to the diffusion 
of ORT in postwar Angola (Chapters 6 to 8). Among these actors, IOs are widely 
believed and often expected to play an increasingly important role in persuading 
reluctant nation states to comply with global revenue transparency principles and 
standards, especially those associated with economic governance like the World Bank 
and the IMF. The Fund in particular has claimed a leading role in the institutionalisation 
of the norm. On its website, it affirms doing so not only by contributing to the 
development of a global architecture of fiscal transparency norms and standards, but 




Campaigners too view the Fund as ―an important force for pushing for greater fiscal 
transparency‖ (HRW 2004:2); or as being ―in a unique condition to advocate transparent 
resource governance as being a macro-significant factor in resource-rich countries‖ (GW 
and BIC 2008: 10). They hold that the IMF has the potential of exerting influence on 
developing countries‘ polities both in its surveillance and gatekeeper functions, and as a 
critical source of information relied upon by other donors, sovereign credit rating 
agencies and institutional investors (Barnett and Finnemore 2004: 45; GW and BIC 
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2008: 10; Action Aid 2006). These and other advocates point to two sources of leverage. 
The first is the IMF‘s Guide on Resource Revenue Transparency which has come to 
define what constitutes best international practice on revenue transparency. The second 
is the Heavily Indebted Poor Country (HIPC) debt relief initiative widely cited as an 
influence on several countries‘ decision to join EITI (Gillies and Heuty 2011: 33-34; 
David-Barrett and Okamura 2013).   
 
It is undeniable that this argument has contributed to advance the debate on why gov-
ernments accept to change in favour of greater ORT. Yet it has two major flaws. First, 
the picture as presented here is distorted by an overemphasis on the early stages of 
norm diffusion and insufficient attention to the stage of norm implementation. This limita-
tion, as several scholars point out, limits the potential for learning about other key as-
pects of norm diffusion, including the processes through which external actors actually 
promote international norms in developing countries as well as the conditions which may 
favour their engagement with the policy norm and the influence they actually have on the 
policy outcomes (see Grigorescu 2003; Bauhr and Nasiritousi 2010, 2012; Shipan and 
Volden 2012)..  
 
The second aspect of the problem is the danger the preceding argument runs of leading 
to a misleading view or assumption that countries that implement ORT policies and 
standards go through these motions in order to access material gains, mostly interna-
tional aid and debt relief. Whilst this captures what happened in Cameroon or Congo-
Brazzaville where accession to EITI was clearly linked to the HIPC programme, one 
Western scholar and former World Bank consultant was adamant that ―that does not 
sum up what is happening in Nigeria or in Angola.‖
156
 After all, the World Bank contrib-
utes on average just about 5 per cent of the Nigerian national budget
157
, whilst Angola 
does not rely on traditional aid but on oil revenues for its budget, unlike some of its 
neighbours and resource-rich peers. In fact in 2013 alone, Angola‘s record budget was 
AKZ6.6 trillion (about US$69 billion). This, according to the Africa-EU Partnership, was 
greater than the European Union‘s combined (European Union and member states) offi-
cial development aid to Africa estimated at 25.3 billion Euros (about US$40 billion) the 
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. It is this ―exceptionalism‖ that sets Angola apart, and adds a level of com-
plexity that renders it difficult to unpack and explain external influences on governance 
reform outcomes.  
 
The objective of this chapter is to critically reflect on the role and contribution of the IMF 
to the diffusion of ORT in the developing countries, taking postwar Angola as a case 
study. Undeniably, it is not always evident what impact, positive or negative, IMF 
conditionality has on the reform content, process and outcomes. Yet, the chapter finds 
that the Fund has only played a limited role in bringing about reforms, especially in the 
period following the 2007-08 global economic and financial crisis. These limitations are 
not only due to external factors, but as emphasised here, to factors that are internal to 
the Fund – for example, the Fund‘s own commitment to ORT reforms and its legitimacy 
problem. This conclusion highlights the importance of managing expectations about 
what outsiders can or cannot achieve, and it should be viewed as a warning against an 
overreliance on external actors for solving complex governance challenges such as 
corruption. 
 
BACKGROUND ON IOs‟ INTERVENTIONS IN ANGOLA 
 
As a starter, it should be pointed out that the IMF is in no way the only IO to have had a 
major influence in Angola. The other actor that has greatly impacted Angola‘s 
development path is the UN.  In its attempts at bringing sustainable peace in Angola, the 
UN has shaped not only the outcome of the civil war, but also relations between the 
state and society in Angola. Some blamed the failure of the peace process on the 
institution‘s lack of resources, its lack of analysis and understanding of the context, its 
underestimation of Jonas Savimbi, ―dogmatic‖ faith in the political process, the continued 
exclusion of civic forces at the negotiating table and its problematic sanctions (Anstee 
1995; Messiant 2004; MacQueen 2006; Nossal 2002; Comerford 2007).  
 
One view is that the inclusion of the Angolan civil society and community-based groups 
―could have shaped the nature of the final agreements themselves, placing greater 
emphasis on transparency and accountable governance‖ (Comerford 2007: 18). 
Another, is that by promoting the idea that ―if you are a rebel, don‘t touch diamond; but if 
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you are the government, you can kill‖
159
, UN sanctions presented the organisation as 
―third party to the conflict‖ and ―complicit‖ in ―converting the war around the idea that had 
Savimbi died, normality would come back.‖
160
 Incidentally, the UN‘s tacit acquiescence 
with the military option pursued by the MPLA in the 1990s was influenced by ―a situation 
of ‗too many interests‘ among the ‗real‘ international community‖ - namely oil companies 
and great powers -, which, in turn, provide ―the basic explanation for the shortcomings 
and failures of international interventions‖ (Messiant 2004: 16). In the end, it is neither 
the UN sanctions nor Savimbi‘s death that brought the war to an end, but a change in 
mentality together with a growing determination to bring the self-destructive to end it.  
 
Still, it is the IMF and the World Bank which have claimed leading roles in the 
institutionalisation of transparency policies in the developing world. The Fund has done 
so in its signalling and gatekeeper function, whereas the World Bank owes its 
prominence in the field generally to being ―the most important IO teacher of norms‖ in 
the field of good governance (Sandholtz and Gray 2003:769); or in Gillies‘ (2010: 117-
18) words, to being ―the primary provider of transparency technical assistance, creating 
work, attracting funds, and increasing its relevance‖ in developing countries. Essentially, 
it is this technical, financial and discursive power which helped these two institutions 
legitimise and institutionalise their influence over developing countries‘ polities in this 
area.  
 
In Angola, the World Bank approved eleven projects in the period between the signing of 
the Bicesse peace accords in 1991 to mid-1999 when it reduced its Country Office to 
Liaison Office as a result of the slow pace of reform, the unstable economic conditions, 
the resumption of fighting and a shrinking portfolio (World Bank 2003: 16; Hodges 2004: 
119-120). Among these, nine projects were intended to improve the efficiency of a 
number of social sectors - including health, education, the power sector, transport - in 
addition to strengthening social rehabilitation; and two projects had at their core, good 
governance and ORT.  
 
The first programme was the US$23 million Economic Management Capacity Building 
Project (1991-98) which had a satisfactory financial performance in the sense that the 
                                                          
159
 Interview with one Angolan rights activist, Oxford, 16 March 2009.   
160
 Raquel Ferrão, speaking at an event on ―Opposition in Angola: UNITA‘s Past, Present and 
Future‖, hosted by Chatham House, London, 26 May 2009.  
161 
 
money allocated was ―disbursed well‖, but generated an ―unsatisfactory‖ rating due to 
the unsuccessful implementation of reforms and the worsening of social indicators 
despite significant per capita increases in oil revenues (World Bank 1999: 2). The 
second Bank-monitored programme was a US$20 million Financial Institutions 
Modernisation Project (1992-2002), which was a relatively successful programme thanks 
in part to the momentum for reform in the final years of implementation in the 1990s, and 
in part to the Central Bank‘s ―dynamic leadership in carrying out important initiatives 
such as the establishment of the modern Payments System in spite of overall 
―insufficient commitment and technical capacity‖ (World Bank 2011: 1, 20-21).  
 
After the cessation of the civil war, the main lending instrument for the Bank to 
operationalise transparency was the Economic Management Technical Assistance 
(EMTA) (2003-11). Described as ―the critical public sector intervention – the vehicle for 
dialogue and reform of the essential governance institutions and processes‖ (World 
Bank 2011: 1), EMTA provided technical assistance on a number of reforms listed in 
Chapter 4, including the MINFIN-led PFGMP and the Central Bank‘s work on Anti-
Money Laundering and related prevention measures. Put simply, EMTA was proposed 
to help the Angolan government in producing ―a good financial management system for 




After nearly nine years of implementation, however, even EMTA only recorded a 
―moderately unsatisfactory‖ rating. This was an over-ambitious, overloaded programme 
which comprised utterly optimistic projections
162
, as well as complex and incoherent 
policy conditions which could simply not be fulfilled in a post-conflict country like Angola 
with extremely weak capacity levels. What is more, implementation was hampered by 
delays in and slow pace of implementation, changes in the leadership on both the 
government and Bank side, and its extreme dependence on the success of parallel 
efforts undertaken by the government (World Bank 2003). 
 
Similar doubts as to the ones described in Chapter 2 over the Bank‘s ulterior motives 
and contradictory interests arise in Angola. Asked why good governance and 
transparency have been at the core of the organisation‘s operations in Angola, one 
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official present in the country at the time of the implementation of EMTA responded that 
it was ―important for us to be laying the foundation and work on improving governance if 
the money we wanted to invest was going to be put to good‖; otherwise, ―it was going to 
be hard to do anything in Angola if this problem was not tackled, whether centrally or 
locally.‖
163
 Underlying this statement is an acknowledgement that lack of governance in 
public finance management was and remains a constraint for the country‘s development. 
As one World Bank document notes: 
―If Angola is to harness its current windfall accruing from both higher level of oil 
production and higher prices for sustained growth, better accountability with 
checks and balances in public spending is probably the main element‖ (World 
Bank 2007: 8). 
 
To some civil society actors, the fact that the Bank Country representative sits in Maputo 
gives the impression that apart from being a ―policy-poor but resource-rich‖ country, 
Angola is completely immaterial (Action for Southern Africa 2004; Govender and 
Skagestad 2009: 22). The predominant view is that the IMF and World Bank are ―all 
about business. You have to understand that as long as you have a good liquidity 
capacity, as a country, then you are a good partner to do business with. And that is what 
is happening with Angola.‖
164 
 
Woodward (2013) insists that the institutional purpose and priority (to ensure the stability 
of the international financial and monetary system) of both the World Bank and IMF, 
along with their simultaneous imperative to ensure their very survival as IFI, generate a 
common approach both in the conception of the state that underlies their lending 
decisions, and in the ways in which they interact with borrowing countries, their operative 
policies and modalities. Yet, each of these institutions has ―its own cultures, beliefs, 
personality and DNA.‖
165
 In turn, this has led the two IFIs to behave differently in terms 
of shaping policy norms, to the extent of having slightly disparate influences, if at all, on 
policy outcomes.  
 
There are two specific examples to back this point up. In the case of the integration of 
the ―social dimension‖ in the two IFIs‘ operations, Vetterlein (2008: 22) submits that the 
Bank tends to respond ―pro-actively‖ to various critiques, whereas the Fund generally 
―adopts policies passively if it cannot be avoided.‖ Insofar as ORT is concerned, percep-
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tions of the Bank are that of an institution engaged in the ―passive‖ promotion of ORT 
while the IMF is seen as pro-actively promoting the policy norm. For example, an inves-
tigation into how the two multilateral institutions operationalised extractive industries 
transparency in their operations in 57 resource-rich countries between 2003 and 2008 
uncovered that ―revenue transparency as a benchmark is frequent for the IMF and infre-
quent for the World Bank.‖ The caveat here is that their approach is neither consistent 
nor comprehensive, and entirely focused on disclosure of revenues, including EITI (GW 
and BIC 2008).  
 
It is beyond the scope of this study to explain these conflicting conclusions on IFIs‘ per-
formance more generally. The remainder of the section rests content with reviewing the 
Fund‘s strategies and modus operandi as they apply to the specific subject matter under 
consideration. 
 
The IMF and ORT Diffusion in Angola 
 
Among external actors, as indicated previously, the IMF is the most oft-cited driver of oil 
governance reform in oil-dependent developing countries. One senior business and 
human rights expert was categorical that the Fund has played the biggest role in the 
institutionalisation of ORT in Angola, especially from 1999-2005, during which time it 
―pushed quite publicly and privately to make the government more accountable‖ and 
―insisted on more transparency and more accountability.‖
166
 Furthermore, he claimed 
that ―one of the fundamental reasons why transparency reforms do not hold is because 
the end of the IMF means the end of reforms. And that is a historical phenomenon.‖
167
 
Another interlocutor of Angolan origin reiterated the Fund‘s utmost importance for this 
issue, when referring to the use of its reports and assessments by various local media 




Three specific IMF interventions justify the preceding arguments. Overall, three specific 
IMF interventions justify this widely-held view. The first is the central role that the Fund 
played in the launch and partial implementation of the Oil Diagnostic Study which was 
implemented as part of a staff-monitored programme implemented between 2000 and 
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2001. The second was the March 2002 IMF unpublished report which uncovered 
troubling evidence of unexplained expenditures amounting to US$4.2 billion - an 
average of about US$703 million or approximately 9.25 per cent of Angola‘s GDP per 
year – from 1997-2002 (HRW 2004: 33). The report noted that: 
 
―A general lack of transparency in public finances - with scant data being officially 
published and a complex set of offshore finances—has generated the perception 
of a poorly managed treasury […] substantial funds received as signature 
bonuses for oil contracts and oil royalties have been outside the control of the 
treasury; and non-transparent external debt transactions have been made‖ 
(quoted in HRW 2004: 41). 
    
The external debt transactions mentioned therein referred mainly to the Angola-Russia 
debt deal which was at the centre of discussions between the Fund and the Angolan 
authorities throughout the nineties and early 2000s (see IMF 2002). The ―strange‖ deal 
is said to have ―poisoned Angola‘s relations with the IMF for years‖ (Shaxson 2007: 
178). After mentioning the deal and its ―major reductions of arrears‖ in its 1997 country 
report (IMF 1997: 8), the Fund had asked the Angolan leadership for clarifications, which 
the latter declined to do, contesting that it would infringe on the country‘s national 
sovereignty (GW 2004: 45). The Fund then advised the executive to seek approval from 
the National Assembly for the loans and publicly disclose them as a way of addressing 
the increased secrecy of Angola‘s external borrowing practices. But even this demand 
was rejected because ―the authorities felt that such a level of transparency vis-à-vis 
parliament and civil society would be too intrusive on government affairs‖ (Hodges 2004: 
167).  
 
This insistence on not fulfilling the Fund‘s requirements for oil revenue transparency later 
transpired as the main explanation for the international donor community‘s reluctance to 
hold a donors‘ conference to aid Angola‘s post-conflict reconstruction. It is also believed 
that such a scathing assessment of the state of Angola‘s public affairs incited the 
government to regularise, or at least begin the process of regularising the situation.  
 
The global financial and economic crisis created the basis for a renewed impetus for 
greater fiscal transparency, thereby providing an opportunity for the Fund‘s latest 
interventions through the SBA implemented by joint agreement between the Fund and 
the Angolan authorities from 2009-12. The arrangement itself was officially approved in 
November 2009 but its ―indicative targets‖ and policy commitments - or ―numerical 
165 
 
parameters that guide the programme‖ (see IMF 2009b) - were negotiated with the 
Angolan authorities during IMF missions in August and September of the same year. 
Work on a few policy recommendations, with regard the oil fund, for instance, began 
before the terms and conditions were agreed, as the Angolan authorities ―were not 
ready, at the time, to accept [them].‖
169
 This, and the signing of the arrangement, appear 
to have been facilitated by the positive working relationship between the then IMF 
mission chief on Angola, Lamin Leigh, and the Angolan Minister of the Economy, 
Manuel Nunes Jr., both of whom were later replaced (Jensen and Paulo 2011: 46). 
 
Worth about US$1.33 billion, the SBA was one of the largest loans ever granted to any 
African country, and to reiterate, the only IMF programme agreed between the two 
parties which actually ran its course and was indeed followed by a Post-Programme 
Monitoring which lasted from 2012-14. The arrangement had a financial, monetary and 
fiscal pillar. The fiscal pillar aimed to reduce the non-oil primary fiscal deficit 
accumulated before and during the crisis, while providing adequate resources for social 
spending and vital infrastructure projects (IMF 2009a, 2009b). In particular, it 
emphasised ―strengthening public financial management and enhancing fiscal 
transparency, especially in the oil sector‖ (IMF 2009c). It is as part of this arrangement 
that the government agreed to the publication of staff reports and associated programme 
documents, a debt ceiling, a cap of 30 per cent on social spending ―its average in recent 
years‖ (Ibid: 7), in addition to a number of initiatives listed in Chapter 4 such as the 
phasing out of Sonangol‘s quasi-fiscal operations, the publication of budget execution 
reports and that of Sonangol‘s audits.  
 
To be sure, the preceding first two sets of instances of IMF-led pressure coincided with 
heightened advocacy on extractive industries transparency; as such, it is likely that 
reputational concerns stemming from heightened international scrutiny over IFIs 
activities had great sway over its attitudes and actions over this period. In effect, it was 
less so from 2005 onwards, when the Fund became ―less aggressive‖ at demanding 
greater ORT and accountability, in part due to ―a change in people‖, a hike in the 
international oil price partly as a result of the war in Iraq, new oil fields coming on 
stream, and the government‘s resistance to change
170
.   
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Putting the Fund‘s efforts into context does not diminish nor overestimate them. What it 
does, is calling for a re-examination of assumptions of its influence on reform process 
and outcomes, and ultimately, a re-assessment of expectations about what the 
predominant culture of conditionality can achieve in real terms. What is more, Woodward 
(2013) finds that it is difficult to separate the effects of IFIs policies from reform 
outcomes. In her view, that is due to the minimal influence that all post-conflict 
governments exert in shaping their own development policies due in part to the 
―gatekeeping‖ role of IFIs on external finance, the non-transparency of the negotiating 
relationships, and the incentive structure for IFI staff – especially at the Bank where 
there is a ―disbursement culture‖ in which ―pay and promotion depend on ‗moving the 
money‘‖ not on results (ibid: 149-50 citing Woods 2006 and Sogge 2002). She adds that: 
 
―Neither organisation collects information on the impact of their policies and 
projects, while the system of competitive tenders and renewable contracting in 
the market for aid for implementing international NGOs that implement these 
projects deters honest reporting of project results‖ (ibid citing Cooley and Ron 
2002).        
 
In all, Woodward is doubtful that there is sufficient evidence in the countries themselves 
to affirm with certainty that IFIs‘ continuing application of policies and conditionalities 
have changed in any way ―the consequences for the structure of post-war power and 
state-building‖ (Woodward 2013: 155). In the second part of the chapter, one re-
evaluates not the effects of IFIs‘ interventions on power asymmetries, but specific factors 
which can reveal how and why the Fund‘s interventions on ORT may have contributed 
very little to the effective institutionalisation of ORT in postwar Angola. 
 
EFFECTS AND LIMITATIONS OF IMF INTERVENTIONS IN ANGOLA 
 
The effects and limitations of IOs‘ ―governance by conditionality‖ (Schimmelfennig and 
Sedelmeier 2004) have been the subject of much debate in the academic and policy lit-
erature. Certain scholars attribute these shortcomings to factors that are internal to IOs, 
such as the interests of IOs‘ powerful national shareholders, IOs‘ failure to internalise the 
same principles they advocate, the ambiguity of their conditionality policies, their track 
record of compliance, and the discredit and poor design of their conditionality packages 
(Action Aid 2006; Bauhr and Nasiritousi 2010; Breen 2010; Copelovitch 2010; Best 
2012; Kaplow 2013; Gunaydin 2014). Others emphasise domestic constraints influenc-
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ing resistance to governance reforms, including the presence of strong special interests, 
the character of domestic politics, lack of political will and commitment to development 
policies (Radelet 2005; Odugbemi and Jacobson 2008; Stevenson 2011). A third group 
concentrates on the evolving global context, shaped notably by the rise in power and 
influence of Asian countries like China and India (see Woods 2008, 2010).  
 
A good number of these explanations applies to Angola, but the chapter will concentrate 
more on the first and last sets, and less on the second. Like Bauhr and Nasiritousi 
(2012: 550), it finds that the ineffectual inputs of IOs are primarily due to (a) motivational 
factors which reflect IOs‘ weak prioritisation and commitment, for example, in the form of 
a low financial or personnel commitment to promoting reforms; (b) ideational differences 
which relate to limits in the knowledge and expertise that IOs possess, hence, in the 
objectivity and quality of the advice given; and finally, (c) procedural aspects or the 
procedures by which decisions are made and the modalities of their translation in 
practice.  
 
Yet, as Gunaydin (2014: 1) argued, ―the scope and intrusiveness of conditionality is 
determined by domestic and international factors alike.‖ To reflect this point, unlike 
Bauhr and Nasiritousi, the section will also demonstrate that internal shortcomings and 
limitations cannot be completely detached from the geopolitical context within which IOs 
negotiate, design and implement their lending policies. Consequently, factors such as 
the global financial crisis, the international oil market, the ambivalence of Western 
powers‘ foreign (commercial) policies, and/or the rise of emerging powers should be 
included in the equation.    
 
Lack of Commitment to Reforms 
 
That IFIs‘ economic interests are the starting point for discussions of their role in 
developing countries‘ polities is not a coincidence. These are arguably the biggest 
impediment to their effective promotion of good governance and development policies in 
those countries. They inform IFIs‘ policy design and implementation, and sometimes 
even their commitment to reforms, leading to a combination of gaps and inconsistencies 
in the policies advocated and their application. In the case of the Fund, one observes a 
heavy emphasis on Sonangol‘s regulation and a certain lack of interest in the 
assessment of, and provision of sufficient details on, the quality of Angola‘s financial 
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reporting (USAID 2009: 5). That is in spite of the latter being, arguably, the main area of 
contention in its relationship with the African petro-state.  
 
Chapter 1 referred to Wade‘s (2010) observation of more flexibility in the design and 
application of IFIs‘ policy instruments in the developing world, despite their traditional 
hostility to the idea of an expansive state. Yet unlike the Bank which adapted its lending 
instruments and application to the context, the Fund has been less flexible, at least until 
recently. As indicated earlier, a donors‘ conference planned for the second half of 2003 
was conditioned on increased ORT and an IMF programme which the authorities were 
extremely reluctant to agree to. But it never took place. The Fund programme was 
supposed to trigger the World Bank‘s involvement in the post-conflict reconstruction 
process (Vidal 2011: 57-58), but the Bank went it alone, a fact which possibly magnified 
the concern that it tends to encourage the Angolan government to disregard pressure 
from ―more demanding‖ donors by ―going bilateral‖ rather than using existing multilateral 
forums for dialogue and negotiation (Tvedten et al 2003: 28).  
 
Things started changing lately, with the Fund adopting ―looser‖ policy conditions for the 
transparency-related component of its latest policy instrument, the SBA. Jensen and 
Paulo (2011: 47-49) point to three conditions that called into question the Fund‘s com-
mitment to reform during its implementation of the SBA. First, the extremely weak ―prior 
action‖
171
 of cabinet approval of the 2010 budget, which the authors attest, ―has never 
been an issue in Angola and is therefore to be seen more as a formality than a sign of 
commitment to reform.‖ The choice of this minimal condition, it is suggested, implies that 
―the IMF was keen on getting this programme going quickly […] to alleviate balance-of-
payments problems across the world‖ during the global crisis (ibid, citing the Economist 
Intelligence Unit 2010: 13). It should also be underscored here, that the leniency of this 
condition compares negatively to the decision taken by the Fund after the partially im-
plemented SMP of 2000-01, that a formal programme with Angola could only be agreed 
with the Angolan government following ―strong prior actions aimed, inter alia, at increas-
ing fiscal transparency and eliminating Angola‘s large quasi-fiscal imbalances‖ (World 
Bank 2003: 4).      
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Second, the analysts make the remark that the funds disbursed for the SBA were 
―heavily frontloaded‖. As they point out, the first disbursement was made shortly after the 
first review (in May 2010) and it amounted to more than 25 per cent of the total value of 
the loan or about US$514.5 million (ibid: 47; see also IMF 2010). By January 2011, only 
14 months after the signing of the 28-month agreement, the Fund had disbursed 
US$1.07 billion, that is, around 75 per cent of the total value of the loan (IMF 2011). 
Finally, it is shown that the IMF waived the non-completion of the accumulation of 
arrears despite the importance initially placed on this factor as one of four key 
performance criteria
172
. The Fund‘s explanation here was that the government did itself 
take further steps to address these deficiencies, among other things, by contracting 
Ernst and Young (Jensen and Paulo 2011: 47). 
 
The question is: what explains the Fund‘s waning interest in fiscal transparency in the 
early 2000s, and inconsistencies in its design and application of economic policy 
conditionality? In truth, no single factor can be attributed to these shortcomings. Fund 
officials imply that the agency‘s loosening of policy conditions reflects changes in the 
agency‘s conditionality framework, which facilitated the abolishment of the use of binding 
structural conditions in favour of monitoring based on periodic programme reviews and a 
strong emphasis on poverty alleviation and growth (Mateos y Lago and Yang 2010: 
223). There were also changes in the leadership team at the Fund already alluded to; a 
falling demand for technical assistance on fiscal transparency; and the reduction in 
funds devoted to this area especially after interest in this issue peaked in 2002 (IMF 
2012: 8), which Bernes (2010) argues was in part as a result of neglected governance 
issues particularly on the part of the G7 group.  Apart from these factors, the following 
paragraphs will claim that quasi-ideological differences between Angola and the Fund 
equally had a dampening effect on the way the IMF went about encouraging greater 
fiscal transparency through its conditionality policies in this postwar era.  Most 
significantly, they provide further evidence of Jacqueline Best‘s finding that the Fund‘s 
attempts to address previous legitimacy shortfalls and change its relationship with 
borrowing countries by ―revising its conditionality guidelines and pursuing greater 
‗domestic‘ ownership over reforms‖ has produced new legitimacy dilemmas, chief among 
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them its ―ability to obtain the deeper political legitimacy that it seeks‖, thereby raising 
questions about the sustainability of its current reform efforts‖ (Best 2007: 469).   
 
The Challenge of Legitimacy 
 
Shaxson (2009: 54-55) remarked that Angolan officials usually advance two arguments 
when they are faced with accusations of endemic corruption. One is the country‘s long 
history of external interference, in particular, the fact that the same Western nations that 
are now calling for reforms contributed to the destruction of the country in the first place. 
Angola‘s Foreign Minister, George Chikoti, made this point when reiterating that 
Angola‘s governance challenges are ―a consequence of the Cold War, where you had 
many people who today are saying we are not going fast, first of all supported this war‖.   
 
The second argument, on the other hand, often revolves around the legitimacy of the 
Fund‘s policy advice to developing countries, or more specifically in this case, the credi-
bility and suitability of its theoretical models and practical approach to solving the re-
source curse. The Fund‘s contractionary policies in particular, have been seen as largely 
inappropriate for a country like Angola just emerging from civil war and with urgent re-
construction needs (Vines et al 2005: 30). The contention is that these policies are often 
proposed for the sole purposes of promoting the Fund‘s stated goal of enhancing global 
stability and protecting the interests of the international community, hence, that they are 
out of touch with Angola‘s political and economic realities (ibid; Shaxson 2009).  
 
Shaxson cites the advice from the Bank‘s 2006 Country Economic Memorandum that 
―Angola needs to complete the transition to a market economy‖, which he said, ―seem[s] 
like a good idea in theory, [but] it completely ignores the political and economic realities 
of an oil-rich, developing African country‖ (2009: 54; emphasis added). Another 
indication of the IMF crisis of legitimacy comes from its handling of the debate 
surrounding the discovery of a US$32 billion fiscal discrepancy accumulated between 
2007 and 2010 (see Chapter 4). Concerns were raised that the discrepancies in 
question in part coincided with the period during which the government was already 
implementing the Stand-By Agreement, suggesting shortcomings in the Fund‘s own 
monitoring performance (HRW and RWI 2012). A second major issue underlined by 
campaigners was the lack of transparency of key documents held by the Fund and the 
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Angolan government, which could have enlightened the public on this topic (OSISA et al 
2012).  
 
A third subject of tension between the Fund and civil society emerged around the lack of 
credibility of the government‘s and Fund‘s ―explanations‖ of the discrepancies. In its at-
tempts to clarify where the money might have gone, the government revealed that 
Sonangol underreported some of the funds it received from its operations, and that part 
of the money unaccounted for was transferred into foreign escrow accounts; explana-
tions that were reiterated in several IMF reports. Yet in an April 2012 letter to the IMF, 
they argued that they ―are vague and do not provide sufficient detail to answer basic 
questions about how the money was spent‖ (OSISA et al 2012). One Western observer 
also felt that the Fund‘s public endorsement of this response was solely influenced by 
the fact that ―the Angolans protested‖
173
, while one of  the country‘s most high profile 
transparency activists underscored what he saw as fundamentally wrong with the Fund‘s 
pursuit of domestic ownership and its approach to resource governance reforms more 
generally:  
 
―They are just listening to what the government is saying; they are reading what 
the government is producing; they are disseminating what the government is 
trying to let come out but they are not confronting this information with other 
information or with the reality on the ground. They are not verifying, they are not 
trying to certify [...] The government just gave a piece of paper and they just 
accepted it [...] When I met with [IFIs] officials in Washington, I said to them ‗but 
how do you know?‘ Give me the locations, places and names of these projects. 
Did they verify? They never verified! Transparency is also verification [...]. All 





In a letter dated April 9, 2012, Antoinette Sayeh - the Director of the IMF‘s African De-
partment - indicated that the Fund was satisfied that discussions of this issue with the 
Angolan authorities led them to investigate the sources of discrepancies and establish 
an ―inter-institutional mechanism to ensure the regular reconciliation of data on oil pro-
duction and oil revenues‖ (Sayeh 2012). On the question of transparency, she clarified 
that the ―initial findings‖ of the government‘s investigations were shared with the Fund in 
a reconciliation report, and ―outlined‖ to the media by the Minister of Finance during a 
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joint press conference in Luanda in January 2012. Yet it is one thing to say that a rigor-
ous process is in place, and another thing to show how this process has worked. As it 
happened, both the second post-programme monitoring report (dated March 19, 2014) 
and the last Article IV Staff report (dated September 5, 2014) suggest, in effect, that the 
Stand-By Agreement delivered mixed outcomes.  
 
Overall macroeconomic stability improved and a number of reports were published.  The 
commitment to phase out subsidies and Sonangol‘s quasi-fiscal activities was short-lived 
in 2012 due to perceived resistance though the momentum for reform returned in 2013. 
The reconciliation of oil revenues continued but remained relatively weak. And new con-
cerns over the governance and transparency of the sovereign wealth fund emerged 
soon after its creation (IMF 2012: 9-13). Furthermore, the inclusion of Sonangol‘s quasi-
fiscal activities in the budget was offset by the ―omission from the budget of expenditure 
on infrastructure for new cities undertaken by Sonangol [which] represents a step back 
on fiscal transparency‖ (IMF 2014b: 8; emphasis added). 
 
The SBA case exemplifies the concern with the costs of transparency, since the produc-
tion of information on the accountancy gap had the effect of ―multiplying the surfaces on 
which disagreement can incubate and flourish‖ (Barry 2013: 182). Most significantly with 
regard to the Fund‘s legitimacy crisis, it showed that by seeking to legitimise its new-
found approach by giving the GoA free hand in the reform process, the Fund presided 
over a programme that increased new doubts over its gatekeeping role.  
 
Still, as noted earlier in this section, the IMF‘s performance in Angola was affected by 
both internal and external factors. Among the oft-cited external factors conditioning the 
effectiveness of the Fund‘s interventions in Angola are Angola‘s agency and 
commitment to reform, its geostrategic relevance, the emergence of alternative sources 
of financing from rising powers  - China and Brazil being the two most important in the 
Angolan context -; and the lack of coordination and coherence among Western nations. 




To recapitulate, many ORT initiatives listed in Chapter 4 began long before the civil war 
ended in 2002, although it is only since the end of the war - since 2004 in particular - 
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that reforms have been consolidating. Work on this area thus constitutes ―work in 
progress‖ and emphasises continuity rather than change, although there have been 
some noteworthy shifts in the actual strategy used by the government, the emerging 
―technocratic‖ handling of public finances (Vallée 2008) as the signing of the SBA 
indicates. As such, contrary to Woodward‘s (2013) observation of the minimal influence 
of developing country governments in the shaping of development policies, one difficulty 
with identifying the role and influence of IOs in ORT policy outcomes in Angola stems 
from the government‘s agency and commitment to reforms. Indeed one critic referred to 
the post-war period from 2004-2008 as ―the last misplaced and poorly articulated phase 
of apparent belief in leverage over aspects of the Angolan government by a few Western 
circles, donors, and companies.‖
175
 The thrust of his argument is that international 
leverage over Angola is largely overstated.  
 
Among the reforms borne out of Angolan initiatives, sometimes against and without the 
advice of external actors, is the case of the contracting of Crown Agents, which ―was not 
requested by the IMF at all‖ but nonetheless led to Angola‘s most significant and 
successful reforms (Vines et al 2005: 15). Angolan agency and ―ownership‖ of the reform 
process is also evident in its initiation of the PFGM and its co-financing of the Oil 
Diagnostic Study. In relation to the latter, Macnab (2006) referred to the increase in the 
pace of change following the adoption of the study‘s main recommendations. As he 
pointed out, ―no major delays have occurred in starting the process of reform‖, an 
important feature which he claimed, ―helped the pace of institutional strengthening‖. The 
AUPEC consultant‘s assessment was that in all, ―the current Angolan government has 
given a clear commitment to develop an efficient, fully resourced, well managed and 
expert tax department to administer oil taxes.‖  
 
To be sure, Angola‘s commitment to reform extends to the post 2009 crisis period as 
well. Like many observers, one long-term observer of Angola expressed its surprise at 
the fact that ―[Angolan petro-elites] stuck by the current round of reform and that they 
actually took the money from the IMF.‖
176
 Further, that work began on the FSDEA before 
the authorities agreed to the terms and conditions of the SBA also indicates that they 
were serious about beginning the reform process as quickly as possible.    
 
                                                          
175
 Interview with Western civil society activist, London, 18 February 2013. 
176
 Telephone interview, 7 June 2011; emphasis added.  
174 
 
Others explain that part of the reason behind both the dampening of Angolan interest 
and urgency to reach an agreement with the IMF and the need for the West to 
reconsider the role that the IMF played in the relationship with Angola was the success 
of Angola‘s ‗home-grown‘ economic policies (Shaxson 2009; Aguilar 2005: 17). These 
policies were formulated and consistently and persistently implemented by ―Angolan 
technicians, specialists and leaders, at times in contradiction with the certainly well 
intentioned advice of some international financial organisations‖ (Nunes Junior 2009), 
resulting in ―the longest period without damaging policy reversals since Angola began its 
long and parsimonious road to a market economy in the second half of the 1980s‖ 
(Aguilar 2005: 18). They brought about an impressive level of macroeconomic and 
financial stability, thereby vindicating Angola‘s interventionist approach. With this 
progress came praises from the international community
177
 and the realisation, by both 
the government and the IMF, that an IMF-monitored programme might be not be 
necessary after all (Aguilar 2005; Shaxson 2009). Most importantly, these changes were 
made possible by the availability and use of policy alternatives facilitated by large 
windfall of oil revenues and the return of China.  
 
Russia, China and the West: Ambiguities and Contradictions of Policies Towards 
Angola 
 
Keen observers of Angolan affairs cannot but notice the swift transformation that it has 
undergone, from being a global battleground, to being one of the major political and 
economic forces in the African continent. Nowadays, Angola‘s reputation as one of the 
world‘s most corrupt countries is overtaken by a more favourable one, for those who 
would like to see it that way at least. Many view it as ‗an incredible success story‘; 
others, as a ‗global player‘. For, not only did it manage to consolidate peace and record 
impressive economic growth rates, it also considerably increased its presence in the 
region, continent and in the world. This in turn helped transform the petro-state‘s global 
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standing, as evidenced by its leading role ―as a friendly security provider‖ across the 
continent (Martins 2011), its participation at the 35
th
 G8 Summit in L‘Aquila (Italy) in July 
2009
178
, its hosting of OPEC‘s chairmanship the same year
179
, its status as one of 
Europe‘s biggest trade partners
180
 and the visits of numerous dignitaries, including 
former Russian President Medvedev (June 2009), former US Secretary of State Hillary 
Clinton (August 2009), UN Secretary-General Ban-ki Moon (February 2012) and 
outgoing European Commissioner President José Manuel Barroso (April 2012).  
 
Besides its petroleum resources, Assis Malaquias affirms that Angola owes this 
newfound economic and political clout to the success of its foreign policy‘s ―pragmatic 
recalibrations‖. He shows how Angola‘s recalibrations have served it well in the 
engagement of external allies that might help overcome domestic challenges, from 
soliciting the services of the ex-Soviet Union and Cuba to ensure the regime‘s survival, 
or the assistance of China to rebuild the country‘s infrastructure soon after the war, to 
seeking the support of the U.S. to propel and sustain development after the transition 
(Malaquias 2011). As he noted, this was a consequence of the Soviet disengagement in 
the late eighties, which for Angola, ―demonstrated the perils of overreliance on a single 
major international backer. For the MPLA regime, this had near-fatal consequences as it 
was left to fend for itself once the conflict reignited after the 1992 electoral fiasco‖ (ibid: 
8).  
 
Fast forward to today, bilateral relations with Russia are marked by attempts to revitalise 
the partnership between the two countries, ―this time grounded on economic drivers‖ 
(Alves et al 2013: 12). Yet, apart from educational/training exchanges, a few prestige 
projects – such as the joint construction of a satellite – and cooperation in strategic 
areas including oil and mining, the importance of these relations to Angola‘s 
contemporary political economy has somewhat been relatively negligible beyond 
strategic military cooperation (ibid), up until recently when it was announced that the 
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GoA has approved borrowing of US$1.5 billion from Russian bank VTB Capital 
(Macauhub 2014).  
    
The same cannot be said of China, even though unlike Russia, it did not have the best 
of starts. From a historical perspective, China‘s relations with Angola dates back to the 
early seventies when it first supported the MPLA during the struggle for independence 
against Portugal (Ferreira 2008:296), then (after 1975) UNITA and FNLA, with to which it 
offered financial and military support (Guimaraes 1998). That China provided assistance 
to its rivals did not however prevent the relationship with the MPLA government from 
bourgeoning. More recently, Angola became China‘s second largest oil exporter (behind 
Saudi Arabia), contributing nearly 16 per cent to China‘s total crude oil imports in 2010, 
and more than 40 per cent in 2012 (Angop 2012a; Silva 2010). Furthermore, as Figure 5 
below illustrates, China has become the first destination of Angola‘s oil exports, 
receiving over 40 per cent of Angola‘s total crude oil exports in 2012, with the US 
importing less than 15 per cent of Angola‘s oil that same year.  In sum, what began as a 
‗partnership‘ based on ideologies and defence has shifted to one based on economic 
interests.  
 
From China‘s perspective, this sea-change reflected the urge of addressing China‘s 
energy security needs and the shift in China‘s vision of development from one entirely 
premised on long-standing claims of a ‗harmonious‘ and ‗peaceful‘ cooperation both 
nationally and internationally to a ‗new‘, ‗pragmatic‘ economic or growth-oriented 
strategy (Power & Mohan 2009). From Angola‘s viewpoint, however, this shift must be 
understood in the context of the country‘s post-conflict reconstruction. President Dos 
Santos, in his 2013 interview with Lisbon SIC Noticias TV, reaffirmed that Angola‘s 
―cooperation‖ with China came at a time when there was ―no empathy on the part of 
Western countries.‖ On the opposite direction,  
―China was one of the countries that expressed its availability to loan money and 
as a result major Chinese companies have come here to carry out works that 
have been paid for with financing secured under conditions that were acceptable 











Figure 5: Angola‟s Crude Oil Exports (2012) 
 
Source: U.S. EIA (2014) 
 
 
The ‗acceptability‘ of China‘s financing stems mainly from the absence of political 
conditions. As soon as the announcement of the first US$2 billion loan from China‘s 
EximBank was made in 2004, China was nonetheless branded a ―rogue donor‖. 
Conventional wisdom for much of the past decade was that by offering an alternative, 
―without any strings attached‖, China effectively undermined efforts by multilateral 
agencies to use overseas aid as an incentive to curb corruption in the country.  
 
This version of events has now been discredited by experts who specify that although 
Angola was put under pressure by the fact that the IMF and the World Bank would not 
lend the state money until they opened up the books, ―the idea that the IMF or World 
Bank was on the brink of making a ‗breakthrough‘ with Angola when China stepped in is 
a bit exaggerated.‖
181
 Unlike many other African countries, Angola did not have a 
structural adjustment plan yet, and so it was much more autonomous in its fiscal 
decisions
182
. Importantly, it had been borrowing from Western private banks and even 
governments, which expanded their own separate development assistance programmes 
and processes, thereby creating a ―cacophony of donors‖ (Woods 2008: 15) making 
different and contradictory demands on Angola. The first to ―break rank‖ in 2003 was 
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Germany, a member of the Paris Club which settled a debt reduction deal unilaterally 
that would facilitate the entry of its companies into the Angolan market (Brautigam 2009: 
275).  
 
China‘s return to Angola has been ―revolutionary‖ (ibid: 276) in two respects. First, as 
remarked in Chapter 5, ―for the first time, there was a hope that some of Angola‘s riches 
might actually be translated directly into development projects‖ (ibid: 276). From a global 
policy perspective as Woods explains, ―this is a silent revolution‖: ―by quietly offering 
alternatives to aid-receiving countries‖, like other emerging donors, China has been 
―introducing competitive pressures into the existing system [and] weakening the 
bargaining position of Western donors in respect of aid-receiving countries with a 
mixture of implications‖ (2008: 17; emphasis added). In the Angolan context, the view of 
one well-known China-Africa analyst is that: 
 
 ―In a way, it seems as if the Exim-Bank loan acted almost like some kind of 
catalyst [...] The government started talking to the World Bank and IMF again - 
there is this impression that Angola stopped talking to the World Bank and IMF 
altogether -, and the first made available about US$1billion for financing a 
programme of diversification over a period of 5 years.  The government made 
arrangements to pay back the Paris Club debt which essentially catalysed the 
increasing of credit lines from various other partners. The recent US$1.4 billion 
from the IMF was also psychologically important because the Angolan 
government has begun some kind of rapprochement not only with various IFIs 
but also various other partners. So if you look at the government‘s position at 





One respondent reinforced this viewpoint, suggesting that ―having a big Chinese friend 
was certainly a big thing for Angola and it helped Angola say to the West: ‗Look, we 
don‘t necessarily need you guys‘. So, it was never really a decisive factor, although an 
important one.‖
184
   
 
It is disputable exactly what China gained from this presumed ―win-win‖ relationship. 
What is clear, is that the Angolan regime has been ―steering development and co-opting 
China where it deems fit.‖
185
 On ORT per se, it should be noted however that 
widespread public perceptions of China‘s non-interventionist policy as a ―publicly stated 
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policy that they don‘t care about governance in other countries‖ (Karin Lissakers quoted 
in GW 2007:8) do not give a true reflection of China‘s attitudes towards transparency. 
They do not do justice to China‘s awareness of, and concerns about, the damage that 
potentially corrupt deals may have on its reputation and international ‗soft‘ power 
ambitions. Nor do they leave space for the benefits of China‘s alternative approach to 
development assistance, or its responses to allegations of corruption such as those 
outlined in Chapter 5, to be showcased.  
 
There is a sense among Chinese officials, that the ―special‖ relationship China has had 
with its African partners is waning and there needs to be a concerted effort to overcome 
China‘s ―PR [public relations] problem.‖
186
 This process was set in motion in late 2007 
when the Chinese government, via the State-owned Assets Supervisory and 
Administration Commission, introduced an array of initiatives designed to increase the 
social and environmental reporting of large extractive sector companies. Besides, 
several subsidiaries of Chinese NOCs are participating in EITI processes in 
implementing countries, though they too recognise the need to do more. In November 
2012, The New York Times quoted Fu Chengyu, the chairman of Sinopec, as saying: 
―Chinese companies have more work to do from this side, to become more transparent 
and more open [...] I think we have become better but still there is a long way to go‖ 
(Reed 2012). Further, in October 2014, the Chinese Chamber of Commerce for 
Minerals, Metals and Chemicals Importers and Exporters published ground-breaking 
Guidelines for its mining and mineral trading companies operating overseas, which 
would cover wide-ranging aspects of responsible corporate behaviour including 
preventing conflict and corruption, labour rights, environmental protection, and 
community relations (GW 2014: 4).  
 
This gradual culture change towards more openness prompted one civil society 
representative to call for a move away from unsubstantiated misgivings against China to 
a focus on more positive policy developments
187
. Another interlocutor reflected the fact 
that these misgivings are the sole product of a general Western uneasiness about China 
rising as a global power
188
. Incidentally, Woods believes that this apprehension about 
China‘s rise generated a competition between ―West‖ and ―East‖ that did nothing but 
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expose the former‘s ―standards that are either out of date or ineffectual‖, and highlight 
their mere aspirational nature. And she warned ―Multilateralism in the international 
development assistance regime is weakening; and there are very few incentives in the 
existing governance structure of multilateralism to give emerging donors an incentive to 
engage‖ (Woods 2008: 17).    
 
Indeed, if China is supposedly the biggest challenge to IOs‘ ORT standard-setting, it is 
by no means its only problem. In effect, IOs‘ apolitical and indecisive response to oil 
governance challenges in postwar Angola simply mirrors a general lack of commitment 
on the part of IOs and Western powers to curb oil sector corruption. It also highlights 
doubts as to whether ORT is the most appropriate tool for solving the resource curse; or 
worse still, whether there is, after all, a known recipe for solving it, especially in difficult 
contexts like Angola. Reinforcing this point is the comment by an Angolan civil society 
representative, that ―Angola is seen as an oil producer with poverty – the US and other 
western actors do not have a model to deal with a rich/poor country like this‖ (quoted in 
Shaxson et al 2008: 18). As will be shown shortly, these doubts and confusion are 
reflected in the practice of Western powers‘ policies. 
 
It goes without saying that Angola‘s oil has always been a focal point of attraction for 
Western governments too, though whilst China has been able to help rebuild Angola‘s 
infrastructure, Western nations have mainly focused on providing technical assistance to 
Angola‘s governmental bodies
189
. As former US Ambassador to Angola, Christopher 
McMullen noted in 2012, US-Angola relations are not just about morals; ―it is self-
interests at work too.‖
190
 This was underscored early on, when in considering US 
responses to the Angolan anti-colonial struggle, Secretary of Defence James 
Schlesinger proposed, during a National Security Council meeting in June 1975 that: 
―we may wish to encourage the disintegration of Angola. Cabinda in the clutches of 
Mobutu would mean far greater security of the petroleum resources‖ (cited in Hanhimäki 
and Westad 2003: 521). Later, such was Angola‘s relevance to US energy security 
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interests that the latter invested US$250 million in covert aid to UNITA between 1986 
and 1991, making US support to Angola the second largest covert programme after the 
Afghan mujahedeen (Human Rights Watch 1998). Further, it was predominantly the 
economic and strategic interests of the US - as one of the ―crafters‖ of the Alvor and 
Bicesse Peace Accords despite being a crucial party to them - that gave the MPLA 
government the advantage over UNITA (Messiant 2004).   
 
Yet the biggest challenge in US-Angola relations has been to ―learn to disagree on 
certain things and to compartmentalise our relationship and try to advance those areas 
we have converging interests.‖
191
 That is why these relations are particularly instructive 
here; for they expose the difficulty Western nations have had of reconciling their need to 
harness business opportunities in the emerging power with calls from parts of their 
domestic constituencies to keep demanding greater transparency and accountability 
from the Angolan government, especially in this post-crisis period. Reflecting these 
contradictions is the following statement: 
―If you see the US, they have taken a very hard line; one you could easily take 
with Angola in terms of calling for greater disclosure of oil revenues, doing assets 
freezes if they are corrupt assets… They won‘t do it in Angola. They won‘t also 
go to war in Angola but I am saying that the anti-corruption mechanisms that are 
available to them are being used elsewhere.‖
192 
 
The clearest evidence of a double standard in the practice of US policy towards African 
petro-states emerged during former US Secretary Hillary Clinton‘s visit to Africa in 
August 2009. In an open letter published ahead of her two-day visit to Angola, the first 
visit to Angola by a US Secretary of State in seven years, and the longest ever by a US 
Secretary of State to any African country, a group of Angolan civil society activists called 
on the Secretary of State to denounce incidents of corruption, nepotism, bad 
governance and human rights violations recurrent in the country. Instead, speaking in 
Luanda on 9 August, Mrs Clinton was seen to be supportive of the government when in 
a conciliatory tone, she affirmed how ―encouraged‖ she was by advances in greater 
democratic participation and government‘s efforts at increasing transparency.  
 
Former US Ambassador Dan Mozena later justified this US ―pragmatic step-by-step 
approach‖ as one ―particularly relevant for promoting human rights, improving 
governance, and increasing transparency.‖ ―Corruption in Angola is a mine-field‖ he 
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affirmed, insisting that ―the U.S. position is not to preach.‖
193
 Yet, preaching is what Mrs 
Clinton came close to doing in Nigeria in dire contrast, where after condemning 
corruption and ―the failure of governance at the local, state and federal level‖, she 
moved on to ―encourage‖ the Nigerian government ―to increase transparency, reduce 
corruption, provide support for democratic processes in preparation of the 2011 
elections‖ (Hillary Clinton, former U.S. Secretary, remarks made in Abuja, 12 August 
2009). What makes this apparent disparity in U.S. modes of engagement with sub-
Saharan Africa‘s biggest oil producers ever more striking is that earlier that year, whilst 
in Ghana, President Obama had stated that ―no country is going to create wealth if its 
leaders exploit the economy to enrich themselves...‖ This is exactly what the group of six 
Angolan activists highlighted in their open letter which was not mentioned by the US 
Secretary of State during her two-day visit. 
 
Unsurprisingly, Angolan opposition parties and civil society were dissatisfied with Mrs 
Clinton‘s speech, which they felt undermined local voices that are critical to the 
government (Vines and Cargill 2010: 65). To some, these ambiguities came as no 
surprise since ―the US has never had a policy of real concern for human rights or for the 
wellbeing of Angolans as such. What is happening with Hillary Clinton‘s visit is just a 
continuation of a U.S. policy which has always been focused on oil.‖
194
 For others, Mrs 
Clinton‘s timid push for increased transparency in Angola was an unfortunate missed 
opportunity. They point out, as shown above, that US officials have at times reacted 
positively to calls for them to exert pressure on foreign governments to undertake 
reforms. This includes in Angola too, where former Ambassador Christopher Dell - 
known for being ―pushy by character‖
195
 - ―certainly pushed hard for reform‖
196
 during his 
tenure between 2001 and 2004. His major contribution towards the end of this tenure 
was to push for a debate on Angola‘s strengthening of the postwar political process at 
highest levels of government. In particular, in 2004, he made clear that ―Washington 
would not accept an indefinite delay in holding elections‖, stating that ―It is important to 
have a date, any date, because without a date, even a tentative one, we cannot have a 
political process […].  From a political standpoint as well as for national reconciliation 
and the completion of the peace process, it is necessary that elections be held in Angola 
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in the next two years‖ (quoted in Alexander‘s Oil and Gas Connections 2004). These 
remarks came as President Dos Santos was preparing for a second visit to Washington, 
where it is understood that he asked President Bush to ―turn a blind eye to delaying 
elections in exchange for oil and other promises of reform‖ (ibid). The publication of 
Chevron‘s payments for block 0 ensued soon after. 
 
The US Senate is also listed as an important influence on the reform agenda in Angola. 
Rumour has it that the President‘s announcement of the LAP in February 2010 was 
linked to his reputation in the Senate ―as somebody who engaged in very suspicious 
transactions.‖
197
 US Senate‘s investigations of HSBC Holdings‘ dealings with the former 
head of the BNA Aguinaldo Jaime and other senior public figures were also reported to 
be linked with the ousting of Aguinaldo Jaime from the national investment agency ANIP 
in 2011. Moreover, one senior analyst commented that ―Dodd-Frank resulted in bad 
relations with the Americans‖
198
, presumably because it is perceived to be contravening 
Angolan laws.   
 
It must be said that whereas U.S.-Angola relations highlight ambiguities and 
contradictions in Western powers‘ foreign policies, Angola-Portugal bilateral relations are 
highly illustrative of the weakening bargaining power of Western actors in respect of 
Angola. Since 2007, several Angolan private investors or SOEs have bought or 
increased shares in Portuguese banking, oil, real estate, telecommunications, and 
media companies doing or with the ability of doing business in Angola. In 2011, it was 
estimated that Angola owns around 3.8 per cent of Lisbon Stock Exchange (ABN 2011). 
Portugal, in turn, is one of a few countries whose companies have been in a ―privileged 
position to make deals – from the smallest to the largest business deal‖ (President Dos 
Santos 2013). In 2009 and 2012, Angola was Portugal‘s fourth largest export market, 
surpassed only by France, Germany and Spain, and adding up to 80 per cent of all trade 
with the Portuguese-speaking African Countries  (Beck 2013; Seabra and Gorjão 2011: 
9). In 2011, Angola offered to help debt-ridden Portugal wither the impact of the financial 
crisis, mostly by investing in its state-owned enterprises.    
 
Despite close economic and trade ties, plans of a ―strategic partnership‖ have for some 
time now been in tatters. Carlos Abreu of the Portuguese weekly newspaper Expresso 
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identified four ―episodes of tension‖ between Portugal and Angola since March 2007 
(Abreu 2013), yet it is the latest and most significant incident that put the idea of a 
partnership between the two countries at risk. In November 2012, Expresso revealed 
that Portugal‘s Attorney General office was investigating senior Angolan officials - 
including Angola‘s Vice-President Manuel Vicente and Attorney General Joao Maria de 
Sousa - were under investigation by the Portuguese Attorney General‘s Office for 
alleged money laundering and tax fraud.  Suspicions and doubts over the scale and 
origins of funds invested by Angolan senior figures had aroused for some time among 
some parts of the Portuguese and Angolan society, but that was the first time that these 
were seriously investigated. 
 
In September 2013, after stating that the executive had no powers over the judiciary, 
Portugal‘s Foreign Minister Rui Machete gave a maladroit ―diplomatic apology‖ in an 
interview with the Angolan national Radio. The Minister later withdrew his apology but 
this ―unfortunate expression‖, as Portugal‘s Prime Minister Pedro Passor Coelho 
described it, had already caused uproar in Portugal, with some critics asking for the 
former‘s resignation (Mail and Guardian 2013).    
 
The sharpest Angolan response to this probe came from President Dos Santos. In his 
State of the Nation speech on 15 October 2013, he declared that Angola had stable 
relations with almost every country in the world but ―with Portugal, unfortunately things 
are not going well [...] There have been misunderstandings at the highest level of the 
state and the current political climate does not encourage the implementation of the 
previously announced strategic partnerships...‖ (Ibid). The President blamed the 
investigations on Western racism. ―In the battle against corruption‖, he attacked, ―the 
anti-corruption organizations in the West are deliberately creating misunderstandings in 
order to intimidate Africans who are generating wealth and who want to get access to it. 
They are creating the general impression that a rich African is invariably a corrupt one.‖  
 
The president‘s remarks were followed by the postponement of a Portugal Summit that 
was expected to result into ―far-reaching‖ economic and cultural accords in November 
2013. Manuel Alves da Rocha, one of the country‘s top economists, revealed in addition, 
that conditions are severing from Portuguese businesses and individuals seeking new 





 When asked by the author about the current state of bilateral relations 
between the two countries in June 2014, Angela Bragança, Angola‘s Minister for 
International Cooperation reiterated the president‘s comments, saying that despite the 
fact that Portugal remains a ―priority for foreign policy‖ in Angola despite the fact that 




THE IMF IN POSTWAR ANGOLA: A CASE OF TRANSPARENCY LEVERAGING?  
 
One of the biggest issues of contention regarding the IMF lies in its role in resource-rich 
developing countries. As it was argued in this chapter, several factors have combined to 
make it extremely difficult, almost impossible, to provide a definite answer to what role 
the Fund has played in bringing about ORT and oil governance reforms in those 
countries. One issue with Angola related to the slow pace and uptake of reform in some 
areas and the lack of reforms in others. Another matter has to do with Angola‘s agency 
and financial autonomy, unlike some of its neighbours for which almost half of the 
budget comes from aid. As one Angolan analyst so eloquently put it, 
 
―That kind of pressure can hardly be applied to Angola. It is true that some of the 
measures that have been implemented can be linked to some extent to the 
recent IMF loan for which certain conditions have been imposed. But still, it is all 
outside, and quite superficial.‖
201 
 
Thus, in lieu of delineating between the effects of the Fund‘s policies and reform 
outcomes, the chapter set out to identify the factors that may have limited a more 
effective diffusion of ORT in Angola. The chapter has evoked questions surrounding the 
Fund‘s inconsistent support for ORT reform; the credibility of its policy advice, the 
success of Angola‘s own homegrown solutions to the resource curse, which might have 
downplayed the extent of the Fund‘s input into the reform process; shifts in the global 
political economy as reflected by Angola‘s growing geostrategic relevance and the 
‗silent‘ revolution led by emerging actors like China, and finally, the incoherence of 
policies of some of the Fund‘s largest shareholders, chiefly the US.  
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This combination of internal and external factors raises the question as to whether the 
Fund should be expected to bear any responsibility for the limitations or ineffectiveness 
of its policies. One way of answering this question could be by making the argument, as 
it was the case here, that beyond structural factors, the IMF itself did not take its role as 
a leading norm entrepreneur seriously enough. This leads to a second and even less 
settled question, of whether one should expect conditionality policies from the Fund to 
lead to wider governance reforms in recipient countries, knowing that the end goal of 
these reforms is neither the stability of the financial and monetary system nor the 
survival of the Fund, but rather, sustainable peace and development in Angola. In actual 
fact, Woodward argues against expecting too much of a pro-developmental stance from 
IFIs in general for, 
 
―[…] neither the IMF nor the Bank seek to build peace but to transform the 
structure of pre-war and wartime economic and political power to create a state 
that facilitates private sector, market-led growth, particularly its capacity to 
service its foreign debt while lowering public expectation to that which the country 
can afford.‖   
 
In sum, it is the foregoing aspects of international arrangements, especially the 
democratic deficits that they engender, that are not yet settled; and they surely do 
deserve much more attention than they are currently receiving.  
 
Following on from this analysis, another fundamental question is where change would 
come from in the absence of a clear and effective contribution from IFIs and foreign 
governments. Kolstad and Wiig (2012: 150-51) suggest that in cases where 
governments fail to provide a satisfactory level of governance and the international 
donor community is weak, these ethical responsibilities for governance improvements 
should be delineated to multinational corporations. Yet, can incentives really come from 
companies wanting to do the right thing in Angola? To answer this question, the author 













ORT AND THE DILEMMAS OF CSR IN POSTWAR ANGOLA 
 
―Does anyone think that Exxon, BP, Total, Repsol, Shell and 
Sinopec do not have to deal with political interference? 
Does anyone think that any big oil company is impervious to 
political influence? Is there not political interference in the 
hierarchies, strategies and big decisions? This is the nature 
of the oil business.‖ 
 
José Sérgio Gabrielli de Azevedo, former 




―If you go to Luanda and visit the Norwegian Embassy, 
you‘ll see that Statoil‘s flag is bigger than Norway‘s national 
flag. That tells you that economic interests are more 
important than anything else.‖ 
 
Excerpt of an interview with Western INGO 
representative, 12 June 2009. 
 
 
That the debate around good energy governance and extractive industries transparency 
is evolving reflects the evolution of the character of the world petroleum industry: from a 
value-blind industry traditionally centred on ‗hard‘ energy issues of profits, price and 
security of supplies, to one using ethical or ‗soft‘ principles as a new strategy to address 
the need to manage and regulate stakeholders‘ behaviour (Goldthau and Witte 2010: 19; 
Benner et al 2010).  As Chapter 2 specified, since its emergence in the oil industry in the 
1990s, revenue transparency has developed into arguably the most prominent policy 
used by oil and gas companies both as a response to criticisms of their performance and 
as a way to tackle the governance challenges facing these countries. Chapter 4 too 
highlighted a few instances where these corporate actors played a key role in driving this 
agenda in Angola, notably with the disclosure of information related to Chevron-operated 
block 0 and Statoil-operated blocks 38/11 and 39/11. These illustrations are increasingly 
challenging conventional writings which tend to ignore their role as central agents to the 
standard-setting and diffusion process of global policy norms (O‘Faircheallaigh 2014 and 
Lamrad 2013 are notable exceptions).  
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The question is how far this shift actually does go, in other words, what evidence there is 
that points to a systematic shift in companies‘ behaviour. That is the central question that 
this chapter will delve on. To be more precise, the chapter will critically examine how 
multinational oil corporations have responded to global demands for greater revenue 
transparency in the extractive sector in postwar Angola. Mixed messages emanating 
from BP‘s, Chevron‘s, Statoil‘s and Cobalt‘s Angolan operations (in the Introduction, 
Chapters 2, 4 and 5) exemplify the necessity to scrutinise these and other companies‘ 
responses more thoroughly. They reveal the limitations of IOCs‘ responses to ‗bad‘ oil 
governance in Angola, a fact that has as much to do with IOCs‘ behaviour, as with the 
institutional context and the policy itself. These findings not only cast light on the 
complexity of implementing corporate social responsibility in a developing country 
context such as Angola‘s, but crucially, call for a systematic rethink of the transparency 
policy, its benefits and costs, for IOCs. 
 
The remainder of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 2 provides a background 
to IOCs‘ behaviour from colonial times up to their embrace of ORT, while section 3 
reviews the dilemmas and paradoxes of implementing CSR in postwar Angola. The 
section gives emphasis to firms‘ and stakeholders‘ views on the factors hampering IOCs‘ 
effective participation in the institutionalisation of ORT in Angola. It will highlight, among 
other things, the challenges of implementing ‗offshore‘ CSR and the divergence between 
IOCs‘ interventions in ―soft‖ areas of development and humanitarian assistance on the 
one hand, and ―hard‖ or more politically-sensitive areas like oil governance in Angola - in 
short, critical issues and emerging trends affecting the practice of CSR in Angola. The 
final section concludes with a word of warning on the possible implications of IOCs‘ 
conduct on Angolan society and the firms.  
 
BRIEF OVERVIEW OF OIL COMPANIES‟ BEHAVIOUR IN WAR-TORN ANGOLA 
 
To understand why oil companies would want to engage on ORT in Angola, it is worth 
revisiting the controversial role they played in the country prior to 2002. Chapter 3 was 
enlightening on how IOCs contributed to the development of the Angolan oil sector 
during the civil war, but it must be said that their contribution to the sector and Angola‘s 
political economy pre-dates the civil war. The Belgian firm Compagnie Financière Belge 
des Pétroles (Petrofina, now part of Total) was the company that exported Angola‘s first 
189 
 
crude oil from the Benfica oilfield in the Kwanza River Basin near Luanda in mid-1955. 
Cabinda Gulf Oil Company, a subsidiary of the American oil firm Gulf Oil Corporation 
(‗Gulf Oil‘), was arguably the biggest contributor to the colonial economy and biggest 
source of funding of the colonial power‘s fight against domestic insurgencies. The 
company is reported to have contributed 13 per cent of Portugal‘s Angolan budget and 
60 per cent of military expenditure by the end of 1972 (Gunn 1987: 184). In 1974, it 
allegedly paid US$550 million in royalties representing 7/10 of the foreign trade income 
of the colony (Dos Santos 1983: 109). At the same time, and together with Petrofina, 
Texaco and other international firms that had initiated exploration activities, Gulf Oil 
transformed the country‘s oil output from just a few thousand barrels per day in the early 
1960s, to a respectable 172,000 bpd in 1974, turning oil into the leading export and 
Angola into the fourth African producer behind Nigeria, Libya and Algeria (ibid: 109).   
 
IOCs too benefited from the situation that prevailed in Angola, even long before the civil 
war began. Gulf Oil was one of the biggest beneficiaries of Portuguese colonial policy. 
Founded in 1957, it was awarded exclusive prospecting and exploratory rights in 
Cabinda for fifty years, renewable for twenty years after negotiations (ibid: 106). It was 
also exempt from certain requirements usually asked by the colonial administration, such 
as ―having the main business office in Portuguese territory, having a majority of 
Portuguese nationals in the board of directors on transferring 20 per cent of the capital 
stock to the colony of Angola‖ (ibid: 106-07). In fact, the dominance of the American firm 
that Yates (2012) cited as an instance of imperialism-at-work begins during this period.  
 
At the same time that multinational oil companies were enjoying great concession deals 
in the colonial state, they were increasingly branded ―a major obstacle to the political 
independence as well as to the enjoyment of the natural resources of these Territories 
by the indigenous inhabitants‖ (Corporate Information Centre 1972). Nevertheless, that 
did not prevent them from pursuing further deals with post-independent governments. In 
Angola, not even the wars for liberation, the transition from the Portuguese colonial 
administration to the Marxist-Leninist MPLA government or the post-independence civil 
war had much of an impact on state-corporate relationship or on the political positioning 
of companies.  Confidence in the operating environment, together with the increasingly 
offshore location of oil operations, the pragmatism of the new MPLA government and the 
combination of diplomacy and pressure on its part convinced Gulf Oil and other oil 
companies to stay put (Perez Niño and Le Billon 2013: 12).  Besides, this was a time of 
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growing corporate predisposition to shift towards African oil provinces, a trend influenced 
by rising resource nationalism that spread from Latin America and the Arab World, and 
high oil prices instigated by OPEC, and companies were unwilling to risk putting their 
investments on the line.  
 
As such, apart from a period of intense fighting and uncertainty that pushed some 
companies to stop production and briefly suspend their operations in late 1975, the 
majority continued to vehemently defend and protect their interests in the country, even 
if as in the case of Gulf Oil, it meant taking a stance that was in direct opposition to their 
home countries‘ foreign policy on Angola. Indeed the only shift visible during this period 
was as a result of the nationalisation process of the oil sector. Specifically, the arrival of 
Sonangol in the scene transformed the way Big Oil interacted with the Angolan state to 
the extent that although the ―first movers‖ were allowed to continue their operations, they 
nonetheless were given less sway than they had during the colonial period, as indicated 
for example, by the restricted amount of land they were henceforth allocated and the 
shorter contract periods.  
 
In the meantime, Angola offered to compensate companies with an efficient 
management of the sector and, as noted in Chapter 3, with a stable, predictable, 
attractive and competitive environment. Two main incentives were particularly relevant 
from the point of view of investors. One is Angola‘s unified and administrative regime in 
which key actors with decision-making powers within Sonangol and the Presidency have 
remained in place since independence (Thurber et al 2010: 22)
203
. This stability has 
presumably facilitated the avoidance of ―confusion, ambiguity and unpredictability of 
taxing authorities‖ (Walde 1995) that foreign companies may be experiencing elsewhere.  
 
The second incentive for companies was Sonangol‘s ―skilful risk avoidance strategy‖ 
largely credited for the country‘s move from a dominance of tax and royalty contracts - 
that allowed Sonangol to receive dividends on oil sales but constrained the financing of 
petroleum projects in the early years of petroleum development – to more modern 
production sharing agreements for deepwater blocks – in which Sonangol‘s participation 
was more limited and compensation received in oil (Perez Niño and Le Billon 2013: 13). 
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Company insiders see this legal and contractual regime as ―one of the most progressive 
regimes in the world‖ (Kellas 2006) and ―one of the most important sources of 
predictability necessary to make billion dollar investment‖ (Heller 2010: 22). 
  
Critics contested that companies were ‗complicit‘ in the destruction of Angola by 
generating oil revenues for a government that waged war against its own people, by 
―sustaining the reluctance of the Angolan ruling elite to abandon violent bids to seize or 
pressure state power and to implement reforms‖ (Le Billon 2001: 75), and by providing 
the context and influencing the attitude of the UN (Cilliers 2001: 639; Messiant 2004; 
Comerford 2007), as well as incentives in the fields of beneficial relations and strategic 
support (Le Billon 2007: 122). Most notably, they argued that by entertaining close 
relations with prominent Angolan figures and by contributing, through their tax bills and 
philanthropic contributions, to ‗social projects‘ initiated by their charitable organisations 
(such as FESA), oil companies aided in the extension of presidential patronage in the 
country (Messiant 1999; Le Billon 2007: 120).  
 
When faced with these allegations of complicity in corruption and with demands for 
greater transparency however, oil companies remained silent, claiming ―we are not 
Jesus Christ […] we came to this country to find oil and make money‖ (quoted in Le 
Billon 2001: 77), and opting instead for support to humanitarian projects in the health, 
educations and business sectors (Le Billon 2007: 120). Exxon‘s line of argument on 
transparency, as put by its top official in Angola, was that: 
 
―It's not up to us to go into a sovereign country and tell them how they ought to be 
governing their people [...]. We obviously want to be a good corporate citizen. But 
we're a guest in this country, and as a guest we‘ve got to show respect‖ (Terry 
McPhail quoted in Ball 2006). 
 
In other words, Exxon bosses did not see it as their role, or as that of private companies, 
to disclose information related to oil deals with states because it could be seen as 
influencing how these revenues are spent (see Buchan and McNulty 2002). Observance 
of contract confidentiality was paramount in a context of increased competitiveness, Lee 
Raymond, Exxon‘s former chairman suggested (ibid). Other companies adopted the 
same stance elsewhere. A former executive at one of Europe-based oil multinationals 




―As a company [we] can‘t and won‘t tell the government of a country what to do. 
That is not our job. But we can do is a variety of things around the edges of that, 
one of which is to work with people like UN agencies, the World Bank, who can 




Thus, when BP effectively ―ran in trouble‖ (Buchan and McNulty 2002) for siding with 
Western campaign groups and unilaterally agreeing to disclose payments it made to the 
Angolan government, it found itself on the fence. In all, fears of litigation under the 
FCPA, together with the minimal disturbances they experienced from Angola‘s conflicts 
and the positive and professional relations they had with the government help explain 
why companies‘ enthusiasm for what became one of the ―major prospective areas in the 
world‖ (cited in Greenpeace 2003: 8) prevented them from taking responsibility for their 
role and contribution to the destruction of the country. As it happened, this enthusiasm 
was such that such that the more Sonangol opened up the Angolan coast during the 
nineties, the greater the number of companies wanting to get in. More recently, as 
noted, the industry appears to have embraced the ‗good‘ governance agenda, albeit with 
shortcomings when it comes to actual practice in Angola. The following section 
investigates contradictions and ambiguities of this practice of CSR in postwar Angola.   
 
ORT AND CSR IN ANGOLA AFTER THE WAR 
 
Nowadays, both the corporate landscape of the Angolan oil industry, and the global 
debate about its regulation, are fast changing. As the veteran Duncan Clarke suggested, 
the positioning of international firms reflects history, opportunity, the competitive 
environment, their long-term strategy and some geopolitical considerations (Clarke 
2008: 124). Chevron and Total who benefit from first mover advantage are now joined 
by Petrobras - which entered the country upon the personal invitation from the Angolan 
leader shortly after Brazil became the first country to recognise Angola as a sovereign 
state (Stolte 2012: 5) -;  Statoil, which entered in Angola through a partnership with BP; 
Sinopec which has been driven by a ‗going global‘ policy of increasing exports from 
overseas markets; and relative newcomer Cobalt, attracted by the geological 
prospectivity and opportunities that the country may hold. 
 
Globally, these and other oil companies have had to consider whether and how to 
respond to rising calls to promote and apply transparency principles in the countries in 
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which they operate. A quick glance at companies‘ external communications reveals that 
this is due to a general acknowledgement of the governance challenges that the 
countries in which they operate face. Total‘s interpretation is particularly insightful. On its 
website, Total states that: 
 
―Oil and gas development by extractive industry operators generates substantial 
revenues for producing countries, but often the exact amounts involved are not 
disclosed to the public and the benefits are not distributed fairly among the local 
population. Linked to weak governance in public institutions, this situation can re-
sult in conflict for the control of these resources. We therefore believe that it is 





According to BP, transparent governance helps citizens of resource-rich countries ac-
cess the information that is necessary to hold public authorities to account for the way 
they spend revenues
206
. This argument generally goes in line with the company‘s early 
realisation that its involvement in Angola and in other resource-rich countries could be-
come problematic ―if the government fails to live up to the commitments to increase de-
mocracy, accountability and transparency, and if oil revenues continue to be the main 
source of income to the government‖ (Cited in Bennett 2002: 8).  
 
To improvements in government accountability, ExxonMobil adds that transparency acts 
as a ―practical‖ and ―effective‖ means to fight corruption and promote greater economic 
stability in these contexts and around the world
207
; while Statoil conceives it to represent 
a competitive advantage, a ―business enabler‖, a means to promote better stakeholder 
relations and mitigate corruption risks (Skedsmo et al 2013: 14)
208
. Statoil professes its 
determination to be known ―for our high ethical standards and our commitment to trans-
parency and openness‖ (Statoil 2012: 3). According to one of its senior CSR advisers: 
   
―We do not have anything to hide. So [...] although [transparency] might make us 
unpopular in certain countries in a short-term perspective, we think that it is best 
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This standpoint was reflected in the company‘s decision to withhold support for the 
American Petroleum Institute‘s litigation against SEC over Dodd-Frank 1504 (see Rube-
sa 2013).  
 
In Angola, there appears to be a big gap between these very companies‘ rhetoric and 
their practices as the following comments show: 
 
―[IOCs] are not transparent at all; they publish no data. This is why we had to do 
the Dodd-Frank in the U.S. because they are absolutely full of self-serving non-
sense about how important transparency is. But when you ask them to do it in a 
difficult environment like Angola, they immediately start giving you excuses [...] 
They will give you their record on malaria projects, how much they contributed to 
community development projects, [...] which may be true. But on this issue of 




―Companies have been pretty quiet in Angola. I mean, they haven‘t really tried to 
push the envelope. They‘d rather let the Angolan government take the lead.‖
211
 
   
This last respondent remarked that ―there may be good reasons and not so good rea-
sons for this lack of transparent reporting.‖
212
 In other words, although the legitimacy of 
some of these reasons may be questionable, not all derive from ―allegedly ‗immoral‘ or 
‗evil‘ decisions that lead a company to fall prey to the trap of bribery – rather, it is real 
dilemmas many companies face when these attempt to do business in markets that are 
tainted by corruption‖ (Eigen 1997). In general, explanations given for companies‘ diver-
gent responses range from lack of institutional support, lack of economic incentives and 
political leverage, to firms‘ positioning, and the difficulties ensuing from the mostly off-
shore and ―enclave‖ character of oil extraction in the country. The following is an as-
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The Institutional Context 
 
The most oft-cited factor mediating IOCs‘ promotion of transparency in Angola is com-
panies‘ priority of maintaining good relations with the government. In a relatively recent 
survey on CSR drivers in Angola, more than half of the IOCs and oil services companies 
surveyed responded that the expectations, requirements or pressure from the Angolan 
authorities are their main motivations for undertaking CSR activities in the country, along 
with companies‘ internal codes of conduct (Wiig and Kolstad 2010). The stability of rela-
tions with the Angolan government matters all the more not just because of Angola‘s po-
sitioning as one of the last frontiers for oil exploration, but more importantly, because it is 
at the same time ―quite a strong state‖, a difficult context, and its government, very adept 
at making companies do what it wants by playing companies one against the other
213
 or 
by imposing relatively stringent operating terms.  
 
As demonstrated in Chapter 5 when discussing the award of E&P rights, most technical 
and commercial activities are dependent upon Sonangol‘s approval; powers which the 
NOC has used to assert its authority over industry participants. Examples of such inci-
dents abound. In 2004, Sonangol refused to approve both the sale of Shell‘s 50 per cent 
stake in block 18 to the Indian firm ONGC Videsh and the renewal of Total‘s contract in 
block 3/80 at the height of the Angolagate scandal (Ferreira 2008: 280). In 2009 when 
Marathon Oil decided to sell its share of block 32 to CNOOC and Sinopec without con-
sulting Sonangol, the NOC exercised its right of first refusal and transferred the shares 
to China Sonangol (Manope 2013). A year later, Sonangol rejected the recommended 
contractors for Total‘s operated block 17 due to ―insufficient local content.‖ As a result, 
contracts due to go to Saipem,  Technip and Aker Solutions were transferred to the Ko-
rean company Daewood Shipbuilding & Marine Engineering (DSME), Hyundai Heavy 
Industries, the Norwegian FMC and Acergy (Ovadia 2012: 406-07).  
 
Interestingly, oil companies‘ communications suggest that Angola‘s lack of implementa-
tion of EITI - one of the MSIs through which IOCs claim to be promoting transparency 
principles at the global and country levels - is another decisive factor preventing their 
active engagement with ORT on the ground. Total is a case in point. After boasting 
about its commitment to publish ―detailed‖ information – extent of acreage, types of con-
tracts, activities held by affiliate companies and taxes paid to the government – regard-
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ing its operations in ―several‖ host countries on its website, Total omitted to disclose in-
formation on the taxes it paid the Angolan government in 2013 in its brief on financial 
transparency in Angola. That is in dire contradiction with other briefings on Gabon, Con-
go Brazzaville, Nigeria and Indonesia among others, for which it clearly stated how much 
it paid. In effect, in lieu of this information, Total noted:  
 
―Angola has decided not to pursue the implementation of EITI. However, the 
country‘s Finance Ministry accumulates and publishes an analysis of oil flows and 
taxes on a monthly and annually consolidated basis (Exportações e Receitas de 
Petróleo 2013) on the Ministry of Finance website …‖ (Total 2014). 
  
As such, Total prefers to ―help authorities who want to implement a transparency pro-
gramme‖ rather than attempting to influence or advocate for one in a country that is re-
luctant to embrace the international standard.  
 
In sum, whereas the BP incident highlighted the dangers of unilaterally acting on trans-
parency, the foregoing incidents partly explain IOCs‘ cautionary approach on transpar-
ency in Angola, thereby adding some degree of credibility to the view that their involve-
ment in the promotion and application of transparency in Angola depends, to some ex-
tent, on whether and how their actions or inactions impact their relations with the gov-
ernment.   
 
It must be said that the absence of a strong domestic constituency interested in and 
campaigning for CSR issues - beyond industry trade unions - contributes to this vicious 
cycle.  Indeed, there is an overwhelming acceptance among a section of the Angolan 
civil society that the responsibility to publish oil data falls above all onto the government. 
In one case, one well educated Angolan interviewee went further, stating that publishing 
oil data is ―definitely the responsibility of the government. The fact that companies are 
not doing it is out of interest.‖
214
 The author finds that this standpoint derives primarily 
from the fact that the ownership of oil resources reside with the Angolan people. In the 
words of an Angolan respondent: ―the wealth belongs to all of us. It means that it does 
not belong to those people that are managing it, people who were mandated by us to 
manage it on our behalf.‖
215
 Ironically, the second perspective given by another 
interlocutor is one that stresses oil companies‘ economic interests. That is to say: 
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―Companies are somewhat not complicit in my opinion […]; it is rather a financial 
interest - people are more interested in business. Here, there is money. Why 
should I deprive myself of money? Companies live off business. They need to 
turn the machine to earn money. They must win lucrative markets [...] This 




Recognition of these economic incentives partly explain why there are fewer 
expectations on IOCs, though not in the exclave of Cabinda where Chevron‘s 
operational based is located. This finding not only raises questions about the credibility 
of PWYP‘s approach that stresses IOCs‘ key role, but also critically, validates the point 
about false assumptions driving the push for ORT in Africa and beyond.  
 
Lack of Political Leverage? 
 
The argument that has just been laid out, that ―companies always do what the 
government allows them to do and they don‘t want to push as they have billions of 
dollars of investment to protect‖
217
 must be qualified in some way. For it is not always 
entirely justified. To take the BP case as a starting point of this argument, one remarks 
that whilst the Angolan response to the incident was critical in shifting the debate from 
IOCs to oil-rich developing country governments, it was nevertheless overlooked that 
Angola was already included in Statoil‘s country-by-country reporting since 2001 despite 
expressions of disapproval from the government and without official reprimands or 
backlash for their business (Skedsmo et al 2013: 17). More recently, while the Nazaki-
Cobalt case gripped savvy corruption analysts, Statoil was announcing that China 
Sonangol that had been at the centre of other allegations of corruption (detailed in 
Chapter 5) was being replaced by two more reputable oil firms. A third incident that 
needs examining revolves around the FOREX saga that began in 2004.  
 
Ovadia (2012: 411) explicates that the initial plan and preferred option - advocated by a 
small fraction within the government including BNA‘s officials – was to require that ―all 
income from crude oil sales first enter an Angola-based account.‖ When the government 
proposed this law in June 2004, at a time when the financial system was extremely 
weak, it argued that the existing system the system promoted the enclave character of 
the oil sector through a stimulation of imports and the use of non-Angolan staff, and that 
it hinders the development of the country‘s financial sector (Wiig and Ramalho 2005: 
                                                          
216
 Interview with Angolan civil servant, Luanda, 13 August 2010.   
217
 Interview with senior business and human rights expert, 7 June 2011.   
198 
 
15).  The new rules were therefore designed to boost bank credit to non-oil sectors of 
the economy and improve the government‘s monitoring of ‗cost oil‘ (Ovadia 2012: 411; 
Vines et al 2005: 17-18).
218
 The operators - BP, Total, Chevron and ExxonMobil - then 
formed a coalition to resist those changes, with at least two reported to have gone 
directly to the President to warn about the policy‘s potential repercussions on their 
business profitability.  
 
As Chapter 4 illustrated, FOREX rules were introduced in spite of these companies‘ 
resistance. Ovadia (2012: 411) perceived this as a victory for the government against 
IOCs with regard to cash call accounts; an illustration of ―its power vis-à-vis international 
capital to promote its own interest‖.  One could argue the opposite, which is that IOCs 
had a major influence in the final outcome of the process as the now-approved Law is a 
far less ―radical‖, albeit significant, policy.  
 
The foregoing episodes provide the grounding for systematically looking into both 
companies‘ actions and inactions for they demonstrate that in some instances, IOCs 
have indeed acted individually or collectively to protect their business interests, and 
sometimes with relative success. By implication, they mean that IOCs do have more 
leverage than they would publicly admit to having in the country and incidentally, can if 
willing, contribute positively to improving the governance situation in Angola.  
 
That said, these incidents also raise serious questions as to why one company that 
decides to disclose oil payments would face threats of reprisal and not another? And 
what explains the divergences that exist between companies?  
 
Firms‟ Positioning and the Challenges of „Offshore CSR‟ 
 
There are a number of factors that explain or dictate companies‘ stance on ORT and 
CSR more generally, some of which already listed above. During the course of this 
research, participants underscored the importance of home countries‘ legal culture and 
leadership - or ―the people at the top [who] saw the wisdom of this.‖
219
 Government 
ownership of the company and influences of domestic constituencies are two additional 
                                                          
218
 A senior Angolan diplomat corroborated these points in an interview in London on 6 December 
2012.  
219
 Interview with former oil executive, 2 February 2010.   
199 
 
elements that transpired in Statoil‘s case. One of the company‘s representatives 
explained that Statoil had to conform to country-by-country reporting because ―the 
government obliges us to do so.‖
220
 Its disclosure of payments related to its partnership 
with White Rose and Genel also coincided with growing criticisms at home over its 
attempts to tame an extended country-by-country disclosure legislation and its 
increasing prioritisation of profits over risks and ethics in countries such as Angola 
(NewsinEnglish.no 2013; Klassenkappen 2013). A fifth factor concerns the positioning of 
companies in the domestic industry. In Kolstad‘s  (2007) view, responsibilities for 
governance improvements assigned to oil companies must depend on the relative power 
of the corporation, for ―the more powerful the more extensive the duties.‖ In other words, 
―a corporation such as Total Oil in Burma, which is a major player in its oil industry, thus 
has extensive duties to promote human rights in that country‖ which a minor player 
would not have.  
 
The last argument was one regularly advanced by Statoil‘s representatives whenever 
asked about the gaps between their responses to governance shortcomings in places 
like Azerbaijan where they are the second largest foreign investor since 1992 and have 
been an ―active promoter of and partner‖ in the country‘s EITI implementation process; 
and those in Angola, where until December 2011, the company was only a minority 
shareholder in the oil fields and appears to be silent on transparency issues beyond 
declarations of oil payments made to the government. Indeed, before Statoil won 
operatorship of blocks 38/11 and 39/11 in Angola, the argument was that ―in Angola, we 
are still on the verge of becoming an operator‖ and because of that, the company had 
only a limited role in influencing CSR policies and practices (including those related to 
transparency) that are usually dependent on the agreements in the joint ventures.
221
 The 
idea is that ―it is through being an operator that you can have the greater impact 
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In the author‘s view, though legitimate, this argument is oblivion of Statoil‘s ability and 
willingness to negotiate with the Angolan government whenever necessary. The fact that 
details of payments made for blocks 38/11 and 39/11 were released suggests in fact that 
the publication must have had the approval of Sonangol. Furthermore, one speculates 
that the identity of the partner that was replaced (CSIH) and that of the new partners 
(White Rose and Genel), besides reflecting inefficiencies at CSIH, also is illustrative of 
Statoil‘s ability to influence who it partners with in the industry. One doubts that Statoil is 
the sole company to at least have a say on this issue, despite the difficulties highlighted 
in Chapter 5. A senior counsel at one of the largest IOCs reiterated this point, 
suggesting that ―we can‘t be required to go into joint venture with a domestic company 
we don‘t want to.‖
223 
 
These speculations notwithstanding, it is worth pointing out even though the argument 
above does not apply to Statoil, it  still does not explain fully why a company like Exxon 
that advocates for transparency policies which ―respect national sovereignty and lo-
cal norms and apply to all companies operating in a country‖
224
, would stay clear of 
promoting transparency in Angola but become the lead partner and operator in the 
Chad-Cameroon Oil Pipeline Project, arguably ―the most radical case of oil industry, in 
co-operation with multilateral organisations, infringement on national sovereignty‖ 
(Skjærseth et al 2004: 15). Neither does it shed light on the contradictions between BP‘s 
alleged multi-million dollar payments to ―obscure social payments‖ in Angola (GW 2012) 
- despite professing its commitment for, and leading on, transparency in Angola -, and its 
undertaking of ―arguably by far the most wide-ranging attempt by a single company to 
address governance shortcomings‖ in Azerbaijan (Frynas 2010: 165).  
 
Perhaps the most fitting explanation to this ethical relativism lies in the local context with-
in which these companies operate. The comparison between BP‘s CSR practices in 
Azerbaijan and Angola is particularly insightful. In Azerbaijan, which BP ―co-governs‖ 
and where it is ―synonymous to the British Embassy‖
225
, it seems that the company‘s en-
gagement with ORT was nothing but ―a tactical response to particular risks‖: 
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―In Azerbaijan, BP is coming out of a dodgy change of power from one autocrat‘s 
son. There were a lot of concerns about the environmental impact of the pipeline 
there, and they were legitimising a very difficult government. So, they had a repu-
tational risk that they sought to fix in the context of Azerbaijan. So it tends to be 
quite specific to the context and Angola is quite difficult.‖
226
   
 
That Azerbaijan received ―a lot more attention‖ from companies than Angola is also due 
to the fact that it is an ―easier context to get mobilised to do certain things‖, and has only 
a ―small club of various companies‖ operating in the industry and contributing to the 
Azerbaijani economy.
227
 Besides, ―transparency and corruption [was] the number one 
risk‖ in Azerbaijan, whereas in Angola there have been other presumably more pressing 
operationally issues to address.
228
 Crucially, in Azerbaijan, ―all our activities are onshore, 
oil is processed onshore and transported in pipeline‖, which creates bigger risks for IOCs 
operating there than in Angola where the majority of oil operations are located off-
shore.
229
 Expanding on this challenge of developing and implementing what Ackah-
Baidoo (2012) termed ―offshore CSR‖
230
 programmes, this interlocutor stated: 
 
―Most companies would relate to their social responsibility in terms of their direct 
impact on the societies in which they operate. But it is more difficult to make the 
case when operations are offshore because they have a less direct impact on so-
cieties. That is why host governments ask for oil to be processed onshore [...]. 
The main question is: who are ‗locals‘? Several social investments in Angola se-
lect particular communities in consultation with several stakeholders, including 
the government, NGOs, whom we meet on a regular basis. We have done sur-
veys about peoples‘ expectations [of the company] in Luanda... [Our] CSR people 
have regular engagement with key stakeholders again in Luanda [...] But it is 
much more difficult to have regular arrangements with ‗local communities‘ be-
cause it is a difficult thing to conceptualise when dealing with offshore opera-
tions.‖
231
        
 
The same issue was raised by a former IOC executive whose company divested from 
Angola. As he conceded, companies would usually consider whether they can operate 
with the government in the upstream business in a way which is in line with their busi-
ness principles. The difficulty is that ―if you are offshore, then the element about your re-
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For Angolans, this argument exemplifies IOCs‘ failure to take responsibility for their ac-
tions and omissions. The fact is that ―companies can‘t separate themselves from where 
they operate; they have a duty of care to the environment and for human rights‖
233
, alt-
hough it is acknowledged that there are ―different levels of affected groups.‖
234
 As such, 
  
―If [companies] want and have political will, they can say our first responsibility 
lies with those who are primarily affected because their livelihoods are based on 
natural resources with which we compete; our second responsibility lies with 
those groups whose livelihoods are extremely affected by oil activities; even if 
they don‘t live in Cabinda or in Soyo, if their activities are affected by oil extrac-
tion, it would still be the responsibility of oil companies.‖
235
   
 
From an IOC perspective, the danger is twofold. There is a risk that these companies 
might define ‗local communities‘ too narrowly and end up serving groups that are less 
needy, then face accusations from civil society groups of not doing enough or even 
contributing to fuel the oil-based patronage system that characterises the Angolan 
setting. Or, it is probable that they define ‗local‘ too broadly and henceforth become seen 
as de facto government, and still invite both rising calls to assume more political roles in 
the societies in which they seek a license to operate, and criticisms that by doing too 
much, they are enabling financial mismanagement (Ball 2006; see also Mack 2001).  
The latter option is the one IOCs seem to fear the most in Angola and the former, that 
which they appear to have adopted, with a few of the consequences that are exposed 
below. 
 
MITIGATING OR MANUFACTURING SOCIAL RISKS?   
 
After examining several arguments justifying IOCs‘ inaction on ORT, it suffices to 
consider what they actually have done since the end of the civil war to contribute to good 
energy governance and development in this developing, post-conflict state. There are 
two opinions on this matter. On the one hand, analysts contend that the GoA‘s rejection 
of EITI and the inaction of corporations on transparency provide an important frame for 
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discussing CSR and governance but regard this inaction as ―symptomatic of a more 
general corporate reluctance to address governance issues.‖ Governance issues, they 
assert, are simply not ―a priority for oil companies in Angola‖ (Kolstad and Wiig 2010: 
183-84). On the other hand, IOCs affirm that they oppose corruption and in this respect 
invest a lot of time, money and effort to put in place mechanisms that contribute to better 
governance and development, or at least ensure that ―our operations aren‘t making the 
situation worse.‖
236
 That is not just in the philanthropic sense, but as Chevron‘s head of 
international affairs insisted, it is ―part of our core business.‖
237
 Mr Beye argued that 
Chevron is contributing to improve governance and it has done so since the end of the 
conflict, through its support to peacebuilding efforts and its funding of the 
decentralisation programme (in partnership with USAID). The project was not linked to 
the company‘s core business but ―helped‖ in Cabinda, and the company is ―looking at 
the same thing in Nigeria.‖
238
 Ambassador McMullen equally noted that ―all major 
companies have fairly robust CSR‖, usually centred on the health and education sectors, 
particularly English language provision. 
 
Beyond these are other wide-ranging examples. ExxonMobil‘s Operations Integrity Man-
agement System aimed at managing safety, security, health and environmental risks; its 
transparent electronic procurement system e-RFX; and IOCs‘ dialogues and partner-
ships with NGOs – such as Transparency International and Amnesty International at the 
global level, and Development Workshop, ADRA and Norwegian People‘s Aid (NPA) at 
the local level – are just some notable ones. IOCs‘ provision of employment and training 
opportunities and local sourcing are noteworthy too, so is Chevron‘s alleged promotion 
of the FCPA on the ground. Mr Beye claims that the company has created a pamphlet of 
the FCPA, which the company has translated in Portuguese: ―In my dealings in Angola‖, 
he asserts, ―wherever I go to a meeting, I will start with these principles that we operate 
in certain manners...‖
239
 But Chevron is not the only company appearing to go the extra 
mile. In a country where private security companies are linked to high-ranking army offi-
cials, Statoil gets off-the record information on the ownership of security companies it 
contracts in an effort to prevent the violation of corruption laws, even if there still is the 
possibility of it working with companies with unknown owners (Ovadia 2013b: 167). An 
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employee stated that the company was fully aware of the risks, ―but we are in this coun-
try, so what can we do?‖ (ibid). 
 
Yet a major area of contention is in the ‗Angolanisation‘ of the oil industry, IOCs‘ 
employment practices in particular.  Several Angolan and non-Angolan observers 
remarked that progress in this area has not met expectations. Civil society actors point 
out that in the majority of cases, Angolans are employed ―to do cheap labour‖ whereas 
―Angolanisation is not just having unskilled labour in the rigs and stuff like that. It is more 
than that!‖
240
 Corroborating this commonly-held perception is Teka‘s (2011) study, which 
shows that out of the 150 engineers working in the oil machinery manufacturing industry 
in 2009, only 17 per cent were Angolans. This in itself represents a major achievement 
considering that four years earlier, no Angolan was in such a position. Moreover, it was 
similar to the 15 per cent rise in the number of Angolans working at a managerial level 
between 2004 and 2009. Still, it was far below the 90 per cent record of local staff who 
occupied basic and mid-skilled level positions. 
 
Respondents were in agreement that this progress was hampered by oil companies‘ lack 
of implementation. One Western researcher observed that: 
 
―There are huge obstacles to overcome in the Angolanisation policy [...] It is the 
companies that bear the cost and it is companies that have very very well-
developed means of evading their obligations. Because when you go and you 
talk to them, they‘ll tell you that the Angolanisation and local content are certainly 
priorities but when you look at the practice, it is a very different issue. But certain-




It was suggested that IOCs usually ―evaded their obligations‖ in three ways: (a) by 
changing the nature of contracts, (b) through training, and (c) by encouraging secrecy 
around salary details among employees. 
  
Back in August 2010, one engineer told the author that the majority of the Angolan work-
force in the French oil service company he worked for had gone on a four-day strike over 
pay conditions: the company in question had allegedly announced that it would reduce 
the duration of the contracts held by its Angolan workforce from five years to one year 
and three months, which the respondent and his colleagues felt would then enable the 
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company to avoid paying employment benefits that would otherwise have come with 
longer employment contracts.
242
 Another critic viewed this area of local content as one 
which confirms oil companies‘ lack of interest in transparency: 
 
―Companies are not transparent and I can give you an example. The government 
took the decision that oil companies can only hire people that cannot be found 
here in Angola, meaning when there is no Angolan capability. The fact is that 
companies are not applying this policy [...]. They are not applying that [...] Even 
the government decided that whenever Angolans are working with expatriates, 
they should be earning the same salary. On the contrary, they are putting in place 





About one and a half years after this interview, this interlocutor travelled to Dubai where 
he spent eighteen months on a training programme. Whilst in Dubai, he complained that 
the training period spent on Dubai was ―unnecessary‖. This, he professed, was an at-
tempt by the company to ―export unemployment‖ because what it could have done was 
to increase the salaries of Angolan employees and allocate the same advantages that 
the expatriate workforce is entitled to. To mislead the government, he added, some 
companies would transfer the salaries of their expatriate staff in foreign bank accounts 
and would insist on maintaining secrecy around the differences in salaries. Or again, 




The Western scholar substantiated these points. ―In the oil sector‖, he stated, ―the major 
companies [...] created an environment where no one talks about their salaries or the 
reason why they are paid different salaries. You made the case that they are actively 
and consciously breaking Angolan law; this is the way they are doing that‖
245
 Reflecting 
on his interviews with foreign companies operating in the sector, this respondent also 
emphasised that training and human capacity was ―part of their tactics‖ to keep expatri-
ates workers in key positions. Brandishing training and human capacity as evidence of 
their commitment to local content issues was therefore,   
  
―One of the ways that they [companies] avoid Angolanisation decrees, because if 
they say that they are working towards Angolanisation through training and hu-
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man capacity that is another way of delaying the process. The thing is that com-
panies have an idea, correct or not, that Angolanisation isn‘t cheaper because 
you will still need the same number of expats and there are a lot of reasons why 
they would think that: some are legitimate, others are purely racist. Certainly any-
one who works for an oil company, and who has not done so for very long, would 





It is difficult to know with certainty whether this is an issue of racism or whether this ar-
gument can even be generalised. Certainly over the course of this research, the author 
remarked that American companies (Chevron in particular) have a good reputation 
among Angolan interviewee – which probably justifies why many stated that they would 
prefer working for American companies -, while French companies tend to be the lag-
gards in many regards. Where there is unanimity, is on the fact that local content policies 
implemented by companies do not always have the expected benefits. The Angolan au-
thorities have expressed their dissatisfaction with the pace of progress on local content 
on numerous occasions. In August 2013, they made public their intention ―to crack down 
on those who have not followed through‖ (Petroleum Africa 2013). Already, reports indi-
cate that Sonangol has been working on a new ―comprehensive‖ local content policy for 
the oil sector since 2009 (Teka 2011: 48; Ovadia 2012). It would also appear that in the 
period between 2011 and October 2012, MINPET handed over ―heavy‖ fines to four 




From a citizens‘ perspective, the concern is that IOCs‘ policies and practices are 
benefitting the elite instead of those who are the most in need. One justification for this is 
that most of what they do is channelled through Sonangol. This is the case of IOCs‘ 
funds for scholarships. One senior Angolan NGO representative recalled that his 
organisation signed an agreement with BP in September 2009. The agreement 
stipulated that the oil company would fund the second phase of a social project 
undertaken by the NGO but because Sonangol did not approve these projects, ―we did 
not receive money until today‖, reiterating that it is in the interests of the companies to 




Other examples are given elsewhere of Chevron‘s agreements with companies that are 
essentially ―paper pushers‖ as opposed to ―individuals with real experience and know-
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how to enter the oil services sector‖ (Ovadia 2013b: 15), or IOCs‘ recruitment of ―sons 
and daughters or political supporters of the current regime‖ (Kolstad and Wiig 2010: 
186). Researchers argue that this ―misrepresentation‖ of local employment or sourcing 
as responsible behaviour has several counter-intuitive implications (Kolstad and Wiig 
2010: 186; Ovadia 2012, 2013a, 2013b). They posit that external pressures for multina-
tional companies to behave responsibly rather than ―doing good‖ are facilitating patron-
age; and that the resulting ―dual‖ character of this practice, in turn, is impacting negative-
ly on democratic accountability and development. It resorts, on the other hand, that non-
Western multinationals such as Chinese companies that face fewer demands to behave 
responsibly might actually do less harm and promote development more because they 
tend to have very few inputs locally, than Western companies employing more local staff 
(Kolstad and Wiig 2010: 186). Whilst not visible as of yet, it is that these practices pose 





































GCS AND THE CAMPAIGN FOR GREATER ORT IN ANGOLA: A 
FORCE FOR GOOD? 
 
―Like many liberal ideas that came before it, transparency 
presents itself as a universal good that is nonetheless 
inherently exclusive, and it is people who live inside this 
contradiction, both embraced and repelled by universal 
promises, that have the most to tell us about what the 
phenomenon entails‖  
 
Hetherington (2013: 2). 
 
One of the key features of globalization has been the development and growth of global 
civil society (GCS)
249
. Depending on who you talk to, GCS is either an instrument for 
global capitalist elites competing in their attempts to ―colonise actual and potential 
spaces of popular participation‖, or it is inherently ethical and progressive, and a ―forceful 
and promising response‖ to the democratic deficit that characterises the process of 
globalization (Löfgren and Thörn
 
2007: 5-13). These differing views notwithstanding, 
there is little disagreement over the sheer influence that this set of non-state actors has 
acquired over the years. Touted as the ―third force in global politics‖ (Florini and 
Simmons 2000: 7), GCS has sought to change ―not just the interests and identities (and 
thus practices) of actors but also the environments within which those actors operate – 
that is, the structures of power and meaning‖ (Price 2003: 613-14). In the extractive 
industries where it continues to push for improved governance, GCS succeeded in 
shaping the development of revenue transparency, from a simple idea first promoted by 
campaigners in the late 1990s, to arguably the most substantive policy response to 
governance challenges facing resource-rich countries in the global South. Indeed, it is 
GCS actors, individually or under the umbrella of the PWYP coalition, who have led the 
charge for transparency whether through MSIs such as EITI or through legislative acts 
like the Dodd-Frank Act and the EU Rules.  
 
PWYP itself has grown, and its scope expanded.  Launched in 2002 by just 6 London-
based INGOs and with a primary focus on the transparent and accountable 
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management of revenues from the oil, gas and mining industries, the global coalition 
now counts over 650 CSOs, and emphasises such issues as revenues, contracts and 
budget transparency
250
. But while it is indisputable that this and other GCS actors played 
an instrumental role in setting and shaping the EI transparency agenda globally, there 
remains very little discussion and factual evidence on its input in developing country 
contexts where, arguably, these issues matter the most. How do GCS interact with other 
state and non-state actors to promote EI transparency at the national, and potentially 
subnational, level? How effective are these interventions? In other words to what extent 
do they further - or to borrow from Gupta and Mason (2014: 1-9), ―inform, empower and 
improve‖ – or constrain resource governance? These are questions that are oftentimes 
left implicit in policy and scholarly debates about natural resource governance, yet are 
crucial for understanding how to consolidate recent gains on EI governance. This 
omission is compounded, among other things, by an inordinate focus on EITI, a general 
bias towards successful experiences by sympathetic academics, and a lack of self-
criticism within parts of GCS.  
 
This chapter is an attempt to remedy this oversight, by critically reflecting on GCS‘s 
promotion of ORT in Angola. Specifically, it explores why, after successfully using war-
torn Angola to put this novel policy idea onto the international agenda, GCS became 
less effective at influencing public debates and policies in the postwar period. The 
chapter suggests that GCS has faced a number of context-specific challenges in its 
engagement with the transparency agenda in postwar Angola. Among other things, one 
notes the nature, positioning and restrictive practices of the Angolan state; the nature 
and capacity of the Angolan civil society; and the peculiar character of the Angolan oil 
industry as an ―enclave‖ (Ferguson 2005; Hodges 2004: 150-51) with only minimal 
linkages to the rest of the economy and society.  Beyond external factors, however, 
there is a clear indication that GCS‘s own agenda and internal contradictions mediated 
the effects of its interventions. That includes its alienation of local interests and 
grievances, which together with a whole range of other issues, is widely perceived in 
Angola to reflect a lack of commitment and genuine interest in the country and its 
people.  
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In turn, the aforementioned limitations led to a set of paradoxical outcomes. Indeed, one 
observes the emergence of partial transparency that is steered and shaped by the 
Angolan government, with no involvement from local civil society and worse still, no 
meaning or utility to the ordinary Angolan citizen. What is more, the inability of GCS to 
sustain the international community‘s attention on Angola, and mobilise domestic 
constituencies willing and capable of supporting the campaign on the ground, has 
enabled multinational oil companies to get away with doing very little on revenue 
transparency while they themselves stand accused of aiding and abetting a culture of 
corruption in the oil industry. Perhaps the most significant consequences of GCS failings 
in postwar Angola have to do, on the one part, with the disengagement from the policy 
by hitherto motivated civil society groups, and on the other, with the rise of ‗new‘ actors 
seeking to redefine and ―localise‖ (Acharya 2014; Wilson and Van Alstine 2014) the 
transparency agenda so as to render it more relevant to the domestic context, hence, 
more appealing to domestic audiences (see Chapter 10 on the contribution of the 
Angolan civil society).  
 
These findings raise important questions about the roles and desirability of civil society 
involvement in the promotion of EI governance in the global South; issues that are 
tackled in the concluding chapter. Following is a brief mapping of key GCS actors 
involved in the promotion of EI transparency in Angola, as well as their motives and 
strategies in Angola, and a discussion of the difficulties GCS encountered in the postwar 
period running from 2005 onwards.   
 
RAISING AWARENESS AND LEVERAGING POLITICS 
 
Any assessment of GCS and its advocacy campaign for greater ORT must begin with an 
acknowledgement of what it achieved, how, and to what effects
251
. Indeed, GCS can be 
credited with ongoing shifts in the discourse, attitudes and mentalities towards extractive 
industry governance and transparency in Angola and beyond. ―Yesterday, nobody could 
speak about oil. Today, one can publicly speak about oil.‖ This is how one leading 
Congolese activist summed up the tremendous transformation that has occurred in 
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Africa since the early 2000s. Like Angola, his country - the Republic of Congo - has 
been linked to the resource curse. Nowadays however, over a decade after the launch 
of the PWYP in his country, there is an incredible amount of information publicly 
available on the oil industry. This ―democratisation of information‖, he contends, is now 
leading to more accountability from the government and to an increased exercise of 





In Angola too, the input of GCS to the uptake of the oil revenue transparency agenda is 
undeniable. Except that one discerns two types of GCS organisations with distinct albeit 
complementary approaches. There are key INGOs such as GW and HRW whose work 
on oil revenue transparency appears to have been targeted primarily at the government, 
under similar motives. Founded in 1993 as an international campaign group dedicated to 
―breaking the links between natural resources, conflicts and corruption‖ (GW 2007), GW 
began working on the role of diamonds in the civil war before turning its attention to oil – 
a shift prompted primarily by the realisation that ―if you needed to understand the role of 
natural resources in the [Angolan] war, you had to look at oil‖
253
. Besides, this was a 
period of great interest in the Gulf of Guinea, with substantial oil revenue accruing to 
various governments, and it was ―hard to find an example of a country that has misused 
its oil revenues to such a great extent‖
254
. Another informant suggested that the decision 
by HRW to ―start scrutinising how the government uses its oil money‖ in the late 1990s 
arose out of a concern that the Angolan government was using the civil war, as well as 
the alleged lack of financial resources to address human rights abuses, as an excuse to 
avoid changing its conduct
255
. In both cases, therefore, the global and national context 
provided significant impetus for these organisations‘ involvement in the campaign.  
 
On the other hand still, there are other INGOs and networks that aimed to work directly 
with local CSOs on the issue of oil revenue transparency, although their work may have 
had some influence on the government‘s attitude and policy. Among these is PWYP, 
which held a series of conferences from which emerged an ad hoc PWYP/EITI network 
in Angola that, regrettably, never fully materialised into a fully-fledged national coalition 
for reasons that will become clearer shortly. OSISA–Angola, the local chapter of Open 
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Society Foundations (OSF), is another prominent INGO working on this field. 
Established in Angola in 1998 to ―build Angolan society, build democratic institutions and 
work with its citizens‖ OSISA-Angola runs various programmes on extractive industry 
transparency, good governance, human rights, education, gender – programmes that 




Others, such as Norwegian Church Aid, Catholic Relief Services (CRS) and CIDSE - a 
coalition of 16 Catholic development agencies – tried to advance the ―moral case‖ (Van 
Parham and Oranje 2009: 36) for ORT in Angola. In actual fact, these faith-based 
organisations were instrumental in stimulating the interest of Angolan Catholic Bishops 
in transparency issues (Croese et al 2011). One Angolan Catholic Priest opined for 
instance that staff employed by the CRS-CIDSE funded Episcopal Commission of 
Justice and Peace (CJP) were ―very active in this area‖ and ―helped a lot to raise this 
question‖ of ORT
257
. Their work inspired the Catholic Church to make an appeal for the 
government to join EITI in 2006, an act that it presumably saw as ―important to continue 
improving the levels of transparency in the country‖ (Amundsen and Abreu 2006: 30).  
 
As a whole, directly or indirectly through multilateral organisations or Western 
governments, GCS and its advocacy campaign for increased revenue transparency in 
the oil sector succeeded in forcing the Angolan government to be more transparent. The 
government‘s decision to participate in the IMF General Data Dissemination System in 
2004 (ibid: 12) and start making available oil sector data on the Ministry of Finance‘s 
website are widely associated with this campaign. Crucially, as well as helping to expand 
the public sphere in Angola, the campaign became an ―eye-opener‖ for local CSOs as 
far as the good governance and transparency agendas are concerned
258
. One African 
INGO representative felt that the campaign had impacted on the way Angolan CSOs 
―look at themselves‖, clarifying that: 
 
―In the past, we were just giving food, making sure that people are fed, […] that 
schools get going […] that the children are immunised, […] that we do this or that, 
which was the work of the government. But right now, CSOs are redefining 
themselves. They are getting in line with our political agenda: to change 
government policy, engage government in discussion...‖
259 
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Still, noteworthy are differences in the input of the abovementioned organisations. For 
instance, it is striking that while collectively they accelerated the embrace of ORT by the 
government and CSOs, some INGOs‘ interventions subsequently became somewhat 
more sporadic and insignificant than others. The position of GW - the ―lead 
entrepreneur‖ (Gillies 2010: 109) - is illustrative of this. Whereas its first report (GW 
1999) highlighting the complicity of the global oil and banking industries in alleged state 
looting during the civil war provoked a livid reaction in Angola (Shaxson 2007: 212-23), 
its second major report on Angola - co-published some twelve years later with OSISA-
Angola (OSISA and GW 2011) - went almost unnoticed. It is even suggested that it had 
a negligible impact on the debate on transparency in Angola. ―This is nothing new, what 
Global Witness is reporting‖, one senior INGO official stated, adding on the main 
question of oil data discrepancies underscored in the report, that: ―it is a problem that 
has been going back several years and […] I am not sure whether they are saying that 
money was lost or whether they just considered the discrepancies‖
260
. In contrast, HRW 
has tended to produce reports on Angola on a regular basis, and its reports would ―really 
influence how Western governments, the IMF and even the Angolan government think 
about these issues‖
261
. This was reflected again three years ago, when it led demands 
for explanations on the US$32 billion accounting gap that the IMF discovered in 
Angola‘s public accounts in the period running from 2007-2010 (HRW 2012). This 
pressure resulted in both the Angolan government and the IMF providing details on the 
so-called ‗missing‘ billion, although these proved to be unsatisfactory (HRW et al 2012). 
 
These differences notwithstanding, there is a consensus that the campaign fell short of 
its potential in Angola. One insider admitted that it had ―less impact in keeping them [the 
Angolan government] accountable‖
262
; while others have expressed their frustrations at 
the absence of a TI chapter (Amundsen and Abreu 2006: 25) or a national PWYP 
coalition despite Angola being the trigger for the coalition and a ―strong candidate‖ for 
having such a platform
263
. As will be demonstrated subsequently, these limitations have 
to do with context-specific factors as well as with GCS‘s inherent character and 
weaknesses.   
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CHALLENGES TO GCS‟S PROMOTION OF ORT IN POSTWAR ANGOLA 
 
Civil society actors interviewed for this research project highlighted several factors 
making Angola a difficult context in which to operate and get change happen, including 
the operating environment, oil‘s materiality, GCS‘s agenda and legitimacy shortcomings. 
These issues are treated in turn below. 
 
The Operating Environment 
 
In seeking to justify the status of Angola as a ―special case when it comes to 
transparency‖, one interlocutor stated that this has to do with a lot of aspects:  
―It has to do with the centralised nature of the country or how things are 
controlled in Angola; it has to do with the political environment, with the difficulty 
in accessing information. I think you see that in other African countries but the 




Another respondent involved in steering the ORT agenda locally underscored Angola‘s 
history as well as low levels of civil society capacity. As he explained,  
 
 ―The capacity of civil society organisations in Angola is very low and I think you 
can say that without insulting anyone. Comparatively speaking to any other 
African country, I have not been to any other country where the capacity is so 
low, and I think that there are a lot of things that explain that. It‘s obviously the 
history of the war; the fact that it is now so strongly dominated by one political 
party, really depends on the oil and not on the international community [...]. It is a 
challenge being an international organisation; it is difficult to find strong 
organisations that you could support.‖
265
   
 
The fact that this period (post-2002) coincided with diminished worldwide attention on 
Angola, the drastic reduction of programmes targeting Angola, the return of China to 
Angola and the oil boom, also contributed to create an environment where international 
actors were either unable or unwilling to dedicate resources to Angola. This includes 
GCS organisations with a focus on transparency, democratic participation and human 
rights. In fact, among all INGOs with an interest on ORT, only HRW retained a dedicated 
Angola researcher, it seems at least up until mid-2013. Among other two leading INGOs 
the author communicated with, one employed an Angola researcher until 2007 and the 
other INGO responded that Angola was not a target state. These difficulties were 
compounded by visa restrictions, language barriers, and the image of Angola as a rich 
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country - one that ―has got US$40 billion-dollar budget and does not therefore need 




It should be pointed out that the difficulties experienced in the operating environment are 
not just affecting INGOs working on extractive industries governance. To illustrate, one 
US-based INGO instrumental to the ongoing process of democratisation was due to 
close its Angola offices in May 2013 due to lack of funding.
267
 These changes are part of 
a trend that sees governments in the developing world restrict civil society space using 
tools such as heavy-handed investigations, restrictive laws and regulations, or blocking 
receipt of foreign cash. This comprises many EITI-implementing countries that are held 
as exemplary for their openness of extractive industries, including Azerbaijan and 
Nigeria (The Economist 2014).     
 
To questions of donor fatigue, geopolitical shifts and lack of funding are added 
government mistrust and attitudes towards Western GCS organisations and individuals. 
Angola‘s Minister for International Cooperation spoke of Angola‘s recognition of the 
importance of INGOs as important partners ―especially in the social sector.‖
268
 Yet in 
practice, INGOs and other GCS representatives are frequently harassed by the 
government. In 2010, HRW Angola researcher Lisa Rimli reported a government‘s 
―campaign of attacks‖ on journalists ahead of the African Cup of Nations in January
269
. 
Rimli herself was detained for about an hour by a local police force in early February 
2013 as she investigated mass evictions and alleged police violence on street vendors 
in the Cacuaco municipality of Luanda. She complained of being treated like ―a 
dangerous criminal‖, and alleged that the security agents rebuked her for not declaring 
her intention of visiting the site in advance (quoted in Mukuta 2013). Before Rimli, it was 
the turn of GW‘s researcher Sarah Wykes to be arrested and incarcerated by police in 
Cabinda in February 2007, before being released on bail three days later and eventually 
cleared of any wrongdoing. In sum, such are the challenges of operating in Angola that 
many INGOs ―don‘t want to take the risks to criticise or call for more transparency 
because they can be expelled. You see that it is a sensitive question.‖
270
 Hence, to 
return to the debate introduced in Chapter 4, it is self-censorship - rather than lack of 
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knowledge about the sources of the budget – that renders about the links between oil 
and the budget an unpopular topic, though this has changed since the author‘s visit in 
August 2010.   
 
The previously-cited informant claims to be the first and last transparency officer at one 
of these organisations, adding that ―to those colleagues I speak with [...] people need 
other projects first, then transparency‖. But it is unclear whether the difficulty stems from 
the topic of transparency or from the fact that this transparency is targeted at the oil 
sector. The author actually found evidence that suggests that it might be more about the 
latter, that is, about the fact that oil remains a taboo in Angola and questioning how it is 
governed is equivalent to being confrontational. This argument is expanded in the 
following sub-section. 
  
ORT and Oil‟s Materiality 
 
Chapter 3 described how the geographic and economic enclave character of oil 
extraction helped the industry remain aloof from decades of violence that wrought the 
country‘s infrastructure and people. Chapter 7 underscored the ways and extent to 
which the geographical location of the sector‘s operations mediated IOCs‘ engagement 
with ORT in Angola, as compared to Azerbaijan where IOCs like BP and Statoil took a 
more proactive stance on the policy. This chapter returns to this topic in view of its 
relevance as a factor affecting the resonance of ORT and constraining the effectiveness 
of GCS‘s promotion of ORT. In order to fully appreciate this dynamic, it is important to 
set the context. 
 
One interlocutor spoke of the existence of two Angola: ―the oil Angola and the other 
Angola‖
271
, and it is not difficult to understand why. The oil sector benefits and serves 
only a small proportion of citizens. It has a very limited impact on Angola‘s energy 
security and its citizens‘ livelihoods. In fact, despite being a major producer of crude oil, 
Angola exports most of its oil to overseas markets. At home meanwhile, the supply of 
fuel from the only domestic refinery (of some 39,000 bpd) covers only 30 per cent of 
domestic demand (Almeida 2010). This left an estimated 74 per cent of Angolans 
without electricity access in 2008 (UNDP and WHO 2009), and many of the 70.2 per 
cent of Angolans surviving on just US$2 a day unable to afford diesel generators (Alkire 
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. Angola‘s 10 billion liquefied natural gas plant has experienced 
halts since production started in June 2013 after an 18-month delay caused by several 
fires and accidents (Gismatullin and Patel 2014). But even before it ran into trouble, it 
was not set to completely satisfy the country‘s needs as it was mostly destined for 
commercialisation rather than for local consumption.  
 
Worse still, the sector only employs well below 1 per cent of the 19 million Angolans that 
are estimated to live in the country (Vines and Weimer 2011: 3 citing United Nations 
Population Division)
273
, while government fuel subsidies continue to be the mainstay of 
wealthy Angolans. One informant illustrated this point when he declared that ―the 
government spends a lot of money subsidising oil for cars and so on, but most poor 
people don‘t use cars‖
274
. This reflects a common criticism that the centrally planned and 
executed energy policy often disregards the needs of the majority who in turn are not 
stimulated to pay their taxes. These circumstances led to a detachment between oil, the 
government and society, to the extent that ―people in the interior or the rural zones do 
not link their livelihoods systems with the government‘s investment‖ and consider that 
―the money from oil is the government‘s money; it is not our money.‖
275
 This is 
compounded by the fact that; 
  
―[…] there are no inroads or very few inroads for civil society organisations to 
work on things like oil because that is big politics. Not even members of parlia-
ments have much of a chance of influencing these things because it is of such vi-
tal importance to power in Angola, to control of the system, that sometimes you 
really wonder if it is worth at all to work on it.‖
276 
 
That said, oil‘s ―magic‖ (Weszkalnys 2013) does not explain everything. Indeed while it is 
undeniable that domestic and international conditions as well as Angola‘s rising 
geostrategic importance affected the diffusion processes and outcomes, it now clear that 
GCS‘s positioning and lack of legitimacy played a significant role in taming the effects of 
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its efforts on ORT in Angola. This in itself is not a novel finding. The consensus view is 
that GCS‘s legitimacy plays a great role in determining why and under what conditions 
specific INGOs are more or less likely to affect global political processes and outcomes 
(Gutterman 2012; The Broker 2012; Peters et al 2009; Lord 2004).  As Peters et al 
(2009: 498) argued, 
   
―The impact of non-state actors on inter-governmental standard-setting 
processes and also their capacity to produce autonomous standards and to 
engage in co-regulation with governments, seems to depend on factors such as 
reputation, flexibility, receptivity to alternative perspectives, representativity and 
reliability – in short, factors which simultaneously contribute to their legitimacy.‖ 
 
The term ‗legitimacy‘ carries three main interpretations (Gutterman 2012: 3). Normative-
ly, it denotes the moral and ethical basis of the actors‘ behaviours or aims; sociologically, 
it refers to the acceptance of the actors by its audiences and constituencies; politically, it 
concerns the acceptance and justification of shared rule within governance and authority 
relationships. The accent in this chapter is on the first two elements.    
 
GCS‟s Agenda and Contested Legitimacy in Postwar Angola 
 
If INGOs began their lives as ―the self-appointed spokespersons of the poor in the 
South‖ as Evert-Jan Quak of The Broker puts it, nowadays, ―they are no longer accepted 
unquestioningly‖ (Quak 2012: 14). In the ORT field, this shift owes very much to the 
characteristics that the ―ORT industry‖ shares with the aid industry as defined by 
Dambisa Moyo and others. Moyo (2009) described the aid industry as a ―self-
perpetuating industry‖, one in which the main actors involved – celebrities, academics, 
the NGO community and policy-makers - have a ―vested interest to see the continual 
cycle of Africa in despair so that they can justify their existence.‖  Another scholar 
viewed it as an inherently ―aristocratic‖ grouping - an exclusive and selective club in 
which leaders and even junior officers of the most well-known organisations know one 
another (Fioramonti 2007: 139). The domiciliation of ORT‗s most vocal advocates in 
Western capitals, their predominantly elitist practices, and the extremely close links that 
exist between and among them, Western governments and multilateral agencies partly 
justify this critique
277
. These links presumably give these organisations a great 
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advantage when it comes to accessing finance and collaborators. Yet, they also feed 
recurrent criticisms that these organisations have become ―too close to the powerful and 
too far from the powerless‖ (Hulme and Edwards 1997: 275); and that transparency is a 
Western agenda set up and driven by the West in order to protect and advance Western 
interests.  
 
In Angola in addition, one concern relates to the adequacy and usefulness of what one 
civil society representative referred to as ―the PWYP agenda‖ for Angola. This respond-
ent identifies two major challenges with this approach. One that has to do with PWYP‘s 
interpretation of transparency, in particular, its lack of appreciation of the different faces 
of transparency, which he says are not only about ―providing the information‖, but also ―a 
question of how we spend this money‖, ―where you spend the money and how you 
spend the money‖, and ―let‘s discuss or explain to us why you spent money in this direc-
tion.‖
278
 In short, these are dimensions the informant felt are necessary conditions for the 
effective diffusion of transparency but regrettably were left unaddressed by the coalition. 
In support of this broad interpretation of transparency was the assertion that:  
 
―To be transparent is to be clear about what you are doing and bring issues on 
the table. It means that whatever programme you have should be known by the 
stakeholders, should be approved and monitored by the stakeholders, and be 
evaluated, in other words, they have the right to say these things didn‘t go well, 
these things went well.‖
279 
 
The second point this and other interlocutors underscored was PWYP‘s apparent lack of 
concern for the answerability dimension of accountability and the ―justice deficit‖ 
(Lammers 2012: 10) in global political processes. He stated:  
 
―You know that the Angolan government does negotiate badly the oil. PWYP 
could also ask companies why they pay such low amount to our government. As 
a citizen, can I go to the office of any of these oil companies and ask to see their 
CSR report? That does not make sense. I think that the availability of the 
information is different from the access to information, different from the credibility 
of the information or from the timeliness of the information. Even if you have the 
report in London, you can send it to me in minutes if I ask for them. But how 
many Angolans are aware of that? Is that information adequate for me? We also 
need to develop the conceptualisation about the information: if you send me a 
report, can I ask questions? Where can I send my queries?‖
280
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This last point may seem trivial, but to reveal the extent of the difficulty, in her interviews 
with three representatives of one European IOC, the author repeatedly asked whether 
key stakeholder communication documents such as CSR or sustainability reports were 
distributed and readily available in Portuguese in Angola but was told that they are not. 
This fact raises serious questions about the expected audience of the data produced, 
and more broadly, about the real - as opposed to intended - beneficiaries of extractive 
industries transparency.   
 
On the subject of justice, it is interesting to note that when asked by the author what the 
oil data disclosed on MINFIN‘s website actually say, many informants‘ emphasis was on 
what the data may reveal about the government‘s ―take‖ or share of revenues. ―Through 
these [data]‖ one Angolan source stated,  
 
―We can see what oil companies‘ contribution has been and we can see whether 
the companies are paying the government enough for the resources they are ex-
tracting. You can see that the companies are not yet paying the government be-
cause they are recovering all the expenses they incurred from the oil extraction. 




This detail shows the participant‘s level of engagement and interest in matters related to 
the extractive industries in Angola. Importantly, it also underlines a certain alignment be-
tween citizens‘ and the GoA‘s interests.     
 
More broadly, the foregoing issues speak to PWYP‘s neglect of local issues. As one of 
the previously cited informants declared, ―PWYP must become a national demand rather 
than an international demand.‖ Before encouraging transparency, he contested, ―we 
need to create public awareness and tell the people that our economy is based on oil‖. 
This conversation did not take place in Angola leading to the PWYP‘s agenda becoming 
―a demand of an elite and not a demand by the people‖ who want answers to specific 
questions such as: ―why are schools or hospitals not there?‖ In his view, focusing on 
such matters could be ―a good link between the international PWYP agenda and the 
national one.‖
282
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To get a better understanding of this point about contradiction between global narratives 
and local realities, it pays to look broadly into the reasons behind some INGOs‘ 
successes in Angola - as defined by their ability to positively impact governance 
discourse and practices – as compared to PWYP‘s shortcomings. Among other things, it 
would appear that INGOs‘ standing and historical relations with the government matters, 
so does the content of INGOs‘ work. To be more specific, INGOs whose work 
emphasise service delivery and community development – as opposed to PWYP‘s 
singular focus on the technical and complex issue that is ORT - are generally more 
successful at creating a long-lasting impact on state-society relations, than those with a 
clear-cut political agenda emphasising natural resources. The relative success of the 
budget transparency work led by the Catholic organisations listed above lends credence 
to these theories, as it can be linked to the credibility of the Church as the most trusted 
institution in Angola - ahead of the media and parliament (Jensen and Pestana 2010: 1 
citing BBC 2008) – as well as to its historical links with the country. Presumably, this 
puts international (Christian) faith-based organisations in a much better situation than 
‗ordinary‘ ones, since ―it is much easier to close down an international NGO than a 




At the other end of the spectrum are Development Workshop (DW) Angola – the oldest 
INGO in the country - and the Norwegian People‘s Aid (NPA), two non-faith based 
organisations which have shown a long-standing commitment to Angola. They first 
began operating in the country in 1980 and 1989 respectively, in the midst of the civil 
war, and managed to build their credibility and legitimacy over time. Further, their 
countries of origin – Canada and Norway – have historically had a relatively neutral and 
friendlier relation with the Angolan government. The two INGOs have been instrumental 
to the visibly improved ability of local civil society and citizens‘ groups to influence public 
policy in such sectors as land reform, poverty reduction, access to water, sanitation and 
better housing, human rights, transparency and local governance.
284
 Attempts by DW 
Angola and colleagues from the Luanda Urban Poverty Programme (LUPP)
285
 at 
improving service delivery and participatory governance are revealing of the process of 
change in Angola. So is the engagement of the CISDE coalition and NPA in helping 
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build and sustain civil society‘s interest in budget transparency and participatory 
governance.  
 
These initiatives will be explored again in Chapter 10. In addition to proving that 
alternative programmes and approaches can be more efficient at driving systemic 
change in Angola, the reason for showcasing the lessons emerging from these two non-
ORT initiatives, are to draw attention to the main differences between homegrown 
initiatives that emphasise bottom-up approaches and current externally-imposed 
governance reform initiatives which favour top-down strategies. In Angola, while the 
success of the first category was facilitated by the creativity and receptivity of local 
political actors, the second became a source of conflicts not just between local and 
international CSOs actors but also, as shown below, among various local actors, up to 
the point of leading to the abandon of the initial reform agenda at the grounds level.  
 
At the centre of these tensions is OSISA, an institution involved in setting up a PWYP 
coalition in Angola in collaboration with CRTC. The expectation shared by many 
domestic and external civil society actors at the time was that with OSISA being an 
INGO, it would act as a funding agency rather than an implementation organisation to 
avoid the challenges that this strategy would generate, including the sustainability of 
projects. The view of a couple of research participants is that by presenting itself as a 
―national‖ organisation and acting as an implementing organisation, OSISA effectively 
internalised functions that were expected to be distributed across other organizations, by 
this means ―franchising‖ OSF‘s brand instead of supporting authentic expressions of 
indigenous civil society, and ―crowding out‖ national participation in knowledge creation 
and advocacy in order to increase its own voice and profile, as if they were the ―only 
people with anything useful to say‖ about ORT in Angola (cf. Edwards 2005). 
Consequently, although it lacked vision at first, OSISA subsequently created frictions by 
imposing an agenda which national NGOs were not directly interested in presumably 
because of its ulterior motive to see the emerging national coalition close down in order 
to dominate the domestic ORT setting. As one Angolan critic described it, ―it is as if there 
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One of OSISA‘s representatives to whom the author put these comments did confirm 
trying a couple of times to make it viable for Angolan civil society to be part of PWYP but 
without much success. The absence of ―viable and sustainable sources of funding‖ 
made this outcome hard to achieve, especially in an environment where work on such 
sensitive issues as transparency is ―very dangerous in terms of security, financially 
[...]‖
287
 This source also categorically refuted the accusations made above about 
OSISA‘s identity and actions: 
―That‘s not true! That‘s a big lie! They don‘t understand Open Society‘s 
philosophy of work. We are both a funder and an implementer, and given the fact 
that 99.99 per cent of our staff are Angolans, that gives us authority to implement 
projects. Just because we have a name that connects us to people in New York 
that are foreign nationals? No! The problem is that we came to realise that we are 
funding a national team that [...] doesn‘t have national competition; they don‘t 
have any work. And that became a real problem because we didn‘t have real 
organisations that are working on these issues. People were doing different 
things and then, when we wanted to explain to them the drive, they didn‘t want to 
listen. They wanted us to build a coalition, to build a structure that we could 
sustain and our position was that: ‗No, the structure has to be sustained by the 
work of member organisations. So, we want to know what each one of you is 
doing and responsible of doing to support this coalition.‘ People are just looking 




For one Angolan activist, the position of George Soros as OSF‘s founder and chairman, 
and a previous holder of Cobalt‘s shares
289
 weakens and compromises OSISA‘s 
legitimacy and authority in this field, not least because of previous investigations into 
Cobalt‘s alleged breach of U.S. anti-corruption laws in Angola.  
 
There are other instances calling into question the moral grounding and motives of 
Western campaigners. Another is that of Forbes‘ apparent double standard. The New 
York-based media outlet has been running a story on Isabel Dos Santos‘ wealth, which 
has sparked outcry in some international quarters due to its inconsistencies, 
inaccuracies and questionable interest in the story about the daughter of a ―monarch 
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whose family and inner circle run the country like their personal ATM‖ (Redvers 2013). 
All the more so considering that Forbes itself ―chooses to exclude from our list of the 
World‘s Billionaires wealth that comes by virtue of royal position‖ (see Nolan 2013). 
Reflecting the general discomfort at ―the outpouring of love for this story‖, one observer 
remarked:   
 
―What‘s clear is that the image of a rich, black, beautiful, woman billionaire from a 
once war-torn country where they speak a strange language (i.e. not English) 
struck a chord with news editors – especially seeing as it comes with a Forbes 
stamp of accuracy [...] It saddens me that so much energy (and internet 
bandwidth) is dedicated to this piffle, at the cost of real African stories‖ (Redvers 
2013).    
 
The story apparently provoked a good reaction from the global and domestic public.
290
 
Paradoxically, Forbes announced in December 2013 that it would launch a Portuguese 
Africa edition in April 2014, in partnership with ZAP Publishing (Forbes 2013), an 
Angolan company in which Isabel Dos Santos reportedly controls through her 70 per 
cent shareholding (Simbovala 2013). One social media commentator opined that ―she 
couldn‘t beat them so she joined them‖
291
; another interpreted this as a sign that ―money 
speaks every language‖.    
 
Whereas Forbes‘ interest in a national public figure got it into trouble, it is the Financial 
Times seeming lack of interest in the domestic context that attracted criticisms of its 
reporting of Cobalt‘s Angolan interests. Rafael Marques de Morais, who first covered this 
story, pointed the finger at its negligence of the country‘s relevant legislation and its 
acquiescence of Manuel Vicente‘s version at face value, ―as do so many academics and 
the IMF who offer their expertise on such matters‖ (Marques 2012). Moorman (2012) too 
is cynical about the Financial Times‘s real underlying motive. According to her,  
 
―The FT cares because one of Cobalt‘s backers is Goldman Sachs. Angola 
matters little to them. Angola matters only insofar as it rattles Wall Street. Life 
there matters only insofar as it touches on life, or rather, the bottom line, the U.S.‖       
 
Foreign media treatment of the youth protest movement suffers from similar bias.  To 
give but one example, a foreign journalist spoke about the Angolan rapper Luaty 
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Beirão‘s ―exasperation‖ at foreign (Dutch, French and Portuguese) media‘s obsession 
with him - presumably because he is white and ―foreign journalists felt connected to him‖ 
as a result.
292
  The activist seemed appalled at this, particularly given the sense of racial 
identity politics prevalent in the country.  
 
In short, notwithstanding the progress that GCS actors helped drive in Angola especially 
with regard the broadening of the public sphere, they find themselves to have lost the 
moral high ground from which to criticise other global and domestic actors. This too 
partly explains the mixed record of transparency reforms in Angola. On the ground, it is 
common to hear from the most vocal section of civil society, accusations that INGOs‘ 
work in and on Angola have been ―self-serving‖, that is, ―aimed more at impacting 
INGOs‘ standing than the lives of people on the ground.‖
293
 Explicit or veiled in a 
somewhat ―jaundiced‖ view of Angolan NGOs as a weak and disorganised movement 
(Shaxson et al 2008b: 6), this lack of genuine interest in Angola was indeed a recurrent 
theme. ―When they were here‖, one research participant insisted, 
 
―They lived with Prados, Pajeros, and they had to make do with local partners 
through whom they would channel the money that remains from what they were 
spending.  And when they started facing difficulties, they did not want to stay 




Conveying the same sentiment, another said: 
 
―International NGOs come here supposedly to guide us because we […] are told 
that we are unable to manage US$100,000. Yet I believe that if white people are 
capable of managing US$100,000, we also can. So in terms of intellectual 
capacities, they are not better than us. It is rather our politicians who are 
worthless [...] I think that there is an effort to make those who are powerful evolve 





This respondent also expressed concern over external actors‘ lack of commitment to, 
and non-compliance of good governance principles that they themselves promote, 
regretting the fact that Angolan civil society has been used solely for instrumental 
purposes. As he put it:  
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―Here in Africa, people like to take you for a ride. They love it when you adhere to 
their agendas. Once you try to have your own agenda, an identity, a personality, 
you're not followed, you are not supported... It was a pleasure to work with Global 
Witness and other organisations, but I'm wary that their work is not always 
sincere. Maybe they too don‘t even know. But this is what I feel. Because how 
can you explain that someone who gives birth to a baby, practically throws away 
the baby with the bath water? At the time when you need these organisations the 
most, that‘s when you're abandoned. And nobody comes looking for you to know 




This critique is similar to that against Western donors, who: 
 
― […] Have some responsibility for the difficulties facing civil society; [they] often 
they push ―sexy‖ questions in one moment, without adapting it to local reality – 
and then they abandon it when it is no longer in fashion – without paying attention 
to the implications that this might have on civil society. Donors don‘t have a 
strategic vision on the role of civil society – what they often do instead is to use 
civil society as an instrument to push their own agendas.‖ (Shaxson et al 2008b: 
9). 
 
It should be stressed, however, that far from leading to defeatism in Angola as 
elsewhere in Africa, efforts by domestic and international actors to hegemonise the 
control of discourses and spaces around ORT and beyond, left open spaces for local 
social actors to re-think their roles and responsibilities in society, and find new and 
innovative ways and methods to enhance their direct participation in the formulation of, 
and influence over, public policy. This movement related and tied to adjacent struggles 
for increased citizenship, producing tremendous result in the ―formal‖ and ―informal‖ 
sections of civil society (Pacheco 2002), and it is not just challenging perceptions and 
theories about the oil-democracy nexus. Indeed, the wave of change currently witnessed 
– a more visible form than that which has long existed, it will be argued subsequently in 
Chapter 10 – is giving more reasons to be optimistic about the future. To understand its 
diverse manifestations, it is useful to unpack Angola‘s reform context, which has been 








                                                          
296




ORT AND THE REFORM CONTEXT: UNPACKING KEY ACTORS, 
MOTIVATIONS AND CONSTRAINTS 
 
―It‘s fashionable to say that we are cursed by our mineral 
riches. That‘s not true. We are cursed by our leaders.‖ 
Rafael Marques de Morais (quoted in Reed 
2009: 18). 
 
―Agents work within institutions but agents shape 
institutions; frustrate or make them work.‖ 
 Leftwich (2009). 
 
According to Grindle (2007: 569), ―a good political economy combines analysis of both 
context and content and seeks ways of bringing that analysis to bear on the process of 
reform.‖ So far, the thesis has provided a background on the normative and political 
context of ORT adoption globally. It dissected the content of the ORT reform agenda 
and examined the roles that external actors might have played in the institutionalisation 
of ORT on the ground. In this and the subsequent chapter, the analysis turns to the 
national context and process of reforms. This chapter specifically looks at the 
government input in the reform process: the various actors, motivations and constraints 
that contributed to shape the design, shape and record of ORT policies. 
The chapter begins by tackling the obsession there is, of strengthening presumed 
―weak‖ institutions in developing countries as a way to bring about reforms. The essence 
of this section is to put the accent on key features which work against international 
policy-makers‘ efforts to reform Angola‘s public finance management. Through the bias 
of some ORT policies listed in Chapter 4, the third section will explore several possible 
explanations behind the dual nature of the ORT reform process in postwar Angola. 
Subsequently, the chapter examines the structural and political constrictions which have 
so far limited the effectiveness of ORT policies, discussing in particular, lack of capacity 
and governance infrastructure, and the weakness of accountability institutions such as 
the judiciary and legislative.  
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OIL GOVERNANCE REFORMS AND THE ANGOLAN LEADERSHIP: BEYOND THE 
„GOOD VERSUS BAD GUYS‟ DICHOTOMY 
 
It is common to read about Angola‘s ‗regime‘, ‗ruling elite‘ or the ‗Angolan government‘ 
without ever knowing what is clearly meant by these terms. Often, these appellations are 
borne out of wrong assumptions that the actors in question are somehow homogeneous. 
In reality, the picture is much more complicated and not all actors involved have a say in 
the choice and implementation of the reform agenda. Among those who do, some are 
more limited than others in terms of what they can do or say. The question is why?  
Indeed, it is generally held that Angola‘s president exerts a great deal of personal 
discretion and personal control over Angola‘s political economy. As one Angolan 
transparency activist summed it up, ―everything is being authorised by the president [...] 
everything has to come from the president.‖
297
  The latter presides over a ―hybrid 
configuration‖ combining a ―formal fragile government‖ ruled by the MPLA, and the more 
―resilient shadow government‖ controlled and manipulated by Futungo (the presidency) 
with Sonangol as its ―chief economic motor‖ (Roque 2011: 1). Under this dual system, 
―the President and the people around him‖ or ―the people around Sonangol and around 
the President‖ control wealth and power in Angola, whereas the MPLA controls the 
system of government, leading to a characterisation of Angola as a ―very centralised 
party-driven state.‖
298
  As such, while politics at top level of government is more chaotic 
in other places in terms of the plurality and diversity of existing factions, in Angola, ―the 





What complicates this picture is that there are divergent attitudes towards reform among 
all these actors. When the Angolan government is not conceived as outright ―anti-
reformist‖ (see Benner et al 2010; Benner and Soares de Oliveira 2013), it is seen as a 
government that is ―either run by a band of committed reformists or is in the grip of a 
villainous, money-hungry elite‖ (Soares de Oliveira 2012: 5). In actual fact, none of these 
perceptions stand out on their own. It turns out that there are even more divergent 
dispositions to reforms at the top of government, within the MPLA as well as within 
government agencies. One Angolan opposition leader commented that within the MPLA, 
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there is a small group of reformists - led by Manuel Vicente and others - who want 
freedoms and have ―more inclination to think about the country [...], a tendency to open 
up and to reach out‖ and who have the law on their side but not ―the power to reform.‖
300
 
In the executive, the central bank has ―sort of joined the battle a little bit recently‖ with its 
―huge effort to reform the economy‖
301
, though it is MINFIN which is the chief reformer 
and Sonangol, its opposite
302
. According to one source,  
 
―Basically, the Ministry of Finance, to me, I mean, they are really the good guys 
… in the governance system in Angola. They have always been spiralling 
reforms; they have always been in the battle with Sonangol about getting the 
transfers from the oil revenues on a timely basis, and so on; and even 
challenging the sensitive issue of what Sonangol is taking for ―administration‖ 
issues. So, it is a ministry that is much more accessible, and perhaps with the 




In truth, there are many reasons why it is fundamental to look beyond this ‗good versus 
bad guys‘ dichotomy notwithstanding the fact that this informant‘s pointers to MINFIN‘s 
pro-reform stance are correct.  Not least because there is in Angola a very complex and 
evolving picture in which not just institutions, but power structures and relationships play 
a role in the political economy of oil. Indeed, as noted in Chapter 4, whilst there is a 
consensus about the need to build strong institutions capable of preventing and curbing 
corrupt, the problem in Angola is not a lack of institutions. Rather, it is that these 
institutions are not very effective at doing the job they are supposed to be doing. The 
majority are ―politicised or controlled by one political party‖, with the government or ruling 




In the midst of this instability in leadership and institutional responsibilities, only 
Sonangol has managed to maintain its autonomy, whilst undermining the authority of 
other government agencies. As demonstrated in Chapters 3 and 5, this is mostly linked 
to the historical context of how Angola developed, to Sonangol‘s ability to carry out a 
number of non-commercial and domestic functions on behalf of the state, and close 
relationships between the company‘s managers and Angola‘s rulers.  
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The issue with Sonangol as an institution is that it is not the typical ―weak‖ institution that 
needs sorting out. In fact, some international observers opine that Sonangol is quite 
strong and capable. For decade, IFIs and Western partners like Norway encouraged the 
government to separate Sonangol‘s commercial, concessionaire and regulatory 
functions, which combination they see as a source of conflicts of interests. While this 
sounds like a sound advice, to others, the question of Sonangol‘s roles in the oil industry 
is merely a ―principle‖ rather than an ―operational‖ problem that the company has 
managed to resolve largely by putting an emphasis on efficiency (Lwanda 2011: 15; see 
also Clarke 2000: 200; Danish Energy Authority and Copenhagen DC 2007: 11; Heller 
2010).
305
 In actual fact, so the counter-argument goes, despite corruption-related 
incidents such as those cited in Chapter 4, Sonangol serves as a counter-point to the 
conventional wisdom that NOCs function best when their activities are constrained by 
oversight from a strong independent regulator (Thurber and Hults 2012; Thurber et al 
2011; Heller 2010). Besides, ―doing oil business in Angola is pretty easy: the system is 
relatively efficient, companies are treated relatively fairly; the contracts are fairly 
constructed.‖
306
 Angola‘s fifth ranking in the upstream Business Environment ratings in 
2011 - compared to its place as 172
nd
 out of 183 countries in the World Bank‘s Doing 
Business ranking the same year (World Bank 2012:6) - corroborates this point as well 
(Business Monitor International (2011). 
 
Adding to questions over the credibility of this policy advice is the admiration of 
Sonangol among some Western officials.  At a London meeting in October 2012, 
Christopher McMullen, former US Ambassador to Angola, did not shy away from stating 
the following when asked about the possible grooming of Manuel Vicente – former CEO 
of Sonangol and Angola‘s vice-President – as a replacement of President Dos Santos: 
 
―Our experience with Manuel Vicente as head of Sonangol was a very positive 
one […]. I think Sonangol has proven itself to be a first rate parastatal oil 
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organisation, so that speaks to itself in terms of his management, I think. I think 
he brings some international vision, a very broad vision of Angola‘s role in the 
world. I think if he brings some of the skills that he developed in Sonangol to the 
rest of Angola, and that Sonangol becomes the model for management of the 




The NOC has now of course undertaken some reforms to reduce its regulatory role, 
though it is too early to what outcomes these reforms will bring. The wider lesson 
emerging from Sonangol‘s history is that it is best to target agents who might be well-
placed to induce change, rather than formal institutions. To quote an Angolan pro-
democracy activist:  
  
―[Good governance] is not about having institutions, but about having leadership. 
It is about who is out there, doing what, standing for what [...] It is about who is 
implementing what and how? Focusing too much on formal institutions rather 




In support of this broad point, another interviewee affirmed that ―Individuals are different 
from institutions but institutions are very much framed according to the people handling 
them‖
309
 Going against the emphasis in international policy-making on institutions also is 
the extremely personalised nature of politics, with issues like personal connections, 
familiarity to the president, and the president‘s trust in the individuals running the 
institutions subjected to reforms, having great sway over the content and process of 
reform. To illustrate the level of difficulty, one respondent reflected:   
  
―The problem in Angola is also that everything is so individualised. You can 
actually meet someone within the system who is perhaps in favour of doing 
something in a different way and if you manage to convince that person, then that 
person will work gradually within his own sort of limited means but [...] it is very 
difficult to exert influence on the whole ministry because it will always appear to 
you, or appear to the outside world, as a close unit and very formal.‖
310
   
 
A final feature of Angola‘s reform context to highlight, which in a sense is a corollary of 
the struggle of power which exists between key government agencies is the diversity or 
plurality of interests within government. As this next source explains with regard to 
environmental regulation, this conflict of interests renders the task of reforming the 
system all the more convoluted:  
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―Often, it is tricky to reconcile the interests of Sonangol, [MINPET] and the 
environmental authorities, and you have to really know what the trends are 
globally and locally to see whether they are aligned and sometimes you even see 
the Ministry of Environment take a different approach to what the oil regulator 
take. So you have to be really careful with these because, for instance, if you 
sometimes try to negotiate with one without bringing the others to the table, you 
may end up with conflicting solutions to the same problem [...] You have to make 
sure that you talk to the right people so you may not find yourself in a situation 
where you may be agreeing with the Ministry of Environment and then you come 
to the conclusion that your main correspondents which are Sonangol and 
[MINPET] are talking about something else. So, you have various layers of 
overlapping regulation and you do have to be careful as to who you deal with to 
try and solve these problems.‖
311
   
 
For sure, not even the task of finding the ―right people‖ to talk to is an easy undertaking, 
for he/she may not always be the person who is the ‗face‘ of that institution. Experts give 
the example of the Minister of Oil, Desidério Costa, who was the ―real power in the 
ministry‖ ever since he was still deputy minister (see Shaxson et al 2008a: 27). As they 
remark, ―his strength comes not so much from his position as minister but from his 
reputation as being a presidential insider, and also being seen as loyal and trustworthy.‖ 
The BP incident further revealed how difficult it can be for companies to identify the right 
decision-makers. According to oil industry insider, one reason why BP got in trouble in 
Angola in 2001 is because company officials misinterpreted the ‗signals‘ from Sonangol: 
―they thought they had the green light from Sonangol‖ to make the disclosures public, 
when in actual fact, Sonangol was against the decision
312
.  
    
Having said that, Angola‘s context of oil governance reform is complicated is one thing. 
To draw some kind of impossibility theorem from it is another. Whilst policy reversals are 
a frequent occurrence, reforms are not overall impossible even in the most unexpected 
and controversial areas. These changes impel one to look beyond the actors and 
features of the reform context, towards considering the factors driving or limiting the 
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A QUEST FOR CONTROL, CONTINUITY, RENEWAL AND LEGITIMACY 
 
To some extent, the multiplicity of interests highlighted above mirrors the divergent 
trends currently at work, and variety of motivations for which ORT policies are adopted 
and implemented in Angola. Two sets of motivations were proposed, with interviewees 
setting one against another: (a) control and continuity; and (b) reputation and legitimacy. 
On the one hand, it is held that governance reforms are more about regime survival, 
about adapting to change and exerting control over the state and the pace at which 
change occurs, than they are about a genuine opening of political space or about elites‘ 
acceptance and embrace of the good governance agenda (Roque 2011: 1; see also 
Shaxson et al 2008a). On the other hand still, there are indications that reforms aim to 
appeal to international and national audiences, and increase the government‘s 
legitimacy at home and abroad. It is the view here that both sets of explanations are 
equally relevant. Indeed, one feature of the Angolan ORT model is that most, if not all, 
ORT and governance reform components have competing objectives.  
 
Political Control and Continuity 
 
During a London meeting organised soon after the 2012 legislative elections, former US 
Ambassador Christopher McMullen described President Dos Santos‘ acceptance 
speech as containing a ―long, interesting and […] very positive agenda of what [the 
president] wanted to achieve.‖ The theme of the speech was ―continuity and renewal‖ 
which reflected the president‘s desire to ―to continue and improve those things he 
thought the government was doing well, and end those things they thought the 
government was not doing so well.‖ According to the American diplomat, the very few 
cabinet changes (11 out of 34 ministers replaced) and the fact that many of those 
appointed were ―fairly well-known, with good party and technocratic credentials fitted 
well with the theme of continuity and renewal.‖
313
 The 2012 elections were the second 
legislative elections held in Angola since 2002, and the third since 1992. It therefore 
signalled the desire of the Angolan authorities to consolidate peace and the political 
process, and reconnect with the MPLA‘s political base. These elections also represented 
a significant shift in Angola‘s history, not least because they facilitated the emergence of 
new political forces and greater participation of civil society in the political process. Even 
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more significant was the fact that they were the first elections organised after a new 
constitution was enacted in 2010 that marked the official end of the post-war transition 
period and the beginning of a ―Third Republic‖ (Vines and Weimer 2011: 290).  
 
The 2010 Constitution exemplifies elites‘ ambitions to use reforms as a tool to control 
power. As noted in Chapter 4, the statute contains several pro-transparency measures, 
among which the parliament‘s take-over of the President‘s role of approving the budget. 
But it is controversial as well. For while encouraging transparency, and broadly 
guaranteeing  citizens‘ rights and freedoms, it effectively instituted in Angola a 
presidential-parliamentary model of governance that paves the way for the president to 
remain in power until 2022 should he wish to, or have a say on who should succeed him. 
What is more, the Constitution gives the president wide powers in appointing and 
exonerating all key positions - judges, prosecutors, generals, state governors and 
election commissioners – and controlling the budget.  
 
Alongside the further consolidation of presidential powers is the instrumentalisation of 
the anti-corruption campaign as a tool to get rid of internal threats or enemies. Chapter 4 
cited one interviewee‘s concern about ―show trials‖ that serve no purpose but to signal 
the president‘s seriousness about his anti-corruption campaign.  One such trial was that 
of General Fernando Garcia Miala, which had nothing to do with corruption, but with a 
question of ―political vested interests‖
314
 and ―intransigent‖ defence not of the state but of 
those who privatised the state (Muvuma 2011; BBC 2006). The General was convicted 
to four years in jail, and in spite of his past unpopularity within the presidential circle, he 
is now being ―rehabilitated‖
315
 In 2011, Roque (2011: 5) disclosed that he was set to 
become the country‘s next inspector general, having previously declined the position of 
interior minister because ―this would make him subordinate to the military office of the 
presidency, run by his arch-rival Kopelipa.‖  
 
Another issue with anti-corruption and ORT reform initiatives is that they often foster 
more opportunities for corruption and private wealth accumulation. Some respondents 
felt that the limited interagency coordination and cooperation of public financial 
institutions as part of this ―mentality of dividing them and not letting them communicate 
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with each other about things they really need to communicate about‖
316
 in order to have 
a firmer grip on government, on the patronage system, and avoid giving too much power 
to any single actor. Another indication of this comes from the establishment of the 
FSDEA - to which the president appointed his own son, Jose Filomeno Dos Santos, in 
an act that allegedly symbolises the ―entrenchment of nepotism and clientelism in 
Angolan society.‖
317
 In 2014, the IMF (2014: 10) noted that despite having already 
instituted most of the accepted best international practices for sovereign wealth funds, 
FSDEA is still lacking in transparency and governance, especially when it comes to the 
issuance of ―frequent (quarterly) and timely reports on its activities and performance, the 
timely publication of audit reports, and clear rules for selecting board members and 
external asset managers. 
 
It is worth noting that control of the political system and protection of political vested 
interests go hand in hand with control of the economy. One Angolan critic expanded on 
this matter in the following way: 
 
―There is a great need to have not only political control of the country, but 
especially financial and economic control. To the extent that if I have economic 
and financial control of the country, I control power in the long run; and even if I 
am no longer in power, I remain unavoidable [...]. Here, there is no Black 
Economic Empowerment. There is MPLA Economic empowerment because 
almost all the country‘s big businessmen are people in power.‖
318
   
 
In effect, Sonangol and the MPLA are the main facilitators of this system. Appointment to 
state employment, access to good healthcare, education, bank credits, housing, land, 
business opportunities, all still depend for the most part, on political affiliation to the 
MPLA and political allegiance to the president. Sonangol, on the other hand, is at the 
centre of Angola‘s ―state capitalism‖, that is, a more sophisticated form of clientelism and 
patrimonialism that combines illicit economic activity with capitalist accumulation through 
the liberalisation of foreign trade and the privatisation of state-owned enterprises 
(Péclard 2008: 29). Under this model, ―the state builds up commercial activity and other 
elements, then releases them to the private sector‖ (Shaxson et al 2008a: 47) in order to 
generate the growth and development of national entrepreneurs. In practice however, 
the private sector in Angola is dominated by a small number of oligarchs who control 
large private enterprises through ‗silent partners‘ or intermediaries that merely deal with 
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day-to-day management duties. An Angolan rights advocate explicated how this system 
works: 
 
―The President has established a special task force within the intelligence 
services, which selects, distributes and oversees business opportunities for 
certain political and social figures, reward loyalists, co-opt dissenters, enrich 
certain families, and ensure a vertical and tight control of the patronage system to 
maintain the status quo... Furthermore, most of the relevant foreign investments 
in the country are made through joint ventures with companies owned by the 
presidential family and the ruling elite, which helps to secure international support 
and complicity through corruption‖ (Marques 2012: 6-7). 
 
 
Sonangol has achieved this economic goal with tremendous success, as the sheer 
number of joint ventures and subsidiaries within its portfolio demonstrates. The exact 
number of these ―Sonaventures‖ (Shaxson 2009) is not known, although some estimate 
that they may be up to thirty nine (Soares de Oliveira 2007b: 604; Lwanda 2011; Heller 
2011). Outside its core oil industry focus area and besides the subsidiaries listed in Ta-
ble 10 below, the group comprises a number of companies that provide technical ser-
vices to oil companies such as platform construction, SONAMET; seismic data analysis, 
Sonawest, and a drilling company, Sonangol SGPS; and Sonangol Holdings Lda, a sub-
sidiary set up in 2004 with the aim of ―developing commercial and industrial activities, 
managing a portfolio of shares and providing technical and administrative services to 
specific companies‖ (Macauhub 2011). It also owns an air transport company, Sonair 
that has operated express flights to and from Houston for over 12 years at the same time 
that it has catered for other oil industry activities
319
.      
 
Sonangol‘s success can also be measured by its profitability, access to international 
markets and sources of financing, and in terms of Angola‘s growing influence in Africa 
and the world. Through its vertical and horizontal integration, Sonangol has increased its 
balance sheet, government revenues and enhanced Angola‘s international standing. 
One sure way it achieved this is by encouraging its foreign partners to use its subsidiar-
ies and by allocating rights for oil projects to itself and/or companies in which it has busi-
ness interests.  
 
Another key development has been its partnership with international companies and its 
use of oil dividends as a tool to gain mining rights and access to international markets. 
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Its expanding international portfolio tells the story. In the upstream and broader petrole-
um sector, Sonangol‘s interests include a 10 per cent stake in Gabon‘s Kiarsseny Marin 
block (in partnership with Tullow Oil and Addax); and other equity stakes in Iraqi fields, 
Cuba, the Gulf of Mexico (the latter alongside the Texan oil firm Cobalt), Venezuela,  
Brazil and Sao Tome and Principe.  
 
Table 10: Selected List of Sonangol‟s subsidiaries 
Subsidiaries Purposes 
Sonangol P&P Prospecting, research, development and  
production of crude oil 
Sonagas Prospecting, research, development, pro-
duction and distribution of natural gas 
Sonangol Shipping Transportation of crude and refined oil 
SONAREL Refining of crude oil 
SONAREF Construction of new refinery in Lobito 
Sonangol Distribuidora Commercialisation and distribution of re-
fined products 
Sonangol Ltd UK Commercialisation of crude oil and LPG 
Sonangol Logistica Storage of refined products 
Sonangol USA Company Commercialisation of crude oil 
Sonangol Asia Ltd Commercialisation of crude oil 
Sonangol Finance Ltd Contracting credit 
Solo Properties (Knightsbridge) Real estate 
Clinica Girassol Clinical services 
SIIND– Sonangol Industrial Coordination of the management, promo-
tion and development of industrial projects 
of Sonangol EP and its subsidiaries in 
Luanda and Bengo 
SONIP Real estate 
SONACI- Sonangol  Comercializa-
cao International Limitada 
International commercialization of liquid 
and gaseous hydrocarbons and their de-
rivatives 
Puaca Real estate 
SHC–Hidrocarbonetos Prospecting, research, development and  
production of crude oil internationally 
Sonangol Holdings, Lda  
ESSA Provider of professional training 
MST Telecommunication services 





It also is a major shareholder of the Portuguese firm Galp Energia through its shares in 
Amorim Energia, which holds one third of GALP's shares; and has a 20 per cent stake in 
Puma Energy Capital, the independent operator owned by Swiss Trader Trafigura which 
secures the company‘s access to the ‗midstream‘ and ‗downstream‘ sectors of a greater 
number of sub-Saharan African countries than it has managed to reach up to now (An-
gop 2012b; Petroleum Intelligence Weekly 2011).  
 
Furthermore, Grupo Sonangol boosts stakes in a number of foreign banks, including in 
in Portugal‘s largest listed bank, Millennium BCP in which it recently increased its shares 
from 14.59 (in March 2011) to more than 15.08 per cent, and by so doing, became the 
bank‘s biggest shareholder (Macauhub 2012). It is also involved in resource-for-
infrastructure and mining projects in Guinea, Zimbabwe, Tanzania, Mozambique, Mada-
gascar, Nigeria, Singapore, China and Indonesia; projects that it undertakes through 
CSIH (see Weimer and Vines 2012; Vines et al 2009).   With such a large portfolio, it is 
perhaps not surprising that the NOC engenders suspicions.      
 
Renewal and Legitimacy 
 
There clearly is, among the Angolan elite, the realisation that the world is changing, that 
political isolation is no longer an option, and that this new post-war international context 
calls forth the need for the normalisation of international relations, the need for smart 
partnerships and broader international acceptance and legitimacy. In turn, the desire to 
gain international legitimacy requires that a country like Angola seeking to find its place 
in the world establishes linkages with international players and institutions such as the 
IMF. The ―marketing‖ of Angola‘s fight against corruption, improvements in local and 
national governance and accountability, and Angola‘s contribution to regional and 
international peace and security apparatuses can be seen in that light. In addition to 
marking, a policy shift from a war-time emphasis on internal issues to a focus on foreign 
relations, these factors indicate elites‘ strategy to position the country as a major 
regional power following in the footsteps of South Africa and Nigeria (Martins 2011: 16).  
 
The signing of the SBA and transparency measures that accompany it, though arising at 
a time of crisis, can equally be interpreted as a ―political signal about identity and intent‖ 
239 
 
(Lord 2006: 20) of Angola‘s readiness to be considered as a good member of the club of 
nations. Jensen and Paulo (2011) noted the position of some government officials that 
the SBA contributed little funding but served to provide credibility to the government‘s 
economic policies and help secure a credit rating by Fitch Ratings in 2010. The analysts 
disputed this argument, on the grounds though small in comparison to Chinese credit 
lines, it was a significant boost to Angola‘s financial and economic credibility. This last 
argument is shared by a number of interviewees too. However, it is the author‘s view 
that the identity of the borrower - the IMF - says more about what the SBA was intended 
for than the amount of money disbursed, which the last positon seems to emphasise; or 
at the very minimum, that both these factors carry the same weight. It is interesting to 
note, for example, that in June 2009, Botswana was able to borrow US$1.5 billion for 
budget support from the African Development Bank, and ―in record time‖ (Woods 2010: 
59). This and the contraction of the US$1.5 billion loan from the Russian investment 
bank VTB Capital suggest that there were other sources of funding that if willing, Angola 
could have tapped into at that precise time.    
 
The preceding argument does not belittle the relevance of Luanda‘s financial liquidity as 
a ―soft‖ and ―hard‖ power tool that it uses regionally and globally to increase its economic 
and military participation in other African countries, to allow itself to have a say in those 
countries‘ national politics, in particular whenever its interests are ignored or violated 
(Dos Santos 2014: 24-26). Furthermore, Luanda increasingly perceives its achievements 
of the National Development Plan 2015, consolidation of its relationship with IFIs and of 
the conditions of economic and financial stability, including of greater fiscal 
transparency, as necessary steps to improve its image, to get closer to being SSA‘s 
biggest economy and an indispensable broker for peace and security in the region
320
. 
Among other things, this international legitimacy necessitates that the authorities ―clean 
up their finances and put the corruption somewhere else‖, even if ―regularis[ing] things a 
bit which is not the same thing as cracking down on corruption; it is just making 




At home, the necessity to become a ‗normal‘ country, a peaceful country that fits into 
today‘s world translated into government‘s attempts to renew the social contract in a 
sense, in order to achieve broader popular national legitimacy and longstanding basis in 
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political support amid growing expectations about the materialisation of peace and 
development dividends. The constant use of developmental language, the evolving 
social agenda, investments in infrastructure development, reforms of democratic 
institutions, and the implementation of transparency policies point to this. Nowadays, the 
government knows that ―transparency has to be part of the Angolan society; that is why 
there is the new public probity law that obliges people to declare their properties.‖  That 
is also why ―the government discloses oil revenue data on the internet and where they 
presented US$10 billion, now, they present US$15 billion; which insinuates that work 
has to be done.‖ These changes were, for the most part, implemented prior to elections 
and so evidently designed to appeal to the electorate.  
 
To close, it is hardly surprising that contradictions between shorter-term aspirations for 
accumulation of private wealth and longer-term goals of political survival and broad-
based development are leading to much scepticism about the rationales for ORT‘s 
embrace. To some, this is ―more a show off rather than substantial change in Angola‖, 




STRUCTURAL AND POLITICAL CONSTRAINTS 
 
The points outlined above partly explains why, on the one hand, the government 
remains engaged and committed to promote and increase transparency, while on the 
other, it appears to be constrained by political impediments and political fear to open up 
the system to international and national scrutiny. It is also the case that whilst there may 
be the desire and political will to implement structural changes, there are capacity 
constraints in terms of policy-making and implementation. As it is shown subsequently, 
this is one of the most contentious issues arising out of discussions concerning oil 
governance reforms in Angola. 
 
It‟s Capacity Stupid! 
 
To be clear, there are multiple risks to the successful implementation and effectiveness 
of transparency and governance reforms in Angola. The author already cited its 
centralised political system, top-down approach. Another prime limitation is the absence 
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of some of the most critical institutions for promoting transparency like the stock 
exchange, and of a culture of transparency and openness within the government. In 
spite of Jose Pedro de Morais‘ efforts to create a new transparent culture (Corbett 2008),  
 
―The government is finding it difficult to explain to people or to involve the people 
in terms of the expenses [...] Within state institutions this is a new discussion [...] 
Some people who are sensible understand that they have to talk about it. You will 
also find people who are not sensible, and when you talk about it, they would say 
that you belong to this party or another. But I think that things are changing, the 
discussion is taking place, essentially in Luanda‖
323
 
    
According to critics, Angola‘s petro-elites feel a sense of entitlement: ―they won the war 
and they feel entitled to the country‖, and therefore, not accountable to the people for 
their misuse of public funds.
324
 That said, the biggest debate is on the extent to which 
governance shortcomings are due to capacity and institutional issues on the one hand, 
or power and lack of political will on the other. Without being dismissive of the latter, the 
author found that the lack of institutional prerequisites and human capacity actually 
account for Angola‘s weak governance a great deal. These capacity issues, in fact, 
extend beyond the oil sector. Talking about the decentralisation process, one 
respondent affirmed that ―there are enough people within the central committees and 
other committees of the MPLA who have managed to consistently and regularly withhold 
or delay local elections‖. Yet, he nevertheless offered the ensuing analysis: 
 
―In 2008, when the CACS [―councils of community consultation and cooperation‖] 
legislation came in, at that stage, Cazenga which had a population of about one 
million, had a budget of about less than US$5 million for the whole municipality. 
They didn‘t have a budget. Therefore, to say that they needed to have local 
elections with that! I mean the staff of Cazenga, about 230 people for the whole 
of Cazenga? It is that absolutely underdeveloped local government, totally 
underdeveloped local government! So, the fact that you then go and have 
significant governance structure around something which didn‘t have money or 
local staff, you can‘t!...And at that stage, for your side of oil revenue 
transparency, some people then said it‘s all China‘s fault. There is such an 






In the oil sector, there are also genuine institutional capacity issues in the ministries 
involved in the management of public finances and the oil industry, and these are 
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seriously hampering their interaction with each other, as well as with IOCs. One 
interlocutor asserted that these issues did affect MINPET‘s inability to enforce local 
content rules, allowing IOCs to ―go round‖ these rules. ―Partly it is political‖, says this 
source, 
 
―…Because the petroleum ministry is not viewed as a powerful ministry. It is 
actually a very weak ministry, not considered to be very prestigious, and with very 
low levels of capacity indicated by the way that they were able to interact with 
me. It is not that they did not want to help me, because they realised that what I 
am doing is very much in their interests. They were just not able to help me, to 
provide me with data. In some cases, they were not even able to meet me 





It is this same lack of capacity that did not enable MINPET to take overall control of the 
oil sector, leading to a ―pragmatic‖ solution that allowed Sonangol to regulate old PSAs 
while guaranteeing it a 51 per cent stake for subsequent joint ventures (Danish Energy 
Authority and Copenhagen DC 2007: 11). 
 
As regards budget execution, it was noted that the low capacity of budget units to follow 
legislation accounted for the low rate of budget implementation and irregularities behind 
the arrears of 2009, besides the dual nature of the public financial management system 
and deliberate attempts by budget units to circumvent the rules (Jensen and Paulo 
2011: 38). The absence of a ―governance infrastructure‖ has also been a big challenge 
as this senior World Bank official explicates: 
 
―Take one example. There was a lot of money when I was there, put into the 
education system. The problem was not the funding of the educational system 
because the Ministry of Finance would give the Ministry of education money to 
pay the teachers, etc. The issue was that there wasn‘t a system to pay the 
teachers. So, teachers were asking money from the kids. That is not corruption 
but weakness of the government. There was no system to pay these guys. 
People were travelling with bags full of cash in order to go across the country and 
pay teachers. In the rural areas, teachers were not paid because nobody would 
come around with the money to pay them, and of course, they did not have 
banks. Now they have ATM, teachers are paid, and they do not need to ransack 
the kids anymore. This is evidence that governance has improved although much 
remains to be done. But governance has technical reasons. Just saying that it is 
corruption is being short-sighted. Of course it is much easier to pay transparently 
but you need to have good systems in place.  I often say that before there is 
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governance, there is need for the governance infrastructure. This is what the 
[World] Bank contributed to put in place but there must also be the willingness to 





Coming to information sharing, foreign observers assert that ―information flows are 
hampered by political and other considerations‖, and this is true in particular for the 
sharing of data on oil resources between Sonangol, MINPET (Danish Energy Authority 
and Copenhagen DC 2007: 10) and MINFIN too. Yet, among the ―other‖ considerations 
are critical factors such as weak institutional culture – meaning ―taking notes, keeping 
records, writing reports based on these records, circulating the reports, asking for peer 
review‖
328
. In short, these deficiencies make it hard to ―record things, and sometimes 
there is information that they don‘t want to share. But sometimes, things are just not 
registered because the systems are just not in place, or they don‘t have the appropriate 




These challenges are compounded by lack or uneducated skilled human resources. It is 
well documented, for example, that some staff at MINFIN‘s Financial Programming Unit 
had limited knowledge of government finances, forecasting techniques, debt projection, 
real growth calculation, inflation, and of how ―debt records should be kept, managed, 
and used in compiling fiscal tables‖ (Development Alternatives 2009: 1). And that there 
was only one member of staff handling seven different albeit key portfolios, from policy-
making, forecasting, tax audits, valuation, to dispute resolution, with limited clerical 
assistance in the Special Tax Regimes Department of MINFIN‘s National Tax 
Directorate in charge of handling over 95 per cent of the country‘s total tax revenues in 
2005 (Calder 2006; Macnab 2006). Taking into consideration the vast volumes of oil 
produced by various oil companies possibly with various accounting techniques, the 
additional layer of difficulty that comes with the receipt of large sums of upfront fees, 
delays in IOCs payments, Sonangol‘s quasi-fiscal activities, and the extreme complexity 
of the oil tax regime, it is perhaps unsurprising that there may be accounting and 
reconciliation issues.  
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A 2009 report also reveals that there are instances where ―extremely poor statistical 
output of the National Statistics Institute and the Ministry of Planning not only make it 
difficult to do the required technical work, but have caused [MINFIN] to be unwilling to 
publish reports‖ (Development Alternatives 2009: 2; emphasis added). That is, in 
addition to differences in presentation setups and basic data entry errors reported 
elsewhere (Jensen and Paulo 2011: 32; see also Chapter 4 on budget reporting). 
Consequently, whilst there may be ―no real interest high up in the system in making the 
situation match‖
330
, it cannot be denied that political constraints go hand in hand with 
technical shortcomings which are in part legacies of the war. 
 
One line of thought holds that the preceding political difficulties can be surmounted ―if 
you have watchdogs, a very informed society, a very inquisitive society asking for this 
and that.‖
331
The issue in Angola however, is that institutional checks and balances are 
weak. The executive power is largely unchecked and unchallenged by both the judiciary 
and parliament, and that in itself, is symptomatic of the wider systemic public 
accountability problem. Focusing on horizontal accountability next, the chapter will 
assess the contribution of these local accountability institutions to the fight against 
corruption and the internalisation of the transparency and good governance agendas in 
general, beginning my analysis with the judiciary.  
 
The Judiciary and Opposition Parties in Postwar Angola: Weak Accountability 
Institutions? 
 
Whether or not the judiciary must play a role in social transformation is theoretically 
debatable (Skaar and Van Dunem 2006). That said, Siri Gloppen proposes that when 
and why courts are active in this domain may depend on four main criteria: the effective 
voicing of social rights grievances; courts‘ responsiveness to social rights claims; judges‘ 
capability to find appropriate remedies; and authorities‘ compliance with judgments and 
implementation through social policies (Gloppen 2005, 2006; see also Skaar and Van 
Dunem 2006).   
 
It is not the aim here to expand on this framework or provide enough empirical evidence 
that would do justice to each of these conditions. What the author proposes to do is to 
                                                          
330





focus solely on the second criterion in this chapter – that is, on judicial bodies‘ 
responsiveness to allegations of corruption by public officials -, while looking into the first 
criterion in the subsequent one. One claim against the judiciary that this section seeks to 
investigate in particular is whether it is helping cover up top officials‘ abuses and foster a 
culture of impunity rather than effectively enforcing rules and administering justice. The 
section uncovers that while this is true to some extent, there are positive signs giving a 
glimpse of hope as to the possibility of change.   
  
To start with, it is worth noting that Angola‘s court system consists of the Supreme Court, 
the Appeals Court which is the highest operating court, in addition to municipal and 
provincial courts operating under the authority of the Supreme Court (Isaksen et al 2007: 
14). The 2010 constitution and the legal system give citizens legal protection of a wide 
range of social and economic rights as well as granting them the rights to seek redress. 
The problem in Angola is that the judiciary is actually the weakest branch of government 
(Skaar and Van-Dunem 2006: 5). There are many reasons why, the first being the 
absence of a legal culture. As noted, there is a clear lack of concern for checks and 





The nature of the legal system, especially its weakness relative to and dependence on 
the executive branch of government, contributes further to tame the judiciary‘s positive 
contribution to the anti-corruption struggle. There are four principal indicators of this: (1) 
the limited role that the Attorney General is expected to play in the application of LAP as 
mentioned in Chapter 4; (2) the lack of a functioning anti-corruption commission even 
though the law establishing such an institution was passed in 1995 by the Angolan 
parliament; (3) the limited jurisdiction or scope of the Court of accounts; and (4) the 
president‘s promotion of the Supreme Court Chief Justice to the rank of general of the 
armed forces (FAA) in October 2012.   
 
Worryingly, none of the requirements for judicial independence - from the security of 
tenure of judges, the financial security of the judiciary, to the direction of judicial 
administration – are fulfilled in Angola. As mentioned previously, the 2010 Constitution 
now gives the president total control over the nomination of judges from the 
Constitutional, Supreme and Audit Courts (Article 119), while the previous one provided 
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that the National Assembly nominates three out of the seven judges sitting at the 
Constitutional Court and gave the Supreme Court authority to name one judge (Manning 
2011). What is more, with the exception of the Supreme Court and the Attorney 
General‘s office, budgets are allocated by the Ministry of Justice and they are overall, 
woefully inadequate for the running of day-to-day administration of the judiciary (AJPD 




The judiciary is also plagued by corruption - bribe taking and influence peddling – is rife 
(U.S. State Department 2013: 23; Manning 2011; AJPD 2009), partly owing to the 
―legacy of militarism‖ that leads to ―confusion between obedience and to commanding 
officers and the exchange of illegal favours‖ as to the ―lack of a culture of legality‖ (AJDP 
2009: 24, 44). This has given rise to limited prosecutorial independence and partisan 
rulings (Manning 2011; AJPD 2009: 45). It is said in fact, that ―everybody in the political 





There are other significant challenges stemming from the inadequacy of the existing 
infrastructure - fax, phones, and electricity; to the shortage of trained judges and 
lawyers, of functioning courts and their high concentration in the capital, Luanda; to the 
lack of knowledge of the law (AJPD 2009; Manning 2011). Tellingly, a 2007 report 
indicated that a number of Supreme Court seats remained unfilled due to capacity 
shortages and the competence, skills and capacity of the Court of Accounts still need 
strengthening (Isaksen et al 2007: viii). This is also what one source had to say about 
these challenges: 
 
―Another indicator to prove the weakness of the justice system is that there is no 
favourable judge-population ratio. 80 per cent of judges are here in the capital 
and the rest in the rest of the country. But even in the capital, the number of 
judges is not enough to solve the problem of people. Bureaucracy also 
discourages one to use the justice system.
335 
 
A couple of studies support this point (see AJPD 2009: 58; Skaar and Van-Dunem 2006: 
9). The Angolan rights group AJPD explicates that this shortage of lawyers in the capital 
is inextricably linked with the practicalities of the legal aid system which prescribes that 
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anyone eligible for legal aid travels to Luanda in order to be allocated a lawyer from the 
bar association (AJPD supra: 59). Another dynamic is that while key individuals remain 
―invisible‖ as was discussed in Chapter 4, the judicial system punishes the poor. The 
irony, indeed, is that ―[Courts] function sometimes. For people who steal potatoes, or 
telephones, they are in jail. But the big people are never put in jail.‖
336
 Even one of the 
highest courts in the country, the Court of Accounts, ―deals only with civil servants at a 
lower level but not really at the highest level.
337
 One of these two informants elaborated 
on his critique by focusing on the looting of US$160 million from BNA. The case led to 
the arrest of some ―forty-nine unassuming people, including cleaners, drivers, archivists, 
porters, and some unemployed citizens‖ (Marques 2011: 25) between September and 
November 2010. Here is how he interpreted this outcome:  
 
―We had this problem with the national bank. They are talking about US$150 
million that disappeared from the treasury. Now the Supreme Court is behind 
those problems and they are saying that the government has recovered almost 
all the money that was taken, which we think is impossible. They are showing 
people but we have never seen the people, but we just see cars, and other things 
bought. And other people that they show as having stolen the money are small 
people who are not part of the decision-making in the bank. We have colleagues 
that went to see those people who took money from the bank. They are small 
small people. They are not the sort of people who have the power to make such 
decisions! How possible can it be that people who have no competence to 
manage the bank or write cheques or others are able to take money from there 
[the central bank] without the minister, their vice-minister and their officers‘ 




These illustrations should not be taken as denoting a complete failure of the judicial 
system or suggesting that impunity is the norm in Angola. In actual fact, Angolan courts 
and legal system are very much ―under construction‖ (Skaar and Van-Dunem 2006), with 
two parallel trends currently taking place. The first is exemplified by the legitimation of 
Manuel Vicente‘s and others‘ alleged corrupt practices; but the second trend is more 
visible at the provincial level and on less politically-charged issues. Two cases in point 
are (a) the arrest and detention of the administrator of Benguela at the centre of the 
―millionaire garden‖ in September 2010; and (b) the sanctioning of Teleservice, the 
private security company at the heart of allegations of corruption and human rights 
abuses in the diamond area – even if it still does provide security services to several 
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European embassies and multinationals in Angola, including Chevron (Marques 2011, 
2013; Chevron 2012: 18). Both scandals were tackled after legal complaints were 
lodged by Angolan journalists: the latter by Rafael Marques; and the former by José 
Manuel and Francisco Rasgado, respectively correspondent of Radio Ecclesia in 
Benguela and director of the local newspaper, Chela.  
 
These and other incidents pointing towards the inconsistency of judicial interventions 
support Pearce‘s (2013) interpretation of the law and legal system as a ―political 
battleground‖ in the wider society. With battle lines marked, on the one hand, by ―the 
progressive legal framework that survives from the 1992 constitution and the fragments 
of functioning judiciary‖; and on the other, by impunity and authoritarianism that stems 
from Angola‘s birth in wartime, the concentration of power in the presidency by legal and 
illegal means, and the extensive use of ―clandestine networks that are called state 
security‖ (ibid).  
 
Many of the foregoing concerns extend to parliament and opposition parties, which by 
many accounts have traditionally been weak at representing the interests and demands 
of the general population. That is, whenever they are given the chance to have a say, as 
there have been instances of complete disregard for due process, for the separation of 
powers and for parliament itself. One of the oft-cited instances was in the summer of 
2004, when two key pieces of legislation – the Land Law and Petroleum Activities Law – 
were passed whilst parliament was in recess because of ―its importance to the country‖ 
(Amundsen et al 2005: 11). The former had provided a rare opportunity for civil society 
activism and extensive public discourse even though most recommendations were 
simply ignored. 
 
Overall, respondents were quite clear that parliament‘s weakness derive primarily from 
its strong, almost unchallenged control by the ruling party, in addition to the party‘s close 
links with and control of the state. Whereas the former turned the institution into ―a 
rubber-stamp body‖ (Shaxson et al 2008: 30) that legitimises decisions taken by the 
executive from which the majority of laws emanate, the latter has allowed the MPLA to 
dictate the terms of engagement of other political parties in the country. What is more, 
one source reckons that the situation worsened following the 2008 elections and passing 
of the 2010 constitution: 
249 
 
―Officially, the National Assembly should make laws and control their 
implementation. But you see that in the last months following the approval of the 
new constitution, some laws that are passed do not even need the approval of 
the National Assembly because the majority of MPs are from the MPLA anyway... 
I think that now we are going back to the communist time because after the 
elections the ruling party won 82 per cent. So, if you go the national assembly, 
most members are part of just one party and they take decisions because there is 
no strong opposition. And you know that a democracy should have a strong 





Reports indicate that little has changed since this interview. In fact, in the first nine 
months of 2013, parliament approved 33 laws on ―how to regulate, how to control and 
give more powers to the president‖, including a law requiring potential international 
investors to enter into a joint venture with national companies at the discretion of the 
president. UNITA‘s leader talked about the existence of a ―controlled democracy‖ in 
which opposition parties do not have access to state media, their access to their 
constituencies is limited and monitored by the authorities, as is their freedom of 
expression sometimes even within parliament.
340
 He gave the following example to bring 
his point home: 
 
―The Angolan National Assembly has one plenary per month. There are many 
issues in Angola that need addressing but they [opposition parties] don‘t have 
space for it. They have an opportunity to come up with what they call ‗a political 
statement‘ every 3 months. Last week, there was a plenary where they were 
supposed to make that statement but they were denied that opportunity. What 
happened is that our deputies came out and they organised a press conference 
instead of talking at the National Assembly.‖
341 
 
This example largely corroborates to informants‘ assessment of how severely restricted 
the political arena has been for opposition parties in Angola. One Western analyst partly 
blamed the decline of UNITA‘s fortunes under Samakuva‘s leadership on the fact that 
―the MPLA has just made it very difficult for UNITA to organise even in its own 
heartland‖
342
. Another Angolan civil society actor declared that the media has been one 
key tool of control of the political space available to opposition parties, in the sense that: 
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―Most of the people who appear on television are often those that relate to the 
government. After debates in the parliament, you would often see the same 
people commenting in the media. Even on national television, members of the 





Continuation with past practices also saw the media continually being used as a 
propaganda tool, a tool to control and shape public discourse around key issues. What 
follows is this informant‘s recollection of events that took place during and after the 
approval of the 2010 constitution: 
 
―UNITA had boycotted the vote and they did that because of the way the 
constitution was approved: from one day to another, nobody knew what was 
going on [...]. The way it was presented is that: ‗UNITA did not even want to 
participate in the vote; they boycotted the vote‘. Almost like: ‗we wanted UNITA to 
participate but they refused to do so‘. But obviously it was the other way round. 
Now, imagine being someone who is not that literate. Of course you would think 
that the MPLA is much better because they wanted to involve UNITA but this 




Incidentally, one UNITA senior representative implied that communication shortcomings 
may not all have been down to the government but more generally, to the general 
coverage of UNITA‘s activities beyond Angola, and the way in which UNITA itself 
communicates with the outside world. He lamented that ―UNITA could be screaming in 
Luanda, it will be hard for you here to know what happened because nobody talks about 
it [...] Most of what UNITA does is not known and I guess we have to find a way to 
improve that as well.‖
 345
 In turn, the general contempt for media bias was reflected in a 
2009 survey, in which 76.3 per cent of respondents felt that the state media should 
devote more time for the opposition parties (Consulform LDA and American View Inc. 
2009). Saying that, what concerned my informants the most, and justifies the title of this 
sub-section, is the limited social representation of the legislature. In other words, the 
problem is that MPs are ―collaborators first, and then representatives of the people‖
346
. 
―They are not very linked to the people... They only talk in the name of the people but 
they are not really linked to the people.‖
347 
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The unfamiliarity with most of the parties holding seats in parliament is thought to be a 
corollary of this factor: 
―In other countries, MPs actually represent people. Here, few people even know 
their MPs! If you go to the streets and you ask people to give you the names of 
ten MPs, I don‘t think people will actually be able to do that because they don‘t 




Broadly speaking, according to interviewees, this problem owes to the fact that MPs are 
selected from a party list and not directly elected by citizens, which means in turn, that 
they are more accountable to the party than to citizens. Besides this lack of citizen 
accountability are (a) clientelism and the capture of parliament by small interest groups 
and personal gains; (b) the preponderance of party politics; and (c) lack of capacity. In 
this regard, it must be said that all political parties have a poor image with citizens. To 
give an example in relation to the first issue, some respondents perceive the problem to 
be the distributive nature of the MPLA - or ability of top MPLA officials to use state 
resources to co-opt opposition deputies -, whereas others would frame it in terms of the 
vulnerability of opposition deputies to MPLA‘s co-optation tactics. The subsequent 
quotations are instructive here:   
 
―The thing is that the MPLA in Angola is like the almighty party controlling 
everything even the improvement of your living conditions and everything is very 
much linked to the extent to which you are close or far from the MPLA... So, there 
are a lot of limitations and so people tend to have all these things into 
consideration so that they can survive. It will change one day if we reach a more 
balanced political picture. For now, it is very complicated because the MPLA is 
still controlling everything. People - I don‘t agree but at the same time I 
understand -, that they don‘t want to take too much risks. They have to think 
about their family, etc...‖
349 
 
―At the top level, if you are a senior member of an opposition party and you are 
offered a job by the MPLA, it‘s going to come with a house and business 
opportunities and yeah, it is just pure economic sense. I mean, at the top level, it 




It is alleged that in the run-up of the 2008 elections, UNITA lost two to three deputies to 
MPLA through co-optation and in return for houses in the new suburb of Luanda Sul 
(Amundsen and Weimer 2008: 31). Similarly, there were rumours that some party MPs 
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were offered and have accepted ―flashy cars‖ from the MPLA in the run-up to the 2012 
legislative elections; rumours which the party‘s president would not be drawn to. In early 
2013, the party suspended its youth leader over allegations of bribe taking from the 
MPLA, to ―discourage participation in anti-government protests and using UNITA 
resources to apply for visas in exchange for cash (Angola Monitor 2013). The situation is 
worse at local level, where the ―politicisation‖ and corruption of public administration 
accentuates challenges related to opposition parties‘ exercise of citizenship rights, their 
access to local state and community representation (Orre 2010).  
 
In addition to what is dubbed the partidarização - the ‗party-isation‘ of public life and all 
social sectors (Schubert 2010: 659) - which I return to subsequently, the other issue is 
that ―parliament itself is more focused on playing party politics, and the whole system is 
formulated in a way that is very competitive.‖
351
 These dynamics vary according to the 
political party in question so much so that if MPLA deputies seem distracted by the 
politics of ―keeping wealth through the party‖, UNITA is perceived to be crippled by 
tribalism and factionalism, whereas PRS (Partido de Renovação Social - Social Renewal 
Party) ―tries to pretend it‘s not an ethnic party but it clearly is.‖
352
 Moreover, ―some MPs 
have been saying that they need training, capacity building‖ in order to effect policy 
change.
353
The MPLA deputy chairing the parliamentarian Foreign Affairs Committee was 
quite defensive on this issue, saying:  
―We have the capacity that we have. We don‘t have the capacity that the UK has, 
but we have committees that deal with issues sent to us by the executive... It is 
very early to criticise the parliament because it is trying to do too many things all 
at once. We have been doing this for only 9 years!‖
354 
 
Her argument is one which has been put elsewhere, that parliament‘s lack of 
experience, capacity and expertise is linked to a lack of resources when compared to 
those at the behest of the executive. For instance, while the executive can afford 
―consultants from all nationalities‖, parliament itself only has a limited number of 
technicians and support staff with relevant expertise who can ―look at issues and pass 
their reports to MPs‖ on time for parliamentarian debates (ibid; see also Amundsen et al 
2005: 9). Traditionally, some of the most heated debates have taken place within the 
MPLA parliamentarian group rather than inside parliamentarian forums comprising 
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members of the ruling party and opposition parties (Amundsen et al 2005: 9; Shaxson et 
al 2008: 30). This has been the case for national budget discussions which sometimes 
left parliamentarians to approve the budget ―under the framework of party-dire loyalty or 





A number of domestic and Western civil society actors interviewed felt that MPs do not 
always understand their role, neither are they necessarily committed to it. One initiative 
that sought to strengthen their understanding of the role of parliament and establish a 
connection between parliamentarians and their constituents is ―Parliament and Me‖, a 
radio talk show co-hosted by the Catholic Radio Ecclesia and the American National 
Democratic Institute. Feedback from the project is that it was ―difficult to get MPs 
involved‖
356
. According to one of the programme‘s initiators, these difficulties emanated 
from the general suspicion there is of INGOs, even though there were variations in MPs 
responses. For example, whereas MPs from Huila province seemed ―open‖ to the idea 
of participating in the programme, others from Huambo were ―extremely closed and 
difficult to work with‖
357
. The other challenge was that MPs‘ interest was ―towards the 





Another mechanism available for citizen accountability is the standing committee on 
―Human rights and citizen petitions, complaints and suggestions‖, one of its nine 
committees
359
. But not even this committee engendered positive reactions. According to 
a couple of interlocutors,  
 
―The committee does not work properly. You cannot request meetings, report or 
talk to them afterwards. There is no proper action from the parliament. There are 
many commissions on various issues, which is quite confusing‖
360
. 
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―Any citizen can go to the national assembly and meet the MPs and talk to them. 
But now when you go there, they are always busy whenever you want to meet 




These apprehensions justify parliament‘s status as one of the country‘s least trusted 
institutions, and worse still, the total disillusionment there has been about the political 
system in Angola (see IRI 2003; IRI et al 2006; NDI 2006). In brief, people believed the 
social role of parliament to be quite minimal. Some held that the Angolan parliament is 
―an inert structure because it harbours a group of people seeking entitlements‖, and 
cannot serve as ―an arena where political change can be achieved‖ (Farinha et al 2004: 
20-21; Shaxson et al 2008a: 30).  
 
It is timely to review these perceptions in light of fairly recent developments that signal 
the advent of a new dawn in terms of the strengthening of parliament/opposition parties 
and their attempts at holding the executive to account. As a matter of fact, Angola‘s 
parliament has become more proactive, taking the initiative by presenting ―a number of 
ideas‖ on reforms of the political system, as well as proposing several debates on topics 
including corruption in government, transparency, respect for human rights and 
individual freedoms, poverty reduction and basic services delivery.
362
 In fact, Abel 
Chivukuvuku claimed that his party, CASA-CE (Convergência Ampla de Salvação 
de Angola-Coligação Eleitoral), is ―the most dynamic element within parliament with only 
eight members. Until today, we are the only parliamentary group that introduced 
proposals of legislation, proposals of government control and so on...‖
363
   
 
Parliament has become ―more assertive‖ as well. On occasion, it has ―sent legislative 
bills back‖. In one instance, the controversial Press and Information Law had to be 
amended because the initial draft ―gave more power to the executive to crack down on 
the opposition‖ and left open ―space for a misinterpretation of article 34 of the 
constitution.‖
364
 Furthermore, it is not unusual to see bills being thoroughly debated 
nowadays. When the law is related to oil exploration, ―normally there‘s a very heated 
debate about the time and space we‘ll dedicate to the oil exploration, as our focus is to 
diversify our economy and break our dependence on the oil economy‖.
365
Noteworthy too 
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is the remarkable intensity of parliamentary debates on the last two national budget 
proposals, as well as those on parliament‘s first ever approval of state accounts for the 
year 2011, for which only 14 out of 39 state departments reported their spending (on the 
latter, see McClelland and Soque 2013).  
 
Another case worth mentioning is that of the refusal of the opposition parties CASA, 
UNITA and PRS to approve a Money Laundering Law on the grounds that it excludes 
from punishment past offences (Manuel 2014). Daniel Benedict, chief of PRS 
parliamentary group, maintained in addition, that his party could not vote for a law that is 
non-transparent and would exempt actors who have benefitted from the proceeds of 
illegal mining which accounts for a lot of the money that is laundered (ibid).  The bill was 
eventually passed in late January 2014 by 144 votes in favour after FNLA sided with the 
ruling party, but there were 5 votes against and 27 abstentions.   
 
In a few instances, opposition parties confronted the executive using the legal system. 
CASA for one, challenged the president‘s decision to create the FSDEA without prior 
parliament approval before the Constitutional Court. It was unsuccessful in its attempt to 
have the decision quashed, but ―at least the debate was there‖
366
. Its leader also 
maintains that it was CASA that forced the President to open up Kilamba Kiaxi, the new 
city that remained empty until the President initiated a programme in February 2013 to 
subsidise the cost of the new apartments in order to make it accessible and affordable to 
a greater number of citizens.  
 
Another issue on which opposition parties have been forthcoming is that of the electoral 
process and transparency. UNITA, PRS, FNLA and Bloco Democratico (Democratic 
Bloc) lodged a complaint was lodged against the nomination of Suzana Inglês as head 
of CNE, which was only successful in a second attempt. In its ruling, the Supreme Court 
overruled the Superior Council of the Judiciary, agreeing that the nomination was illegal 
as Inglês, a close ally of President Dos Santos, was a lawyer and not a judge as the law 
stipulates. Pursuing the challenge further, UNITA asked for ―full investigation and the 
prosecution of the president of the republic and 18 other officials, including his national 
security advisor, for seven crimes against the sovereignty of the people‖. It claims to 
have 123 pieces of evidence on electoral irregularities during the 2012 elections that it 
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presented to the Constitutional Court in a case lodged against electoral fraud
367
. If a 
parliamentary Committee investigated some of its allegations of political interference and 
intolerance in Huambo,
368
 the judicial process was not that straightforward, as 
Samakuva recalls:  
 
―The constitutional court had initially denied to receive the process but it was also 
illegal the way they had done it. So, we went back with a stronger argument and 





In October 2013, the same Court ruled that parliament does not have the authority to 
hold inquiries into executive decisions; nor its members, the power to call for a public 
audience with members of the government or the president who, as head of 
government, ―should only answer to parliament if he, by his own will, decides to do 
so.‖
370
 In spite of this ruling, opposition MPs managed to get some concessions from the 
ruling party, with regard monthly public debates about relevant matters of national 
interest. After initially rejecting demands to do so in accordance to Assembly rules, the 
MPLA subsequently ceded and promised that these debates would begin in February 
2014 (Angolan News Network 2014).    
 
As demonstrated above, Angolan opposition leaders also have found alternative 
avenues - other than parliament - to keep the executive in check. The judicial system 
and above all traditional and social media have been useful in this regard. To illustrate, it 
is via a speech published online on his personal website and reproduced by other social 
media platforms including Maka Angola and O Pais - as well as by the weekly paper 
Seminario Angolense which was eventually silenced -, that Isaias Samakuva criticised 
the failure by President Dos Santos, to make his State of Nation address in parliament 
as laid down in the Constitution. More so, the content of the speech gave a taste of how 
forceful a stance opposition parties are willing to take in order to prove their credibility 
and viability as an alternative to the current government.  The leader of Angola‘s largest 
opposition party confined that:    
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―The idea that the Angolans were left with is that the veil covering the fact of 
corruption in Angola was lifted and people no longer have any doubt over who is 
the mentor and defender of corruption in the country....‖  
 
To him, corruption is:  
 
―When somebody in the role of the President of the Republic utilises public power 
to nominate his son as the lead manager of a sovereign wealth fund, without any 
justification; when he uses the government to deliver assets to his daughter to 
invest in private business and directs public authorities to interfere with judicial 
investigations of individuals suspected or to threaten and blackmail foreign 
governments only to protect private interests...‖   
 
In response to the president‘s attack on Western interest in corruption in the Angolan 
government, and with specific reference to his take on investigations into money 
laundering and fraud involving top Angolan officials in Portugal, Samakuva stated: 
 
―Europeans mention the corruption of African politicians not because they envy 
them but because African politicians chose Europe and America to store and 
invest the assets of corruption...There is no crisis in relations between Angola 
and Portugal ... There is only a crisis of values in Angola – in justice and in 
Angolan political institutions that resonates wherever Angolans claim to whiten 




Finally, the author recalls being told that the relationship between political parties and 
citizens has ―improved and it is much better than it has ever been‖
372
. This can be 
gauged by events taking place in May 2012, when ―UNITA called for a rally in one week 
and we had a massive adherence to that not only in Luanda, but in all [provincial] 
capitals.‖
373
 The rally took place on 19 May and was the first time since the 1992 
elections, that UNITA drew crowds far larger than MPLA in some provinces of Angola, 
including Luanda, to call for peace, electoral transparency and respect of the rule of law. 
Subsequent calls for mass protests have since followed in the same vein, in spite of the 
authorities‘ heavy-handed responses. As the author will show in Chapter 10, MPs‘ close 
cooperation with civil society has proved one of the most valuable elements behind 
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THE ROLE AND CONTRIBUTION OF THE ANGOLAN CIVIL SOCIETY 
 
―‗Civil society‘‖ is a complicated beast, full of conflicting 
particular interests and rife with individuals and 
organizations claiming to represent the general interest. 
Still, shared interests in capability expansion are broad and 
deep.‖ 
 
Evans (2008: 16). 
 
―The problem with ―civil society‖ as an analytical concept, or 
even as a political ideal, is not that it is under-theorized, but 
that it is over-theorized. It leaves out very little.‖  
 
Fierlbeck (1998: 165) 
 
 
Ultimately, this thesis is about how to bring about positive, transformative change to 
societies deeply affected by the negative impacts of oil extraction and production. But 
how possible is it to do so without an appropriate understanding of who should drive or 
drives that change, and how? Specifically, what is or should be the role and contribution 
of these countries‘ civil society? As Acharya (2012: 1) remarks, there is a big gap 
between the marginalized conceptualization of the agency of local actors in the diffusion 
of transnational norms and the important role they actually play in their 
institutionalisation. Precisely in the Angolan case, as was noted in Chapter 8, the 
retraction not just of those INGOs specialising in extractives sector transparency but 
indeed the vast majority of international actors present in the country coupled with the 
lack of resources available for citizen and civil society engagement to push existing local 
social actors to redefine their roles and responsibilities in society, leading to the adoption 
of new and more innovative ways to increase their direct involvement in their country‘s 
political life. Most surprisingly, this opened up political space for new actors to emerge. 
Who are these ‗old‘ and ‗new‘ actors, what are their motivations, how do they navigate 
this highly contested political terrain, at what price and for what outcome(s)? These are 
the main questions this chapter will attempt to provide answers to. Precisely, the chapter 
considers the processes through which the Angolan civil society has embraced and 
localised - redefined and contextualised - the transparency agenda (cf. Acharya 2012), 




A general mapping of civil society actors and issues in Angola follows this introduction. 
Then, the chapter moves to an analysis of how the Angolan Church
374
 which has the 
longest history of supporting transparency in the country, has gone about promoting the 
norm locally, and what it achieved. The section finds that the achievements of this local 
civil society actor are most visible at the level of discourse, though it has waned recently 
for various reasons, including many highlighted in Chapter 8 that explored the role of 
GCS. Yet the third section uncovers an indirect outcome of the Church and GCS‘s 
advocacy work on ORT, namely, the affirmation of alternative understandings of 
transparency which is leading to incremental but real changes. It depicts the recent 
trends with specific examples. This finding reasserts the view that studying GCS‘s 
contribution to policy norm diffusion is not very meaningful without an understanding of 
the ways in which local NGOs relate to transnational actors (Acharya 2012: 1).  
 
MAPPING CIVIL SOCIETY IN ANGOLA 
 
As noted in the introduction to the thesis, advocates of ORT place enormous on faith on 
civil society‘s ability to demand accountability and drive change in their countries (see 
Idemudia 2010: 14). In Andrew Barry‘s words, ―the purpose of those who promote the 
virtues of transparency is not just to address the lack of economic information, and to 
foster the development of a market economy, but also to address the lack of 
development of civil society‖ (Barry 2013: 62). Yet what exactly is meant by ‗civil society‘ 
is a mystery; in fact, defining civil society has become ―a political exercise all of its own‖ 
(Van Rooy 2004: 10). What counts as civil society, why and who decides? Writing on the 
―illusion of civil society‖ in Africa, Chabal and Daloz (1999: 17) conceive that the notion 
of ‗civil society‘ ―would only apply if it could be shown that there were meaningful 
institutional separation between a well-organized civil society and a relatively 
autonomous bureaucratic state.‖ David Chandler too deplored a similar focus on the 
incapacities of Bosnian people as was highlighted in Chapter 8. He noted in particular 
perceptions of Bosnian people and society as ―deeply sick‖, ―feudalistic‖ or as ―the flock‖ 
among INGOs and internationally-funded local NGOs, which he argued, necessitated 
that greater attention be paid to ―the failing within international democratisation practice 
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itself‖ (Chandler 2004: 240-41, 228). Even the author was advised by a Western 
extractive industries‘ ‗expert‘ not to ―talk to [Angolan] NGOs‖
375
 as though they are 
somewhat irrelevant to the debate of ORT.  
 
While far removed from reality, this outright denial of the existence and denigration of 
civil society helps in identifying the main issues at the centre of contestations and 
contradictions of the concept of ‗civil society‘. They emphasise debates on the ―location‖ 
of this ‗civil society‘, that is, its separation from the state and the market; its 
―organisation‖, viewing ‗civil society‘ as ―a place of organizations, rather than loose 
constellations within society‖; and as with GCS, its ―inspiration‖ or moral high ground 
(Van Rooy 2004: 6-8; see also Mohan 2002: 2). Van Rooy (2004: 7-8) remarked: 
 
―Of course, in real life, such distinctions can be hard to make with precision: 
Where do you put an organization founded by an entrepreneur whose family has 
great influence with the current government, and whose activities focus on pro-
moting civic awareness among minorities? […] Are unions part of the market-
place or of civil society? What about non-governing political parties? What about 
clans or kinship groups? […] Are political parties in or out? Are business councils 
in or out? And what about groupings that are not really organizations in the 
Western sense, and certainly are not of voluntary membership, such as tribes, 
age-sets, or kinship groupings? [And] With such an array of virtue, how can one 
see clearly what is actually going on in the real world of power struggles?‖  
 
Like Chandler and others, Fernando Pacheco - a high profile and well-respected 
Angolan civil society advocate - laments the preference for the Westernised, 
professional and recognisable civil society in development thinking.  In the Angolan 
context, he defined civil society in terms of their identity both as organisations and 
agents, including churches, NGOs, entrepreneurial and professional associations; labour 
unions and privately-owned media; cultural groups; opinion leaders; solidarity groups 
belonging to the informal sector; foundations, cultural associations, labour unions, 
peasants‘ and youth organisations that ―manifest their own dynamics and act like 
pressure groups‖; and traditional authorities given their role in rural communities 
(Pacheco 2002: 55-56).  
 
Vines et al (2005b: 2) however, foresee two major problems with this conception of civil 
society. First, they highlight the complexity that exists in the characterisation of 
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traditional authorities as ‗civil society‘ given as they say, that ―traditional authorities have 
been politically manipulated since colonial times, and they continue to be divided along 
political lines.‖ The role of traditional authorities in Angola is indeed indisputable. One 
well-informed observer of Angola suggested that they not only held the balance in the 
rural areas in the 1992 elections, but that their contribution to the MPLA‘s electoral 
campaign in advance of the 2008 elections partly explains the downfall of UNITA. In 
effect, while in 1992 ―the traditional chiefs were instrumental to each party in gathering 
support in rural areas‖, in 2008 things changed ―because of the way the MPLA took 
control of the traditional chiefs, traditional authority has been effectively incorporated into 
the local administration which is indistinguishable from the MPLA.‖ Therefore,   
 
―[…] chiefs are now the local representatives of the MPLA in the villages, and no 
one is allowed to talk about politics except in the way that favours the MPLA. And 
in the village, there is no way you can hold a different opinion. All kind of public 
knowledge and public discourse are communal property in the village. So, it was 
partly the MPLA using the chiefs to keep control on things, make sure that no op-
position activist was able to campaign in the village, which was another thing, and 
also sheer bribery: the MPLA would come with a motorbike for the chief and 




Still, while the basis of the argument on why traditional authorities may not representing 
‗society‘ offers an objective depiction of politics in Angola, the concern itself only reflects 
the point made above about the general unease there is around so-called ―unethical‖ 
parts of civil society even among Angolans. In the past, this includes civil society actors 
who take up parallel employment. The extent of the challenge was revealed recently by 
World Learning‘s recent mapping of civil society in Angola (World Learning 2010). The 
INGO found that 76.7 per cent of Angolan civil society actors work in the public sector, 
19. 9 per cent have private sector jobs and 3.5 per cent undertake work in the third 
sector. It observed that while parallel employment constitutes a factor of organisational 
weakness of the Angolan civil society in terms of human resources, it also means that 
many have better technical capacity to go about implementing the necessary projects. 
These dynamics suggest that international actors have to trade carefully in order to 
avoid sidelining Angolan transparency activists who may have the passion for activism 
but rely on private sector employment (mostly in the oil services industry) to survive as 
they did in the past. 
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The second question that concerns Vines and colleagues relates to the inclusion of 
party-affiliated organisations in Pacheco‘s conception of civil society. As they observe, 
―this raises a complex question in an Angola where the state has been so powerful and 
able to permeate many aspects of society or repress those it has seen as threats‖ (Vines 
et al 2005b: 2).  The issue here is mainly one of civil society pressure and of attribution 
of impacts. In short, how possible is it to distinguish between instances where societal 
change occurs because of civil society‘s direct actions from those where change is 
driven by civil society pressure through more powerful actors such as, say MPLA 
structures at the provincial or municipal level as was the case with the ―Millionaire 
Garden‖ in Chapter 9? In the latter case whom are the outcomes of the intervention 
attributed to? This is essentially an open ended question that the dissertation will not 
address, if not indirectly in the fourth section by providing the reader with some pointers 
on what happens when civil society does take a leading role in development.    
 
As elucidated on in Chapter 8, a third challenge to the conceptualisation of identity of 
civil society has to do with what constitutes ―local‖ civil society and ―international‖ civil 
society. In the case of OSISA, one respondent distinguished a ―local‖ from an ―interna-
tional‖ civil society in terms of the identity of key decision-makers and the organisation‘s 
agenda. Put simply: 
 
―It is important to distinguish that Open Society, while being an international or-
ganisation, has in Angola a very national face in the sense that the staff, in terms 
of strategic thinking, is totally Angola; priorities are defined by Angolans, and so 
on. It is a combination of international but with a strong Angolan face […]. Of 
course, some of the staff is not Angolans, but these are not the staff defining the 




This question posed itself with regard to DW Angola as well, though this time the em-
phasis was not on the staff, but on the organisation‘s territorial coverage and the period 
of activity in the country. As another interlocutor put it: 
 
―That‘s an easy one. In the case of DW, its name is DW Angola. It‘s not DW Eng-
land, when it began there was no possibility to have local organisations regis-
tered, only international organisations. At that stage, it was the first to be regis-
tered, and it was in part for the solidarity with the MPLA and issues like that. [Its 
director] is Canadian, has been living in Angola for the last 30 years, just. But 
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apart from that, you could define it as local […]; it doesn‘t extract money from an-




These brief comments give the opportunity to clarify that in this context, the key deter-
mining factor was the origin of OSISA, which is treated in the dissertation as a US INGO 
since it originated in the US.   
 
On the specific functions of civil society, Pacheco appears to see civil society as a 
―pluralistic space whereby associations act as transmission belts between the individual 
and the state‖ (Mohan 2001: 3). Specifically, he identifies four types of civil society 
organisations in Angola that function as (a) conduits of the state; (b) complement to the 
state‘s actions; (c) a substitute for the state in certain critical sectors; and (d) watchdogs 
that are ―critical of the State and its institutions‖ and are contributing to ―weaving nets 
and complicities that shape possible alternatives to power, in line with certain social 
movements that embodied political parties in Latin America.‖ While connotations of 
‗government‘ are often left implicit in debates about civil society, in Angola, specific 
examples of collaborative or constructive engagement with government means. In brief, 
it means supporting the executive, by ―working critically, constructively, to ensure that [it] 
does its job so that the US$40 billion [budget] or a good chunk of it does to address the 
needs of the poor.‖
379
 It also means working to ensure the effective functioning of the 
judiciary by creating awareness on constitutional matters
380
. Finally, it equates to 
supporting MPs by providing 
―[…] a basis to support their position, argument. I am not an expert on the budget 
but when we have debates on the budget or food security, I can combine the 
research that has been undertaken to construct my argument. It does not happen 
in the national assembly.‖
381 
 
The grounding for this perspective is laid out in Teka (2008: 68). In this analyst‘s view,   
 
―NGOs concur that the state should lead the development the nation-building 
process […]. The public sector is viewed as central in the creation of the support-
ive bases the country lacks for sustainable development. However, NGOs posit 
that such a state-led framework should be participatory, accommodating of both 
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the civil and private sectors given the state‘s weakness in soft and hard capacity 
and its historically intransigent politics.‖   
 
According to the same author, this position reflects the extent to which civil society‘s 
function has been remoulded from an ―anti-statism watchdog‖ status to one that is ―more 
complementary to state‖ (ibid: 45). However, as Pacheco (2002: 56) himself acknowl-
edged, the concern often is how these organisations should cooperate with the govern-
ment, and to what extent, in order to avoid criticisms that they are being co-opted by the 
government, or to paraphrase Chabal and Daloz and others, avoid being seen as an in-
tegral part of the MPLA‘s neo-patrimonial networks. Should they take a concert-
ed/uniformist approach or a pluralist one? Teka (2008) sided with those who believe in 
the need for a non-uniformist yet common vision; whilst in Macedo‘s (2009: 119) view,  
―This disguised and apparently well-intentioned initiative to promote unity is a 
great threat to the Angolan democratic constitution […]. Pluralism of expression 
and of political organisation aims to guarantee that various interests, rights and 
aspirations, even of minority groups, are taken into consideration through public 
debate, public demonstration and other democratic means.‖      
 
After mapping out a few key issues of critical relevance to the examination of civil society 
in Angola, it is now time to review the contribution of the Angolan church to the institu-
tionalisation of ORT in this postwar era. As explained in Chapter 8, the Church has 
played a vital role in building and establishing the ―moral case‖ for ORT (Van Orange 
and Parham 2009: 36). It is the objective of the next section to assess what it did, how 
and to what effects.   
 
GOD OR POLITICS? THE CHURCH AND ORT IN ANGOLA 
 
None of Angola‘s 302 NGOs has played as critical a role as Church affiliated 
organisations in the institutionalisation of ORT in postwar Angola particularly in the run-
up to the 2008 elections.  The reasons for this will soon follow in this account which 
draws from interviews and reports by key individuals that were either heavily involved in 
the processes described subsequently or closely watched and studied them with a keen 







The Role of the Church in War-torn Angola 
 
One Angolan Protestant pastor explained that ―to understand the role of Churches in 
Angola, one needs to revisit the role that it played during the colonial period.‖
382
 In doing 
so, one should begin by noting that the Church has always had an ambiguous role in 
society, not least because ―you find the Church on both sides‖
383
. Protestant missions 
played a critical role in the ‗enlightenment‘ of the masses; they were ―the principal fora in 
which the Angolans could express their aspirations and work for the achievement of their 
goals‖ (cited in Vidal 2009: 30). Their work is most evident in rural areas, in the North in 
particular, where they had appeared long before colonial rule and seemed to be ―much 
at odds with the Portuguese authorities‖ (Newitt 2007: 69). But their role was 
―circumstantial‖ since they were almost always in opposition with the Catholic Church 
which was seen as the ―Church of the colonial state‖ on the grounds of its participation in 




According to this account, it was therefore not a coincidence that anti-colonial 
sentiments took root in rural areas, that the anti-colonial war was waged for the most 
part in those areas, and also that the three rival revolutionary factions – the MPLA, FNLA 
and UNITA –emerged and developed from within Protestant missions. Yet, one should 
not be oblivion of the fact that by ―supporting‖ these three movements, Protestant 
missions actually reinforced ethnic and tribal differences: 
 
―Agostinho Neto [leader of the MPLA] was Methodist, Olden Roberto [leader of 
the FNLA] was Baptist and Jonas Savimbi [leader of UNITA], was 
Congregational. And it's true that these three denominations were the most 
important in terms of […] influence. And you know […] the country was divided 
the same way that Chevron and others run their business: if Shell operates this 
bloc, Chevron will be in another. So, Baptists were in the north where you find 
Bakongo; Methodists were in the north central where Kimbundu are found; and 
Congressionalists lived in the south central where the Ovimbundu are located. 
These are the three biggest tribes [...]. Therefore, there‘s been a political 




A 1984 document indicates in effect that the Church was deeply concerned by foreign 
missionaries‘ evangelisation methodologies, which were such that ―historical differences 
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between ethnic groups became religious differences and subsequently political 
differences, when the nationalist parties emerged from within these ethno-religious 
identities‖ (Comerford 2009: 164). It is these internal divisions, along with the colonial 
regime‘s ‗divide and conquer‘ policies, that engendered the ―lack of unity‖ the Church 
saw as the ―determining factor slowing down the search for peace, for justice and 
development‖ (CICA 1984 cited in Comerford 2009: 164). 
 
One defining moment in the history of Angola and the Church‘s political engagement 
was the alleged coup in May 1977 which was described in Chapter 3 as one of the main 
sources of the culture of fear and self-censorship that has since prevailed in the country. 
These events were described as ―une bonne malchance‖ (or a ―good bad luck‖) 
illustrating the paradoxical effect they had on (a) the relationship between the Church 
and the state, and (b) the relations among churches themselves
386
. Specifically, the 
Methodist Church went from occupying a privileged position in the socialist state – 
precisely because of the links established previously – to being segregated, as 
perceptions of churches, religious groups and personalities within the political elite 
changed dramatically, from them being seen as collaborators to being treated as 
potential enemies. Radio Ecclesia, the Angolan Catholic Radio was banned and 
nationalised in 1977 and was only allowed to broadcast in Luanda in 1992 (Marques 
2014). These types of restrictions on the Church and society in general combined with 
the heavy-handed approach of the MPLA to influence the attitude of churches on 




Simultaneously, the shift to Marxism-Leninism that followed facilitated the separation 
between Church and State, allowing the Angolan Churches to unite. Reflecting this unity 
is the creation in 1977 of CICA, the Conselho das Igrejas Cristas de Angola or the 
Angolan Council of Christian Churches, which is an umbrella organisation that 
comprises 22 members, including non-Catholic and Protestant churches (Jensen and 
Pestana 2010: 4). In 1999, CICA joined CEAST, the Catholic Church‘s Episcopal 
Conference of Angola and Sao Tome and Principe, to form COEIPA, the Ecumenical 
Peace Committee that led the peace process. In sum, therefore, this unity then allowed 
the churches to put a united front in the construction of the public sphere and peace 
narratives during the civil war in the 1990s, though with a slight difference on each 
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individual church‘s theological conception of the civil war: from CEAST‘s definition of the 
civil war as a ―genocide‖ to Protestant churches‘ interpretation of the war as ―an unjust 
and fratricidal war‖ (Comerford 2009: 176-77).  
 
It appears that these reflections were influenced by, or at least tracked alongside two 
trends. The first was the combination of state fragility and the presence of humanitarian 
agencies between 1992 and 1999, which helped create the conditions for the 
emergence of a new and more independent Angolan civil society whose work would be 
on humanitarian aid, human rights and, as in the case of the church, peace-building 
(Pacheco 2006: 2; Amundsen and Abreu 2006: 3). As one interlocutor put it, ―with the 
footprint that international organisations were able to leave in Angola, local civil society 




The second trend relates to reflections taking place within and among churches. Pastor 
Luis Nguimbi, Chairman of the Christian Forum of Angola and former Secretary General 
of CICA recalled that reflections within CICA before the 1990s revolved around the role 
of the Church. On this subject there were three main positions. One position espoused 
the idea of the Church as ―more heavenly than an earthly institution‖, arguing that it 
could ―exercise a humanitarian role in support of the needy from a charitable 
perspective, but not as politically aware activists.‖ A second grouping believed that the 
primary duty of the Church as an institution was ―to gain souls for Christ‖: ―they saw 
politics as a necessity, reserved exclusively for those trained in the subject, thus 
ensuring a clear separation between politics and the Church.‖ A third group thought that 
―in spite of the mission to evangelise, the Church was obliged to contribute to the greater 
society, part of its mission being to guide people in defining policies that promoted the 
well-being of all‖ (Luis Nguimbi quoted in Vidal 2009: 29).          
 
These divisions notwithstanding,   
 
―The churches collectively and consistently argued that dialogue represented the 
best way to achieve lasting peace [...] Democratisation was seen perhaps in an 
idealised way, as the surest means to consolidate peace in Angola, and provide 
the proper forum where ethnic differences could be addressed in a non-violent 
manner‖ (Comerford 2009: 177).   
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The Church sought to engage on the definition of post-war reconstruction as well, but 
without much success, partly because of the failure of the peace process to include civil 
voices. Indeed unlike in Namibia, Mozambique and South Africa where peace came 
through a negotiated settlement, Angola is an ―unusual post-conflict setting‖
389
 in which 
transition from war to ‗peace‘ was the result of a clear and definitive military victory by 
the party-State. The 2002 Luena peace agreement, like its antecedents, was only an 
affirmation of ―the rights of the most powerful‖ (Nzinga 1999: 7) and of the legitimisation 
of the exclusion of other political and social actors which was set in motion in previous 
peace processes. More importantly for civil society and the peace movement led by 
churches is the fact that Luena exposed their limited ability to convince the MPLA 
government that a negotiated peace settlement, as opposed to the military option, would 
bring about ‗peace‘ thereby demonstrating their irrelevance in Angolan politics (Vines et 
al 2005b).  
 
Where the Church succeeded thereafter, the Catholic Church in particular, was in raising 
the profile of the question of economic justice and transparency. Following are an outline 
of the actors involved in this advocacy work, of the ways and methods employed, and 
impacts. 
 
The Church on Transparency and Economic Justice in Postwar Angola: Actors, 
Actions and Impacts 
 
From the Catholic Church perspective, as noted previously in Chapter 8, two key Church 
affiliated organisations played a critical role in raising awareness on the question of 
transparency and economic justice in Angola. The first, CEAST, is regarded as a major 
actor in relation to ―internal pressures on transparency issues‖. In 2004, it delivered its 
first pastoral letter The Path Towards Hope and created an Economic Justice Unit within 
CJP, a ―timely initiative that assisted in monitoring revenues from the oil and diamond 
industries‖. A second pastoral letter For Economic Justice followed in October 2006, 
calling on the government to ―actively participate‖ in the EITI (Comerford 2009: 183). 
CJP‘s, the second organisation, had a valuable input in the campaign especially in the 
area of budget transparency notably through its participation in IBP‘s budget 
transparency surveys from 2006-2010, and its release of a detailed analysis on the oil 
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sector in Angola in 2008. It is listed too as one of the organisations to have played a key 
in discussing electoral legislation and increasing political tolerance in the run up to the 
2008 elections. A third group, the Dominican Congregation‘s Cultural Centre Mosaiko 
created in 1997, had an indirect contribution though its promotion of human rights 
issues, particularly relating to land rights, at the grassroots level. The thinking behind this 
focus was that ―people on the ground are the ones who are really faced the duress of 
life, problems, and so on, and they are the ones best placed to voice their own concerns 




Jensen and Pestana (2010: 13) observe that one of the main characteristics of the land-
scape of churches in Angola is between the unity of the Catholic Church – due to ―its hi-
erarchical structure with all bishops being appointed by the Holy See in Rome‖ – and the 
diversity of the Protestant churches which is ―profound and rooted both in the missionary 
tradition as well as interdenominational strife and discord in the process of choosing 
church leaders.‖ These divisions partly explain why the Protestant Church did not en-
gage much in the question of transparency and economic justice, if only perhaps indi-
rectly through the Evangelical Congregational Church (IECA) – the most significant 
protestant church in Angola (Jensen and Pestana 2010: 11) -, its involvement in the 
preparations for the 2008 elections and its membership to Socio-Political Observatory of 
Angola (OPSA) (ibid: 24). As one key source reflected,  
    
―There were no declarations on socio-economic justice, whether in the theological 
language or in the theological training. The Catholics have that advantage. 
Somebody said that the problem with us Protestant is that we protest against 
everything. The only thing we did – actually that I did as an individual and not as 




This informant attributed this lack of initiative on the part of the Protestant Church to 
contextual factors, and the way in which the Church interpreted its role in that context. 
He noted:  
 
―The separation between Church and State equates to ‗not knowing‘. And 
seeking to know is loving politics [...] politics is when you criticise; and not doing 
politics is giving praises.‖
392
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One consensus in Angola is the Church‘s efforts have been minimal beyond the level of 
discourse. Analysts cite the 2008 elections as a major driver against reforms in the 
Catholic Church (Croese et al 2011). Other constraining factors include the receptivity to 
the issue of transparency, self-censorship, government‘s ‗co-optation‘ of church leaders, 
lack of funding and capacity issues. Analysts noted that in the run up to the 2008 
elections, CEAST became ―a careful actor, conscious of its position in Angolan society 
and the political sensitivities involved in advocacy‖. The overriding priority of the Church, 
it seems, was ―to get through them in a peaceful manner, as a step in the normalization 
of a democratic process in the country‖ (Croese et al 2011: 72). Moreover, the Church 
was confronted with a lack of capacity and difficulties in retaining key staff:  
 
―Many people who are competent and voicing their opinions in a very critical way 
are very vulnerable to offers made by the government. This is for example the 
case with the [CEJP] of the Catholic Church. It had some young people whom, 
considering our context, were competent considering […] but they have been co-





The other challenges the Church encountered are leading to challenges to its legitimacy. 
Officially, the Church is the most trusted institution in Angola and most representative of 
the people, even though ―there were times in the colonial period when the Catholic 
Church was not part of civil society‖ (cited in Vidal 2009: 31). The Catholic Church alone 
has more than 13 million members and is present in all 18 provinces of Angola (Jensen 
and Pestana 2010: 12). Its legitimacy also stems from the fact that it ―has been for a long 
time, the only voice denouncing injustice.‖
394
 Yet it would seem that the Church has not 
lived to expectations as the levels of poverty in the country demonstrate, according to 
this source: 
 
―I believe that the Church has got power and authority. Are they using it? That is 
a different question because the majority of the Angolan people are Christians 
and they got to Church but are the most poor and impoverished people, and 
completely excluded and marginalised. Does the Church speak on their behalf? I 
think no because these people have no water, no electricity, they have no 
sewage system, poor health and education and so on. Does the Church really 
work for these people? I would say no, and sometimes I feel that leaders of the 
Church themselves have become an elite and don‘t really identify themselves 
with the real problems. They speak on behalf of the poor but don‘t live what the 
poor live. And you know in Angola, the Church in Angola is closer to the 
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government structure and systems than to the real people that they pretend to 
represent. How can you administer to a congregation of people who don‘t have 
water or electricity, no health for the health system is completely in decay? They 
cannot afford to go to the mushrooming of private health clinics and private 




During a 2004 conference on The Process of Transition to Multiparty Politics in Angola 
(Vidal 2009) organised in Luanda, a number of commentators reflected the same 
feeling: 
―[In] Benguela, Malange and Luanda, all the responses except one considered 
that churches are not [civil society organisations], in so far as they are 
hierarchically organised, dogmatic and not democratic, though they have their 
role in the public sphere, articulating and mediating social relations and 
promoting social justice.‖  
―What is CICA doing to return to the vision of the Church as an organisation 
where people have access to material goods? Which COIEPA projects reduce 
social injustices, such as the demolition of houses and death of street sellers? 
Recently we witnessed a massacre, but saw no comment from a religious 
leader.‖ 
 
Recent incidents involving the Church contribute to fuel distrust among the Angolan 
people. These include revelations about Catholic Church-linked forced evictions which 
forced Pope Benedict XVI to intervene during his visit in Angola in 2009 (see Amnesty 
International 2007). Similarly, Radio Ecclesia (owned by CEAST) has recently faced 
accusations of self-censorship, after unjustifiably cancelling programmes which 
encouraged live debates and firing some of its staff. These incidents apparently 
occurred soon after MINFIN deposited US$50,000 in an account belonging to the radio 
(Marques 2014).    
 
In a sense, the foregoing analysis about the limited roles of Angolan civil society in the 
institutionalisation of ORT in Angola justifies going beyond accountancy or beyond ORT 
to identify and highlight what may be absent or hidden from current debates and can 
shed light on the ways and extent to which actors can bring about positive change in 
Angola. The following section attempts to highlights some of these positive experiences 
by looking into specific instances of civic-driven change in Angola.  
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BEYOND ACCOUNTANCY: CIVIL SOCIETY AND CITIZENS LED INITIATIVES IN 
ANGOLA 
 
During the course of her field visit to Luanda in August 2010, the author was given 
various examples of civil society gains that were showcased to help make the case for 
the existence, growth and indeed sophistication of an Angolan civil society. These 
initiatives are worth discussing herein for the possible lessons that can offer about the 
drivers and process of change in Angola. Among the most important initiatives listed 
were Maoes Livres‘ and AJPD‘s contestation of arbitrary arrests of political prisoners and 
promotion of human rights through the training of police officers, publications and direct 
engagement with the judiciary. The overriding vision of such projects is ―how we 
enhance change in thinking at the governance level, as well as at the level of the 
citizens.‖
396
 A second example was that of civil society activism against the lack of 
transparency and accountability surrounding the allocation of US$350 million to ―Aldeia 
Nova‖, a small project based in Waco Kungo (Kwanza Sul province) and aimed at 
integrating 800 families who fled from the community during the civil war. The allocation 
of government funding was supposed to be in support of small scale farming and the 
diversification of the economy. But civil society organisations questioned both ―the 
investment of so much money‖ to such a small group of returnees, and the 
developmental model the project was based on, which in their view, was 
 
―[…] one based on the commune system of the Israelis. We call it ‗intensive 
development zone‘. That is their way of thinking. So, we challenged that and now 
the government is now trying to spread out the benefits.‖
397 
 
A third positive experience came from a project that was adopted in 2009 from Norway‘s 
OfD programme and was funded by the Norwegian Embassy in Luanda which had been 
―motivating civil society organisations to discuss issues of transparency‖
398
. The main 
rationale behind the project was formulated as follows:  
 
―Oil is offshore, and does not directly impact on the way people in Moxico or Lu-
anda conduct their lives, it does not impact directly on the farmers in Malanje. But 
oil belongs to the Angolan people, offshore is part of the Angolan territory. We 
feel that the way the oil money is used is important for the prosperity of Angolans. 
Therefore ADRA and NPA formulated a plan of action to ensure that civil society 
                                                          
396
 Interview with African INGO representative, Luanda, 10 August 2010.   
397
 Ibid.   
398
 Interview with Angolan NGO official, Luanda, 13 August 2010.   
273 
 
organisations are able to have an input in the way that the national budget is pre-
pared, and is monitored, and that is the basics for our oil-for-development pro-
gramme. Now, this is a new thing, because the technocrats who are in govern-
ment still feel that it is their main responsibility to ensure that the money is allo-
cated to different sectors and regions of the country and is none of the business 
of the civil society organisations to question this funding. But I think we are reach-
ing a common ground that after all, civil society organisations are part of this 





The project appears to have impacted on the education reform conducted by the gov-
ernment since 2003, and budget transparency which was taken up by OPSA and ADRA 
following the lack of interest of the Catholic Church in the issue after the 2008 elections. 
In 2013, the allocation of the budget to the education sector increased from US$38 bil-
lion in 2012 to US$78 billion, an increase which Hon. Adão do Nascimento, Angola‘s 
Minister of Higher Education attributed to Angolan CSOs‘ activism during a Chatham 
House meeting in January 2013. For CSOs, this increase would mainly serve to ―in-
crease capacity building efforts and buy materials not only for the teachers, but also for 
the students for more classrooms.‖
400
 The choice of this specific aspect was influenced 
by action research, existing expertise, dialogue with other organisations which took 
place notably during a national conference on the topic, and more importantly, because 
of the challenges persisting in the sector despite government‘s interventions: 
 
―[…] you can find children in grade 6 or 7 without being able to read or write. This 
reform educative says that in each classroom, there must be only up to 35 stu-
dents; that teachers must be trained and be able to teach but you find in classes 
more than 60 students, teachers who are academically prepared but don‘t have 
pedagogical education. So, we saw that the government gives many expectations 
to the populations, saying that things are running well, but when you go to the 




The other aspect of the problem was with budget execution at the Ministry of Education, 
or the fact that: 
 
―[The Ministry of Education] can finish a whole year without receiving the whole 
money [from MINFIN]. Like last year [the government] allocated 10 per cent of 
the budget to the education, but [the Ministry] didn‘t receive it all. So we have 
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been undertaking this project to involve more people, at least listening to the ide-




A third challenge emanates from the government‘s approach to the reforms, that is, the 
fact that the project ―comes from up to down: When you talk to the teachers, they say 
that they don‘t know anything about this project. This is a project which was drawn by 
other people and given to the teachers to implement. This is one of the reasons why this 
strategy is not working perfectly.‖
403
 To go about its activism, civil society engaged gov-
ernment officials in projects: 
 
―When we are doing a project, we send them a letter explaining the nature of the 
project and asking for two or three people to work with us in the drawing of the 
project. We think that this is best way of doing advocacy rather than the type of 
advocacy which involves people boxing all the time. We try to do things with 
them, essentially within the network we call ‗Education for all Coalition‘ which our 
organisation is a member of. Maybe this is how to develop the discussion on 
transparency. We always do our best to work with mass media, the radio, news-
papers; we also use meetings with MPs, with ministries, and also involve mem-




Besides this account of the actions, actors and processes contributing and driving re-
forms in the education sector, several interlocutors highlighted the work of ADRA and 
OPSA - a group of prominent members of civil society, MPs and a constitutional judge - 
on budget transparency, which as described in Chapter 8, draws from the Catholic 
Church‘s advocacy on the matter. Since 2010, this collaborative work has produced five 
policy papers examining specific aspects of the national budget, including budget alloca-
tion to social sectors (education, health, agriculture). In December 2009, the author was 
told that this group organised a seminar just before the approval of the national budget 
to ―comment and give our own vision‖ on the budget
405
. According to this source, the 
idea was ―for everybody to understand that it is the rightful duty of the citizens especially 
represented by the civil society organisations, to say something about the budge; that it 
is kind of a patrimony that belongs to Angolans.‖
406
 The coalition is said to have net-
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works of community organisations on the ground that are ―monitoring the projects that 




Work on budget transparency is particularly illuminating as it gives credence to the au-
thor‘s theory that the problem with ORT in Angola has been one of local resonance with 
the idea particularly due to its complexity and focus on oil, a substance whose monitor-
ing by the people and some of the country‘s governors brings several challenges. In-
deed, these are the very points that this next source highlighted in his account of how 
and why incremental and progressive changes were possible through work on the budg-
et rather than oil:   
 
―When that understanding [about the challenging operating environment] 
gradually sank in a few years ago, I started changing my focus much more to 
budget politics; it is much easier for civil society organisations to influence things, 
and it also offers better and simpler tools for them to use in this regard... I mean, 
it was not easy, but it was definitely easier than oil because with oil you have 
access to nothing! Sonangol is just very close and you don‘t have access to it...  
For the budget stuff, it has been a gradual process because at the beginning 
there was very little information available. It is also something that has to go to 
the National Assembly so you can do your work well enough; you can define 
members of parliaments that would be willing to share the budget report with you. 
For example, for many years there was a problem that the budget proposal was 
not made public and it was not made public when it was handed to the National 
Assembly. It was still not considered public and so, it was difficult to get access to 
it. When you search, get to know the right people, it is actually possible to get 
access to these things.  
There are also just simple things you can do with budget work: you can look at 
the expenditure side, you can quite easily find figures on how much goes to 
education, and it is quite easy for an organisation to say that it is really silly that 
we spend only 6 per cent of public money on education, and 15 per cent on 
national security, or whatever it is...  
The research is not too complicated. You can look at accessibility and 
transparency of the budget transparency... For example, we participated in the 
Open Budget Survey, and I think the first time we did that was way back in 2006. 
It was unheard of to do work like that in Angola but it was actually pretty easy 
because for most of the questions I could say no because it was not accessible. 
So, it was a pretty easy piece of research, but the findings were very strong 
because it continued to push, or rather it pushed the ministry of finance on ‗why is 
this not public? It really is unbelievable that Angola is the only country in the 
world where the executive budget proposal is not made public. Why is that? And 
it can save you I don‘t know how many points of this ranking if you made it 
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available and it is not a secret document anyway‘. Everybody knows that you can 




Finally, one could not discuss the role of civil society in governance and transparency 
without referring to the DFID-funded LUPP project. Whereas the foregoing projects took 
place during this postwar period, the story of LUPP is one of the most important and in-
sightful in the history of civil society participation in governance due to (a) its approach to 
the ―creation of ‗spaces‘ for community dialogue and for citizen-state exchange‖ (Care 
2006: 20); and (b) the broader lesson emerging from the project, that: 
 
―[…] you don‘t have to wait for peace or democracy. You can and are able to 
evolve expectations and practices around the issues of transparency, accounta-
bility and governance. If you develop those expectations over time, people expect 
that not only of water communities but more broadly. But as much as having 
more transparent and accountable approaches to governance within that com-
munity, of the provision and development of that community water, at the same 
time you have a process of developing more expectations more generally of 




From a project that evolved organically in Luanda‘s neighbourhood committees and was 
organised by citizens around the provision of access to basic services such as water and 
health in the early 1990s, LUPP had become a major influence on the discourse and 
politics around participatory planning and governance by 2010.  In spite of an overall 
democratic deficit in the country, it generated ―upwards pressure that citizens, organisa-
tions and networks should be involved in this process [of service delivery and govern-
ance].‖
410
 It is widely cited as the main origin of the Law on Local Organs of State (Law 
2/07) that was listed in Chapter 4 as one reform initiative of utmost relevance to resource 
governance in Angola. Another achievement, according to this informant, was the rheto-
ric around the campaign against urban poverty. As he recalled: 
 
―From 2002-2008, a whole range of incredible events. 2 years running on UN day 
against poverty, there were big events in the national parliament saying that ur-
ban poverty is a bad thing and of course we are all against it […]. So, the lan-
guage that came up at that time, the campaign against poverty, some issues to 
do with accountability, the commitment to the jobs, the commitment to the famous 
million houses, came out of that sort of  process. Not exclusively but there were 
enough people involved at the local and through the MPLA, through the commit-
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tees and so on who felt it completely essential because you had national assem-
blies of water committees at that time.‖
411 
 
Although LUPP was initially ―designed by DFID‖ (Earle 2011: 15), its leverage was pos-
sible due to its unified message, strong marketing to national and international audienc-
es, inclusivity of community residents, but above all, great government receptivity. The 
previous interviewee recalled, for example, the involvement of ―local government officials 
who are very frustrated; don‘t have resources; who feel personal embarrassment and 
upset that they can‘t provide what they feel they should be doing and are happy to work 
in partnerships.‖
412
 In short, as a 2006 report remarks: 
―LUPP leverage has been possible because of the perception of LUPP as a na-
tional (Angolan) rather than international programme. This has facilitated en-
gagement with GoA, enabling a lack of defensiveness on its part and a more 
ready acceptance of new ideas. This is particularly important in the post-conflict 
context when the government is having to shift gear, change the culture of gov-
ernment to adapt to a peace-time administration, to focus on service delivery, 
and, in particular, engage with and adopt new ideas and skills‖ (Care 2006: 11-
12).  
 
In sum, in spite of the challenges that civil society faces in Angola, these positive experi-
ences prove that they have not been passive recipients of international norms but rather, 
that they sought to localise these norms in their own ways, so as to make them relevant 
to their circumstances and context. It is believed that these arenas of increased civil so-
ciety activism can serve as indicators to the possible windows of opportunity that may 
exist for civil society and citizens to influence public policy and effect change. The 
broader lessons from both these experiences and the limitations of the global ORT cam-
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―Truth often fails to lead to Justice.‖  
Fox (2007: 663). 
 
 
―Honesty and transparency make you vulnerable. Be 




Almost fifteen years after the first call for the global oil industry to embrace full 
transparency in Angola, many observers continue to qualify Angola as ―non-reformist‖ 
and inherently corrupt.  The overwhelming view is that set out by Christine Messiant, that 
changes taking place are merely ―cosmetic changes‖ to disguise the regime‘s true nature 
(quoted in Vidal 2009: 6). Even some large IOCs have argued that legislative measures 
to force them to disclose oil data should exceptionally exempt their operations in Angola 
primarily because, as they argue, Angolan legislation does not allow for such 
disclosures. Interestingly, this ―non-reformist‖ attitude is measured by Angola‘s notable 
absence from EITI. These perceptions are typical of assessments of Angola‘s ORT 
practices in Angola which have centred mostly on the ―operationalisation‖ of 
transparency as ―information availability‖ (Christensen and Cheney 2013: 1), framing 
them around information discrepancies and corruption scandals deemed to prove that 
ORT is not only effective, but that it might in fact produce other types of opacity in the oil 
industry and beyond.  
 
The purpose herein was not to dispute these arguments but on the contrary to examine 
them in some depth so as to get close to the truth or truths about the rise and effects of 
the transparency turn in the Angolan oil industry. To be more specific, this doctoral 
research aimed to lift the lid on the transparency ‗black box‘ by studying how ORT 
reforms have been implemented in postwar Angola, what the motivations for this 
institutionalisation is, what its outcomes are, and the possible explanations behind these 
effects. The author sought to achieve this goal by scrutinising the content of the ORT 
reform agenda implemented throughout this postwar period and providing a critical 
analysis of their implementation so as to appreciate the type of transparency that is at 
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play in the country. Ultimately, this analysis necessitated that one looks closer at the 
roles that key ―insider‖ and ―outsider‖ proponents (Acharya 2004, 2012) played in the 
institutionalisation of ORT, as an alternative to the predominantly statist analyses that 
underpin the literature.  
 
The second objective was to investigate the assumptions and principal normative 
rationales underpinning the current transparency turn in the oil industry, globally and 
locally; and the third, to evaluate what outcomes these policies have led to so far, and 
lay out the possible reasons that might help explain them. Hence more than identifying 
the possible drivers working in favour or against reforms, and solely undertaking an 
analysis of transparency as information, the study adopted Gupta and Mason‘s (2014) 
approach by (a) showing how the normative rationales identified intersected with one 
another so as to condition the design, shape and record of specific policies; and (b) 
exploring whether and the extent to which ORT informs, empowers and improves the 
conditions that seem to be causing the so-called ‗resource curse‘. The questions, 
therefore, were: who does ORT inform and about what? Who does it empower, and 
how? And what does ORT actually improve? It was a matter of building on the empirical 
data generated through this examination of ORT in Angola so as to draw broader 
conclusions on the difficulties of operationalising ORT more broadly.  
 
Previous chapters contain findings that are relevant to all these issues and it will not be 
appropriate to repeat them all here. This concluding chapter specifically deals with this 
last objective. Precisely, it aims to answer the foregoing questions by summarising key 
findings regarding Angola‘s institutionalisation of ORT and elaborating on transparency‘s 
main limitations and uncertainties. As the chapter concludes, these shortcomings call 
forth a re-examination of how the potential of transparency can be harnessed in the oil 
industry so as to bring about transformative changes to the countries and societies 
suffering from the pathologies of oil extraction in the developing world.  The last section 
suggests two things: (1) the (re)building of broader coalitions in which civil society are 
included and meaningfully contributing to the debate and practice of ORT; and (2) 
placing materiality at the forefront of this effort, that is, materiality of the information 






MAKING SENSE OF ANGOLA‟S ORT MODEL 
 
Before debating what the uncertainties, limitations and pitfalls of ORT are, one must 
begin by making sense of the transparency turn in the global and domestic oil industry. 
On the origins of ORT globally, the thesis indicated that besides the policy research on 
the resource curse, the mainstreaming of this reformist agenda in the petroleum industry 
was facilitated by the increasing scrutiny of the conduct and policies of international 
actors, notably IOCs and IFIs, as well as the rise of the good governance and anti-
corruption agendas onto the international stage and in the energy arena. The latter was 
very much facilitated by the mainstreaming of anti-corruption values into the core of the 
World Bank activities and the recognition of the interrelation between oil activities, 
conflicts, corruption and poverty by, among others, savvy norm entrepreneurs who 
pushed through transparency as the key strategy for improving oil governance. As 
explained in Chapter 2, these changes occurred at a time of widespread realisation that 
current global issues require a holistic approach to problem-solving, hence, the 
contribution of a wide array of stakeholders and resources. 
 
Angola, SSA‘s second largest oil producer, provided the context for global demands for 
ORT. ―It is hard to find an example of a country that has misused its oil revenues to such 
a great extent; maybe Nigeria‖ in SSA where there was great interest generated by oil 
companies
413
. Previously a poster child of the resource curse, a typical case of an oil 
kleptocracy and the site of international experiments for neoliberals to bring about peace 
and development, Angola is somewhat unique in that despite being a key case around 
which this and other revenue transparency standards developed, it has undertaken a 
series of homegrown reforms independently of global standards such as EITI. Chapter 4 
demonstrated that Angola‘s expression of ORT deals with a wider set of issues such as 
the availability of information related to revenues inflow, the availability of budget 
information and beneficial ownership – though ironically, key public officials are exempt 
from producing relevant information under this last component, and the information 
released is not destined for public consumption. These measures are completed by 
assurances of integrity through validation from external ‗experts‘ as well as the 
implementation of other oft-cited transparency initiatives such as the setting up of the oil 
fund, FSDEA.  In this sense, thus, the claim that Angola‘s non adherence to the EITI 
framework is reflective of its level of commitment to transparency is unfounded. 
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This postwar reform agenda is a consequence of internal logics and contradictions. As 
many observe, it lies at the intersection of two main rationales, one of which is reputation 
building. This is reflective of a shift in elites‘ worldviews and interests; put simply, it 
denotes their ―adherence to a global free-market worldview‖, but also represents ―an 
interest-based conformity founded on fear that nationalist policies would bring 
punishment by international financial markets [even though] the extent of the over-
conformity suggests an irreducible element of ideological conversion‖ (Chang and Evans 
2005: 29). The second rationale as detailed in Chapter 9 is control of power - mostly but 
not solely through control of the oil sector - in order to maximise its rewards so as to 
preserve elite‘s monopoly over the state and society.  
 
Two important features of this model are noteworthy. The first is the diversity and identity 
of information authors: from oil companies, to IFIs, and government agencies. It is 
remarkable, for instance, that a powerful agency like Sonangol which was previously 
considered ―anti-reformer‖ has taken up the ORT reform agenda; while MINFIN, 
previously the ―weaker‖ agency, has essentially become the main ―insider proponent‖ of 
the transparency agenda (Chapter 4). This shift in attitudes, practices and positioning 
would suggest that even institutions are subject to change. And contrary to the belief 
that states mainly have the power to obstruct or that ―they are the problem and not the 
solution‖ (Bieckman 2012: 4), these shifts insinuate that power may not only be used to 
resist transparency, but may also be used by powerful actors to define transparency and 
steer its development in specific ways and directions (Meijer 2012). The second notable 
feature - which one may associate with the homegrown nature of Angola‘s ORT agenda 
the Angolan ORT model but actually reflects a wider concern with of the implementation 
of ORT initiatives as the discussion of EITI in Chapter 2 shows - is the minimal input of 
civil society. The chapter will return to the role of civil society at a later stage in the 
chapter. 
 
Saying that Angola undertakes reforms on its own terms is not the same as implying that 
it is completely immune to external pressure. The point is that one should not 
overestimate the role that external actors can play in these reform processes. For 
instance, how can one prove that Changes in Sonangol‘s transparency practices were 
influenced by the IMF? These innovations no doubt coincided with the implementation of 
the SBA, which gives the impression that they were influenced by the IMF. However, 
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that remains to be proved especially given the existence of other sources of funding and 
the fact that the context within which this IMF-monitored programme was implemented – 
in the midst of a financial crisis – was not entirely new to the Angolans. In fact, the 
author would rather interpret these changes as a mere statement of intent and an 
expression of the fact that the Angolan regime was ready to change, more than as a 
consequence of IMF pressure.  
 
The point about Sonangol and the IMF‘s leverage brings to the fore one theme 
particularly relevant to the investigation into reform drives: that is the timing of 
implementation of transparency policies.  In Angola, Chapter 4 demonstrates that 
international oil prices are a determining factor in the uptake of reforms. The deepening 
of the reform agenda during the period from 2009-2013 corroborates this point, so does 
the signing of the SBA in November 2009. Political crises too are an important driver of 
reforms as indicated by the links between the US Senate investigations and the adoption 
of LAP in 2010 in Chapter 6. Besides timing, however, there is a broader sense that the 
pace at which reforms take place, and the design of the reforms itself, is equally dictated 
by broad uncertainties about the uses of transparency and domestic implications of 
greater openness; a point that is worth expanding on.  
 
UNCERTAINTIES AND LIMITATIONS OF ORT  
 
That there are uncertainties surrounding the uses of ORT in Angola is hardly surprising. 
This is a country emerging from a long and prolonged civil war characterised by great 
distrust and international interventions, and one during which opacity and lack of 
transparency was used for national security purposes among other things (see Chapter 
3). Indeed, a number of Angolan interviewees insisted that current transparency 
practices should be put in context. They present it as a novel idea, one that needs time 
to be adapted to elites‘ old revolutionary minds, albeit pointing out that the progress 
achieved so far reflects the slow pace and limited extent of this cultural shift.  
 
Worth stressing that the existence of uncertainties extends to other developing countries 
as well. One respondent whose organisation has consistently called on China to adopt 
transparency policies observed that there were great uncertainties in China about EITI, 
in particular, great wariness of domestic implications of exposing discrepancies between 
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revenues and receipts for the country‘s peace and stability
414
. Increasingly, there are 
questions asked of the utility of transparency in prominent EITI-implementing countries 
like Nigeria or Cameroon, because of its politicisation both by domestic and international 
actors. In all, these uncertainties are perhaps more illustrative of actors‘ responses and 
the way in which ORT has been implemented so far than of the policy itself. To 
comprehend this, one needs to consider the origins of these uncertainties, two of which 
are underlined below. 
 
One source of uncertainty resides in the existence or absence of the required capacity to 
undertake what are often technically complex accountancy tasks. In Angola, the reader 
is reminded of the argument by critics that this is merely a question of political will as 
opposed to being a structural issue. However, it is maintained here that the human and 
physical infrastructure necessary for the production and disclosure of key information 
that would have enhanced the effectiveness of specific ORT policies simply did not exist. 
This prompted one source to conclude that:  
 
―In order to have transparency and accountability, you have to have the 
information in the first place. And to have the information, there has to be a 
purpose to generate that information in the first place. And without that, 
sometimes it is just that the information does not exist or it is absolutely not in the 
form that is consistent enough to be shared even if someone wanted.‖
415 
 
As mentioned in the introduction, uncertainties also derive from divergent 
understandings of key values critical to the construction of transparency. Chief among 
these is participatory democracy. Indeed, one of the key features of the past decade of 
data revolution has been the paradox between increased transparency and diminishing 
civil society space, despite the centrality of civil society and a right to know to the 
discourse on ORT. The dissertation abounds with instances where this notion of civil 
society, its purposes and contribution to ORT, triggered conflicts among key 
stakeholders. Chapter 2 referred to it in the discussion on the EITI‘s admission of 
Ethiopia as a Candidate country in spite of civil society warnings that it could not 
reasonably be expected that the Ethiopian civil society would meaningfully participate in 
the initiative once set up. The same chapter pointed to EITI Secretariat‘s alleged 
exclusion of Cameroonian civil society in the decision-making surrounding Cameroon‘s 
validation report in 2010; while Chapter 10 referred to claims of it sidelining Angolan 
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activists with links to the oil service industry
416
. Most significantly, the dissertation 
showed this to be an issue even among civil society itself. This is notable in the big gaps 
that exist between GCS‘s agenda and approaches to ORT – its previous emphasis on 
companies and the revenue side of ORT – and domestic civil society‘s needs and 
interests that centre on government‘s expenditures and accountability (see Chapters 4, 
6, 8 and 10 in particular).  
 
There are other examples that were not included in the previous chapters but are 
nevertheless relevant.  Most notably, the limited participation of civil society has been a 
major source of anxiety for EITI‘s poster project in Azerbaijan, where according to a 
commentator, ―EITI lost Azerbaijani civil society a long time ago though they weren‘t 
ever enthusiastic about EITI.‖
417
 In Angola, ―we did not incorporate very well the 
perspective that CS organisations are part of the monitoring process‖
418
. What is more, 
while up to the 2011 youth protests most external actors were commending the regime 
on transparency, civil society actors and opposition leaders were deploring ―renewed 
social conservatism and social fascism‖ disguised in Angola‘s developmental agenda. 
Another critic argued that the government had ―sophisticated strategies to curve 
democratisation by empowering its elites while infiltrating its people within civil society‖. 





Together, the foregoing patterns underscore the lack of consensus there is on what 
roles civil society should play in this relatively new context, with serious implications for 
the operationalisation of ORT.  Above all, they are a reflection of a lack of understanding 
of the contexts – historical, socio-political, geographical and global - to which ORT 
policies are adopted and applied. In turn, this points to a secondary challenge ORT has 
faced, which is that at its inception it was not based on an appropriate theory of change 
but rather on false assumptions as to what it presumably can achieve as a policy tool.  
 
The theory that oil sector data can lead to civil society empowerment has yet to be 
proved. Critics also query whether transparency can or does address the causes of 
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corruption, and whether transparency should be prioritised at all over other solutions, 
particularly in view of its limitations and unintended consequences. Taking two 
predominant contributions to the idea of institutions as key to avoiding corruption-related 
problems, Kolstad and Wiig (2008:526) observe that ―information is a factor in neither of 
these two studies, and it is therefore not immediately apparent that transparency reform 
should receive priority.‖ In actual fact, these authors noted, ―transparency does not affect 
the extent to which resource abundant countries suffer a resource curse‖ (ibid: 527). 
What is more, the expansion of the norm content - from revenue to contract, beneficial 
ownership, commodity trade and sovereign wealth funds -, it is still uncertain precisely 
what type of transparency can best achieve the challenges at hand.    
 
Ultimately, what ORT can achieve depends on one‘s expectations and perceptions of 
what counts as transparency and what its purposes are. Andrew Barry makes an 
interesting argument:  
 
―The problem with EITI is not that its operation necessarily conceals anything, but 
that it is not expected to reveal much. It does not necessarily hide the truth, but 
leaves a huge amount unsaid. It allows a vast space of discretion: the realm of 
what one chooses not to know, does not investigate, or deliberately overlooks 
[…] But if transparency is rendered so specific in its focus, it is, therefore, also 
achievable‖ (Barry 2013: 18-19).    
 
Another EITI champion stated:  
 
―If you look at the EITI, Iraq just signed up, Afghanistan just signed up, and 
Indonesia might sign up. So, the numbers are increasing, not decreasing. I think 
it is easy to criticise something but it has a modest impact. It keeps attention to 
the right set of issues.‖
420
   
 
The problem with this state-centred proposition is twofold. First, what and whom is this 
transparency achievable for? One of the revelations of the past decade - in direct 
contradiction to the ―win-win‖ model that transparency policies are supposedly designed 
to foster - is that ―transparency was never ‗innocent‘ of wider structures of political and 
economic power‖ (Gupta and Mason 2014: 337). This finding reaffirms the imperative to 
consider ORT as a contested political terrain in which on-going conflicts over norms, 
practices and objectives of governance take place (Gupta 2010). Indeed, it comes as no 
surprise that it is investors that are the primary users of the type of information sought 
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and disclosed (Krakenes 2013). Generally speaking, most investors are not fazed by 
Angola‘s absence from EITI, or its poor ranking in corruption and ease of doing business 
surveys. In contrast, they are ―flocking‖ the country, mostly content with seeking out 
lucrative partnerships with ―strongmen of the apparently stable regime‖ (Soares de 
Oliveira 2012: 5). The fall and rise of the price of Cobalt‘s shares following the 
announcement of SEC‘s investigations (Chapter 5) certainly does not give the 
impression of international markets worries about this subject. Further, Angola‘s good 
credit rating scores show that for all the alleged corruption scandals it is linked to, it 
remains a viable place to do business.   
 
ORT has benefited other external actors too. By disclosing oil sector data on a project-
by-project basis, companies like Statoil can enhance their international reputation whilst 
avoiding more difficult questions, say, about its investments in a country like Angola that 
is prone to corruption - which incidentally it is currently facing in Norway.  By reaffirming 
the GoA‘s explanations of the US$32 billion missing from Angola‘s public finances, the 
IMF was allowed to go unchecked even though as GCS actors stressed, this occurred 
under its watch. Likewise, according to one senior IFI representative, ―in Nigeria, people 
are asking: we are EITI compliant, how come we have US$10 billion missing?‖
421
 Finally, 
it goes without saying that several GCS actors made their reputations out of ‗exposing‘ 
corruption and pushing for ORT globally and locally.  
 
The preceding expose helps make the point about power imbalances and conflicts that 
ORT can create. Beyond conflicts, ―the double-sided nature of transparency reminds us 
that often we do not know what we are missing. So, it is difficult to know what to ―ask 
for,‖ […] because we take it for granted in looking beyond‖ (Christensen and Cheney 
2013: 16). As a matter of fact, the thesis has shown how the information released was at 
times less relevant and useful than the context or identity of information senders to the 
understanding of the intricacies of the reform process. In other cases as with the 
information on oil receipts disclosed by various Angolan agencies (Chapter 4), or with 
the IMF‘s explanations of the whereabouts of the US$32 billion gap that occurred 
between 2007 and 2010 (Chapter 6), the information in question even engendered 
greater distrust of the message and messengers. This point about unintended 
consequences of transparency‘s rise in popularity has been made with regard to EITI as 
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well, with one senior analyst suggesting that the MSI ―has caused more harm than good‖ 
principally because ―it has shifted the resource curse debate to the issue of transparency 
and corruption.  Whilst indeed an important ‗branch‘ of the argument, it certainly is not 
the only reason why resource-rich countries are poor.‖
422 
 
In sum, therefore, ―transparency is hard to do‖; whereas it lets information users see 
streams of facts, it neither conveys any understanding of their meaning, nor does it 
always enable them to act upon them (Florini 1999: 3). Assuming that emphasising 
specific issues is the answer to making transparency work as Barry seems to suggest, 
what issue(s) then are we to focus on? On this question again, Angola does provide 
some clues which are examined further below. 
 
HARNESSING THE POTENTIAL OF TRANSPARENCY FOR OIL-LED 
DEVELOPMENT 
 
It should be clear that though transparency matters, full transparency is simply an 
illusion for the reasons underlined throughout the thesis and again in the previous 
section. This conclusion is best summed up by Drucker and Gumpert (2007: 493) who 
remark that ―transparency, the opposite of opacity, is a worthy but unobtainable ideal in 
the social relationships of people, the workplace, and between governments and the 
governed.‖ Over the past decade, this illusion of transparency has been fostered by ―an 
ever-growing environment of informational access often bleeding into the realm of 
overload and message saturation‖ and ―an ever-growing presence of press coverage of 
the governors, institutions and business coupled with more sophisticated use of media 
technologies to make organisations appear more accessible‖ (ibid). But whilst 
transparency benefited the powerful - governments, IOCs, investors, GCS and IFIs - the 
most, in many cases it alienated citizens who are the alleged primary beneficiaries of 
this policy.  
 
Today, the policy and its promoters find themselves at a critical juncture, with growing 
calls to align transparency policies with the expectations of resource-rich developing 
countries‘ citizens, young and old. The question currently facing advocates is how 
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extractives sector transparency specifically can be made to work for both information 
users and senders so as to deliver real tangible changes for societies suffering from the 
pathologies associated with the resource curse. In answering this question, it suffices to 
start by re-examining existing approaches so as to gauge their appropriateness and 
allow the reader to make an informed assessment about the possible way(s) ahead. 
Precisely, the multidirectionality of the demand and supply of ORT imparts on one the 
responsibility to assess the appropriateness of home state regulation which has been 
PWYP‘s recommended option; as well as those preferred by governments and IFIs, 
namely, EITI and technical assistance. It should be clear by now what the main limits of 
EITI are and so these will not be repeated here. Instead, what follows is an examination 
of extraterritorial legislation and IFIs‘ technical assistance.     
 
Take the case of home state legislation, the Dodd Frank Act specifically. Some 
advocates argue that although not a ―silver bullet‖, this type of regulation has a critical 
and unique role to play in addressing corporate behaviour in the extractive industries 
because it can (a) employ a range of mechanisms to incentivize, facilitate and/or coerce 
compliance; (b) act as a catalyst for other states to develop similar regulation; and so (c) 
contribute to development of international consensus for a global legal response 
(Simons and Macklin 2014). Others insist that the Act cannot deter more complex forms 
of oil sector corruption such as those witnessed lately in Angola and the global South 
more generally. In one source‘s view, ―this is a common misconception. The [Dodd 
Frank Act] covers the disclosure of basically visible payments from oil companies to 
governments‖ and it would not cover ―equity structures that have become more complex 
than old-school bribery.‖
423
 Nor would it address oil companies‘ manipulation of oil sector 
employment rules as detailed in Chapter 7. One leading Angolan transparency 
campaigner who has publicly shown his support for the Act privately also opined that it 
will have no impact in Angola simply because ―this is a global world and as long as there 
are interests playing around, you know, people will still find a way to compromise things.‖  
This interlocutor stressed that good resource governance in Angola ―will not depend on 
the American Senate or House of Commons. It will depend on whether and how the 
Angolan people demand of the government more transparency, more accountability, 
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For IOCs and some GCS actors, the problem with the Dodd Frank Act lies in its 
coverage and authority. Jean-Francois Lassalle, Total‘s Vice-President of Public Affairs, 
contested the Act only 6 per cent of the world‘s total oil and gas reserves whereas EITI 
covers 15 per cent of reserves.  Lassalle also argued that the Act‘s extraterritoriality 
creates conflicts between home states and host states laws and does not respect the 
sovereignty of the latter; that it is inappropriate in an international environment in which 
Western companies are competing ―with open card‖ with Asian firms not registered on 
stock exchanges; and that it targets companies already applying good governance 
principles and strong codes of conduct
425
. One legal expert who advises various IOCs 
operating in Angola also cited the difficulty that emanates from having ―a regulator from 
a common law jurisdiction imposing a common law perspective to companies that 
operate in common jurisdiction but also operate in civil law countries, and in 
geographical areas that are different culturally and legally‖ such as Russia, the Middle 
East, Africa.
426
 In sum, as one Western scholar queried, ―to make [ORT] mandatory 
under whose authority would it be under?‖
427 
 
A third challenge with this mandatory approach is one that goes at the heart of the 
fundamental issue of onus of disclosure. Indeed, one of the greatest omissions in the 
thinking and practice of ORT have been domestic constituencies‘ expectations on who 
the onus of disclosure should lie. In Angola, the position clearly is that this responsibility 
should above all fall on the government for reasons set out in Chapter 7, including 
perceptions on who owns the country‘s natural resources. It is also the case that this 
approach only has a minimal effect on government accountability, which has been the 
real challenge of resource governance including in Angola. As the last informant noted, 
 
―Some people in the PWYP coalition say that it is companies that should be 
required by British law, or US law to disclose every payment that they make. I 
think it is good, but it does not get what you and I are working on which is really 
what governments are doing, and which I think is more important because it is 
governments that decide whether development is served or not. So, it is time to 
focus on what governments do or not and the fact is that you cannot really force 
them to sign up to anything. That is what the World Bank has tried to do with 
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conditionality but it does not work; it is not going to work with a country like 
Angola.‖
428
   
 
Likewise, the jury is still out on whether providing technical assistance is the best 
approach to achieve transformative change. One opinion is that using IFIs‘ high levels of 
technical expertise is an important entry point, as it can help identify where 
improvements are needed and induce change from within government
429
. In short, so 
this argument goes with regard to Angola, ―the only meaningful way to engage the GoA 
is via technical assistance [...] which is not frontloaded by package of conditionalities 
(e.g. human rights).‖ Conditionalities ―can be brought in at a later stage in ways that do 
not solicit the opposite effect from the GoA‖ (Govender and Skagestad 2009: 25 citing 
an Angolan civil society representative). In fact, promoters of this stance argue that the 
World Bank should tread carefully between providing technical assistance to the 
government and discussing civil society space nationally, and even that it should avoid 




A counter-view to such a cautionary approach is that the deployment of technical 
capacity building tools ―does not guarantee influencing the direction that the revenues 
flow or even how they are accounted for‖ (Govender and Skagestad 2009: 25). Besides, 
while the Bank should recognise the depth of its technical expertise, it must equally be 
useful in the coordination, operational support and funding of CSOs. Currently, the bulk 
of its funding of civil society work appears to be going to three main organisations - 
namely, EITI International Secretariat, RWI and PWYP - but must be extended to 
developing countries‘ civil society organisations in order to help expand civil society 
space in those countries
431
.  What is more, this approach runs the risk of being 
perceived as non-engagement with more pressing issues on the ground. For example, 
Norway has been accused of using its institutional support to MINPET to avoid 
addressing human rights violations in the region. Put bluntly, ―now that they are 
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interested in business, human rights no longer exist […]. They are not really interested in 




Fung and colleagues (2007: 11) insist that the effectiveness of transparency policies is 
heavily dependent on whether and the extent to which they are ―user-centred‖ - that is, 
focused on the needs, interests and capacities of both information users and disclosers 
– and gain in use, accuracy and scope over time. Nowadays, campaigners are calling for 
a systemic shift from responsibility to accountability which should no doubt include that 
of external actors who continue to play a key role in the institutionalisation of 
transparency in developing countries, but whose efforts do not receive the attention it 
deserves as of yet. In addition, the position here is that for transparency to work for all 
stakeholders and indeed gain in use, accuracy and scope, there needs to be a two-
pronged strategy that centres on: (1) the (re)building of broader coalitions in which civil 
society plays a central role in the policy in question; and (2) placing materiality at the 
forefront of any effort aimed at tackling governance challenges.  
 
The point about coalitions is not novel. Most development analysts agree that effective 
and developmental states can only be created and sustained when there are inclusive 
coalitions supporting its institutional arrangements (see for example Leftwich 2008). The 
point that the author would like to emphasise here is the need for a systemic shift from 
institutions to agents. That does not mean that institutions no longer matter, but rather 
that when institutions are encouraged, one must get beyond the traditional view of 
―institutions as constraints‖ and focus instead on ―institutions as devices which enable 
the achievement of goals requiring supra-individual coordination and, even more 
important, which are constitutive of the interests and worldviews of economic actors‖ 
(Chang and Evans 2005: 2).  
 
But this should not only be about state actors, even though as some respondents have 
argued, development is conditioned by what these actors do. The analysis of the 
institutionalisation of ORT in Angola showed that the global ORT movement was 
previously limited mainly by (a) the lack of interest in and resonance of ORT; (b) lack of 
capacity of governed and governors; and (c) the absence of ‗trusted messengers‘ or the 
fact that all key messengers – governments, IOCs, IFIs and GCS - suffered from 
legitimacy shortfalls and as a result have not been trusted by developing countries‘ 
                                                          
432
 Interview with an Angolan Protestant Pastor, Yaoundé, 18 August 2010.  
292 
 
citizens.  And increasingly, perceptions of GCS actors abandoning their emancipatory 
goals and search for dignified justice and what this entails (cf. Quak 2012: 13; 
Bieckmann 2012); or of IOCs contributing to the entrenchment of the pervasive culture of 
opacity in the oil industry; or again of IFIs and EITI cosying up to governments and 
companies, are leading to a myriad of citizens-led initiatives demonstrating the 
awakening - and in some cases reawakening - of the citizenry. If anything, as suggested 
elsewhere (Mouan 2014), these various expressions of citizenship underscore the 
urgency to put citizens and their needs at the centre of the thinking and practice of 
transparency and development more broadly.    
 
It remains the case that international actors have a critical role to play - as LUPP 
demonstrates - even in the most contested and highly complex, non-democratic settings 
like Angola. As explained in Chapter 10, the award-winning DFID-sponsored programme 
was one of the catalysts for change in Angola. It helped develop the expectation of 
active citizenship, create spaces for public debate and consultation, and facilitate the 
emergence of political accountability, citizen empowerment and the formation of new 
leaders in anticipation of future democratically elected municipal councils. That it did 
proved that a positive interaction and alliance between various domestic and 
international actors – local government, political parties, citizens, DFID and INGOs – is 
possible, and that it can enhance participative processes starting from the base in the 
community and moving upwards.  
 
The second ingredient for success is inextricably linked to the first one, and like its 
predecessor necessitates further research. As indicated earlier in the chapter, it refers to 
materiality of the information sought and released as well as materiality of the resource 
being governed, which in this case is oil. If one should ask of the previous topic whether 
EITI and PWYP are the right models to harness the potential of extractive industry 
transparency, and whether and how they could be sustained, on this topic, the 
fundamental question is: if the information released so far has informed and empowered 
already powerful actors, and if civil society empowerment is the ultimate goal of 
transparency, what do we know about the information that may be of relevance to this 
civil society? To return to Barry‘s (2013) note on the focus on one issue, what issue then 
are we to emphasise if revenue transparency limits opportunities to tackle the core of the 
problem? Should the same issue or subject matter apply to both the oil and mining 
sector? If not, what would be best suited for each sector? Is beneficial ownership, 
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transparency of commodity trading or budget transparency the answer? In short, it is 
critical that one begins to ask not just whether transparency works (see Gillies and Heuty 
2011), but in which area and for what purposes.     
 
In this respect, the thesis showed transparency to have some incremental effects on a 
variety of areas such as budget reporting and beneficial ownership. In fact, one of the 
biggest lessons from the institutionalisation of oil sector transparency in Angola came 
from Cobalt‘s partnership with Nazaki and that is not solely because it exemplified the 
limits of home state legislation (see Chapter 5). As a matter of fact, this case 
demonstrates the limits of extraterritorial legislation up to a point. Precisely, it shows that 
extraterritorial legislation has a big impact on who gets into the Angolan oil industry, and 
in the offshore ultra-deep waters more than anywhere else. Western oil firms that 
dominate these types of plays – due to their significant capital investment and know-how 
– are increasingly risk-averse and reputation-conscious in part because of growing 
regulatory pressures. These reputational concerns, in turn, may explain why they are 
more cautious about investing their hard earned cash on acquiring companies such as 
Cobalt that seem to have a lot of potential but are also tarnished by corruption scandals. 
Industry experts suspect that Cobalt itself may not have enough cash flow to move from 
exploration to production, nor do Chinese companies possess the expertise necessary 
to operate in these complex plays. In all, doubts over the financing of Cobalt and its 
dominance of the pre-salt play in Angola – with its three blocks and five well discoveries 
so far (see Chapter 5) – create uncertainties not only around the future and reputation of 
the Angolan oil industry as a major oil province, but most significantly, for Angola‘s 
developmental model, which is heavily reliant on its successful offshore oil industry.   
 
In the past, moments of uncertainty have led the Angolan petro-elites to seek pragmatic 
solutions that could help them wither the impacts of external shocks. That was the case 
during the 1980s economic crisis when Sonangol was forced to start mortgaging the 
country‘s future oil in order to access the financing that secured the country‘s functioning 
during the civil war. In the end, it is probable that this same pragmatism and the need to 
sustain the flow of oil revenues trump any short-term aspiration for accumulation of 
private wealth in the short- to medium term.     
 
Beyond the economics of the oil industry, the thesis detailed how elites‘ control of and 
dependence on offshore oil influenced the ORT reform process notably by (a) limiting 
294 
 
interactions between and taming the responses of diverse stakeholders; and (b) 
influencing the emergence of the budget transparency movement in Angola. By 
reaffirming the centrality of oil‘s materiality to contemporary hydrocarbon politics, and its 
influences on oil policy on transparency, this finding underlines the value in 
reconsidering ―just how oil‘s materiality matters and is ‗locally‘ appreciated‖ in Africa, 
global policy circles and various fields of social science (Weszkalnys 2013: 280). 
Tackling this question at the current juncture would make a substantial contribution to 
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APPENDIX 1: SELECTED LIST OF INTERVIEWS AND COMMUNICATIONS 
1. Interview with Angolan journalist and rights activist, Oxford, 16 March & 18 June 
2009. 
2. Interview with senior transparency campaigner via Skype, 3 June 2009. 
3. Telephone interview with senior Western IOC adviser, 21 July 2009. 
4. Interview with Late senior Western rights activist, London, 24 July 2009. 
5. Interview with Angolan asylum seeker, Coventry, 5 August 2009. 
6. Interview with senior African China-Africa analyst, Stellenbosch, 7 August 2009. 
7. Telephone interview with former Western IOC vice-president, 23 September 2009 
& 2 February 2010. 
8. Interview with Western scholar and former World Bank consultant, Cambridge, 1 
March 2010 & 5 June 2010.  
9. Telephone interview with Western university lecturer, 23 February 2010. 
10. Personal communication with EITI International Secretariat insider, 7 April 2010. 
11. Interview with African doctoral researcher and China-Africa analyst via Skype, 7 
April 2010.  
12. Interview with senior Western journalist and writer, Coventry, 9 April 2010 & 16 
November 2011.  
13. Telephone interview with former Western EITI Board member (investor), 26 April 
2010.  
14. Interview with Cameroonian accountant, Coventry, 3 July 2010. 
15. Interview with Nigerian university lecturer and former environmental auditor, Cov-
entry, 5 July 2010.  
16. Interview with senior Angolan NGO director, Luanda, 4 August 2010. 
17. Interview with Angolan university lecturer and rights activist, Luanda, 5 August 
2010. 
18. Interview with Angolan transparency activist and oil service worker, Luanda, 6 
August 2010. 
19. Informal conversation with Angolan university student and CSO official, Luanda, 7 
August 2010. 
20. Informal conversation with Angolan oil service worker and trade unionist, Luanda, 
8 August 2010 & 28 July 2012. 
21. Informal conversation with Angolan civil servant and CSO activist, Luanda, 8 Au-
gust 2010. 
22. Informal conversation with Angolan oil service worker, Luanda, 8 August 2010. 
23. Interview with Angola consultant, CJP, Luanda, 10 August 2020 & 21 January 
2013.  
24. Interview with Angolan extractives sector analyst, CJP, Luanda, 10 August 2010. 
25. Interview with African INGO development programme manager, Luanda, 10 Au-
gust 2010. 
26. Interview with Angola UN programme officer, Luanda, 12 August 2010. 
27. Interview with Angolan civil servant and former CRTC executive, Luanda, 13 Au-
gust 2010. 
28. Interview with Western Doctoral Researcher, Luanda, 13 August 2010.  
29. Interview with Angolan Protestant Pastor and former executive of the Inter-
Ecclesial Committee for Peace in Angola (COIEPA), Luanda and Yaoundé, 14 & 
18 August 2010. 
30. Interview with Cameroonian associate coordinator, RELUFA, Yaoundé, 19 Au-
gust 2010. 
31. Interview with Western representative, Service National ―Justice et Paix‖ (SNJP), 
Yaoundé, 19 August 2010. 
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32. Interview with Cameroonian PWYP campaigner, Yaoundé, 19 August 2010.  
33. Telephone interview with OSISA representative, 16 December 2010. 
34. Interview with Cameroonian INGO country director, Yaoundé, 19 August 2010. 
35. Telephone interview with World Bank official, 12 November 2010. 
36. Telephone interview with senior Western transparency campaigner and former 
EITI Board member (civil society), 7 March 2011. 
37. Interview with Western Think tank analyst, London, 31 May 2011. 
38. Telephone interview with senior Western business and human rights analyst, 7 
June 2011.  
39. Interview with Western doctoral researcher and Angola analyst, London, 20 April 
2012.  
40. Personal communication with senior resource governance analyst, 3 May 2012.  
41. Telephone interview with Principal IOC CSR consultant, 21 June 2012.  
42. Interview with Angolan Dominican Priest, London, 5 July 2012. 
43. Interview with senior UNITA representative, London 31 July 2012. 
44. Telephone interview and personal communication with Congolese PWYP cam-
paigner, 29 & 31 August 2012. 
45. Telephone interview with Western lawyer, 3 September 2012.  
46. Telephone interview with senior Western policy analyst, 12 September 2012.  
47. Telephone interview with Angolan legal expert, 5 October 2012. 
48. Interview with former Western diplomat and oil industry insider, London, 12 Octo-
ber & 14 November 2012. 
49. Interview with senior IOC official, London, 14 November 2012. 
50. Informal conversation with senior Angolan diplomat, London, 6 December 2012. 
51. Telephone interview with investigative journalist, 4 January 2013. 
52. Interview with Western reporter, London, 17 January 2013. 
53. Personal communication with senior Western development consultant, 11 & 12 
February 2013. 
54. Interview with senior Western CSO activist and former LUPP insider, London, 18 
February 2013. 
55. Interview with Western INGO country director via Skype, 21 February 2013.  
56. Interview with Nigerian doctoral researcher and former NEITI insider via Skype, 
10 March 2013.  
57. Interview with Western INGO officer, London, 12 April 2013. 
58. Telephone interview with senior Angolan diplomat, 16 May 2013. 
59. Interview with two senior Angolan diplomats, London, 21 May 2013. 
60. Interview with Angolan OSISA representative, London, 17 &18 September 2013. 
61. Informal conversation with senior IOC strategist, London, 18 September 2013. 
62. Personal communication with senior IOC strategy analyst, Statoil 27 Sept 2013 
and 10 October 2013. 
63. Informal conversation with senior INGO analyst, London, 13 June 2013. 
64. Interview with senior Western CSO representative and transparency analyst 
(China), London, 9 July 2014. 
65. Telephone interview with Western transparency analyst (Azerbaijan), 10 July 
2014. 
66. Interview with PWYP campaigner, London, 16 July 2014. 
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